fs to the differing kinds of subjects; |" copia," and such as by device and practice may ig but four kinds of demonstrations, be exalted to an extreme degree of wonder,) than I do of the tricks of tumblers, funambulos, baladines; the one being the same in the mind that the other is in the body, matters of strangeness without worthiness.

that is, by the immediate consent of the mind or sense, by induction, by sophism, and by congruity, (which is that which Aristotle calleth demonstration in orb or circle, and not "a notioribus ;") every of these hath certain subjects in This art of memory is but built upon two inthe matter of sciences, in which respectively tentions; the one prenotion, the other emblem. they have chiefest use; and certain others, from Prenotion dischargeth the indefinite seeking of that which respectively they ought to be excluded: we would remember, and directeth us to seek in a and the rigour and curiosity in requiring the more narrow compass, that is, somewhat that hath consevere proofs in some things, and chiefly the facil-gruity with our place of memory. Emblem reity in contenting ourselves with the more remiss duceth conceits intellectual to images sensible, proofs in others, hath been amongst the greatest causes of detriment and hinderance to knowledge. The distributions and assignations of demonstrations, according to the analogy of sciences, I note as deficient.

which strike the memory more; out of which axioms, may be drawn much better practice than that in use; and besides which axioms there are divers more touching help of memory, not inferior to them. But I did in the beginning distinguish, not to report those things deficient, which are but only ill managed.

parts; the first concerning the organ of tradition; the second concerning the method of tradition; and the third concerning the illustration of tradition.

The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in Writing or Memory; whereof writing hath two parts, the nature of the character, and the order of There remaineth the fourth kind of rational the entry; for the art of characters, or other visible knowledge, which is transitive, concerning the notes of words or things, it hath nearest conjuga-expressing or transferring our knowledge to tion with grammar; and therefore I refer it to others; which I will term by the general name the due place for the disposition and collocation of tradition or delivery. Tradition hath three of that knowledge which we preserve in writing, it consisteth in a good digest of commonplaces; wherein I am not ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the use of commonplace books, as causing a retardation of reading, and some sloth or relaxation For the organ of tradition, it is either speech or of memory. But because it is but a counterfeit writing: for Aristotle saith well," Words are the thing in knowledges to be forward and pregnant, images of cogitations, and letters are the images except a man be deep and full, I hold the entry of of words;" but yet it is not of necessity that cogicommonplaces, to be a matter of great use and es-tations be expressed by the medium of words. sence in studying, as that which assureth "copia" For whatsoever is capable of sufficient differences, of invention, and contracteth judgment to a strength. But this is true, that of the methods of commonplaces that I have seen there is none of any sufficient worth; all of them carrying merely the face of a school, and not of a world; and referring to vulgar matters and pedantical divisions, without all life, or respect to action.

For the other principal part of the custody of knowledge, which is Memory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly inquired of. An art there is extant of it: but it seemeth to me that there are better precepts than that art, and better practices of that art than those received. It is certain the art, as it is, may be raised to points of ostentation prodigious; but in use, as it is now managed, it is barren, (not burdensome, nor dangerous to natural memory, as is imagined, but barren,) that is, not dexterous to be applied to the serious use of business and occasions. And therefore I make no more estimation of repeating a great number of names or words upon once hearing, or the pouring forth of a number of verses or rhymes extempore, or the making of a satirical simile of every thing, or the turning of every thing to a jest, or the falsifying or contradicting of every thing by cavil, or the like, (whereof in the faculties of the mind there is great

and those perceptible by the sense, is in nature competent to express cogitations. And therefore we see in the commerce of barbarous people, that understand not one another's language, and in the practice of divers that are dumb and deaf, that men's minds are expressed in gestures, though not exactly, yet to serve the turn. And we understand further, that it is the use of China, and the kingdoms of the high Levant, to write in characters real, which express neither letters nor words in gross, but things or notions; insomuch as countries and provinces, which understand not one another's language, can nevertheless read one another's writings, because the characters are accepted more generally than the languages do extend; and therefore they have a vast multitude of characters, as many, I suppose, as radical words.

These notes of cogitations are of two sorts; the one when the note hath some similitude or congruity with the notion; the other "ad placitum," having force only by contract or acceptation. Of the former sort are hieroglyphics and gestures. For as to hieroglyphics, things of ancient use, and embraced chiefly by the Ægy, tians, one of the most ancient nations, they are but as

Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, [matical and disclosed. The pretence whereof is, in logic, as a part of judgment: for as the doc- to remove the vulgar capacities from being adtrine of syllogisms comprehendeth the rules of mitted to the secrets of knowledges, and to reserve judgment upon that which is invented, so the them to selected auditors, or wits of such sharpdoctrine of method containeth the rules of judg-ness as can pierce the veil. ment upon that which is to be delivered; for judgment precedeth delivery, as it followeth invention. Neither is the method or the nature of the tradition material only to the use of knowledge, but likewise to the progression of knowledge: for since the labour and life of one man cannot attain to perfection of knowledge, the wisdom of the tradition is that which inspireth the felicity of continuance and proceeding. And therefore the most real diversity of method, is of method referred to use, and method referred to progression; whereof the one may be termed magistral, and the other of probation.

Another diversity of method, whereof the consequence is great, is the delivery of knowledge in aphorisms, or in methods; wherein we may observe, that it hath been too much taken into custom, out of a few axioms or observations upon any subject, to make a solemn and formal art, filling it with some discourses, and illustrating it with examples, and digesting it into a sensible method : but the writing in aphorisms hath many excellent virtues, whereto the writing in method doth not approach.

For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial or solid: for aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous, cannot be made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse of illus

The latter whereof seemeth to be "via deserta et interclusa." For as knowledges are now delivered, there is a kind of contract of error be-tration is cut off; recitals of examples are cut off; tween the deliverer and the receiver: for he that delivereth knowledge, desireth to deliver it in such form as may be best believed, and not as may be best examined; and he that receiveth knowledge, desireth rather present satisfaction, than expectant inquiry; and so rather not to doubt, than not to err: glory making the author not to lay open his weakness, and sloth making the disciple not to know his strength.

discourse of connection and order is cut off; descriptions of practice are cut off; so there remaineth nothing to fill the aphorisms but some good quantity of observation: and therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt to write aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded. But in methods,

"Tantum series juncturaque pollet, Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris ;" as a man shall make a great show of an art, which, if it were disjointed, would come to little. Secondly, methods are more fit to win consent or belief, but less fit to point to action; for they carry a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, one part illuminating another, and therefore satisfy; but particulars, being dispersed, do best agree with dispersed directions. And lastly, aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, do invite men to inquire farther; whereas methods, carrying the show of a total, do secure men, as if they were at farthest.

But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on, ought to be delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in the same method wherein it was invented; and so is it possible of knowledge induced. But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge, no man knoweth how he came to the knowledge which he hath obtained. But yet nevertheless, "secundum majus et minus," a man may revisit and descend unto the foundations of his knowledge and consent; and so transplant it into another, as it grew in his own mind. For it is in knowledges as it is in plants: if you mean to use the plant, it is no matter for the roots; but if you mean to remove it to grow, then it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips: so the delivery of knowledges, as it is now used, is as of fair bodies of trees without the roots; good for the carpenter, but not for the planter. But if you will have sciences grow, it is less matter for the shaft or body of the tree, so you look well to the taking up of the roots: of which kind of delivery the method of the mathematics, in that sub-things will come in of themselves: indeed a man ject, hath some shadow; but generally I see it neither put in ure nor put in inquisition, and therefore note it for deficient.

Another diversity of method there is, which hath some affinity with the former, used in some cases by the discretion of the ancients, but disgraced since by the impostures of many vain persons, who have made it as a false light for their counterfeit merchandises; and that is, enig

Another diversity of method, which is likewise of great weight, is the handling of knowledge by assertions and their proofs, or by questions and their determinations; the latter kind whereof, if it be immoderately followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding of learning, as it is to the proceeding of an army to go about to besiege every little fort or hold. For if the field be kept, and the sum of the enterprise pursued, those smaller

would not leave some important piece with an enemy at his back. In like manner, the use of confutation in the delivery of sciences ought to be very sparing; and to serve to remove strong preoccupations and prejudgments, and not to minister and excite disputations and doubts.

Another diversity of method is, according to the subject or matter which is handled; for there is a great difference in delivery of the mathematics,

which are the most abstracted of knowledges, and | &c. than he did in introducing the canker of epipolicy which is the most immersed; and howso- tomes; and yet (as it is the condition of human ever contention hath been moved, touching a things that, according to the ancient fables, "The uniformity of method in multiformity of matter, most precious things have the most pernicious yet we see how that opinion, besides the weakness keepers;") it was so, that the attempt of the one of it, hath been of ill desert towards learning, as made him fall upon the other. For he had need that which taketh the way to reduce learning to be well conducted that should design to make certain empty and barren generalities; being but axioms convertible, if he make them not withal the very husks and shells of sciences, all the kernel circular, and "non promovent," or incurring into being forced out and expulsed with the torture and themselves but yet the intention was excellent. press of the method: and therefore, as I did allow The other considerations of method, concerning well of particular topics for invention, so I do propositions, are chiefly touching the utmost proallow likewise of particular methods of tradition. positions, which limit the dimensions of sciences; Another diversity of judgment in the delivery for every knowledge may be fitly said, besides the and teaching of knowledge is, according unto the profundity, (which is the truth and substance of light and presuppositions of that which is deliver- it, that makes it solid,) to have a longitude and a ed; for that knowledge which is new, and foreign latitude; accounting the latitude towards other from opinions received, is to be delivered in sciences, and the longitude towards action; that another form than that that is agreeable and fa- is, from the greatest generality to the most parmiliar; and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks ticular precept: the one giveth rule how far one to tax Democritus, doth in truth commend him, knowledge ought to intermeddle within the prowhere he saith, "If we shall indeed dispute, and vince of another, which is the rule they call Ka@avrò; not follow after similitudes," &c. For those the other giveth rule unto what degree of particuwhose conceits are seated in popular opinions, larity a knowledge should descend which latter need only but to prove or dispute; but those I find passed over in silence, being in my judgwhose conceits are beyond popular opinions have ment the more material; for certainly there must a double labour; the one to make themselves be somewhat left to practice; but how much is conceived, and the other to prove and demon-worthy the inquiry. We see remote and superstrate: so that it is of necessity with them to have recourse to similitudes and translations to express themselves. And therefore in the infancy of learning, and in rude times, when those conceits which are now trivial were then new, the world was full of parables and similitudes; for else would men either have passed over without mark, or else rejected for paradoxes that which was offered before they had understood or judged. So in divine learning, we see how frequent parables and tropes are; for it is a rule, "That whatsoever science is not consonant to presuppositions, must pray in aid of similitudes."

There be also other diversities of methods, vulgar and received: as that of resolution or analysis, of constitution or systasis, of concealment or cryptic, &c., which I do allow well of, though I have stood upon those which are least handled and observed. All which I have remembered to this purpose, because I would erect and constitute one general inquiry, which seems to me deficient, touching the wisdom of tradition.

ficial generalities do but offer knowledge to scorn of practical men; and are no more aiding to practice, than an Ortelius's universal map is to direct the way between London and York. The better sort of rules have been not unfitly compared to glasses of steel unpolished, where you may see the images of things, but first they must be filed; so the rules will help, if they be laboured and polished by practice. But how crystalline they may be made at the first, and how far forth they may be polished aforehand, is the question; the inquiry whereof seemeth to me deficient.

There hath been also laboured and put in practice a method, which is not a lawful method, but a method of imposture; which is, to deliver knowledges in such manner, as men may speedily come to make a show of learning who have it not such was the travail of Raymundus Lullius, in making that art which bears his name; not unlike to some books of typocosmy, which have been made since; being nothing but a mass of words of all arts, to give men countenance, that those which use the terms might be thought to understand the art; which collections are much like a fripper's or broker's shop, that hath ends of every thing, but nothing of worth.

But unto this part of knowledge, concerning methods, doth farther belong not only the archi-| tecture of the whole frame of a work, but also the severals beams and columns thereof; not as to their stuff, but as to their quantity and figure: Now we descend to that part which concerneth and therefore method considereth not only the the illustration of tradition, comprehended in that disposition of the argument or subject, but likewise science which we call Rhetoric, or art of elothe propositions; not as to their truth or matter, but quence; a science excellent, and excellently well as to their limitation and manner. For herein Ra- laboured. For although in true value it is inferior mus merited better a great deal in reviving the to wisdom, (as it is said by God to Moses, when good rules of propositions, Kalóλov pŵтov kaтà пavтós, | he disabled himself for want of this faculty, Aaron

shall be thy speaker, and thou shalt be to him as God :) yet with the people it is the more mighty; for so Solomon saith, "Sapiens corde appellabitur prudens, sed dulcis eloquio majora reperiet ;" signifying, that profoundness of wisdom will help a man to a name or admiration, but that it is eloquence that prevaileth in an active life. And as to the labouring of it, the emulation of Aristotle with the rhetoricians of his time, and the experience of Cicero, hath made them in their works of rhetoric exceed themselves. Again, the excellency of examples of eloquence in the orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection of the precepts of eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this art; and therefore the deficiencies which I shall note will rather be in some collections, which may as handmaids attend the art, than in the rules or use of the art itself.

that she cannot be showed to the sense by corporal shape, the next degree is to show her to the imagination in lively representation: for to show her to reason only in subtilty of argument, was a thing ever derided in Chrysippus and many of、 the Stoics; who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp disputations and conclusions, which have no sympathy with the will of man.

Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to reason, it were true, there should be no great use of persuasions and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and proofs; but in regard to the continual mutinies and seditions of the affections,

"Video meliora, proboque; Deteriora sequor:"

reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of persuasions did not practise and win the imagination from the affections part, and contract a confederacy between the reason and imagination against the affections; for the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good, as reason doth. The difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely the present; reason beholdeth the future and sum of time. And therefore the present filling the imagination more, reason is commonly vanquished; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote appear as present, then upon the re

Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the roots of this science, as we have done of the rest; the duty and office of Rhetoric is, to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will. For we see reason is disturbed in the administration thereof by three means; by illaqueation or sophism, which pertains to logic; by imagination or impression, which pertains to rhetoric; and by passion or affection, which pertains to morality. And as in negotiation with others, men are wrought by cunning, by importunity, and by vehemency; so in this negotiation within our-volt of the imagination reason prevaileth. selves, men are undermined by consequences, solicited and importuned by impressions or observations, and transported by passions. Neither is the nature of man so unfortunately built, as that those powers and arts should have force to disturb reason, and not to establish and advance it: for the end of logic is, to teach a form of argument to secure reason, and not to entrap it; the end of morality is to procure the affections to obey reaand not to invade it; the end of rhetoric is, to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to oppress it for these abuses of arts come in but "ex obliquo," for caution.

son,

We conclude, therefore, that rhetoric can be no more charged with the colouring of the worst part, than logic with sophistry, or morality with vice. For we know the doctrines of contraries are the same, though the use be opposite. It appeareth also that logic differeth from rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm, the one close the other at large; but much more in this, that logic handleth reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. And therefore Aristotle doth wisely place rhetoric as between logic on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on the other, as participating of And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, both: for the proofs and demonstrations of logic though springing out of a just hatred of the rhe-are toward all men indifferent and the same; but toricians of his time, to esteem of rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, resembling it to cookery, that did mar wholesome meats, and help unwholesome by variety of sauces to the pleasure of the taste. For we see that speech is much more conversant in adorning that which is good, than in colouring that which is evil; for there is no man but speaketh more honestly than he can do or think; and it was excellently noted by Thucydides in Cleon, that because he used to hold on the bad side in causes of estate, therefore he was ever inveighing against eloquence and good speech; knowing that no man can speak fair of courses sordid and base. And therefore as Plato said elegantly, "That Virtue, if she could be seen, would move great love and affection;" so seeing

the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric ought to differ according to the auditors:

"Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion :” which application, in perfection of idea, ought to extend so far, that if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons, he should speak to them all respectively in several ways: though this politic part of eloquence in private speech it is easy for the greatest orators to want; whilst, by the observing their well-graced forms of speech, they lose the volubility of application: and therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend this to better inquiry, not being curious whether we place it here, or in that part which concerneth policy.

Now, therefore, will I descend to the deficiencies, which, as I said, are but attendances: and first, I