and appears as section 24, Chapter 135, Revised Laws of Massachusetts, 1902. The Massachusetts statute gives to testators no greater power of disposition of contingent interests in land by devise than was given in this State by Gen. Laws, 1896; Chapter 201, § 23. The case of Upington v. Corrigan, 151 N. Y. 143, cited by the respondent, takes a view of the right remaining in a grantor, who conveys land upon a condition subsequent, different from that adopted by the Massachusetts cases. The New York court held that there remained in the grantor no estate or interest in the land, and as, under the New York statute, only an "estate or interest in real property" could be devised, the right remaining in the grantor was not devisable, but there was no statute in New York, at the time of the decision in Upington v. Corrigan, with reference to the devise of contingent estates, of the nature of the Massachusetts and Rhode Island statutes. Whether we are prepared to accept the doctrine laid down in Austin v. Cambridgeport, supra, or not, if at law the estate conveyed to Hooper was one upon condition subsequent, then the right of reverter remaining in Nicholas Ball was devisable under Gen. Laws, 1896, cap. 201, § 23. This complainant, however, is not seeking to enforce any legal right. Whatever may have been the legal interest remaining in Nicholas Ball in the estate conveyed to Hooper, he obtained a certain equitable interest which he had a right to devise, and which he did devise, to this complainant, and the complainant is now seeking to enforce the equitable right which he claims that equitable interest gives to him. When Hooper accepted the deed from Nicholas Ball he bound himself, his heirs and assigns, to reconvey the estate, described in the deed, to Nicholas Ball, his heirs, executors, and assigns, in case of a violation of the provision in the deed. This gave to Ball an equitable interest in the land. It is well established that a right to demand a conveyance of land constitutes an equitable interest in that land. In London &c. Railway Co. v. Gomm, 20 L. R. Ch. Div. 562, it appeared that the plaintiff was seized of certain land which was no longer required for the purpose of the railway, and the plaintiff conveyed the land to C. P., and the grantee covenanted with the company that he, his heirs and assigns, whenever the land might be required for the railway or works of the company, and whenever thereunto requested by the company, after a certain notice and on payment of a certain sum, would reconvey the land to the company. The land passed by conveyance to the defendant with notice of the covenant, and the company gave the defendant notice and requested him to reconvey the land. It was found that the land was at the time of the notice required for railway purposes. Jessel, Master of the Rolls, held that the covenant gave an interest in the land, and said: "But if it binds the land it creates an equitable interest in the land. The right to call for a conveyance of the land is an equitable interest or equitable estate. In the ordinary case of a contract for purchase there is no doubt about this, and an option for repurchase is not different in its nature. A person exercising the option has to do two things, he has to give notice of his intention to purchase, and to pay the purchase money; but, as far as the man who is liable to convey is concerned, his estate or interest is taken away from him without his consent, and the right to take it away being vested in another, the covenant giving the option must give that other an interest in the land." The interest of Nicholas Ball in the land conveyed to Hooper does not differ in its essential quality from the interest of the railway in the land referred to in London v. Gomm, supra. The railway had the right to demand a reconveyance from its grantee or his assigns upon the happening of the contingency that the growth of the railway's business should make requisite the use of the land by the railway. Nicholas Ball had the right to demand a reconveyance from Hooper or his assigns upon the happening of the contingency that the land was used in violation of the provisions of the deed. In such case an equitable interest in the land was given to the grantor. Where a person has entered into a contract to purchase land, and, before he receives a deed, dies, it is well established that, although the purchase money has not been paid, the testator's equitable interest in the land will pass by a devise. Acherley v. Vernon, 9 Mod. 69, and 10 Mod. 518. An equitable interest in land, though it is but a contingent equitable interest, clearly might be devised under Gen. Laws, 1896, cap. 201, § 23, and the doctrine that it might have passed by devise, before the enactment of said Chapter 201, is well supported by the case, Bailey v. Hoppin, 12 R. I. 560. In that case the court held that a certain interest in land, then under consideration, was a contingent equitable interest, and that such an interest conveyed before his death to a testator is transmissible in equity to his devisee, notwithstanding the precarious nature of the subject of the deed. The court said: "Under the English Statute (32 Henry VIII. cap. 1) a devise of equitable estates, including estates which have only been contracted for, and even where the contract by its terms is not performable until after the execution of the will, is upheld as good in equity. Greenhill v. Greenhill, Finch. Prec. in Ch. 320; Acherley v. Vernon, 9 Mod. 68, 78; M'Kinnon v. Thompson, 3 Johns. Ch. 307. Under these precedents the only difficulty here is, that the estate contracted for was, when the will was made and until after it went into effect, something which might never exist. The contract, however, was, as we have seen, valid in equity; and therefore the contract itself, whatever subtle lawyers may think of the subject of it, was a valuable property, and as such we think it must be held to have passed to William A. Hoppin under the will." The provision of the deed to John W. Hooper, giving to Nicholas Ball the right to demand a reconveyance of the land upon the violation of the restrictions contained in the deed, gave to said Ball an interest in the land. This interest might be devised, and the right to demand a reconveyance is now in the complainant as devisee of Nicholas Ball, and is not in the heirs of Nicholas Ball. The next question is whether the complainant shall be given the relief which he seeks and shall obtain a decree for specific performance ordering a conveyance of the land to him for a breach of the provisions of the deed. (2) A bill for specific performance is an application addressed to the judicial discretion of a court of equity. "Even if the plaintiff were entitled to a specific performance of the defendant's agreement, such right is not an absolute one, but rests in the discretion of the court to be exercised on equitable considerations in view of all the circumstances of the case." Graves v. Goldthwait, 153 Mass. 268. From the testimony in the case it appears that in the use of this property by successors in title to Hooper there have been departures from the letter of the restriction in the deed. It is not clear that all of these violations came to the knowledge of Nicholas Ball or of this complainant. These breaches of the condition were known to the respondent and, not unreasonably, she might have believed that they were known to the complainant, and that the restrictions in the deed had been to some extent waived by him. Now, . upon another violation of the restriction on her part, the proceeding to compel a conveyance of the property to the complainant and thus destroy the estate of the respondent, in the circumstances of the case, would not be viewed with favor by a court of equity. It is one of the principles of equity that it will not decree a forfeiture. "It will never aid in the divestiture of an estate for a breach of a covenant on a condition subsequent, although it will often interfere to prevent the divestiture of an estate for a breach of a covenant on condition." 2 Story Equity, § 1319. It is true that the ancestor in title. of the respondent agreed to a reconveyance in the event of a breach, but to grant a specific performance of that agreement is, in effect, to decrce a forfeiture. Equity has in some cases taken jurisdiction for the protection of a grantor and ordered specific performance of a covenant to reconvey in case of a breach of condition, and thus aided in the divestiture of an estate. This has usually been in cases where a conveyance has been made by an aged or infirm person in consideration that the grantee should support and care for the grantor, with the condition that if the grantee fails in his obligation he shall reconvey. Upon a breach of this condition equity has taken jurisdiction and decreed specific performance. Stamper v. Stamper, 121 N. C. 251; (3) Robinson v. Robinson, 9 Gray, 447. In Baker v. St. Louis, 75 In these cases the circumstances warranted an exercise of the discretion of the court to decree a specific performance. Such circumstances are not presented in the case as bar, and to decree specific performance would be unreasonably to oppress the respondent and would violate equitable principles. We are of the opinion that the complainant is entitled to an injunction. He is the possessor of the land which the restriction was made to benefit. In a similar case, Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. St. 289, the court held that the remedy asked for was one which the law authorizes courts of equity to grant, to prevent or restrain "the commission or continuance of acts contrary to law and prejudicial to the interests of the community or the rights of individuals." Cases are numerous in which injunctions have been granted to restrain the violation of similar restrictions in deeds, without reference to pecuniary damage. The courts, apparently without hesitation, placing the right to relief upon the sole ground of the disregard of a duty |