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it did not allege that Barbour was the agent of the Detroit Stove Works, from whom it was charged that the money was fraudulently obtained, and because it did not allege that the respondent knew the representations to be false. These representations were that he was authorized to collect money for a poor woman whose son was killed on the railway, and who was her only support. He might honestly have believed that he was authorized. Consequently the scienter was important and material. Had Behee been charged with falsely representing to B. that A. had subscribed and paid him $10, and obtained $5 from B. on this representation, that case would be in point. The information must be held good.

The proofs fully sustain the charge, and conclusively show that the respondent represented to Shank that Newton had subscribed and paid $10, whereas in fact he had subscribed and paid but $1. It is, however, insisted that no criminal intent necessary to the offense is shown, because the respondent used the money obtained for the purpose of establishing the school, and had purchased articles necessary to start it. What he did with the money is immaterial. The law does not sanction the obtaining of money under false pretenses, though the object to which it is devoted be meritorious. The criminal character of the act is not determined by the subsequent use of the money, but by the means used in obtaining it.

We find no error in the record, and the verdict is affirmed, and the court below directed to proceed to sentence.

The other Justices concurred.

OCTOBER TERM, 1895.

PRATT v. BROWN.

1. NAVIGABLE STREAMS-MAINTENANCE OF DAM-PRESUMPTION. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a dam across a navigable stream will be presumed to have been constructed under proper authority from the board of supervisors.

2. SAME-BREAK IN DAM-RIGHTS OF OWNER-DETENTION OF LOGS. The owner of a dam lawfully maintained across a navigable stream is entitled to a reasonable time within which to repair an accidental break therein, and for that purpose, if necessary to the protection of the dam from further serious injury, may temporarily detain the logs of a navigator.

Error to Saginaw; McKnight, J. Submitted April 18. 1895. Decided October 8, 1895.

Case by Edward L. Pratt against Addison T. Brown and William Ryan for an alleged unlawful interference with the driving of plaintiff's logs. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants bring error. Reversed.

William H. Sweet and W. A. Burritt (Chauncey H. Gage, of counsel), for appellants.

C. W. Perry, for appellee..

MCGRATH, C. J. This action is brought to recover damages by reason of what is claimed to be an unreasonable interference by defendants, who are the owners of a milldam known as the "Beaverton Dam," with the plaintiff, in the use of the Tobacco river for the purpose of driving logs. The following is a crude sketch of the river and its tributaries:

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The river, in its natural state of water, is from 80 to 100 feet in width. The dam is between 500 and 600 feet long, extending across the stream proper, and over a broad river bottom lying inside of an oxbow, formed by a bend in the river. A sketch will assist in understanding the situation:

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The south branch is the principal stream, and is really the river proper. The milldam is located four miles above the boom company limits, and about a mile below the junction of the middle branch and north branch with the main river. The "sand bar" is about eight miles from the mouth of the middle branch. Plaintiff's rollways were located on the middle branch, at points between the sand bar and a point four miles above the mouth of the middle branch.

One Schunk commenced floating and driving logs on the south branch on March 28, 1893. Plaintiff commenced on the middle branch April 1st. When Schunk's logs reached the junction of the middle branch with the main river, but a few of plaintiff's logs had passed that point. Defendants had placed a boom stick across the main channel of the river at a point about 500 feet above the dam, and, when these drives reached the boom stick, a break had occurred in the dam just south of the log chute, reducing the water on the flats below the floor of the chute, and so low that the logs would not pass

over the flats. Schunk's logs filled the river for one and a half miles above the dam, and plaintiff's logs extended back several miles above the mouth of the middle branch, and were held for some time. Finally, a ditch was made across the flats and through the dam, and the logs were released.

Defendants contend (a) that the river was not navigable for this purpose without the aid of floods, (b) that the break in the dam was caused by the flooding, and (c) that defendants' right to maintain the dam, to the concurrent use of the stream, and to a detention of the logs until a reasonable time within which to repair the dam had elapsed, was not sufficiently guarded in the instruction given to the jury.

1. The dam was constructed in 1892, with reference to the use of the stream for this very purpose. The detention occurred in April, 1893, and the testimony clearly tended to show that the river had been actually used for this purpose for upwards of 25 years. There was testimony tending to show that, east of the mouth of the middle and north branches, the river was navigable at this season of the year in ordinary stages of water, and without flooding. There were no log dams on the main river west of the Beaverton dam and east of the Clare dam, in Clare county, some 15 miles above. The log dams were in the tributaries, and were used principally to float the logs into the main river. The court was fully warranted in submitting this question to the jury. The instructions given upon the point were full, and correctly stated the rules of law applicable. The following questions were submitted to the jury, and both were answered in the affirmative: "Is the Tobacco river navigable for driving logs?" "Can it be navigated without

the use of dams?"

2. The testimony did not warrant the submission to the jury of the question as to plaintiff's responsibility for the break in the dam.

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