Chancery.

in paying the purchase-money, gave them no costs for the application. Lewis v. The
South Wales Railway Company, 424.

2. Specific Performance.] The Eastern Counties Railway Company, having a bill be-
fore parliament for enabling them to make a railway from W. to S., entered into an
absolute agreement with A, a landowner on the proposed line, in consideration of
his withdrawing his opposition to the bill, to purchase a house and six acres of land,
which stood settled on A for life, with remainders over, for the price of 8,000l., and
5,000l. additional by way of compensation, and undertook to obtain all such powers
and to do all such acts as would enable A to sell the estate. The bill was passed con-
taining no special powers as to A's estate; but the company under their compulsory
powers, could have taken two acres of the estate as within their line of deviation.
No funds were raised under the act, and no part of the line was commenced. The
company having totally abandoned the line, sent a notice to A that they should not
require his estate. Upon a bill filed by A against the company, before their com-
pulsory powers had expired, it was

Held, that the company were bound specifically to perform their contract. Hawkes v.
Eastern Counties Railway Co. 358.

3. Cases Explained.] The case of Webb v. The Direct London and Portsmouth Rail-
way Company, 21 Law J. Rep. (N. s.) Chanc. 337; s. c. 9 Eng. Rep. 249, is to be
explained on the ground of the uncertainty of the contract. Ib.

4. Failure of Funds.] An existing railway corporation, duly authorized, promoted a
bill in parliament for extending their line, and entered into an onerous contract with
a landowner in furtherance of the objects to be carried out by their bill. The act
passed, but no money was raised under it, and the scheme utterly failed:—
Held, that it was no objection to enforcing specific performance that it would involve
the payment of the purchase-money out of the general funds of the company, and
so would work hardship upon the shareholders who had no notice of the arrange-
ment; for the court could not recognize the rights of individual members as distinct
from the rights and liabilities of the corporation itself., Ib.

5. Contract of Company to Purchase Land.] A railway company, who had projected
and were promoting a new line of railway, being opposed by a landholder on the
line, arranged, through a third party, who professed to be the agent of the company,
to purchase his land at a certain price. The landowner accordingly withdrew his
opposition, and the bill passed authorizing the construction of the new line. No steps,
however, were taken to carry out the scheme, and the compulsory powers having
expired, though the time for completing the line had not, the landholder filed his
bill against the company for specific performance of the contract to purchase his
land:

Held, that there was no contract between the plaintiff and the company, for before
they obtained their new act they could not enter into a contract; and as to their
adoption of the contract made by their professed agent for their benefit, as a cor-
poration subsequently established, there had been nothing done after obtaining the
act which the plaintiff's withdrawal of opposition had enabled them to do, and there-
fore they could not be said to have adopted it. Gooday v. The Colchester, &c.,
Railway Company, 596.

6. The court refused even to put the company on terms to admit the contract at law;
but dismissed the bill with costs.

Ib.

RECEIVER.

1. Occupier of Estate Attorning to.] A defendant, who is the owner and occupier of
an estate subject to a charge which this suit seeks to enforce, will be compelled to
attorn to a receiver, and a reference will be directed to the Master to fix an occupa
tion rent. Everett v. Belding, 354.

2. In Partnership Cases.]

See PARTNERSHIP.

Chancery.

REHEARING..

Effect of Lapse of Time.] A petition presented in 1851, to rehear a cause disposed of
in 1834 dismissed with costs. Townley v. Bedwell, 92.

1. Conditions of] On a sale by auction of shares in a ship, part of a bankrupt's es-
tate, one of the conditions was, that the purchase-money should be paid to the soli-
citor of the assignees on or before a certain day, when the purchase was to be com-
pleted, and the purchaser to have possession and a bill of sale; the purchaser paid
part of the purchase-money to the solicitor before the day appointed for the comple-
tion of the purchase, and had possession, but not a bill of sale:-
Held, that the payment, and the execution of the bill of sale, ought, in pursuance of
the condition, to have been contemporaneous; that the assignees, not having received
the money from the solicitor, or executed the bill of sale, would not be restrained
from taking proceedings to recover possession of the ship; and that the purchaser
was not entitled to a decree for specific performance of the contract, by the execu-
tion of the bill of sale by the assignees upon payment to them of the balance of the
purchase-money. Hughes v. Morris, 175.

2. Right of Purchaser to Direct Mode of Conveyance.] A purchaser of property includ-
ed in one contract, may divide the property purchased, and apportion the purchase-
money, and he may direct its conveyance to be made by the vendors in such manner
as he may deem most expedient, and by one or more deeds; but in this case the
objections on both sides being frivolous, the decree was made without costs. Clark v.
May, 536.

3. Stipulation by Trustee as to his Receipt.] On a sale by a trustee, he stipulated, that
his receipt should be deemed an effectual and conclusive discharge, and that the pur-
chaser should not require the concurrence of the heir or cestui que trust. A decree
was made for specific performance and reference as to title. The Master found in
favor of the trustee; and upon exceptions, the purchaser contended, that the rule
as to the concurrence of the cestuis que trust being one for their protection, it was a
breach of trust to stipulate that they should not concur; but the court held the point
concluded by the decree. Wilkinson v. Hartley, 135.

4. Deduction of Title by Vendor.] The defendant sold and conveyed to the plaintiff
some undivided shares in various properties. Disputes afterwards arose as to what
shares had been purchased. They agreed to settle all these disputes, and signed a
written agreement that the plaintiff should pay the defendant 9,500l., and that the
defendant should execute such deeds as the plaintiff should require for the convey-
ance of the estates. Upon a bill for specific performance:

Held, that the defendant was not bound to deduce any title to the property. Godson
v. Turner, 79.

5. Rescinding Sale for Inadequacy of Price.] Where the owner of a reversionary life-
interest in leasehold estates sold the same by private contract, and the purchaser
obtained only the opinion of an actuary on its value, without taking any steps to
obtain a knowledge of its market value with reference to its local circumstances,
and the vendor instituted a suit to rescind the sale on the ground of inadequacy of

Chancery.

price, the court, considering upon the evidence that the defendant had not shown
that he gave the fair market value, set the same aside. Edwards v. Burt, 434.

6. Valuation of Reversion.] If, before a sale of a reversionary interest, the vendor
and purchaser concur in ascertaining from persons of competent skill, and who
have a knowledge of the property and of all the circumstances likely to influence its
value, and also a well-considered estimate of what the property would be likely to
fetch on a sale, and act on that opinion:

Semble, that the court would not set aside the sale merely because surveyors should
differ from the conclusion on which the parties acted. Ib.

7. Sale of Reversion.] Semble-That a sale by auction is not necessary to sustain a
purchase of a reversion, if impeached. Ib.

8. Opening Biddings.] Leave will not be given to open the biddings until after the
Master's report on the purchase. Lovegrove v. Cooper, 415.

9. By Prebendary.] A prebendary sold to a trustee for himself, in 1808, certain pre-
bendal property for the redemption of the land-tax. The lords commissioners and
other necessary persons were parties to the sale. The succeeding prebendary did
not question the transaction; but his successor, who was appointed in 1833, and had
ever since been in the receipt of the annual amount of land-tax, which had been re-
deemed, filed a bill in 1848, to set aside the sale, on the ground of illegality, irregu
larity and fraud:-

Held, first, that such property was salable under the provisions of the Land-Tax Re-
demption Acts; secondly, that the selling prebendary might purchase the property
for himself; and thirdly, fraud not being proved, the prebendary not being a direct
trustee of the property for his successors, and forty years having elapsed since the
transaction, impeachable (if at all) at its inception, that the bill ought to be dismissed,
with costs. Beadon v. King, 388.

1. Voluntary Settlement not Revokable.] A woman while sole, in contemplation of a
marriage with J. T., assigned the whole of her property to trustees for the benefit of
herself until her marriage, if any; or in case no such marriage should be solemnized,
and after the solemnization, if any, of the same marriage, upon trust for her; and
after her decease, in case she should marry and have issue, upon trust for the child-
ren as therein mentioned. The fund was transferred to the trustees; but the con-
templated marriage did not take effect, and the woman married another person:-
Held, that the settlement was voluntary; that the trusts arose upon the fund being
completely vested in the trustees; that they could not, at the request of the settler,
allow any part of the fund to be withdrawn; and that the settlement was good upon
her while sole, and upon her and her issue in the event of any marriage, and could
not be revoked. M'Donnell v. Hesilrige, 587.

Chancery.

2. Wife's Equity to.] The wife of a lunatic entitled to a share of residue of an intes-
tate's personal estate, filed a bill against her husband, praying a settlement of the
fund on herself and children. After inquiries in the lunacy, the committee was
authorized to assent to a settlement of one half of the fund; and, by an order made
in the cause, it was referred to the Master to approve of a settlement. The Master
accordingly approved of a settlement, by writing at the foot of the draft, and no
further proceedings were had when the lunatic died. The wife subsequently died,
having by will disposed of the entire fund:-

Held, that the proposals in the Master's office had not been proceeded with to such a
stage at the time of the lunatic's death as to preclude his wife from retiring from the
proposed settlement; and the court ordered the whole amount of the fund to be paid
to the representatives of the wife. Baldwin v. Baldwin, 158.

3. Conversion of Real Estate into Personal.]

An

1. Lien upon Title Deeds.] In an administration suit instituted by an infant cestui que
trust, under a will against the executors, one of the executors admitted that part of
certain sums advanced by him on mortgage, formed part of the trust estate.
order was made in the suit for the completion of contracts for sales of the mortgaged
property which had been entered into by the executor. Under this order the pur-
chase-moneys were paid into court to the credit of the cause. The order directed
the executor to execute the conveyances, and deliver the title-deeds to the petition-
ers; but the executor's solicitors refused to give up the deeds, claiming a lien upon
them for costs due from the executor and advances made for the maintenance of
the plaintiff:

Held, that the court had jurisdiction on petition, to order the solicitors to deliver up the
deeds. Francis v. Francis, 47.

2. Liability for Money Received.] A married woman, to whom a sum of money was
payable for her separate use, received a check from the Accountant-General, and
handed it over to her solicitor, who accompanied her. The solicitor was on motion
ordered to pay the balance to his client, and

Held, that the onus being on the solicitor to show cause for not paying it over, he could
not set up a voluntary agreement to pay her husband's debt out of it. Mawhood v.
Milbanke, 73.

3. Of Assignees in Bankruptcy] The solicitor appointed by the creditors' assignees is
the solicitor of all the assignees in the bankruptcy, but he is not, by such appoint-
ment, otherwise constituted the agent of the official assignee. Hughes v. Morris, 175.
4. Change of Name.] Upon the application of a solicitor, who had assumed the name
of Chamberlain in addition to his own, the court, being statisfied with the reasons,
ordered an entry of the change of name to be made upon the roll of solicitors
Mathews, Ex parte.

Chancery.

What Constitutes Specialty Debt.]

SPECIALTY.

See COVENANT.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

1. Of Contract of Sale.] On a sale by auction of shares in a ship, part of a bank-
rupt's estate, one of the conditions was, that the purchase-money should be paid to
the solicitor of the assignees on or before a certain day, when the purchase was to
be completed, and the purchaser to have possession and a bill of sale; the purchaser
paid part of the purchase-money to the solicitor before the day appointed for the com-
pletion of the purchase, and had possession, but not a bill of sale:
Held, that the payment, and the execution of the bill of sale, ought, in pursuance of
the condition, to have been contemporaneous; that the assignees, not having received
the money from the solicitor, or executed the bill of sale, would not be restrained
from taking proceedings to recover possession of the ship; and that the purchaser
was not entitled to a decree for specific performance of the contract, by the execu
tion of the bill of sale by the assignees upon payment to them of the balance of the
purchase-money. Hughes v. Morris, 175.

2. Breach of Trust.] The provision in a contract for the sale of the property of a
bankrupt, entered into by the creditors' assignees, that the purchase-money is to be
received by the solicitor of the assignees, is not a breach of trust which would induce
the court to refuse specific performance of the contract. 16.

3. Of Agreement to Purchase Copyholds Devised to Trustees.] A testator devised
copyholds to such uses as his two trustees, or the survivor of them, or the executors
or administrators of such survivor, within twenty-one years after the death of such
survivor should, by deed, appoint; and subject thereto to the use of his two trustees,
their heirs and assigns, forever; and he directed them to sell the same, and gave
them power to give receipts for the purchase-money:—

Held, that a purchaser who had agreed to buy was bound to complete on having a pro-
per deed of appointment from the trustees, without the trustees being first admitted.
Glass v. Richardson, 383.

4. Uncertainty of Agreement.] Bill for the specific performance of an agreement made
between patentees for the use of their respective patents, embodied in an order at
nisi prius, the defendants admitting that they were bound by the agreement, and
that it ought to be specifically performed, but disputing its meaning - dismissed with
costs, on the ground that the agreement was framed in terms which were incapable
of any certain construction. Tatham v. Platt, 190.

5. Of Verbal Agreement.] Leave given to file a claim to enforce the specific perform-
ance of a verbal agreement to purchase land, containing a statement of facts show-
ing part performance. Burnley v. Eastern Counties Railway Company, 158.

6. Effect of Verbal Provision.] A filed a claim for specific performance of a contract by
B, C, and D, stating in his claim that the defendants had by an agreement in writing
contracted to demise a house to A for a certain term, at a stated rent, and that the
plaintiff A had agreed by parol, at the same time, to pay to the defendants a pre-
mium of 2001. The claim prayed that the defendants might grant a lease, the plaintiff
offering to pay the premium according to the parol agreement :-

Held, on appeal, overruling the decision of the court below, that the Statute of Frauds
did not present an obstacle to specific performance if there were no fraud. Martin
v. Pycroft, 376.

7. Allegations of Fraud.] The defendants, at the hearing, alleging that the agreement
was obtained by the plaintiff from one by fraud and from another by fraudulent mis-
representation, the cause was ordered to stand over that an oral examination of wit-
nesses might take place under the provisions of the statute 15 & 16 Viet. c. 86; and
such examination having taken place, upon which the allegations of fraud and fraud-
ulent misrepresentation failed, the court decreed specific performance. Ib.