Invention is of two kinds, much differing; the one, of arts and sciences; and the other, of speech and arguments. The former of these I do report deficient; which seemeth to me to be such a de ficience as if, in the making of an inventory touch. ing the estate of a defunct, it should be set down, that there is no ready money. For as money will fetch all other commodities, so this knowledge is that which should purchase all the rest. And like as the West Indies had never been discover. first discovered, though the one be vast regions, and the other a small motion; so it cannot be found strange if sciences be no farther discovered, if the art itself of invention and discovery hath been passed over. and religion, we raise our imagination above our invented; or to retain that which is judged; or reason; which is the cause why religion sought to deliver over that which is retained. So as the ever access to the mind by similitudes, types, arts must be four; art of inquiry or invention; art parables, visions, dreams. And again, in all of examination or judgment; art of custody or persuasions that are wrought by eloquence, and memory; and art of elocution or tradition. other impressions of like nature, which do paint and disguise the true appearance of things, the chief recommendation unto reason is from the imagination. Nevertheless, because I find not any science that doth properly or fitly pertain to the imagination, I see no cause to alter the former division. For as for poesy, it is rather a pleasure or play of the imagination, than a work or duty thereof. And if it be a work, we speak not now of such parts of learning as the imagination produceth, but of such sciences as handle and con-ed, if the use of the mariner's needle had not been sider of the imagination; no more than we shall speak now of such knowledges as reason produceth, for that extendeth to all philosophy, but of such knowledges as do handle and inquire of the faculty of reason: so as poesy had its true place. As for the power of the imagination in That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my nature, and the manner of fortifying the same, we judgment standeth plainly confessed; for first, have mentioned it in the doctrine "De anima," logic doth not pretend to invent sciences, or the whereunto it most fitly belongeth. And lastly, axioms of sciences, but passeth it over with a for imaginative or insinuative reason, which is the "cuique in sua arte credendum." And Celsus subject of rhetoric, we think it best to refer it to acknowledgeth it gravely, speaking of the emthe arts of reason. So therefore we content our-pirical and dogmatical sects of physicians, “That selves with the former division, that Human Phi- medicines and cures were first found out, and losophy, which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man, hath two parts, Rational and Moral. The part of Human Philosophy which is rational is of all knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful, and seemeth but a net of subtilty and spinosity. For as it was truly said, that knowledge is "pabulum animi ;" so in the nature of men's appetite to this food, most men are of the taste and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that would fain have returned" ad ollas carnium," and were weary of manna; which, though it were celestial seemed less nutritive and comfortable. So generally men taste well knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, civil history, morality, policy, about the which men's affections, praises, fortunes, do turn and are conversant: but this same "lumen siccum" doth parch and offend most men's watery and soft natures. But, to speak truly of things as they are in worth, rational knowledges are the keys of all other arts; for as Aristotle saith aptly and elegantly, "That the hand is the instrument of instruments, and the mind is the form of forms:" so these be truly said to be the art of arts: neither do they only direct, but likewise confirm and strengthen; even as the habit of shooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer shoot, but also to draw a stronger bow. The arts intellectual are four in number; divided according to the ends whereunto they are referred for man's labour is to invent that which is sought or propounded; or to judge that which is then after the reasons and causes were discoursed; "Dictamnum genetrix Cretea carpit ab Ida, So that it was no marvel, the manner of antiquity "Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator Anubis, Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam," &c. And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and ascribe the first inventions to men; yet you will rather believe that Prometheus first struck the flints, and marvelled at the spark, than that when he first struck the flints he expected the spark: and therefore we see the West Indian Prometheus had no intelligence with the European, because of the rareness with them of flint, that gave the first occasion. So as it should seem, upon those sons of Jesse which were brought that hitherto men are rather beholden to a wild goat for surgery, or to a nightingale for music, or to the ibis for some part of physic, or to the pot lid that flew open for artillery, or generally to chance, or any thing else, than to logic, for the invention of arts and sciences. Neither is the form of invention which Virgil describeth much other: "Ut varias usus meditando extunderet artes Paulatim." For if you observe the words well, it is no other nethod than that which brute beasts are capable of, and do put in use; which is a perpetual intending or practising some one thing, urged and imposed by an absolute necessity of conservation of being for so Cicero saith very truly, "Usus uni rei deditus, et naturam et artem sæpe vincit." And therefore if it be said of men, "Labor omnia vincit Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas ;" it is likewise said of beasts, "Quis psittaco docuit suum xaîpe?" Who taught the raven in a drought to throw pebbles into a hollow tree, where she espied water, that the water might rise so as she might come to it? Who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea of air, and to find the way from a field in flower, a great way off, to her hive? Who taught the ant to bite every grain of corn that she burieth in her hill, lest it should take root and grow? Add then the word "extundere," which importeth the extreme difficulty, and the word "paulatim," which importeth the extreme slowness, and we are where we were, even amongst the Egyptians' gods; there being little left to the faculty of reason, and nothing to the duty of art, for matter of invention. before him, and failed of David, which was in the field. And this form, to say truth, is so gross, as it had not been possible for wits so subtile as have managed these things to have offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful toward particulars; which their manner was to use but as "lictores and viatores," for sergeants and whifflers, " ad summovendam turbam," to make way and make room for their opinions, rather than in their true use and service. Certainly it is a thing may touch a man with a religious wonder, to see how the footsteps of seducement are the very same in divine and human truth: for as in divine truth man cannot endure to become as a child; so in human, they reputed the attending the inductions whereof we speak, as if it were a second infancy or childhood. Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly induced, yet nevertheless certain it is that middle propositions cannot be deduced from them in subject of nature by syllogism, that is, by touch and reduction of them to principles in a middle term. It is true that in sciences popular, as moralities, laws, and the like, yea and divinity, (because it pleaseth God to apply himself to the capacity of the simplest,) that form may have use; and in natural philosophy likewise, by way of argument or satisfactory reason, "Quæ assensum parit, operis effœta est:" but the subtilty of nature and operations will not be enchained in those bonds: for arguments consist of propositions, and propositions of words; and words are but the current tokens or marks of popular notions of things: which notions, if they be grossly and variably collected out of particulars, it is not the Secondly, the induction which the logicians laborious examination either of consequences of speak of, and which seemeth familiar with Plato, arguments, or of the truth of propositions, that can (whereby the principles of sciences may be pre-ever correct that error, being, as the physicians tended to be invented, and so the middle propo- speak, in the first digestion: and therefore it was sitions by derivation from the principles ;) their not without cause, that so many excellent philoform of induction, I say, is utterly vicious and in-sophers became sceptics and academics, and decompetent: wherein their error is the fouler, because it is the duty of art to perfect and exalt nature; but they contrariwise have wronged, abused, and traduced nature. For he that shall attentively observe how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of knowledge, like unto that which the poet speaketh of, "Aërei mellis cœlestia dona," distilling and contriving it out of particulars natural and artificial, as the flowers of the field and garden, shall find that the mind of her self by nature doth manage and act an induction much better than they describe it. For to conclude upon an enumeration of particulars, without instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can assure, in many subjects upon those particulars which appear of a side, that there are not other on the contrary side which appear not? As if Samuel should have rested nied any certainty of knowledge or comprehension; and held opinion, that the knowledge of man extendeth only to appearances and probabilities. It is true that in Socrates it was supposed to be but a form of irony, "Scientiam dissimulando simulavit:" for he used to disable his knowledge, to the end to enhance his knowledge; like the humour of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would reign, but would not acknowledge so much and in the later Academy, which Cicero embraced, this opinion also of "acatalepsia,” I doubt, was not held sincerely: for that all those which excelled in "copia" of speech seem to have chosen that sect, as that which was fittest to give glory to their eloquence and variable discourses; being rather like progresses of pleasure, than journeys to an end. But assuredly many scattered in both Academies did hold it in subtilty and integrity: but here was their chief error; like a good householder, that bringeth forth both they charged the deceit upon the senses; which new and old store; and we see the ancient in my judgment, notwithstanding all their cavilla- writers of rhetoric do give it in precept, that tions, are very sufficient to certify and report pleaders should have the places, whereof they truth, though not always immediately, yet by have most continual use, ready handled in all the comparison, by help of instrument, and by pro- variety that may be; as that, to speak for the ducing and urging such things as are too subtile literal interpretation of the law against equity, for the sense to some effect comprehensible by and contrary; and to speak for presumptions and the sense, and other like assistance. But they inferences against testimony, and contrary. And ought to have charged the deceit upon the weak- Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great ness of the intellectual powers, and upon the man- experience, delivereth it plainly, that whatsoever ner of collecting and concluding upon the reports a man shall have occasion to speak of, if he will of the senses. This I speak, not to disable the take the pains, he may have it in effect premedimind of man, but to stir it up to seek help: for no tate and handled "in thesi;" so that when he man, be he never so cunning or practised, can cometh to a particular, he shall have nothing to do, make a straight line or perfect circle by steadi-but to add names, and times, and places, and such ness of hand, which may be easily done by help other circumstances of individuals. We see likeof a ruler or compass. wise the exact diligence of Demosthenes; who, in regard of the great force that the entrance and access into causes hath to make a good impression, had ready framed a number of prefaces for This part of the invention, concerning the invention of sciences, I purpose, if God give me leave, hereafter to propound, having digested it into two parts; whereof the one I term "Expe-orations and speeches. All which authorities and rientia Literata," and the other "Interpretatio Naturæ:" the former being but a degree and rudiment of the latter. But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great upon a promise. precedents may overweigh Aristotle's opinion, that would have us change a rich wardrobe for a pair of shears. But the nature of the collection of this provision or preparatory store, though it be common both to logic and rhetoric, yet having made an entry of it here, where it came first to be spoken of, I think fit to refer over the farther handling of it to rhetoric. The invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention: for to invent is to discover that we know not, and not to recover or resummon that which we already know: and the use of this invention is no other but, out of the knowledge whereof our mind is already possessed, to draw The other part of invention, which I term sugforth or call before us that which may be perti- gestion, doth assign and direct us to certain nent to the purpose which we take into our con- marks or places, which may excite our mind to sideration. So as, to speak truly, it is no inven- return and produce such knowledge as it hath tion, but a remembrance or suggestion, with and formerly collected, to the end we may make use application; which is the cause why the schools thereof. Neither is this use, truly taken, only to do place it after judgment, as subsequent and not precedent. Nevertheless, because we do account it a chase, as well of deer in an enclosed park as in a forest at large, and that it hath already obtained the name, let it be called invention: so as it be perceived and discerned, that the scope and end of this invention is readiness and present use of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification thereof. To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two courses, Preparation and Suggestion. The former of these seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge, consisting rather of diligence than of any artificial erudition. And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the sophists near his time, saying, "they did as if one that professed the art of shoemaking should not teach how to make a shoe, but only exhibit, in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes." But yet a man might reply,' that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he should be weakly customed. But our Saviour, speaking of divine knowledge, saith, that the kingdom of heaven is VOL. I.-27 furnish argument to dispute probably with others, but likewise to minister unto our judgment to conclude aright within ourselves. Neither may these places serve only to prompt our invention, but also to direct our inquiry. For a faculty of wise interrogating is half a knowledge. For as Plato saith, "Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for in a general notion; else how shall he know it when he hath found it?" And therefore the larger your anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is your search. But the same places which will help us what to produce of that which we know already, will also help us, if a man of experience were before us, what questions to ask; or, if we have books and authors to instruct us, what points to search and revolve: so as I cannot report that this part of invention, which is that which the schools call topics, is deficient. Nevertheless topics are of two sorts, general and special. The general we have spoken to; but the particular hath been touched by some, but rejected generally as inartificial and variable. But leaving the humour which hath reigned too much $ 2 in the schools, which is, to be vainly subtle in a few things which are within their command, and to reject the rest; I do receive particular topics, (that is, places or directions of invention and inquiry in every particular knowledge,) as things of great use, being mixtures of logic with the matter of sciences; for in these it holdeth, "Ars inveniendi adolescit cum inventis;" for as in going of a way, we do not only gain that part of the way which is passed; but we gain the better sight of that part of the way which remaineth: so every degree of proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which followeth; which light if we strengthen, by drawing it forth into questions or places of inquiry,we do greatly advance our pursuit. Now we pass unto the arts of Judgment, which handle the natures of proofs and demonstrations; which as to induction hath a coincidence with invention; for in all inductions, whether in good or vicious form, the same action of the mind which inventeth, judgeth; all one as in the sense; but otherwise it is in proof by syllogism; for the proof being not immediate, but by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing, and the judgment of the consequence is another; the one exciting only, the other examining. Therefore, for the real and exact form of judgment, we refer ourselves to that which we have spoken of "Interpretation of nature." For the other judgment by syllogism, as it is a thing most agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently and excellently laboured; for the nature of man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his understanding fixed and immovable, and as a rest and support of the mind. And therefore as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all motion there is some point quiescent; and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas, that stood fixed, and bare up the heaven from falling, to be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conversion is accomplished: so assuredly men have a desire to have an Atlas or axle-tree within, to keep them from fluctuation, which is like to a perpetual peril of falling; therefore men did hasten to set down some principles about which the variety of their disputations might turn. So then this art of judgment is but the reduction of propositions to principles in a middle term: the principles to be agreed by all and exempted from argument; the middle term to be elected at the liberty of every man's invention; the reduction to be of two kinds, direct and inverted; the one when the proposition is reduced to the principle, which they term a probation ostensive; the other, when the contradictory of the proposition is reduced to the contradictory of the principle, which is that which they call "per incommodum," or pressing an absurdity; the number of middle terms to be as the proposition standeth degrees more or less removed from the principle. But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, the one by way of direction, the other by way of caution; the former frameth and setteth down a true form of consequence, by the variations and deflections from which errors and inconsequences may be exactly judged; toward the composition and structure of which form, it is incident to handle the parts thereof, which are propositions, and the parts of propositions, which are simple words: and this is that part of logic which is comprehended in the analytics. The second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite use and assurance sake; discovering the more subtile forms of sophisms and illaqueations with their redargutions, which is that which is termed Elenches. For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth, as Seneca maketh the comparison well, as in juggling feats, which though we know not how they are done, yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to be; yet the more subtle sort of them doth not only put a man beside his answer, but doth many times abuse his judgment. This part concerning Elenches is excellently handled by Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato in example, not only in the persons of the sophists, but even in Socrates himself; who professing to affirm nothing, but to infirm that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the forms of objection, fallacy, and redargution. And although we have said that the use of this doctrine is for redargution, yet it is manifest the degenerate and corrupt use is for caption and contradiction, which passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt is of very great advantage: though the difference be good which was made between orators and sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound, which hath his advantage in the race, and the other as the hare, which hath her advantage in the turn, so as it is the advantage of the weaker creature. But yet further, this doctrine of elenches hath a more ample latitude and extent than is perceived; namely, unto divers parts of knowledge; whereof some are laboured and others omitted. For first, I conceive, though it may seem at first somewhat strange, that that part which is variably referred sometimes to logic, sometimes to metaphysics, touching the common adjuncts of essences, is but an elench; for the great sophism of all sophisms being equivocation or ambiguity of words and phrase, (especially of such words as are most general, and intervene, in every inqui ry,) it seemeth to me that the true and fruitful use, leaving vain subtilties and speculations, of the inquiry of majority, minority, priority, posteriority, identity, diversity, possibility, act, totality, parts, existence, privation, and the like, are but wise cautions against ambiguities of speech. So again the distribution of things into certain tribes, which we call categories or predicaments 13 are but cautions against the confusion of defini- to be of human shape. And therefore Velleius tions and divisions. Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of the impression, and not by the subtilty of the illaqueation; not so much perplexing the reason, as overruling it by power of the imagination. But this part I think more proper to handle when I shall speak of rhetoric. the Epicurean needed not to have asked, why God should have adorned the heavens with stars as if he had been an Ædilis, one that should have set forth some magnificent shows or plays. For if that great Work-master had been of a human disposition, he would have cast the stars into some pleasant and beautiful works and orders, like the frets in the roofs of houses; whereas one can scarce find a posture in square, or triangle, or straight line, amongst such an infinite number; so differing a harmony there is between the spirit of man and the spirit of nature. But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or inquired at all, and think good to place here, as that which of all others appertaineth most to rectify judgment: the force whereof is such, as it doth not dazzle or snare the Let us consider, again, the false ppearances understanding in some particulars, but doth more imposed upon us by every man's wn individual generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the nature and custom, in that feigned supposition state thereof. For the mind of man is far from the that Plato maketh of the cave: for certainly if a nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the child were continued in a grot or cave under the beams of things should reflect according to their earth, until maturity of age, and came suddenly true incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted abroad, he would have strange and absurd imagiglass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be nations. So in like manner, although our pernot delivered and reduced. For this purpose, let sons live in the view of heaven, yet our spirits us consider the false appearances that are imposed are included in the caves of our own complexions upon us by the general nature of the mind, be- and customs, which minister unto us infinite holding them in an example or two; as first, in errors and vain opinions, if they be not recalled to that instance which is the root of all superstition, examination. But hereof we have given many namely, That to the nature of the mind of all men examples in one of the errors or peccant humours, it is consonant for the affirmative or active to af- which we ran briefly over in our first book. fect more than the negative or privative: so that a And lastly, let us consider the false appearfew times hitting or presence countervails oft-ances that are imposed upon us by words, which times failing or absence; as was well answered are framed and applied according to the conceit by Diagoras to him that showed him in Neptune's temple the great number of pictures of such as had escaped shipwreck and had paid their vows to Neptune, saying, "Advise now, you that think it folly to invocate Neptune in tempest:" "Yea, but," saith Diagoras, "where are they painted that are drowned ?" Let us behold it in another instance, namely, That the spirit of man, being of an equal and uniform substance, doth usually suppose and feign in nature a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth. Hence it cometh, that the mathematicians cannot satisfy themselves, except they reduce the motions of the celestial bodies to perfect circles, rejecting spiral lines, and labouring to be discharged of eccentrics. Hence it cometh, that whereas there are many things in nature, as it were "monodica, sui juris;" yet the cogitations of man do feign unto them relatives, parallels, and conjugates, whereas no such thing is; as they have feigned an element of fire, to keep square with earth, water, and air, and the like: nay, it is not credible, till it be opened, what a number of fictions and fancies the similitude of human actions and arts, together with the making of man "communis mensura," have brought into Natural Philosophy; not much better than the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, bred in the cells of gross and solitary monks, and the opinion of Epicurus, answerable to the same in heathenism, who supposed the gods and capacities of the vulgar sort; and although we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well, "Loquendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes;" yet certain it is that words, as a Tartar's bow, do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment; so as it is almost necessary, in all controversies and disputations, to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians, in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms, that others may know how we accept and understand them, and whether they concur with us or no. For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we are sure to end there where we ought to have begun, which is, in questions and differences about words. To conclude, therefore, it must be confessed that it is not possible to divorce ourselves from these fallacies and false appearances, because they are inseparable from our nature and condition of life; so yet nevertheless the caution of them, (for all elenches, as was said, are but cautions,) doth extremely import the true conduct of human judgment. The particular elenches or cautions against these three false appearances, I find altogether deficient. There remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency, which to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I may report that also deficient; which is the application of the differing |