PART V.

DISORDER OF OUR MORAL NATURE.

1. THE preceding investigations have repeatedly brought into view evidence that our moral nature is in a condition of disorder. Stated generally, the result is, that our nature does not work in full harmony with the dictates of the governing power.

2. The evidence of moral disorder may be summarized under three divisions :-(1.) insubordination of lower motives, as in the gratification of natural desires in opposition to the guidance of Conscience; (2.) the action of impulses which are in their nature condemned by Conscience, such as envy, selfishness, cruelty; (3.) the experience of moral sentiment of a kind which can have exercise only in a nature disordered, and as a check upon the increase of moral disorder,—the sentiment which according to its degree of strength is named self-disapprobation,-shame,-remorse.

3. The disorder of our moral nature, of which the evidence is so distinct and abundant, has been all but uniformly acknowledged by philosophers. The explicit character of the general acknowledgment may be inferred from the following examples. The Socratic doctrine that Virtue is knowledge, and that no one is voluntarily evil, kaкòs ékùv ovdeìs, may seem adverse to an admission of disorder, and so in form it is, for it implies the presence of adequate motive power for

well-doing. But in reality it involves a very full acknowledgment of disorder, since it is supported on the ground that all men seek their own good, and that they excuse their folly by reference to some form of deception of which they have been the victims. Plato says, 'Virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice is the disease and weakness and deformity of the soul.'-Repub. IV., Jowett's Transl. II. 276. The disorder he explains in the following manner. First distinguishing the parts of our nature as rational, concupiscent, and irascible, he says, 'Must not injustice be a kind of quarrel between these three—a meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part of the soul against the whole soul, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural vassal-that is the sort of thing; the confusion and error of these parts or elements is injustice and intemperance, and cowardice and ignorance, and in general all vice?' —Ib., Jowett, iv. 275. See also the misery of a corrupt soul, as described in the Gorgias. Aristotle says, 'We are more naturally disposed' towards those things which are wrong, and 'more easily carried away to excess, than to propriety of conduct.'-Ethics III. I. The testimony from modern philosophy is equally explicit. Des Cartes says, 'With respect to seemingly natural impulses, I have observed, when the question related to the choice of right or wrong in action, that they frequently led me to take the worse part.'-Medit. III., Prof. Veitch's Transl. p. 39. I need not mention in detail Hume's representations of human vanity in sec. II. of his Dissert. on the Passions. In illustration of the fact that an opposition of passions commonly causes a new emotion in the spirits, and produces more disorder than the concurrence of any two affections of equal force,' he says, 'Hence we naturally desire what is forbid, and often take a pleasure in performing actions merely because they are unlawful. The notion of duty, when opposite to the passions, is not always able to overcome them;

and when it fails of that effect, is apt rather to increase and irritate them, by producing an opposition in our motives and principles.'-Dissert. on the Passions, sec. VI., Essays, II. 218. Adam Smith's whole theory is a testimony to moral disorder, in the acknowledgment of the continual need for going out of self, in search of a disinterested spectator, in order to avoid bias. Mackintosh, in remarking that 'many passions prevail over' the moral sentiments, says, 'The prevalence itself . . is perceived to be a disorder, when seen in another man, and felt to be so by the mind disordered, when the disorder subsides.'-Dissert. sec. vi., Remarks on Butler, Whewell's ed. p. 153. Comte says, 'We must regret that even in the best natures, the social affections are so overborne by the personal, as rarely to command conduct in a direct way.-Philos. Positive, B. VI. c. 5; Sociology, Miss Martineau's Tr. II. p. 131. In accordance with this statement, Comte proceeds to speak of 'the radical imperfection of the human character,' II. p. 133. With these as representative witnesses to the fact of moral disorder, testimony need not be extended in proof of its general acknowledgment.

4. As the fact of moral disorder appears conspicuously in the abnormal action of the desires and affections, and in the existence of dispositions, having the influence of motive forces, which are antagonistic to the authority of conscience and to the harmony of our nature, the extent of the disorder may be computed on these data. Having regard to the difference between Intelligence and Disposition, the question may be considered from the two opposite points of view afforded by these sides of our nature. For this purpose, it is not needful here to reproduce the evidence in support of the position that the conscience discovers to us moral law, and has in this respect competent authority in the government of our life.—Part 1. div. i. chaps. iii. and iv. Assuming this, our investigation must take the form of an inquiry, how far the

conscience, and our intellectual powers generally, are affected

in nature or action by the moral disorder existing in the mind; and, on the other hand, how far natural dispositions are influenced by this disorder.

5. Our Intellectual Powers are not so influenced by moral disorder as to render them uncertain guides in the recognition and application of moral truth.

Taking first a general view, the contrast between Intellect and Disposition is such that neither abnormal action of natural dispositions, nor the action of unnatural dispositions, produces an essential change upon intellect. Cognitive power, that is power of sight or knowledge, is so different in nature from the power of disposition, that each produces distinct results according to its own nature; in the one case, knowledge; in the other, movement or excitement of mind, exercising impelling or restraining force. It is no part of the function of cognitive power to produce sentiment, neither is it of sentiment to provide knowledge. This is a simple exposition of the difference of the two classes of powers.

When, however, we consider the laws which regulate the action of these two sides of our nature, we find that they do not operate singly, but conjointly, and in such a manner as to influence each other. What then is the nature and possible extent of this influence? It is such that they may mutually stimulate or restrain each other, but not such that either can change the nature of the other, or the laws of its exercise. Affection in its ardour can greatly restrain the action of intellect, a fact commonly known under the designation of 'the blinding power of love.' Intellect in full exercise, takes the government of affection, and thereby keeps it in check. These are the laws which regulate the joint action of the two sides of our nature, and their bearing on the question under discussion is obvious. The intellect is by its nature the governor of disposition, but disposition in its development may break away from its control. Abnormal action of natural disposition does involve a check on intellectual action, so