ditional connexion, with lex, of the formula Velitis jubeatis, Quirites? And if the word jubere can be, in spite of some difficulties, identified as Corssen identifies it, with jus habere, to take or hold for jus, we have, on the one hand, a good explanation of jubere to command, and, on the other, a significant order of priority established between jus and lex. The latter is not the oldest unconscious definition of law by the Romans, but it indicates a drawing up of the matter in question, in a prospective form, whereas the old derivative connexions of jus merely indicate declaration by way of judicial decision. Historically, if the law of the Twelve Tables was the first lex (publica), it did in fact result from the partial administration, by a dominant order, of undefined custom. And we may remark that its traditional mode of enactment, from the outset, is the democratic one of consent, not the autocratic or theocratic one of imposition. = Lex body of law. Although there may be some doubt whether lex, in references to the Twelve Tables, means the whole code, which was passed as one, or the individual clause relating to the special matter regarding which the reference is made, this word in the general use of classical jurists only signifies an individual statute, not a body of law. The latter signification is a late one, of which the first clear instance that I can find is in the title, lex Dei, of a comparison between the Mosaic and Roman law, written in the reign of Theodosius towards the close of the fourth century after Christ 35. The descendants of lex in the different Romance languages-French loi, Italian legge, and, though not so clearly, Spanish ley-often combine the two meanings. So the plural legum (abbreviated LL.), of the style used for a 25 For other instances see Savigny, Geschichte, T. 1, c. 3, §§ 37, 38. Cambridge law degree, is still held by many authorities to have indicated two bodies of law, the civil and the 36 I have given elsewhere (Student's Guide to the University of Cambridge, pt. 5, pp. 39, 40) my reasons for believing that this term meant originally Roman ("Civil ") Law, but has come to mean law generally, i.e. all law studied at Cambridge. The translation "of laws," though literal, is ambiguous and misleading. CHAPTER IV. EARLY NAMES OF LAW: GREEK. The Hellenic race, Antiquity of Hellenic literature. though neither our juridical ancestors, as to a certain extent the Romans were, nor our natural ancestors, like the Teutonic nations, whom I shall consider last, furnish some illustrations of the present subject too interesting and significant to be entirely passed over. Of writings indeed directly juridical there is in Greek literature, as compared with Roman, scarcely anything. Whether this be due to the ultimate political ascendancy of the one nation, or to the less legal tendency of the other, the fact remains. And, in the vast legacy of oratorical and philosophical works bequeathed us by Athens, the quotations from her ancient law appear to have been in general so much modernised that they are of comparatively small value for investigating the earliest characteristics of Attic or other Greek legislation. On the other hand, we have from the Hellenic race a very much older poetic literature than from the Italian. While Rome gives us little but a few fragmentary legal phrases until the third century before Christ, we can test the meaning of Greek names for law in continuous poems of the sixth and seventh, or perhaps even an earlier date. It is not my intention to pursue this subject into much detail; but a short investigation of what was as a plural of the original Oéus, which is a divine agent suggesting judicial awards, by Sir H. Maine. His conclusions as to the bearing upon early law of the group of words under consideration, may perhaps require a slight modification on philological grounds. Curtius is apparently right in considering, with Meyer, Oépiores not to be the plural of the original Oéus, which makes épidos and OéμTos in the genitive, but a secondary formation, generally occurring in the plural, from an intermediate verb Oeuíço, of which we have a trace in Pindar's θεμισσαμένους οργάς, governing our tempers. Both the original forms are personified. In Hesiod Oépis (acc. Oéμv) is the sister of Memory, the wife of Zeus, the mother of Order, Justice and Peace. In Pindar Oéμs (éμitos) is the assessor of Zeus, who protects strangers, the saviour goddess-doubtless from such hospitality as that of Polyphemus-and the mother of the same three daughters, who are the basis of states, the stewards of prosperity to men'. A confusion of these guardian 5 3 A. L. ch. 1, pp. 4, 5. Grundzüge, p. 536. Pyth. 4. 141, Böckh. Böckh translates "moribus ad juris normam castigatis," which is rather forced. Hesiod, Theog. 135, Ib. 901-3, Γαῖα τέκε....Θέμιν τε Μνημοσύνην τε. δεύτερον ἠγάγετο (Ζεὺς) λιπαρὴν Θέμιν ἢ τέκεν Ωρας αἵτ' ἔργ ̓ ὠρεύουσι καταθνητοῖσι βροτοῖσι. 7 Pindar, Ol. 8. 21, 22, ἔνθα Σώτειρα Διὸς ξενίου πάρεδρος ἀσκεῖται θέμις. Cf. O1. 9. 16, 17, where the daughter has the epithet ἂν (Οπόεντα) Θέμις θυγάτηρ τέ οἱ Σώτειρα λέλογχεν |