10. PROBLEMS.-(1.) Is Wonder greatest in mind when it is the child of ignorance or of knowledge? (2.) Can the Emotions be proved to afford evidence of the greatness of our nature, while they are at the same time essentially connected with its weakness? (3.) How does the emotion of Fear stand related to the affection of Reverence? (4.) Is Grief capable of proving in any way an elevating power, though its immediate effect is depressing?

PART III.

THE WILL.

CHAPTER I.

ITS NATURE AND RELATIONS TO OUR OTHER POWERS.

1. WILL is a power of control over the other faculties and capacities of our nature, by means of which we are enabled to determine personal activity.

It is to be carefully observed that Will is control of our own powers, not of external things. Edwards has quite overlooked this, in his definition,-Will is that which chooses anything.'-Freedom of Will, I. I. And again, he extends its application to things present and absent.' Locke had said, Essay II. 21, sec. 15, with more accuracy,' Volition is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from, any particular action. And what is the Will, but the faculty to do this?' So Reid makes Will' a power to determine in things which he conceives to depend upon his determinations.'-Active Powers, II. I. From the time of Kant, the doctrine of the Will has generally had the leading place in the Ethical systems of Germany. Next in importance in the treatment of the Will, is the literature of America, which has distinct Treatises on this subject by Edwards, Upham, Tappan, Whedon, Hazard, Bledsoe, and Day.

2. Will is a power distinct from all the other powers already named. Intellect is knowing power, Will is controlling power. Affection is inclination towards another person, Will is guidance of our own activity. Desire is craving of what we have not, Will is use of what belongs to us as part of our own nature. Emotion is excitement of feeling in contemplation of an object, Will is energy from within, directing us in our relations to external objects. Affection, Desire, and Emotion, are all concerned with external objects, Will is concerned with the management of affections, desires, and emotions. Intellect, besides being occupied with the objects and occasions which awaken affections, desires, and emotions, is capable of making these exercises of feeling themselves the matter of observation, but it is the function of Will, under fixed laws, to determine in the case of all these, including Intellect, the time, manner, and measure of exercise.

Most important of these distinctions is that between desire and will. These have often been identified. Their distinction is thorough-going, as indicated above. This has been insisted upon by Locke, Essay II. 21; by Reid, Act. Powers, II. 1, Works, 531; by Stewart, Act. and Mor. Powers, App. p. 471, Works, vi. p. 345; by Upham, on the Will, c. v. p. 84. Des Cartes identified Desire and Will, Principles of Philos. XXXII. So also did Priestley, Philosophical Necessity, p. 35. Edwards

said, 'Will seems to be a word of more general signification, extending to things present and absent. Desire respects something absent I cannot think they are so entirely distinct, that they can ever be properly said to run counter.' -Freed. of Will, 1. 1. Dr. Thomas Brown said, 'These brief feelings, which the body immediately obeys, commonly termed Volitions; while the more lasting wishes, which have no such direct termination, are simply denominated 'Desires.'-Cause and Effect, 1. 3, 3d ed. p. 51.

are

3. Will is an essential and prominent feature of Personality. A person is a Self-conscious Intelligence, capable of

self-determination. If Intelligence is needful to make knowledge of Moral Law possible, Will, or power of self-determination, is needful to make obedience to that law possible. Power of self-determination is thus essential to the nature of a moral being. Kant says of man that 'his will' is his 'proper self,' Metaph. of Ethics, 3d ed. 71. It is power of control over our whole nature. 'The immediate object of every act of will is to move some portion of the body, or to influence mental activity.'-Freedom of Mind in Willing, p. 13, by Rowland G. Hazard, New York, 1864. The author, however, gives a definition too wide, when he says, 'Will is the power or faculty of the mind for effort,' p. 24.

4. Will holds a double relation to Intelligence, (1.) a relation of superiority in respect of control; and (2.) a relation of dependence in respect of need for guidance in the government of the subordinate powers. The former is the common relation of Will to all other powers of personal activity. The latter is a special relation subsisting between Will and Intellect, by reason of which self-control in human experience is a Rational Self-control.

Reason is the 'legislator and governor of Will.'—Kant, Metaph. of Ethics, p. 18. The term 'governor' must, however, be interpreted in harmony with legislation or discovery of law, which is the proper function of intelligence.

Intellect has superiority of teaching power, without controlling power, Will has superiority of controlling power, with out teaching power. The grand distinction of man as an active being is recognised when the harmony of these two is such as to secure unity of force, and unity of result.

5. To all the powers lower than Intelligence, Will holds only the single relation of superiority in respect of control, without any dependence in respect of authoritative guidance. These lower powers afford occasion for the exercise of Will, but Will is not dependent on them for a rule of action. This singleness of relationship is consequent upon the natural