method of Kant is included, by which he distinguishes between the a posteriori and the a priori in knowledge; but the dialectic method is excluded, such as that of Spinoza (Ethics), which elaborates a theory from a series of definitions, or such as that of Hegel (Wissenchaft der Logik), which starts from the highest abstraction, viz., Pure Being; (v. Secret of Hegel, by J. H. Stirling, LL.D., London, 1865.)

4. The Order of Investigation must, as in all sciences, be from the simple to the complex. Moral Philosophy must, therefore, begin with individual experience; and must pass thence to social life, and thereafter to the wider testimony of History. From these fields of observation it rises to grapple with problems which transcend observation, while they rise out of it.

Comte pleads for commencing our study in society, because the laws of human conduct are best inferred from the actions of men in the mass; Cours de Philosophie Positive, 1. 31; 2d ed. The following passage from Mr. Mill may be taken in reply:-'Human beings in society have no properties but those which are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of nature of individual man ;' System of Logic, 2d ed., II. 543. But, for the reason indicated by Hume, (Intro. to Treat. on Hum. Nat.), observation of the actions of men is essential for completing our investigations.

5. CONSCIOUSNESS (Conscientia, Bewusstseyn) is the uniform condition of individual experience. To consciousness, therefore, must be our primary and ultimate appeal concerning the facts of personal experience. As here understood, 'individual experience,' and the facts of consciousness,' are identical. Physical impressions are facts of experience only as they are recognised in consciousness. A distinction must,

however, be kept between facts of experience and conditions of life. The play of vital organs, such as the heart or brain, is largely beyond the range of consciousness, though the action of both may be closely connected with our mental activity, and may thus have an important bearing on the interpretation of what is experienced.

Consciousness, though associated with physical energy, is not so closely connected with it as to make the latter the measure of the former. Accordingly, physical prostration, popularly named 'unconsciousness,' is not to be reckoned equivalent to a cessation of personal experience. On the contrary, it often happens that those said to be unconscious are aware of what is transpiring around them.

For a full investigation of the nature, evidence, and authority of Consciousness, Hamilton's Metaphysics, Lects. xi.-xvi., and Note H. in Reid's Works. Hamilton says, 'It is the recognition by the thinking subject of its own acts or affections;' Metaph. 1. 201. Rather, it is the recognition by the thinking subject of itself and its own acts and affections. 'What consciousness directly reveals, together with what can be legitimately inferred from its revelations, composes, by universal admission, all that we know of the mind;' Mr. J. S. Mill's Exam. of Sir W. Hamilton's Philos p. 132, 3d ed. For the grounds on which Mr. Mill holds that 'we cannot study the original elements of mind in the facts of our present consciousness;' Ib. p. 173.

6. THE INTROSpective or Reflective Mode OF ENQUIRY is an essential requisite for the construction of a science of mind. This mode of enquiry is named Introspective, because the individual must look within himself in order to discover the facts of his experience; Reflective, because he must turn

back upon the facts as having had a place in experience. The necessity for the introspective line of enquiry arises from the application of an obvious law of evidence. A man must attend to the facts of experience in order to interpret them. And it is only as the facts of our inner experience are subjected to observation and analysis that it is possible to attempt the construction of a philosophy of them.

Comte has declared Introspection impossible. His argument is this, 'In order to observe, your intellect must pause from activity; yet it is this very activity which you want to observe. If you cannot effect the pause, you cannot observe; if you do effect it, there is nothing to observe.'-(Miss Martineau's Translation, I. p. 11.) The argument involves neglect of the following facts: that intellectual activity implies consciousness; that attention to its own states is a possibility of mind; that repetition in consciousness of the same act leads to increased familiarity with it; that memory admits of the recall of what has previously passed through consciousness. There is, therefore, no necessity for a pause in order to attain knowledge of personal activity. Dr. Maudsley not only accepts the argument of Comte, but supplements it thus: (a) There are but few individuals who are capable of attending to the succession of phenomena in their own minds; (b) there is no agreement between those who have acquired the power of introspection. (c) As long as you cannot effect the pause necessary for self-contemplation there can be no observation of the current of activity; if the pause is effected, then there is nothing to observe.'-The Physiology and Pathology of Mind, p. 1o, 2d ed. These statements may be summarised thus (1.) Few can use the introspective method; (2.) those who can are not agreed as to the results thereby secured; (3.) nobody

can use it at all. Comte himself did not maintain his consistency. Take the following example :- Philosophers tell us of the fundamental difficulty of knowing ourselves; but this is a remark which could not have been made till human reason had achieved a considerable advance. The mind must have attained to a refined state of meditation before it could be astonished at its own acts,-reflecting upon itself a speculative activity, which must be at first incited by the external world.' -Cours de Philos. Positive, vi. 6, Miss Martineau's translation, II. p. 159. If it be possible by any process of refinement to attain reflection on our own mental activity, the objection to introspection is admitted to be untenable. On this subject see Sir H. Holland's chapter on Mental Consciousness, Mental Physiology. By Mr. Mill a 'Psychological mode of ascertaining the original elements of mind' is placed over against the Introspective. Exam. of Hamilton's Philos., p. 170, and p. 173; with which compare the Natural History' mode in Prof. Bain's Senses and Intellect, with Append. A., and chapter on Consciousness;' Emotions and Will, p. 555; also Spencer's Principles of Psychology, 'On Consciousness in general,' p. 322, c. 25. Mr. Mill, 'for want of a better word,' calls his mode 'Psychological;' but the Introspective is Psychological, and his Psychological is Introspective. For an admirable statement on Introspection, see Mill's Exam. of Hamilton's Philos., p. 169.

7. The testimony of Consciousness cannot be denied without self-contradiction. He who doubts it relies on Consciousness for the affirmation of his doubt.

This is the key of the Cartesian position, and the basis of modern philosophy; Des Cartes's Method, I. II. III.

Method

and Meditations, translated by Professor Veitch.

Leibnitz,

Nouveaux Essais, 11. 27. Maudsley points to the madman's delusion as throwing discredit on consciousness, Physiol. and Pathol. of Mind, p. 11. So far from such an objection having any force, the pathology of brain depends for its scientific validity on the reliableness of the madman's consciousness. If a man says that he constantly sees spectres which have no existence, or that a person resides in his stomach, it is because, knowing his statements to be erroneous, you nevertheless trust his consciousness, and do not regard him as a wilful deceiver, that you pronounce him insane. Consciousness thus discovers with certainty those forms of experience which give evidence of a morbid organism.

8. The Interpretation of Consciousness is the business of philosophy. This implies the discrimination and classification of facts, the determination of their origin or source, and the discovery of the legitimate inferences from these facts. In this way we may construct a rational explanation of our experience. The distinction between the testimony of consciousness to internal facts, and its testimony 'to something beyond itself,' is well put by Mr. Mill; Exam., p. 166.

9. Every state of consciousness involves three elements. The shortest expression of such a state is, I-am consciousof a perception. An act of perception thus standing as the illustration, there are in the single state, the conscious knower, the consciousness, and the present experience, viz., a perception. Consciousness is the uniform characteristic of our experience; in consciousness, the recognition of self is invariable; the special exercise recognised is variable. While, therefore, Consciousness is knowledge of a present state, it is always knowledge of Self as Intelligence,-Self-consciousness, Selbstbewusstseyn.