Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 2

Front Cover
Kenneth Joseph Arrow, Amartya Sen, Kōtarō Suzumura
Gulf Professional Publishing, 2002 - Social choice
The Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare presents, in two volumes, essays on past and on-going work in social choice theory and welfare economics. The first volume consists of four parts. In Part 1 (Arrovian Impossibility Theorems), various aspects of Arrovian general impossibility theorems, illustrated by the simple majority cycle first identified by Condorcet, are expounded and evaluated. It also provides a critical survey of the work on different escape routes from impossibility results of this kind. In Part 2 (Voting Schemes and Mechanisms), the operation and performance of voting schemes and cost-sharing mechanisms are examined axiomatically, and some aspects of the modern theory of incentives and mechanism design are expounded and surveyed. In Part 3 (structure of social choice rules), the positional rules of collective decision-making (the origin of which can be traced back to a seminal proposal by Borda), the game-theoretic aspects of voting in committees, and the implications of making use of interpersonal comparisons of welfare (with or without cardinal measurability) are expounded, and the status of utilitarianism as a theory of justice is critically examined. It also provides an analytical survey of the foundations of measurement of inequality and poverty. In order to place these broad issues (as well as further issues to be discussed in the second volume of the Handbook) in perspective, Kotaro Suzumura has written an extensive introduction, discussing the historical background of social choice theory, the vistas opened by Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values, the famous "socialist planning" controversy, and the theoretical and practical significance of social choice theory. The primary purpose of this Handbook is to provide an accessible introduction to the current state of the art in social choice theory and welfare economics. The expounded theory has a strong and constructive message for pursuing human well-being and facilitating collective decision-making. *Advances economists' understanding of recent advances in social choice and welfare *Distills and applies research to a wide range of social issues *Provides analytical material for evaluating new scholarship *Offers consolidated reviews and analyses of scholarship in a framework that encourages synthesis--
 

Contents

Introduction
1
Chapter
2
STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES
7
Significance of the subject and main lines of research
18
Chapter 1
36
Fundamental lemmas and Arrows theorem
43
Relaxing the Pareto criterion
52
Relaxing the domain condition
64
Chapter 6
289
Sharing variable returns
316
Heterogeneous outputs or inputs
328
References
354
PRASANTA K PATTANAIK
361
Some notions of positionalist social ranking rules and social decision rules
367
Arrows conditions the principle of simple majority and positionalist SDRs
375
Concluding remarks
392

Relaxing independence of irrelevant alternatives
70
Concluding remarks
84
Categories of Arrovian Voting Schemes
85
Positional Rules of Collective DecisionMaking
92
FUAD ALESKEROV
95
Social decision rules
103
Functional voting rules
112
Conclusion
125
Chapter 3
131
The existence of Arrovian social welfare functions and the domain of
146
Distributional restrictions over the set of individual preferences under simple
153
Social choice in continuous space
160
Concluding remarks
166
Chapter 4
173
Voter preferences and social choice functions
180
Introduction to voting procedures for three or more candidates
186
Strategic analysis of nonranked voting
193
Condorcet choices and ranked voting
203
Chapter 5
237
Definitions
245
further topics
260
Bayesian implementation
276
References
282
some
398
Representations of committees
407
Strong representations of committees
415
Concluding remarks
421
Constitutional choices
427
A committee of politicians
436
Elections as methods of belief aggregation
443
Concluding remarks
452
Chapter 10
461
Axioms and their use
477
Independence and invariancebased characterisations
507
Discarding neutrality or invariance
520
Conclusion
534
CHARLES BLACKORBY WALTER BOSSERT and DAVID DONALDSON
543
Socialevaluation functionals
549
Generalized utilitarianism
560
Utilitarianism
566
Uncertainty
581
Conclusion
590
Chapter 12
597
Measurement of poverty
619
Author index
635
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