PART IV.

MORAL SENTIMENTS.

1. BESIDES the Affections and Emotions already described in PART II., there are other dispositions of mind, which have as their objects, moral actions considered in themselves, or persons regarded as agents acting within the moral sphere. These are properly named 'Moral Sentiments,' and are experienced only through means of the exercise of our moral nature, distinguishing between right and wrong.

2. These Sentiments afford illustrations of the common law of mind, that all exercise of the intelligent nature is accompanied by an experience of sensibility. Intelligence directed on moral distinctions, is thus attended by a particular order of sensibility.

3. The moral sentiments differ in their psychological character, according as the judgment on which they attend, applies merely to an action in itself considered, or to the agent whose action is observed, or to self as the agent. These sentiments may thus wear the character of mere feeling, or of affection, or of emotion. The name 'moral sentiments,' therefore, is not to be regarded as indicating exact similarity of psychological character in the dispositions grouped under it, though they agree in these two characteristics, that they are of the nature of sentiment or feeling in contrast with intelligence; and that they attend upon moral judgments. They

harmonize with these judgments, as sentiment can harmonize with thought, and they support the judgments as attendant sanctions.

4. In accordance with their functions, the natural ground of classification is obtained by reference to the distinct moral judgments which they accompany, as these judgments refer to the actions or to the agent,—and, in the latter case, to another person or to self.

5. In harmony with the twofold division of moral quality, as right or wrong, moral sentiments appear in double form, as pleasurable or painful, each sentiment of a pleasurable kind, because of approval, having its contrary, in case of a judgment of condemnation.

6. Viewing a moral action simply in the light of the judgment pronounced upon it, we experience a sentiment of beauty or deformity, as the judgment is favourable or unfavourable. There is a moral beauty, varying in degree, according to harmony with moral law, and the simplicity or complexity of the action. There is in like manner a moral deformity, awakening, more or less powerfully, a sense of aversion or dislike.

7. Consequent upon a judgment approving an action, and the attendant sentiment of the beautiful, there is admiration of the agent. With the opposite judgment, and its attendant feeling, there is disrespect to the agent. These dispositions are of the nature of affections, analogous to love and hate. They accordingly have impelling power, as all affections have. Admiration of an agent in successive cases, leads to a judgment of general approval as to his character, attended by love and trust. Disrespect to an agent, in like manner, in consequence of its recurrence, conducts to dislike and distrust. 'A generous and noble character affords a satisfaction even in the survey; and when presented to us, though only in a poem or fable, never fails to charm and delight us.'-Hume, Essays, II. 195, Dissert. on the Passions, sec. 2.

8. Moral sentiment assumes a distinct type when the

judgment on which it depends is concerned with our own conduct or character. Such sentiments, however, follow the analogy of those already described.

As the sense of beauty or deformity is dependent upon a judgment concerned with the action only, either sentiment is as natural in contemplation of our own action as in contemplating the action of another person. To shun experience or acknowledgment of either sentiment, simply because the action happens to be our own, is suppression of natural sentiment, possible only by shunning the approval or disapproval of conscience.

9. As there is a judgment of approval on ourselves when we have done a right action, there is a sentiment or pleasurable feeling of self-approbation attendant on the judgment. This sentiment, being experienced in consequence of the decision that there has been conformity with moral law, is in natural harmony with the teaching of conscience. It is thus, according to its essential relation with our moral judgments, a sanction of these judgments, and a natural reward of right action. Its experience is often described as 'the testimony of a good conscience,' meaning an approving conscience.

10. The frequent recurrence of judgments of self-approval, if sufficiently tested by strict moral law, warrants a favourable judgment as to personal character, attended by a more enduring sentiment of self-esteem. Such self-esteem is in full harmony with Conscience. It is in nature wholly distinct from Pride, which is an immoral sentiment, the attendant of falsehood and self-deception. Self-esteem because of continuous observance of moral law, is in perfect harmony with a true humility, springing from habitual recognition of the limits of all our powers, for humility is not, as Hume makes it, 'a dissatisfaction with ourselves, on account of some defect or infirmity.'-The Passions, sec. 2; Essays, II. 191. Humility as a virtue is at the opposite extreme from humiliation or mortification, whether as the result of our own conduct or that of

others. Self-esteem is an essential feature of a soundly working moral nature. The loss of it betokens moral disorder.

11. As there is a judgment of condemnation pronounced by us upon ourselves when we have done a wrong action, there is a sentiment of dissatisfaction with ourselves, which involves us in the experience of great uneasiness. This is often termed the accusation of an evil Conscience. In its more active form it is designated Shame, which, as it becomes intensified, is named Remorse. This sentiment, as a restraining force, wears the character of Emotion. This restraint it exercises in harmony with the authority of Conscience, so as to prevent continuance in immorality. This emotion, in common with others, is liable to gain ascendency, and overleap the barriers of personal control. It may thus urge to recklessness in complete surrender of self-government.

12. As continuance in immoral conduct leads to the loss of self-esteem, and to an intolerable experience of self-reproach, there is a struggle of the nature to escape its misery. And, if this attempt be made while the cause of the suffering continues in operation, it is carried through under shelter of false reasoning and excuses, which blunt the sense of shame, and prepare the way for shamelessness, in wilful defiance of moral distinctions.

13. Moral sentiments which are in harmony with Conscience, are by consequence in harmony with our whole moral nature. Disregard of such sentiments, indicates some form of moral disorder.

14. Moral sentiments being essentially dependent on the moral judgments, rise spontaneously along with these judg ments, and in accordance with them. They are not dependent on our Will, either to occasion or prevent their rise, except in so far as the judgments themselves depend upon our Will.

15. This law of the rise of moral sentiments, by which they depend upon preceding judgments, makes the moral sentiment of no value as a standard for deciding the moral

character of actions. Everything here depends upon the validity of the moral judgment with which they have taken their rise. A sentiment of self-satisfaction will attend a judgment of self-approbation, whether that judgment be correct or The sole test of the moral value of sentimental experience is found in the test of the moral quality of personal actions, clear recognition of moral law.

not.

16. PROBLEMS.-(1.) Explain how one man can boast of an act, which another man regards with shame. (2.) In what combinations of experience may Shame instigate to action subversive of its own natural end? (3.) In Adam Smith's theory of Moral Sentiments, what is the value of his reference to a disinterested spectator in attempting to secure a test of sympathy?