encumbered by discussing the question of Morals under the general conception of The Good, as a character of things, rather than under the conception of The Right, as a quality of actions. It commonly led to an estimate of moral good by its utility, as in the part taken by Socrates in the Protagoras; or to the use of good and evil in a double sense, as when Socrates makes the doing of injustice a greater evil, and the enduring of it a less.-Plato's Gorgias, 509. As a compensation we receive from the Ancient Philosophy most valuable discussions in support of the unapproachable superiority of Moral good, among all forms of good attainable by man. Ultimately, as with Plato, The Good comes to be identified with God himself.-Repub. vii. 517; Jowett, ii. p. 351. The disposition to make The Good the basis of Morality has recently reappeared in some adherents of the à priori school, as well as among Utilitarians. For example, Schleiermacher, Die Sittenlehre, Werke, Philos. vol. v.; the younger Fichte, System der Ethik, ii. 1, p. 27; Rothe, Die Theologische Ethik, vol. iii.; and in one of the most recent works, translated from the Danish into German, Bishop Martensen's Die Christliche Ethik.

In modern times the universally acknowledged distinction between actions right and wrong, has commonly been accepted as the primary fact, giving occasion for a Moral Philosophy. 'Those who have denied the reality of Moral distinctions may be ranked among the disingenuous disputants; nor is it conceivable that any human creature could ever seriously believe that all characters and actions were alike entitled to the affection and regard of every one.'-Hume's 'Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,' Essays, vol. ii. p. 223.

It is of essential moment to distinguish between the foundation of moral distinctions and the knowledge of them. Hume has confounded these at the outset. He treats of the problem 'concerning the general foundation of Morals; whether they be derived from reason or from sentiment, whether we attain

the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense.'—Ib. These are two perfectly distinct questions. Mackintosh's Dissertation, sect. i. As to the foundation of moral distinctions, I wish to insist that that is independent of human personality; while as to the knowledge of moral distinctions, that is derived from Reason, not from feeling.

2. Of the duality of moral distinctions, these may be taken as examples :-persevering use of personal powers, courageous endurance of privation, truthfulness in utterance, kindness of disposition, and efforts to mitigate the sufferings of others, are right actions; while vanity on account of possessions, envy of others in prosperity, secret satisfaction at their trials, dishonest dealings, and wilful infliction of injury, are wrong actions.

3. The actions possessed of moral quality are the actions of intelligent agents. If the term 'action' be employed in a wider sense, such application goes beyond the moral sphere, as when we speak of the 'action' of water on the rock; · organic action, as the action of the heart; and the action of an animal in walking or eating. When deliberate reflection on the nature of the act is impossible, moral quality does not belong to the action. The terms 'right' and 'wrong' are misapplied, when used in relation to any actions other than personal actions.

4. All moral actions, being the actions of persons, presuppose intelligent observation, and are carried out by personal determination for a definite end. Every moral action, therefore, is capable of being regarded in three relations, according to its origin, progress, and result. With all these, intelligent self-determination is concerned. A moral action, therefore, includes motive, act, and end. As these may be distinguished from each other, they may differ in moral quality. The motive may be right, though the act is wrong. And still further, the rightness of the end does not determine the character either of the motive or of the means.

5. All personal actions are not known as moral actions. The varieties of activity possible to man are according to the powers which belong to his nature. That nature may be contemplated as physical, intellectual, and moral. Action which is merely physical, or purely intellectual, does not necessarily come within the moral sphere. For example, walking, leaping, and lifting; efforts of attention, reasoning, and memory, are not in themselves moral actions.

6. Actions not in themselves recognised as moral actions may acquire moral character by being involved with the action of our moral nature. The complex nature, physical, intellectual, and moral, may in all its parts be concerned with a definite line of action, in which case the whole extent of activity wears a moral character. Every power belonging to us as moral beings is thus capable of being turned to a moral or an immoral use. Physical exercise is a merely physical good; but physical strength can be employed for the attainment of moral good or the doing of moral evil. Intellectual exercise is an intellectual good, but it also can be employed in moral relations, for good or evil.

7. Actions which are not in themselves Moral actions, cannot with philosophical warrant be denominated actions 'morally indifferent.' The reason for this statement is contained in the previous paragraph, from which it appears that the distribution of our actions into 'good, bad, and indifferent,' is inadmissible.

The designation 'indifferent' comes to us from the Stoic Philosophy, adtápopa, things neither good nor bad. See Zeller's Stoics, etc., p. 218. The distinction was accepted by Cicero, who translated adtápopov by indifferens: Quod illi ádiá popov dicunt, id mihi ita occurrit, ut indifferens dicerem.' -De Finibus, iii. 16. Cicero also described things indifferent by the designation res mediae, things lying in the middle, between right and wrong. This phrase is as unsuitable as the other, for things morally right are not separated from

things morally wrong by an intermediate territory. Moral distinctions belong to a single sphere, which is the inner and more sacred sphere of human life. All beyond that sphere, moral characteristics cease to apply. The contrast is interesting between this classification of things (possessions rather than actions), without moral quality as res mediae, and Aristotle's mean, peσórns, as determining the nature of virtue. The Stoics aimed at a classification of different kinds of good, and placed such external good as health of body, honours, and wealth, as res mediae. Aristotle, looking at activity, makes the mean to be the test of virtuous action in all cases.

In the Scotch Philosophy, Reid accepted the classification of actions into 'good, bad, and indifferent.'-Active Powers, Essay v. c. iv. (Hamilton's Ed. p. 646.)

8. Whether moral distinctions are recognised by men generally, may be ascertained by reference to the testimony coming (1) from individual conduct, and (2) from social life. What has been reached introspectively may thus be tested by external observation. First, Testimony from personal conduct. Every man is seen to experience self-approbation and self-condemnation on account of his actions. Shame because of wrong-doing may be taken as an illustration, with the admission that there is a distinction between the shame felt on account of awkwardness, and that on account of wickedness. Second, Testimony from social life. Men are agreed in approving certain actions as right, and all nations inflict punishment on evil-doing.

The sufficiency of the evidence from these sources is not affected by the question whether that evidence is applicable to all forms of moral distinctions. For the present purpose, it is of no moment whether the actions punished by society do or do not embrace the whole range of actions morally wrong. The fact of the punishment of some actions is sufficient. Even on Professor Bain's theory, which makes punishment and moral distinction co-extensive (Emotions and Will, p. 257), there arises no difference at the present point.

9. While all men agree in accounting certain actions right and others wrong, they may not agree as to the actions so regarded. The explanation of such disagreement is connected with the later enquiry regarding the ground or criterion of moral distinctions, but such disagreement does not affect the evidence for the fact, that men do recognise moral differences among actions.

10. PROBLEMS.-—(1.) Indicate the grounds on which THE GOOD is not to be taken as affording a commencement for Ethical Enquiry. (2.) Does the identification of pleasure with the good, in the Protagoras, rest on sufficient grounds? (3.) Animals may be trained to obedience; a dog will rush into the water to save a drowning child; animals undomesticated and untamed will die for the protection of their young: do such facts as these indicate a knowledge of moral distinctions? Darwin's Descent of Man, I. c. iii. 'The Moral Sense.' On the opposite side, Wallace's Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection.