expressing great respect for their talents. In Ethics he blended the principles of Aristotle and Plato. The contemporary of the two former, Samuel Parker,1 bishop of Oxford, criticised the atomistic theory of Descartes, and his proof of the existence of the Deity; and defended theology (whence he derived his proofs of the existence of God) against Atheism.2 One of the most remarkable writers of this age was the physician and preacher John Pordage, who declared himself the decided advocate of a mystical Supernaturalism. He endeavoured to systematize the theosophic enthusiasm of Jacob Böhm (see § 330), and asserted, on the evidence of well-attested facts, that he had been assured of the truth of his theosophic doctrines by special revelation. His pupil Thomas Bromley, disseminated the same notions. The writings of this remarkable man contain some original and ingenious views on the spiritual interpretation of Scripture, as also on the phenomena of apparitions. In France, Pierre Poiret, originally a Cartesian (§ 337), devoted himself altogether to a mystical Supernaturalism, which denied to the mind all independent agency; and declared war against speculative philosophy." A remarkable knot of Mystics appeared in England about this time, including, besides Pordage and Bromley, Jane Lead, a woman of elevated piety and enthusiastic spirituality, who has scattered several luminous thoughts and memorable relations in the midst of the obscurity that generally characterises her style.

1 Died 1688.

2 A Free and Impartial Account of the Platonic Philosophy, Oxford, 1666, 4to. Tentamina Physico-Theologica de Deo, Lond. 1669, 8vo. 1673. Disputationes de Deo et Providentia, Lond. 1678, 4to. 3 Born about 1625; died in London 1698.

4 Die Lehre des Deutschen Philosophen Jacob Böhm, 1844.

5 Metaphysica Vera et Divina, Francof. et Leips. 1725, 3 vols. 8vo. Sophia, seu Detectio Coelestis Sapientiæ de Mundo interno et externo, Amst. 1699. Theologia Mystica, sive Arcana Mysticaque Doctrina de Invisibilibus, Eternis, etc. non Rationali Arte sed Cognitione Intuitiva descripta, Amst. 1691.

6 See his Sabbath of Rest.

7 De Eruditione Triplici, Solida, Superficiaria et Falsa, Amst. 1629 -1706, 1707, 2 vols. 4to. Fides et Ratio collatæ ac suo utraque loco redditæ adversus Principia Jo. Lockii, Amst. 1707, 8vo. Opera Posthuma, Amst. 1721, 4to., and elsewhere. See § 340, note.

V. Sceptics.

343. Scepticism was propagated in France by two disciples of Le Vayer, Simon Sorbière1 and Simon Foucher (§ 332). The first translated the Sketch by Sextus Empiricus of the Pyrrhonean philosophy (§ 151, bibliogr.). The latter employed himself upon the history of the Academic system (see at the head of § 166), and opposed Scepticism to the speculations of Descartes and Malebranche. On the other hand appeared, as opponents of Scepticism, Peter Mersenne, Martin Schoock (§ 336), and Jean de Silhon. In England the preacher Joseph Glanville endeavoured to moderate by a degree of Scepticism the unbounded extravagancies of Dogmatism, (particularly of the Aristotelians and Descartes), with the hope of promoting the cause of philosophy. He enlarged with ability on the causes of doubt, and applied them to the different departments of science; more particularly, the discoveries in physics effected in his own time. His remarks on Causality, in which he coincides with those of Algazel (§ 258), and appears to have forestalled Hume, deserve especial attention. We do not, says he, detect the existence of any cause immediately by sensational or intuitional perception, but only by mediate representations, and therefore by infe rence, which may be erroneous." Jerome HirnhaymR also

6

1 Born 1615; died at Paris 1670.

* Died 1648.

P. MERSENNE, La Vérité des Sciences contre les Sceptiques, Paris, 1625, 8vo.

3 MART. SCHOOCKII De Scepticismo pars prior, libb. IV, Groning. 1652, 8vo. 4 Died 1666. JEAN SILHON, De la Certitude des Connaissances Humaines, etc. Paris, 1661, 8vo. 5 Died 1680.

6 Jos. GLANVILLE, Scepsis Scientifica, or Confessed Ignorance the Way to Science; in an Essay of the vanity of dogmatizing and confident opinion. With a reply to the exceptions of the learned THOMAS ALBIUS, Lond. 1665, 4to. De Incrementis Scientiarum inde ab Aristotele ductarum, Lond. 1670. HENR. STABIUS has published a Dissertation in answer to the latter work. 7 Scepsis Scient., p. 142.

8 A monk of the order of Præmonstratenses, and Doctor of Theology at Prague; died 1679.

HIERONYMUS HIRNHAYM, De Typho Generis Humani, sive Scientiarum Humaniorum inani ac ventoso tumore, difficultate, labilitate,

allied Scepticism to Supernaturalism. Declaiming with considerable ability against literary presumption, and the arrogance of the learned, and maintaining that all knowledge is delusive, and that every axiom (so esteemed) of Reason had been annulled by Revelation, he insisted that Revelation from God, Supernatural Grace, and an internal Divine illumination, are the only true sources of certain knowledge. His Scepticism led him to recommend an enthusiastic Asceticism.

It may be remarked in general, that about this period Scepticism was called in to support the Catholic religion, whose advocates endeavoured by the use of it to recall Protestants to the pale of the church.*

PROGRESS OF SCEPTICISM IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

I. Sensationalism of Locke.

An Essay concerning the Human Understanding, in four books, Lond. 1690, fol. tenth edition; Lond. 1731, 2 vols. 8vo.

Thoughts on Education, Lond. 1693; Lond. 1732, etc.

Posthumous Works, Lond. 1706. The Works of John Locke, 1714, 3 vols. fol. third edition, 1727. Collection of Several Pieces of John Locke, Lond. 1720, 8vo.

On his Philosophical System consult:

JEAN LE CLERC, Eloge Historique de feu M. Locke, en avant du tom. I des Euvres Diverses.

TENNEMANN'S Abh. über den Empirismus in der Philosophie, vorzüglich den Lockischen; in d. III. Th. d. Uebersetzung.

Darstellung und Prüfung des Lockischen Sensualsystems, in G. E. SCHULZE'S Kritik der Theoretischen Philosophie, I. B, s. 113; II. B,

s. 1.

CHRISTLIEB GOTTWALD WABST, Diss. (resp. Jo. GODOFR. SCHULER) Jo. Lockii de Ratione Sententias excutit, Viteb. 1714, 4to.

Life of Locke, by LORD KING, 2 vols.

falsitate, jactantia, præsumtione, incommodis et periculis, tractatus brevis in quo etiam vera sapientia a falsa discernitur, et simplicitas mundo contempta extollitus, idiotis in solatium, doctis in cautelam conscriptus, Prag. 1676, 4to.

* The same remark is applicable at the present day with additional force.-ED.

344. John Locke, (born at Wrington near Bristol, 1632, died 1704), renounced the intricacies of Scholastic philosophy for the more congenial study of the classics. The writings of Descartes inspired him with fresh ardour, particularly for the cultivation of Medicine and Metaphysics. He rejected indeed many of his master's notions, more particularly that of Innate Ideas; but was not the less captivated by his love of perspicuity and distinctness. The endless disputations of the learned led him to suspect that they had their origin in an improper use of words and a defective use of conceptions; which he proposed to rectify by ascertaining the grounds and extent of human knowledge, through investigation of the properties of the human understanding. This was the origin of his renowned work on the Human Understanding, by which he justly acquired the greatest distinction for the modesty und tolerance of his way of thinking, the clearness and rectitude of his understanding, evinced in the course of a correspondence with the most accomplished men of his day, and his penetrating acuteness and manly honesty. He so far adopted Bacon's. principles that he pursued the method of experiment and observation, in preference to that of speculation; applying it principally to our inner nature. His method of philosophizing has many advantages, but at the same time some great defects; especially that of avoiding the great obstacles and difficulties in the course of philosophical knowledge instead of directly sounding them by a more radical and a deeper research. Notwithstanding, the opposition which he encountered was not so much the consequence of this radical fault, as of certain deductions from his system. (See § 346, note, and 348, note). By his treatises on Toleration and Education, Locke has rendered indisputable and undisputed services to mankind.

345. Locke's great object and merit, was the investigation of the origin, reality, limits, and uses of knowledge. He contested the hypothesis of Innate Ideas, throwing great light on one side of the question; and endeavoured to prove by an induction which was necessarily incomplete, that all our representations are acquired by experience. The two ultimate sources of all our representations are impressions through the external Senses, and Reflection, or the perception

of the operations of our minds; which has caused his system to be called one of Sensationalism; since he gives even to Reflection the appellation of an Internal Sense. Our representations are partly simple, partly compound: among the first are those of Solidity, Space, Extension, Figure, Motion, Rest: those of Thought and Will: those of Existence, Time, Duration, Power, Enjoyment, and Pain. Our simple notions have an objective, or absolute and independent reality. The soul, like a piece of white paper (tabula rasa), merely receives their impressions through perception, without adding anything thereto of her own. They represent partly primary, partly secondary qualities or properties: among the first are Extension, Solidity, Figure, Number, Movement: among the latter, (which are deduced and derived as the first are direct and original), Colour, Sound, Scent. Compound notions are deduced from simple ones by an activity of the understanding, for instance by Connection, Opposition, Comparison, or Abstraction. The representations so acquired are those of Accident, Substance, and Relation. The understanding either applies Experience and Observation to the formation of compound notions, or by a totally different course, develops simple and absolute ones, such as those belonging to Mathematics and Ethics.

Locke has also suggested some admirable ideas on Language, and the abuses to which it is liable. He defines knowledge to be the perception of the Connection and Agreement or the want of Connection and Disagreement of certain representations, which may be reduced to four sources; Identity or Discrepancy-Relation-Co-existence or necessary connection, and Real Existence. As relates to the mode of this perception, knowledge becomes either Immediate or Mediate: Immediate, if the result of intuition, and Mediate, if produced by demonstration: to these must be added a third class relating to particulars ascertained by sensational cognition, and confined to matters presented to our Senses. It must be remarked, however, that his observations on the limits and use, etc. of knowledge do not penetrate far enough, nor, by any means, exhaust the question: he may even be said to have pronounced judgment upon the

1 Essay, B. IV, ch. I, § 1—3.