DIVISION II.-DEVELOPMENT THEORY.

CHAPTER I.

ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE.

1. NOTHING is to be held innate that can be shown to arise from experience and education.'-Prof. Bain, Ment. and Moral Science, B. II. c. 6. This is common ground. A development theory of Moral Philosophy is sufficient if it can prove its competence to explain our recognition of moral distinctions, personal obligation, and personal rights.

2. The fundamental position of the development theory is, that all our most complex states of consciousness are merely developments, under natural law, from our simplest state. The mind, as known in present consciousness, is the general resultant of all previous experience. 'We have it not in our power to ascertain by any direct process, what consciousness told us at the time when its revelations were in their pristine purity. It only offers itself to our inspection as it exists now, when those original revelations are overlaid and buried under a mountainous heap of acquired notions and perceptions.'— Mill's Exam. p. 171. The development theory is, therefore, first a theory of mind, in order to become a theory of morals. Its ethical theory depends on the proved accuracy and sufficiency of its theory of mind. The preliminary stages of the theory are of consequence here only as bearing on a theory of morals.

The history of the theory may be traced through the following works-LOCKE'S Essay (1690), giving the germ, in making sensation the origin of all knowledge, while attributing to mind a power of reflection. CONDILLAC, Essai sur l'origine des Connaissances Humaines (1746), following Locke; but later, Traité des Sensations (1754), he derives reflection from sensation. HARTLEY'S Observations on Man (1749), tracing development by association. PRIESTLEY, Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit (1777). ERASMUS DARWIN, Zoonomia, or Laws of Organic Life (1793-96); criticised by Dr. THOMAS BROWN, Observations on Darwin's Zoonomia (1798). Mr. JAMES MILL, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (1829), and a Fragment on Mackintosh (anonymously) 1835. Of the former, a new edition, edited by his son, Mr. John S. Mill, with notes by Prof. Bain, Mr. Findlater, and Mr. Grote, London, 1869,-a valuable compendium. JOHN S. MILL, Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy, 3d ed. 1867, Chaps. IX. XI. XII. PROF. BAIN'S Works,-Senses and Intellect, Emotions and Will,-Mental and Moral Science. HERBERT SPENCER, Principles of Psychology, 2nd ed. ALFRED BARRATT, Physical Ethics, London, 1869, a very able work, unfolding a theory hopelessly entangled between the irritability and contractility of animal tissue.' CHARLES DARWIN, Descent of Man, opening chapters, in contrast with which, see ALFRED RUSSELL WALLACE, Theory of Natural Selection, Chaps. on Mind and Morals.

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3. The development theory objects to the affirmation of original faculties of mind as explaining the states of consciousness. The old ground of original faculties is accounted a reproach to Philosophy. That a child is born with limbs, and organs of sense, is matter of observation; but that the child is born with power of observation, reasoning power, memory, and will, is pure assumption. Indeed, that there is in human nature such a thing as mind, or spiritual existence, in addition to physical organism, is not self-evident, but needs

proof. It may, indeed, be questioned whether Mind is anything more than 'the sum of Subject-experiences,' so that 'operations and experiences constitute mind,' or even whether mind is not merely a function of brain.'

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4. Since it is impossible to go back to the dawn of experience, the theory begins with Sensation, as the simplest fact in consciousness. Hence the development theory is called the Sensational theory.

5. The first test of the theory turns upon the account it gives of Sensation, as a fact admitted by all. What is Sensation? How does it arise? Where does it exist? How is it known? An answer to these four questions is essential to a philosophy of Sensation. Take smell as the example—one of the Sensations furthest removed from intellectual power, or, as Prof. Bain puts it, one of 'the least intellectual Sensations.' Mr. James Mill says, 'In the smell three things are commonly distinguished. There is the organ, there is the Sensation, and there is the antecedent of the Sensation, the external object.'—Analysis, I. 4; 2d ed. 1. 8. Sensation, then, is so connected with bodily organism that it implies an impression made upon some part of the nervous system by an external object. The Sensation is the fact requiring attention.

(1.) What is this Sensation? Mr. James Mill replies, it is 'a particular feeling, a particular consciousness,' 'a point of consciousness, a thing which we can describe no otherwise than by calling it a feeling.'-Analysis, I. 7; 2d ed. I. 12.

(2.) How does the Sensation arise? Odorous particles which proceed from the object' reach the organ of smell, and, in some way to us unknown, make an impression on the nerve, of which impression, the sensation in some way unknown is the consequent. Or, as Hume says (Treat. on Hum. Nat. I. I, 2), 'Sensations arise in the soul originally from unknown causes.' That the impression is transmitted to the nervecentre in the brain is acknowledged. Beyond this, Physiology makes no averment. Every one is able to tell from his own

consciousness, when he has a sensation of smell. And, as Mr. Mill says, we can distinguish this feeling, this consciousness, the sensation of smell, from every other sensation.'— Ib. 1. 7, or 1. 12.

(3.) Where does the sensation exist? Mr. Mill does not hold with Hume,' that an object may exist, and yet be nowhere' (Hum. Nat. 1. iv. 5), but replies, 'What is in me is the sensation, the feeling, the point of consciousness.'-Ib. p. 9, or 13. The sensation is in Me; not in my nose any more than in the violet. That Mr. Mill means to distinguish between the organ of smell, where the impression is, and the Me, where the sensation is, admits of no doubt. For he says the sensation is a part of that series, that succession, that flow of something, on account of which we call ourselves living or sensitive creatures.' He could not have meant that the nostrils belong to the 'flow.' In confirmation we have the following: We can conceive ourselves as endowed with smelling, and not enjoying any other faculty. In that case, we should have no idea of objects, as seeable, as hearable, as touchable, or tasteable. We should have a train of smells. Our life would be a train of smells, and nothing more.'Ib. p. 8, or 13. To which account of life this must be added, our sensitive organism would be Nose and Brain, and nothing

more.

(4.) How is the Sensation known? Much of the information now possessed as to Sensation is the result of Physiological Inquiry, and is not known by experience. But Sensation itself is always a form of experience. Our acquaintance with the facts, that odorous particles come from an object,—that there are within the nostrils olfactory nerves, sensitive to the influence of such particles, and that these olfactory nerves are connected with the nerve-centre in the brain, is not obtained by us in experiencing the Sensation of smell. Such knowledge is obtained by external observation. But Sensation is known to me as a fact in my own experience. Sensation

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does not know itself, but is known by me. This knowledge is consciousness, which is characteristic of all internal experience. Sensation, then, is known to us as a part of that . . . on account of which we call ourselves living or sensitive creatures.' The simplest expression of the fact is this-I am conscious of a sensation of smell. This is our primary fact, out of which by development a Philosophy of Mind and of Morals is to be constructed. Here we start with absolute certainty, for, as Mr. J. S. Mill says, 'Consciousness of the mind's own feelings and operations cannot be disbelieved.'—Exam. p. 166. Here also we start with the greatest attainable simplicity in human experience. However great be the 'mountainous heap of acquired notions and perceptions,' this consciousness of a sensation of smell is the simplest fact in experience. Here, on the testimony of all the authorities of a sensational philosophy, we are underneath the mountain, and have come upon the primordial element of the whole formation.

As to this simple experience of sensation, four questions have been raised. In gathering the answers, facts have accumulated. We have objects-sensitive organism-impressions made upon it by the objects—and sensations known in consciousness. All these belong to the interpretation of the simplest element in human experience. Of these, three,—the object, the sensitive organism, and the impressions made upon it, are acknowledged as realities affording an external explanation of the rise of the Sensation.

But the Sensation itself, as a fact of internal experience, is that which we need to have explained. I am conscious of the sensation as a fact 'in me.' This Consciousness is not identical with the Sensation. The latter is a sensation of smell, the former is consciousness of the sensation as mine. Sensation is a particular feeling;' consciousness is a general characteristic of all experience. With the capacity for sensation, I receive the particular feeling into myself; but with the consciousness as a characteristic of myself, the rise of the