Chancery.

2. Equitable.] An agreement between a debtor and a creditor, that the debt owing
shall be paid out of a specific fund coming to the debtor, or an order given by a
debtor to his creditor upon a person owing money or holding funds, belonging to the
giver of the order, directing such person to pay such funds to the creditor, will ope-
rate as an equitable assignment of such debt or funds. Rodick v. Gandell, 22.
3. A railway company was indebted to A, their engineer, who was greatly indebted to
his banker; the latter having pressed for payment or security, A, by letter to the
solicitors of the company, authorized them to receive the money due to him from the
railway company, and requested them to pay it to the banker; the solicitors, by let-
ter, promised the banker to pay him such money on receiving it:
Held, that this did not amount to an equitable assignment of the debt. Ib.

4. Release of Debtors, by the Assignor of a chose in action after Assignment.] The
equitable assign of a judgment debt assigned it over. Notice of this assignment was
not given to the judgment debtor. The original assign afterwards gave a release to
the debtor:

Held, that such release was good as against the assign, who had omitted to give notice
of the assignment to him. Stocks v. Dobson, 314.

1. Sale of goods in possession, Bankrupt Mortgagor.] A mortgagee of goods, under
a power of sale, allowed the goods to remain in the order and disposition of the mort-
gagor, until the latter committed an act of bankruptcy, but took possession before
any petition of adjudication was filed. On the mortgagor being found bankrupt,
the messenger took the goods out of the mortgagee's possession and sold them. The
mortgagee brought an action of trover and recovered, on the ground that, under the
Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, the assignees could not sell, without an ex-
press order of the commissioner, goods in the reputed ownership of a bankrupt.
The assignees applied to the commissioner, who made an order respectively confirm-
ing the sale, and reciting as a fact, that the goods were in the order and disposition
of the bankrupt at the time of the bankruptcy, with the permission of the true

Owner:-

Held, that the mortgagee was not entitled to have the order discharged on his appeal,
as being invalid on the face of it; and on the appellant declining to enter into the
question whether he had notice of the act of bankruptcy, when he took possession,
his appeal was dismissed with costs. Heslop, Ex parte, 18.

2. Performance of Conditions in the Sale of Estate.] On a sale by auction of shares
in a ship, part of a bankrupt's estate, one of the conditions was, that the purchase-
money should be paid to the solicitor of the assignees on or before a certain day,
when the purchase was to be completed, and the purchaser to have possession and a
bill of sale; the purchaser paid part of the purchase-money to the solicitor before
the day appointed for the completion of the purchase, and had possession, but not a
bill of sale:

Chancery.

Held, that the payment, and the execution of the bill of sale, ought, in pursuance of
the condition, to have been contemporaneous; that the assignees, not having re-
ceived the money from the solicitor, or executed the bill of sale, would not be
restrained from taking proceedings to recover possession of the ship; and that the
purchaser was not entitled to a decree for specific performance of the contract, by
the execution of the bill of sale by the assignees upon payment to them of the bal-
ance of the purchase-money. Hughes v. Morris, 175.

3. Powers of Creditors' Assignees.] Under the Bankrupt Act, prescribing the duties
of official assignees, the official assignee is bound by contracts entered into by the
creditors' assignees for the sale of the bankrupt's property, such contracts not being
in breach of their trust. Ib.

4. Breach of Trust.] The provision in a contract for the sale of the property of a
bankrupt, entered into by the creditors' assignees, that the purchase-money is to be
received by the solicitor of the assignees, is not a breach of trust which would induce
the court to refuse specific performance of the contract. Ib.

5. Agent for Official Assignee.] The solicitor appointed by the creditors' assignees is
the solicitor of all the assignees in the bankruptcy, but he is not, by such appoint-
ment, otherwise constituted the agent of the official assignee. Ib.

3. Gift to A and his Issue, and in Default of Issue, then over.]

1. Of Revivor.] An administrator of an intestate died in 1817, indebted to a large
amount in respect of his receipts as administrator, but leaving sufficient personal es-
tate to pay this amount, and also leaving freehold estates. In the same year a suit
was instituted for the administration of his personal estate, and in 1832, it appeared,
from the report in that suit, that his personal estate had been misapplied, and that
his executor had become bankrupt. Thereupon, and in the same year (1832), an
administrator de bonis non of the intestate, instituted a suit against the administrator's
heir and the sureties, in the usual administration bond, and against the representa-
tives of the archbishop, (who had died,) praying to have the benefit of the bond, and
to charge by means of it the administrator's freehold estates. No decree was made
in this suit, the plaintiff having married in 1838, and having died in 1847, without
the suit having ever been revived. In 1848, another of the next of kin who had
been a defendant to the suit of 1832, took out administration de bonis non of the in-
testate, and filed a bill of revivor and supplement, claiming to have the benefit of the
suit of 1832:

Held, that the suit of 1832, must be considered as having been abandoned, and that the
suit of 1848 must be considered an original suit, and as such barred by length of
time and laches. Bolton v. Powell, 32.

2. Quære. Whether the suit of 1832, was in its nature one which it was competent for
the plaintiff in that of 1848, to revive. Ib.

3. Quare. Whether either suit could be maintained, the ordinary's personal represen-
tative not having declined to lend his name in an action. Ib.

Chancery.

4. Relief upon Petition.] A tenant for life of a coal mine filed a bill, setting out docu-
ments which showed this to be the state of his title, but by mistake alleging that he
was tenant in tail. The prayer of the bill was to restrain the lessees of a contermi-
nous mine from trespassing upon his mine, and to obtain an account and payment of
the proceeds of their alleged wrongful workings in it. After an interim order was
obtained, the suit was compromised, in October, under an agreement, whereby the
defendants were to pay the plaintiff 400l., which he agreed to accept for the full
value of all coals to be raised from the mine in question, with costs to be taxed in
the then next Michaelmas term, and if reasonable security to the plaintiff's satisfac-
tion were given, six months were to be allowed for the payment:-
Held, 1. that the erroneous allegation of title in the bill could not be regarded as hav-
ing led to such a misapprehension of it, as would prevent a court of equity from
enforcing the agreement for compromise. 2. That under the agreement, the defend-
ants were not entitled to have the plaintiff's title deduced and verified. 3. That the
compromise could not be enforced by petition in the original suit, but that a new
suit was properly instituted for this purpose. Richardson v. Eyton, 51.

BOND.

Breach of Condition by Administrator.] Quare. Whether the circumstance of an
administrator dying largely indebted to the intestate's estate is a breach of condition
of the bond. Bolton v. Powell, 32.

Mortgage to secure future Payments.] A building society was formed under the 6 & 7
Will. 4, c. 32. The articles of the society provided that certain monthly subscrip-
tions and payments should be made by the members, in respect of each share held by
them, until the joint contributions were of an amount to enable each member to
receive 100%. in respect of each share. Power was given to the society to advance to
any member his shares at a discount; such member executing a mortgage to secure
the due payment of his future subscriptions. The plaintiff took an advance upon his
five shares at the rate of 45l. 10s. per share, and executed to the society a mortgage
for securing the payment of his future subscriptions, &c. The mortgage deed con-
tained no covenant or stipulation for the repayment of the money advanced upon
the shares; and the articles of the society provided that, at the termination of the
society, the mortgage should be indorsed as satisfied, without contemplating the re-
payment of the advance made. Upon a suit by the mortgagor to redeem:-
Held, reversing the decision of the court below, that the advance so made to the plaintiff
was not a loan, but an anticipatory payment, by way of discount, of the shares he
would otherwise have been entitled to at the termination of the society; and that
the mortgage was to secure his future subscriptions, &c., until that period; and that
he was not entitled to redeem upon the terms of repayment of the advance, minus
the amount of subscriptions paid by him up to the notice to redeem; and the bill
was dismissed. Seagrave v. Pope, 477.

CASES EXPLAINED, &c.

1. The case of Webb v. The Direct London and Portsmouth Railway Company, 21
Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Chanc. 337; s. c. 9 Eng. Rep. 249, is to be explained on the

Chancery.

ground of the uncertainty of the contract. Hawkes v. Eastern Counties Railway
Company, 358.

2. Pitt v. Jackson, 2 Bro. C. C. 51, and Nicholl v. Nicholl, 2 W. Black. 1159, observed
upon. Monypenny v. Dering, 551.

3. Fazakerley v. Ford, 4 Sim. 390, and Taylor v. The Earl of Harewood, 3 Hare, 372,
approved of. Harrison v. Round, 563.

CHAMPERTY.

Mortgage of Fund in Court.] A party prosecuting his claim to a fund in court, and to
which he was ultimately found entitled, mortgaged it pendente lite, to enable him to
carry on his claim :-

Held, not void for champerty. Cockell v. Taylor, 101.

CHARITABLE LEGACIES.

When Void.] A bequest of a legacy, to be applied towards establishing a school at A,
provided a further sum could be raised in aid thereof, if necessary:-

Held, to import an intended outlay of the sum in building a school-house at the place
referred to; and, therefore, to be a void bequest within the Statute of Mortmain.
Attorney-General v. Hull, 182.

1. Agreement made in Ignorance of Rights.] A party relying on his ignorance of facts
must show, not only that he had not the information, but that he could not, with due
diligence obtain it.
Wason v. Wareing, 121.

2. Means of Information.] The plaintiff, a surety, sought to set aside a deed executed
in 1848, on the ground that he had been released by a transaction between the prin-
cipals in 1842, of which he was ignorant in 1848. It appeared that he had made
inquiries in 1845, and was referred to persons who could give him the information,
but neglected to do so until the end of 1849, when he obtained it :-
Held, that having, in 1845, the means of acquiring the knowledge, he must be deemed to
have had it in 1848, and his bill was dismissed. Ib.

3. Condition as to Inquiry into Title.] A condition, on the sale of leasehold property,
that the title of the lessor would not be shown, and should not be inquired into, held
to be binding, and the purchaser compelled to perform his contract, although in the
investigation, before the Master, a serious defect in the lessor's title was dicovered.
Hume v. Bently, 1.

4. Verbal Provisions affecting written Agreement.] Where persons sign a written
agreement, and there has been no circumvention, or fraud, or mistake, the written
agreement binds at law and in equity, according to its terms, although verbally a
provision be agreed to, which has not been inserted in the document, if the party who
should perform the omitted term consents to the performance of it. Martin v. Py-
croft, 376.

5. Time an Element of

Chancery.

What is a reasonable Time.] A tenant held under an agree-
ment which gave him the option of purchasing the estate, from his landlord, on giving
three months' notice. He accordingly gave notice, which expired on the 14th of
August. On the 4th of September, the vendor urged him to complete the purchase,
and on the 2d of November, gave him notice, that unless he completed within six
weeks he should consider the contract as abandoned. The purchaser went on with
the investigation of the title, but did not complete before the six weeks had expired.
The vendor then treated the contract as abandoned. In a suit instituted by the pur-
chaser for specific performance:-

Held, first, that time was not of the essence of the contract, and that if it had been, it
would have been waived by the conduct of the parties. Secondly, that the six weeks
limited by the defendant, was not a reasonable time; and specific performance was
decreed. Pegg v. Wisden, 12.

6. Acceptance of Title.] Held, also, that the purchaser, having proceeded to examine
the deeds with the abstract, must be considered to have accepted the title; but, under
the circumstances, he was allowed a week to bring in objections before the Master of
the Rolls. Ib.

7. Covenant by Lessee to Build.] A lessee of land, covenanted to build thereon,
two houses, with the approbation, and under the inspection of the lessor's surveyor,
and to expend in such building 400l. With the surveyor's approbation he built five
houses on the land, no two of which were worth so much as 400l., though all together
were worth much more:-

Held, that the covenant was substantially performed, and that there was no objection
on the ground of the deviation from its terms, under the circumstances, to the lessor's
title. Hume v. Bentley, 1.

8. Evidence, by Affidavit, of Performance.] The hearing of the cause on further direc-
tions was ordered to stand over for the production of evidence, by affidavit, of the
value of the houses built, and the approbation of the lessor's surveyor at the time.
Ib.

An

9. Inadequacy of Price.] A. B., being desirous of raising money to enable him to
prosecute his claim to a fund in court, applied to a solicitor for that purpose.
agreement was executed, by which the solicitor agreed to lend 1,000l., and A. B.
agreed to purchase from him some land for 6,000l. (ten times its value). The land
was conveyed, and the funds in court mortgaged by A. B. for the 6,000l.; but the
1,000l. was not advanced at the time. The court, on the ground of the gross inade-
quacy of value, coupled with the other circumstances of the case, set aside the whole
transaction with costs. Inadequacy of value, though it is not by itself a sufficient
ground for avoiding a sale, is yet of great weight when coupled with circumstances
of oppression. Cockell v. Taylor, 101.

10. With Railway Company to sell Land and withdraw Opposition.]