CONTENTS. Jurisprudence. Uses of the historical study of Roman Law. Historical and Analytical Jurists. Scheme of the present volume. Books referred to. pp. 1-10 CHAPTER II. Early names of Law : Roman. Jus not jussum. True derivation of jus. Early usage of jus. Judex and judicare. Summary. Jura. Jus=right. Derivation of Jus =right. Justus. pp. 16–28 CHAPTER III. Early names of Law: Roman (continued). Lex. Derivation of lex. Lex publica, legare, lex mancipi. Summary as to lex and lex publica. Lex= body of law. pp. 29–40 CHAPTER IV. Early names of Law : Greek. Antiquity of Hellenic literature. Déjs. θέμιστες. Summary. δίκη in early usage. Derivation of δίκη. νόμος Or voués. Conclusion, pp. 41-58 Early names of Law : Teutonic. Moeso-Gothic: Witoth. Early English laws. æ, domas, asetnissa. Dom. Dom-boc. Domas and θέμιστες. Law, lagu, laga. Lagu, " Common law.” Common law from folc-riht. Early names of Law: Right and Wrong. Austin's Right and Wrong. Blackstone. Derivation of Right. Relation of Right to rex, &c. Derivation of Wrong, &c. Right and Wrong. Summary. Droit and Tort. Right=Law. Unconscious definition: Summary. Pervading idea of Law. Austin's Definitions of Law. Unsatisfactory character of Definitions. Chrysippus. Demosthenes. Papinian, Bracton, Plato, Aristotle. Cicero. Modern defi- Definition : Law as a rule of human conduct. Blackstone. Montes- quieu. Hooker Austin. Ulpian. Generality of a rule. Capito. Black- pp. 106-114 CHAPTER X. Definition : Law as to the motive for obedience. An ulterior motive to action. Motive, what? The Law of Nature. Austin's Law of Nature. Philosophical Law of Nature. Paulus. Modern Emotional Intuitionism. Grotius. Hobbes. Blackstone. Bentham's Physical Sanctions. Utilita- rianism. Summary. pp. 115--126 CHAPTER XI. Definition : Law as to its Sanction. Grotius' Voluntary law. Grotius compared with Hobbes and Blackstone. Law of God not law in the ordinary Positive law, what? Sanction not remuneratory. Explanation of the term Sanction. Conclusion. pp. 127-134 sense. Definition: Austin. Law proper, positive, and strictly so called. Positive Law, as between the Elements of a State. State or Nation. The Social Contract: Grotius, Hobbes. The Family. From Family to Gens. Austin's subordinate political society. General course of national or political associa- tion. First common rules of conduct. The popular Assembly. The Council Law, as between the Members of a State. What constitutes a State ? Sovereignty of all impossible. Sovereign not necessarily sole. Sovereignty not primary or original. Analysts' definition good, for a fully formed State. Origin of Legislation. Subdivision of Sovereignty. Definition of a State. The objection to Austin's definition of Law. Customary and Constitutional Law. Blackstone's Municipal Law. Conclusion. “Civil” or Municipal Law, as between States. International Law Ancient and Modern. Amphictionies. Fetiales. Jus Gentium. Name of International Law. Public and Private International Law. Law or not Law. Hobbes. Grotius. Blackstone. Austin on International Law. Practical sanctions Definition of Law: Conclusion. The general object of Law. The Sanc- tion of Opinion. Locke. Law in and between States. "Laws” of Honour PART II., pp. 196—394. THE FORM OF LAW. Source, Mode and Form. Austin's Sources and Modes. Written and Unwritten Law. The “Modes in which Law begins and ends.” Form of Statute Law. English Statutes. Faults of classification by "Sources." 1. “Source” properly legislative. 2. Legislation by a judicial “Source." Conclusion. Austin's Statute Law. Actual Enactment. Publication. pp. 202—213 CHAPTER III. Case-Law: its general character, history and authority. Case or “ju- diciary” Law. Authority of Case-Law with the Romans. Cicero. Digest. Imperial Constitutions. Blackstone on the Rescripts. Authority of modern Case-Law. pp. 214–226 CHAPTER IV. Special Characteristics of Case-Law: the Grounds of Judicial Decision. Hale’s Constituents of the Common Law. Application of existing rules. Interpretation Authoritative or Doctrinal. Mode and means of Interpreta- tion, Context. Ratio Legis. Intrinsic Merit. Spurious Interpretation. Austin on Spurious Interpretation. Its history. The term Equity as applied to Interpretation. The “Reason of the thing” or Equity. Pre- cedents. pp. 227-246 " CHAPTER V. Special characteristics of Case-Law: the Application of a Precedent. Austin's Judiciary Law. Practical application of Precedents. Cessante ratione legis, cessat lex ipsa. Analogy. Competition of opposite ana- logies. pp. 247-252 |