were indorsed and taken by the plaintiff, he knew that the defendant James Kennedy signed them as surety for his son, the other defendant; and that said notes were all signed by said James Kennedy with his son as joint maker, and for the express purpose of procuring the indorsement of the plaintiff, who indorsed said notes for the accommodation of both defendants; and that both defendants were sober and mentally competent when said notes were given. As a conclusion of law the court found that both defendants were primarily liable to plaintiff as joint makers of the notes. Exceptions were taken to each finding of fact, and to the refusal to find as requested, and to the conclusions of law. The questions which counsel appear to rely upon are: (1) Error upon the part of the court on several findings of fact. (2) His refusal to find that defendant James Kennedy received none of the proceeds of the notes, and that the plaintiff signed them for the accommodation of Robert J. Kennedy, knowing that James Kennedy was only a surety. (3) That he erred in admitting a date stamped upon one of the notes with a bank stamp as evidence of the time of payment, as bearing upon the question of defendant James Kennedy's alleged intoxication. (4) That both James Kennedy and the plaintiff were sureties of Robert J. Kennedy, and, therefore, that plaintiff had not a joint cause of action against the defendants. 1. The first point may be disposed of by the trite statement that we cannot review the findings of the circuit judge upon questions of fact, where there is a conflict in the evidence. We think that such was the case here upon every material proposition covered by the findings. 2. We think that the findings do show that James Kennedy did not receive the proceeds of the notes, inasmuch as it is stated that the plaintiff knew that he was an accommodation maker. They also show clearly that the plaintiff was an accommodation indorser. 3. The claim was made that James Kennedy was drunk when the notes were signed, and, as tending to contradict this as to one of the notes, counsel attempted to show that it was given at a certain and different time than that stated by the witnesses for the defendant, and at a time when he was not drunk. The plaintiff testified that he received the note when it was executed, and used it in payment of a former note, which was produced, which former note was stamped by the bank officer at the time with a certain stamp, and which the bookkeeper of the bank testified was paid upon the day shown by the date of the stamp. It was also shown that the stamp was one which, according to the custom of the bank, was put upon papers when paid, and such stamp was used on no other occasions. The paper with the stamp upon it was admitted in evidence, and the statement of the witness that it was paid that day was allowed to stand, against defendant's objection. Technically this was a conclusion of the witness, as it was based upon the fact that the note had the stamp upon it, and, perhaps, not admissible. But the court might properly draw the same conclusion from the document and stamp, which were properly admissible as a part of the transaction testified to by the plaintiff. Bennett v. Smith, 40 Mich. 212; Smith v. Holmes, 54 Mich. 105. We cannot hold the error fatal without concluding that the learned circuit judge relied upon the conclusion of the witness. The record clearly implies that the paper and stamp were admitted upon the proper theory, and that the findings of the court were based upon his own deductions, and not upon those of the witness, which were objected to. 4. Whatever may be the rule of law as to contribution between cosureties, it has no application to a case where the parties are not cosureties. The court found that plaintiff was not a cosurety with James Kennedy, but that he indorsed for the accommodation of both defendants, which he might lawfully do, though one was an accommodation maker for the other. The evidence is sufficient to justify this finding. We find no error in the record, and the judgment must therefore be affirmed. The other Justices concurred. BRESNAHAN v. NUGENT. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-ESTATES OF DECEDENTS-REMEDY OF An administrator cannot maintain a bill in equity under 2 Appeal from Kent; Grove, J. Submitted June 13, 1895. Decided September 27, 1895. Bill by John Bresnahan, administrator of the estate of Daniel Nugent, deceased, against Emanuel Nugent, to subject to the claims of creditors assets alleged to have been fraudulently conveyed by the decedent. From a decree dismissing the bill on demurrer, complainant appeals. Affirmed. J. H. Tatem, for complainant. Taggart, Wolcott & Ganson, for defendant. HOOKER, J. This cause is here upon general demurrer to complainant's bill of complaint, an appeal having been taken from an order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill. The bill alleges that the complainant was appointed administrator of the estate of Daniel Nugent on July 19, 1888; that on June 10, 1890, commissioners on claims in said estate allowed claims against said estate in favor of James Nugent to the amount of $2,255.03; that prior to his death, and on March 31, 1879, the intestate conveyed, by bill of sale, to the defendant, all of his personal property in the county of Kent, and, by deed, all of his real estate in said county; that upon said real estate a crop of wheat was growing, which, when ripe, was harvested and sold by the defendant, and $1,040, received therefor, was appropriated by said defendant. Subsequently the land was sold upon foreclosure of a mortgage, except one parcel. The bill states, further, that said transfer was fraudulent as against creditors, and that it has been so adjudicated in an action tried in the Kent circuit court on May 20, 1885, as between the parties to this suit, who were the parties in interest in that action, and that defendant is thereby estopped and barred from denying the fraudulent character of said deed. It is further alleged that on October 4, 1890, the complainant brought assumpsit against the defendant to collect from the defendant the amount of the claims of James Nugent, on the ground that the transfer of personal property was fraudulent and void as against Daniel Nugent's creditors, and that on December 21, 1892, he obtained judgment in the Kent circuit for $1,600, wherein said transfer was held fraudulent. Such judgment was afterwards modified and affirmed by this court (Bresnahan v. Nugent, 97 Mich. 359), and the defendant paid $947.25, that being the value of said personal property, as found by the jury, with interest. Afterwards the parcel of land hereinbefore mentioned as excepted from foreclosure was sold by order of the probate court, and the proceeds applied on the judgment. After crediting all property in the hands of the complainant, $1,232, principal, and $405, interest, is yet due upon this judgment, and there is no available property to pay the same. A decree is asked declaring the deed to the land upon which the wheat grew to be void, and that defendant be required to pay this sum of $1,040, received for wheat, with interest thereon, to the administrator. This proceeding is commenced under 2 How. Stat. § 5884, which is as follows: "When there shall be a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or administrator, and when the deceased shall, in his lifetime, have conveyed any real estate, or any right or interest therein, with the intent to defraud his creditors, or to avoid any right, debt, or duty of any person, or shall have so conveyed such estate that by law the deeds or conveyances are void as against creditors, the executor or administrator may and it shall be his duty to commence and prosecute to final judgment any proper action or suit, at law or in chancery, for the recovery of the same, and may recover, for the benefit of the creditors, all such real estate so fraudulently conveyed; and may also, for the benefit of the creditors, sue and recover for all goods, chattels, rights, or credits which may have been so fraudulently conveyed by the deceased in his lifetime, whatever may have been the manner of such fraudulent conveyance." The bill appears to be filed upon the theory that the wheat in question passed to defendant by the deed of the land, and that he acquired a title that can only be set aside by declaring the deed fraudulent and void, which, it is said, only a court of equity can do. It appears from the bill that all personal property of other kinds was held to have been fraudulently conveyed, and this by a court of law in an action of assumpsit. There can be no doubt that the crop of wheat in question might have been, if it was not, conveyed by the same bill of sale; and, if it was, there would seem to be no reason why the proceeds might not be recovered in an action of assumpsit, as well as the value of horses and other chattels. In fact, the record of the former case shows that this was attempted, but apparently failed, through defective pleading. However that may be, there seems no escape from the position that |