though the height or fulness of them may refer is that part of learning which answereth to one to some one age. This is a work which I find of the cells, domiciles, or offices of the mind of deficient; but is to be done with wisdom, so-man; which is that of the Memory. briety, and reverence, or not at all. The third, which is History of Providence, containeth that excellent correspondence which is between God's revealed will and his secret will: which though it be so obscure, as for the most part it is not legible to the natural man; no, nor many times to those that behold it from the tabernacle; yet at some times it pleaseth God, for our better establishment and the confuting of those which are as without God in the world, to write it in such text and capital letters, that as the prophet saith, "he that runneth by may read it ;" that is, mere sensual persons, which hasten by God's judgments and never bend or fix their cogitations upon them, are nevertheless in their passage and race urged to discern it. Such are the notable events and examples of God's judgments, chastisements, deliverances, and blessings: and this is a work which hath passed through the labours of many, and therefore I cannot present as omitted. There are also other parts of learning which are Appendices to history: for all the exterior proceedings of man consist of words and deeds; whereof history doth properly receive and retain in memory the deeds; and if words, yet but as inducements and passages to deeds: so are there other books and writings, which are appropriate to the custody and receipt of words only; which likewise are of three sorts; Orations, Letters, and brief Speeches or Sayings. Orations are pleadings, speeches of counsel, laudatives, invectives, apologies, reprehensions, orations of formality or ceremony, and the like. Letters are according to all the variety of occasions, advertisements, advices, directions, propositions, petitions, commendatory, expostulatory, satisfactory; of compliment, of pleasure, of discourse, and all other passages of action. And such as are written from wise men, are of all the words of man, in my judgment, the best; for they are more natural than orations and public speeches, and more advised than conferences or present speeches. So again letters of affairs from such as manage them, or are privy to them, are of all others the best instructions for history, and to a diligent reader the best histories in themselves. For Apophthegms, it is a great loss of that book of Cæsar's; for as his history, and those few letters of his which we have, and those apophthegms which were of his own, excel all men's else, so I suppose would his collection of apophthegms have done; for as for those which are collected by others, either I have no taste in such matters, or else their choice hath not been happy. But upon these three kinds of writings, I do not insist, because I have no deficiencies to propound concerning them. POESY is a part of learning in measure of words for the most part restrained, but in all other points extremely licensed, and doth truly refer to the imagination; which, being not tied to the laws of matter, may at pleasure join that which nature hath severed, and sever that which nature hath joined; and so make unlawful matches and divorces of things; "Pictoribus atque poetis, &c." It is taken in two senses, in respect of words, or matter: in the first sense it is but a character of style, and belongeth to arts of speech, and is not pertinent for the present: in the latter, it is, as hath been said, one of the principal portions of learning, and is nothing else but feigned history,which may be styled as well in prose as in verse. The use of this feigned history hath been to give some shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature of things doth deny it, the world being in proportion inferior to the soul; by reason whereof there is, agreeable to the spirit of man, a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more absolute variety, than can be found in the nature of things. Therefore, because the acts or events ol true history have not that magnitude which satisfieth the mind of man, poesy feigneth acts and events greater and more heroical: because true history propoundeth the successes and issues of actions not so agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns them more just in retribution, and more according to revealed providence: because true history representeth actions and events more ordinary, and less interchanged, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness, and more unexpected and alternative variations: so as it appeareth that poesy serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality, and to delectation. And therefore it was ever thought to have some participation of divineness, because it doth raise and erect the mind, by submitting the shows of things to the desires of the mind; whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of things. And we see, that by these insinuations and congruities with man's nature and pleasure, joined also with the agreement and consort it hath with music, it hath had access and estimation in rude times and barbarous regions, where other learning stood excluded. The division of poesy which is aptest in the propriety thereof, (besides those divisions which are common unto it with history, as feigned chronicles, feigned lives, and the appendices of history, as feigned epistles, feigned orations, and the rest,) is into Poesy, Narrative, Representative, and Allusive. The Narrative is a mere imitation of history, Thus much therefore concerning history; which with the excesses before remembered; choosing for subject commonly wars and love, rarely state, and sometimes pleasure or mirth. Representative is as a visible history; and is an image of actions as if they were present, as history is of actions in nature as they are, that is past. Allusive or parabolical is a narration applied only to express some special purpose or conceit: which latter kind of parabolical wisdom was much more in use in the ancient times, as by the fables of Æsop, and the brief sentences of the Seven, and the use of hieroglyphics, may appear. And the cause was, for that it was then of necessity to express any point of reason, which was more sharp or subtile than the vulgar in that manner; because men in those times wanted both variety of examples and subtilty of conceit: and as hieroglyphics were before letters, so parables were before arguments: And nevertheless now, and at all times, they do retain much life and vigour; because reason cannot be so sensible, nor examples so fit. upon the fable framed. For I find it was an ancient vanity in Chrysippus, that troubled himself with great contention to fasten the assertions of the Stoics upon the fictions of the ancient poets; but yet that all the fables and fictions of the poets were but pleasure and not figure, I interpose no opinion. Surely of those poets which are now extant, even Homer himself, (notwithstanding he was made a kind of Scripture by the latter schools of the Grecians,) yet I should without any difficulty pronounce that his fables had no such inwardness in his own meaning; but what they might have upon a more original tradition, is not easy to affirm; for he was not the inventor of many of them. In this third part of learning, which is poesy, I can report no deficience. For being as a plant that cometh of the lust of the earth, without a formal seed, it hath sprung up and spread abroad more than any other kind: but to ascribe unto it that which is due, for the expressing of affections, passions, corruptions, and customs, we are beBut there remaineth yet another use of poesy holden to poets more than to the philosophers' parabolical, opposite to that which we last men- works; and for wit and eloquence, not much less tioned for that tendeth to demonstrate and illus-than to orators' harangues. But it is not good to trate that which is taught or delivered, and this stay too long in the theatre. Let us now pass on other to retire and obscure it; that is, when the to the judicial place or palace of the mind, which secrets and mysteries of religion, policy, or phi- we are to approach and view with more reverence losophy, are involved in fables or parables. Of and attention. this in divine poesy we see the use is authorized. In heathen poesy we see the exposition of fables doth fall out sometimes with great felicity; as in the fable that the giants being overthrown in their war against the gods, the Earth, their mother, in revenge thereof brought forth Fame: "Illam Terra parens, irâ irritata deorum, Extremam, ut perhibent, Cao Enceladoque sororem The knowledge of man is as the waters, some descending from above, and some springing from beneath; the one informed by the light of nature, the other inspired by divine revelation. The light of nature consisteth in the notions of the mind and the reports of the senses: for as for knowledge which man receiveth by teaching, it is cumulative and not original; as in a water that, besides his own spring-head, is fed with other springs and streams. So then, according to these two differing illuminations or originals, knowledge is first of all divided into Divinity and Philosophy. Expounded, that when princes and monarchs have suppressed actual and open rebels, then the malignity of the people, which is the mother of rebellion, doth bring forth libels and slanders, and taxations of the state, which is of the same kind In Philosophy, the contemplations of man do with rebellion, but more feminine. So in the fa- either penetrate unto God, or are circumferred to ble, that the rest of the gods having conspired to nature, or are reflected or reverted upon himself. bind Jupiter, Pallas called Briareus with his Out of which several inquiries there do arise hundred hands to his aid: expounded, that monar- three knowledges, Divine philosophy, Natural chies need not fear any curbing of their absolute- philosophy, and Human philosophy or Humanity. ness by mighty subjects, as long as by wisdom For all things are marked and stamped with this they keep the hearts of the people, who will be triple character, of the power of God, the differsure to come in on their side. So in the fable, ence of nature, and the use of man. But because that Achilles was brought up under Chiron the the distributions and partitions of knowledge are Centaur, who was part a man and part a beast. not like several lines that meet in one angle, and expounded ingeniously, but corruptly by Machia- so touch but in a point; but are like branches of vel, that it belongeth to the education and disci- a tree, that meet in a stem, which hath a dimenpline of princes to know as well how to play the sion and quantity of entireness and continuance, part of the lion in violence, and the fox in guile, before it come to discontinue and break itself into as of the man in virtue and justice. Neverthe- arms and boughs; therefore it is good, before we less, in many the like encounters, I do rather think enter into the former distribution, to erect and that the fable was first, and the exposition then constitute one universal science, by the name of devised, than that the moral was first, and there- [" Philosophia Prima," primitive or summary phi VOL. I.-25 R losophy, as the main and common way, before we come where the ways part and divide themselves; which science whether I should report as deficient or not, I stand doubtful. For I find a certain rhapsody of natural theology, and of divers parts of logic; and of that part of natural philosophy which concerneth the principles; and of that other part of natural philosophy which concerneth the soul or spirit: all these strangely commixed and confused; but being examined, it seemeth to me rather a depredation of other sciences, advanced and exalted unto some height of terms, than any thing solid or substantive of itself. Nevertheless I cannot be ignorant of the distinction which is current, that the same things are handled but in several respects. As, for example, that logic considereth of many things as they are in notion, and this philosophy as they are in nature; the one in appearance, the other in existence; but I find this difference better made than pursued. For if they had considered quantity, similitude, diversity, and the rest of those external characters of things, as philosophers, and in nature, their inquiries must of force have been of a far other kind than they are. For doth any of them, in handling quantity, speak of the force of union, how and how far it multiplieth virtue? Doth any give the reason, why some things in nature are so common, and in so great mass, and others so rare, and in so small quantity? Doth any, in handling similitude and diversity, assign the cause why iron should not move to iron, which is more like, but move to the loadstone, which is less like? Why in all diversities of things there should be certain participles in nature, which are almost ambiguous to which kind they should be referred? But there is a mere and deep silence touching the nature and operation of those common adjuncts of things, as in nature; and only a resuming and repeating of the force and use of them in speech or argument. Therefore, because in a writing of this nature I avoid all subtilty, my meaning touching this original or universal phylosophy is thus, in a plain and gross description by negative: "That it be a receptacle for all such profitable observations and axioms as fall not within the compass of any of the special parts of philosophy or sciences, but are more common and of a higher stage." 99 Now that there are many of that kind need not to be doubted. For example; is not the rule, "Si inæqualibus æqualia addas, omnia erunt inæqualia," an axiom as well of justice as of the mathematics? And is there not a true coincidence between commutative and distributive justice, and arithmetical and geometrical proportion? Is not that other rule, " Quæ in eodem tertio conveniunt, et inter se conveniunt," a rule taken from the mathematics, but so potent in logic as all syllogisms are built upon it? Is not the observation, 6 in philosophy thus, that the quantum of nature is eternal? in natural theology thus, that it requireth the same omnipotence to make somewhat nothing, which at the first made nothing somewhat? according to the Scripture, “Didici quod omnia opera, quæ fecit Deus, perseverent in perpetuum ; non possumus eis quicquam addere nec auferre." Is not the ground, which Machiavel wisely and largely discourseth concerning governments, that the way to establish and preserve them is to reduce them "ad principia," a rule in religion and nature, as well as in civil administration? Was not the Persian magic a reduction or correspondence of the principles and architectures of nature to the rules and policy of governments? Is not the precept of a musician, to fall from a discord or harsh accord upon a concord or sweet accord, alike true in affection? Is not the trope of music, to avoid or slide from the close or cadence, common with the trope of rhetoric of deceiving expectation? Is not the delight of the quavering upon a stop in music the same with the playing of light upon the water? "Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus." Are not the organs of the senses of one kind with the organs of reflection, the eye with a glass, the ear with a cave or strait determined and bounded? Neither are these only similitudes, as men of narrow observation may conceive them to be, but the same footsteps of nature, treading or printing upon several subjects or matters. This science, therefore, as I understand it, I may justly report as deficient: for I see sometimes the profounder sort of wits, in handling some particular argu ment, will now and then draw a bucket of water out of this well for their present use; but the spring-head thereof seemeth to me not to have been visited: being of so excellent use, both for the disclosing of nature and the abridgment of art. This science being therefore the first placed as a common parent, like unto Berecynthia, which had so much heavenly issue, "Omnes cœlicolas, omnes supera alta tenentes :"* we may return to the former distribution of the three philosophies, divine, natural, and human. And as concerning Divine Philosophy or Natural Theology, it is that knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning God, which may be obtained by the contemplation of his creatures; which knowledge may be truly termed divine in respect of the object, and natural in respect of the light. The bounds of this knowledge are, that it sufficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform religion: and therefore there was never miracle wrought by God to convert an atheist, because the light of nature might have led him to confess a God; but miracles have been wrought to convert idolaters and the superstitious, because no light of nature extendeth to declare the will and true worship of God. For as all works do show forth ⚫ Omnia mutantur, nil interit," a contemplation, the power and skill of the workman, and not his image; so it is of the works of God, which do show the omnipotency and wisdom of the maker, but not his image; and therefore therein the heathen opinion differeth from the sacred truth for they supposed the world to be the image of God, and man to be an extract or compendious image of the world; but the Scriptures never vouchsafe to attribute to the world that honour, as to be the image of God, but only the work of his hands; neither do they speak of any other image of God, but man: wherefore by the contemplation of nature to induce and enforce the acknowledgment of God, and to demonstrate his power, providence, and goodness, is an excellent argument, and hath been excellently handled by divers. But on the other side, out of the contemplation of nature, or ground of human knowledge, to induce any verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith, is in my judgment not safe: "Da fidei, quæ fidei sunt." For the heathen themselves conclude as much, in that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain: "That men and gods were not able to draw Jupiter down to earth; but contrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven." So as we ought not attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of God to our reason; but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason to the divine truth. So as in this part of knowledge, touching divine philosophy, I am so far from noting any deficience, as I rather note an excess: whereunto I have digressed; because of the extreme prejudice which both religion and philosophy have received and may receive, by being commixed together; as that which undoubtedly will make an heretical religion, and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy. gems." And it is no more unlawful to inquire the nature of evil spirits, than to inquire the force of poisons in nature, or the nature of sin and vice in morality. But this part touching angels and spirits I cannot note as deficient, for many have occupied themselves in it; I may rather challenge it, in many of the writers thereof, as fabulous and fantastical. Leaving therefore divine philosophy or natural theology (not divinity or inspired theology, which we reserve for the last of all, as the haven and sabbath of all man's contemplations) we will now proceed to Natural Philosophy. If then it be true that Democritus said, "That the truth of nature lieth hid in certain deep mines and caves:" and if it be true likewise that the alchymists do so much inculcate, that Vulcan is a second nature, and imitateth that dexterously and compendiously, which nature worketh by ambages and length of time, it were good to divide natural philosophy into the mine and furnace; and to make two professions or occupations of natural philosophers, some to be pioneers and some smiths; some to dig, and some to refine and hammer; and surely I do best allow of a division of that kind, though in more familiar and scholastical terms; namely, that these be the two parts of natural philosophy, the inquisition of causes, and the production of effects; speculative and operative, natural science, and natural prudence. For as in civil matters there is a wisdom of discourse, and a wisdom of direction; so is it in natural. And here I will make a request, that for the latter, or at least for a part thereof, I may revive and reintegrate the misapplied and abused name of Natural Magic; which in the true sense is but natural wisdom, or natural prudence; taken according to the ancient acceptation, purged from vanity and superstition. Now although it be true, and I know it well, that there is an intercourse between causes and effects, so as both these knowledges, speculative and operative, have a great connection between themselves; yet because all true and fruitful natural philosophy hath a double scale or ladder ascendant and descendent; ascending from experiments to the invention of causes, and descending from causes to the invention of new experiments; therefore I judge it most requisite that these two parts be severally considered and handled. Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, which is an appendix of theology, both divine and natural, and is neither inscrutable nor interdicted; for although the Scripture saith, "Let no man deceive you in sublime discourse touching the worship of angels, pressing into that he knoweth not," &c. yet, notwithstanding, if you observe well that precept it may appear thereby that there be two things only forbidden, adoration of them, and opinion fantastical of them; either to extol them farther than appertaineth to the degree of a creature, or to extol a man's knowledge Natural Science or Theory is divided into Phyof them farther than he hath ground. But the sic and Metaphysic; wherein I desire it may sober and grounded inquiry, which may arise out be conceived that I use the word metaphysic in a of the passages of Holy Scriptures, or out of the differing sense from that that is received: and in gradations of nature, is not restrained. So of like manner, I doubt not but it will easily appear degenerate and revolted spirits, the conversing to men of judgment, that in this and other particuwith them or the employment of them is prohibit-lars, wheresoever my conception and notion may ed, much more any veneration towards them; differ from the ancient, yet I am studious to keep but the contemplation or science of their nature, the ancient terms. For hoping well to deliver their power, their illusions, either by Scripture or myself from mistaking, by the order and perspi reason, is a part of spiritual wisdom. For so the cuous expressing of that I do propound: I am apostle saith, "We are not ignorant of his strata-otherwise zealous and affectionate to recede as Jittle from antiquity, either in terms or opinions, | provision; that they be handled as they have effias may stand with truth and the proficience of cacy in nature, and not logically. It appeareth knowledge. And herein I cannot a little marvel likewise, that Natural Theology, which heretoat the philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in fore hath been handled confusedly with metaphysuch a spirit of difference and contradiction to- sic, I have enclosed and bounded by itself. It is wards all antiquity: undertaking not only to frame therefore now a question what is left remaining new words of science at pleasure, but to confound for metaphysic; wherein I may without prejudice and extinguish all ancient wisdom: insomuch as preserve thus much of the conceit of antiquity, he never nameth or mentioneth an ancient author that physic should contemplate that which is or opinion, but to confute and reprove; wherein inherent in matter, and therefore transitory; and for glory, and drawing followers and disciples, he metaphysic that which is abstracted and fixed. took the right course. For certainly there cometh And again, that physic should handle that which to pass, and hath place in human truth, that supposeth in nature only a being and moving; which was noted and pronounced in the highest and metaphysic should handle that which suptruth: "Veni in nomine Patris, nec recipitis me; poseth further in nature a reason, understanding, si quis venerit in nomine suo, eum recipietis." and platform. But the difference, perspicuously But in this divine aphorism, (considering to whom expressed, is most familiar and sensible. For as it was applied, namely to Antichrist, the highest we divided natural philosophy in general into the deceiver,) we may discern well that the coming inquiry of causes, and productions of effects; so in a man's own name, without regard of antiquity that part which concerneth the inquiry of causes or paternity, is no good sign of truth, although it we do subdivide according to the received and be joined with the fortune and success of an "Eum sound division of causes; the one part, which is recipietis." But for this excellent person Aris- physic, inquireth and handleth the material and totle, I will think of him that he learned that efficient causes; and the other, which is metahumour of his scholar, with whom, it seemeth, physic, handleth the formal and final causes. he did emulate; the one to conquer all opinions, as the other to conquer all nations: wherein nevertheless, it may be, he may at some men's hands, that are of a bitter disposition, get a like title as his scholar did: So, "Felix terrarum prædo, non utile mundo "Felix doctrinæ prædo." Physic, taking it according to the deriviation, and not according to our idiom for medicine, is situate in a middle term or distance between natural history and metaphysic. For natural history describeth the variety of things; physic, the causes, but variable or respective causes; and metaphysic, the fixed and constant causes. "Limus ut hic durescit, et hæc ut cera liquescit, Uno eodemque igni :" Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay: fire is the cause of colliquation, but respective to wax; but fire is no constant cause either of induration or colliquation: so then the physical causes are but the efficient and the matter. Phy But to me, on the other side, that do desire as much as lieth in my pen to ground a sociable intercourse between antiquity and proficience, it seemeth best to keep away with antiquity, "usque ad aras;" and therefore to retain the ancient terms, though I sometimes alter the uses and defi-sic hath three parts; whereof two respect nature nitions, according to the moderate proceeding in civil government; where although there be some alteration, yet that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth, "eadem magistratuum vocabula." To return, therefore, to the use and acceptation of the term Metaphysic, as I do now understand the word; it appeareth, by that which hath been already said, that I intend "philosophia prima," Summary Philosophy and Metaphysic, which heretofore have been confounded as one, to be two things. For, the one I have made as a parent or common ancestor to all knowledge; and the other I have now brought in as a branch or descendant of natural science. It appeareth likewise that I have assigned to Summary Philosophy the common principles and axioms which are promiscuous and indifferent to several sciences: I have assignea unto it likewise the inquiry touching the operation of the relative and adventitious characters of essences, as quantity, similitude, diversity, possibility, and the rest: with this distinction and united or collected, the third contemplateth nature diffused or distributed. Nature is collected either into one entire total, or else into the same principles or seeds. So as the first doctrine is touching the contexture or configuration of things, as "de mundo, de universitate rerum." The second is the doctrine concerning the principles or originals of things. The third is the doctrine concerning all variety and particularity of things; whether it be of the different substances, or their different qualities and natures; whereof there needeth no enumeration, this part being but as a gloss, or paraphrase, that attendeth upon the text of natural history. Of these three I cannot report any as deficient. In what truth or perfection they are handled, I make not now any judgment: but they are parts of knowledge not deserted by the labour of man. For Metaphysic, we have assigned unto it the inquiry of formal and final causes; which assignation, as to the former of them, may seem to be |