apart from their causes'? If the 'habits and views' of men are to be 'rationalized, so as solidly to establish the universal obligations,'-and this is what all moralists admit must be done, if a science of morals is to be constructed,-Comte has not given us any help in explaining the rationalizing process. It may be true, as he suggests, that there is 'something astonishing in man's expectation of understanding matters which are inaccessible to reason.' But if man has a natural craving for knowledge of causes, it is needless to denounce that craving; while it is plain that what is accessible to reason can be determined only by examining reason itself.

Professing to be a philosophy of the universe, Positivism has not provided a philosophy of human nature. It may be true that men from early times have concerned themselves with explanations of the phenomena of the outer world; but the first necessity was to guide their own life. If they were intellectually interested in physical events, they were practically concerned in human actions. If they gave some thought to the rising and setting of the sun, the flowing of the waters, and the growth of trees,—they must have given more thought to the direction of their own energies. How did they recog nise a rule of personal conduct? Positivism gives no answer And while constructing a Sociology, with professed denial of the possibility of knowing causes, it fails to account for that most conspicuous fact in the procedure of Society, that it has always regarded men as the causes of their own actions, and has punished them for their evil deeds.

Returning again to Germany for a rapid glance at what has been done more recently, I refer first to JOHANN FRIED. HERBART (1776-1841). He may be regarded as a philosopher who, about the time of the elder Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, was lifting his voice in favour of Psychology, though he was still an adherent of the transcendental philosophy. His Ethical system was first published in 1808, under the title of Allgemeine Practische Philosophie, which, with his other

ethical writings, is to be found in vol. viii. of the Collected Works.

He begins by asking 'what is the Good? Who is the Good? the Better? the Worse?' (vol. viii. p. 4) and insists that the approval and condemnation implied in these words, both in ordinary conversation and in the exercise of Conscience, makes it necessary to raise these questions,- Is such a judgment admissible? And, if this may be affirmed, Which judgments are correct?' The verification or rectification of such a judgment, 'may be expected from practical philosophy as its sole vocation,—if it has a vocation, and if it is anything,' p. 4. He treats of morals under the three conceptions, -the Good, Virtue, and Duty, showing that all three are concerned with the Will,-'Good stands as the boundary for man's Will; Virtue is the strength of his Will; and Duty is the rule of his Will,' p. 1o. In view of the judgments pronounced as to the condition of the Will, he holds two main positions,-(1.) The judgment pronounced upon a volition never marks it out as a single volition, but always as the member of a relation; (2.) The judgment has originally no logical quantity, but the sphere of its authority comes to it from the universality of the conceptions through which the members of the relation were thought,' p. II. He assigns the knowledge of moral distinctions to Taste, saying that it should be obtained from a universal Esthetic. His system is seriously hampered by the need for explaining and vindicating this Esthetical doctrine, which places Ethics along with Poetry, Sculpture, and Music, p. 12. At this stage, the theory has some analogy with that of Jonathan Edwards, who begins his theory by saying that Virtue is a species of beauty. This, however, is only an incidental resemblance. After defending the position that the recognition of moral quality is by a moral sense or taste, Herbart proceeds to enquire, How far a practical philosophy can attain to universality.' As morality is a matter of proportion or harmony, he says it

is founded on the harmony between conceptions and real things, p. 29. 'Universal conceptions, being abstracted from reality, lose a great deal of its determinateness.' On this account, they do not afford a measure of degree of moral excellence. That is found only when we contemplate the real, and compare it with the universal conception. 'Harmonious or inharmonious proportions' between volitions and conceptions, afford the ultimate test of moral actions, p. 30. On this basis, he builds up a theory of ideas, of which the following are the fundamental,-(1.) The idea of internal freedom; (2.) the idea of perfection; (3.) the idea of good volition; (4.) the idea of right.

HEINRICH M. CHALYBÄUS (1792-1862) published at Leipzig, in 1850, his System der Speculativen Ethik, in 2 vols.—a work of very great ability. The system is divided into three parts,— I. The primary principle or fundamental doctrine of Ethic; II. Phenomenology of morals; III. System of Ethic—that is, applied Ethics. A brief statement will indicate the author's fundamental position. He begins by considering Ethic in its relation to knowledge in general. 'Science is in so far a formal conception, as there is included under it the manifold and particular contents of the whole empirical knowledges; but in a more restricted sense, Science is pure, highest, philosophical (éπtýμn). As among the sciences, Ethic does not take the place of the most fundamental, pure, and original, but belongs to the mixed or applied sciences, so must we give to it that which is fundamental and pure. . . . It raises, therefore, in the foreground the demand (1.) to indicate this relation of Ethic to pure philosophy, (2.) particularly to show the basis of the Ethical principle in the absolute Idea, and its development from the same; and lastly (3.) to determine the special principle of Ethic itself as to content and application,' p. 3. 'It behoves us to make a path' to 'Pure or Fundamental Philosophy.' 'If such a general ground-science were not yet attained, the moralist himself must strive to unfold it, that

thereby he may be able to give his principle the necessary foundation,' p. 4. From these opening statements the author's standpoint is clearly seen,-his conclusion being that the Reason discovers necessary moral law, and that morality consists in the harmony of volition with reason.

'The idea of the

IMMANUEL HERMANN FICHTE, Son of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, born 1797, published his System der Ethik, in 3 vols., Leipzig, 1850-51-53, a work of great merit. The volume in which his own system is developed is vol. ii. part i., Leipzig, 1851, sold separately. He says that 'Ethic is for us the science of the nature of the human Will.' It may also be treated as 'a system of practical ideas,' for the very conception of Will involves possession of such ideas, p. 1. 'Ethical ideas are the ideal notions of perfection of Will.' Good' is the proper object of Moral Philosophy. The science shows how 'the abstract idea becomes a distinct and manifoldly articulate conception in the system of Ethical ideas; and how thence there arises for Moral Philosophy the threefold point of view of a Science of Virtue, of Duty, and of Good,' p. 28. The conception of the Will, 'resting on the depth and background of human consciousness,' recognises the will of the individual as 'a law for itself, -as command or prohibition,' p. I. 'The source and internal basis of the Shall and Shall-Not is the simple internal nature of man, and specially of that which is fundamental to his Will,' p. 29.

One of the most notable of quite recent books is that of BISHOP MARTENSEN, published at Copenhagen, the German translation at Gotha, 1871, entitled Die Christliche Ethik. 'Only in the domain of freedom is morality possible,' p. 3. 'The Moral itself is an idea, which has not its source in conduct and experience, but rather itself exists as the unconditioned law of such experience,' p. 4. All research . . . points to the idea of an absolute aim and last end for the human will and voluntary action. This all-embracing end for the will of man is THE GOOD. The Good is what secures its

end or object.' 'The Idea becomes also the Ideal when it presents itself as the pattern which, in the exercise of freedom, shall be reduced to a specific form,' p. 5. Moral Philosophy may be treated from three different standpoints,-The OUGHT, Duty, a demand on man's will; VIRTUE, the ability to do good, the law admitted into the will; and the GOOD, the realization of the sum-total of all good, p. 9. 'The Ideal of self-government is essentially the good, or the idea of Ethics. And if we inquire as to the content of this ideal, it can only be described. as man himself,-human personality, conceived in its purity and perfection.' 'The universal human,'-Allgemeine Menschliche, -thus becomes with Martensen the test of all natural Ethics.

Recent British and American developments may be more briefly traced, as the books themselves are more readily accessible. See Professor Masson's vigorous and vivid sketch -Recent British Philos., 2d ed., London, 1867. Dr. Thomas Brown's theory I have already given, p. 25. The most important works in support of the Utilitarian basis of Morals will be found in the following Division, where the theory is examined. Dr. CHALMERS in his Sketches of Mental and Moral Philosophy did not enter upon a systematic development of the Science. The most valuable portions of the book are, chap. i. -On the distinction between mental and moral philosophy; and chap. vi.-On the undue place which is often given to the Emotions, and the delusive estimate of human virtue to which it leads.

Dr. WILLIAM WHEWELL published the Elements of Morality in 1845, 2 vols.; and Lectures on Systematic Morality in 1846. In the earlier and larger work, after treating of Reason and the Springs of Action, he proceeds to maintain that 'moral rules exist necessarily,' 1. 32. The gratification of natural I. desires 'must be a part of the order of Society. There must be Rules which direct the course and limits of such gratification. Such Rules are necessary for the peace of Society.' 'Reason directs us to Rules,' 1. 33. 'As there is a