uine." It thus proceeds to love them. The mere beauty, as it has been called, of Virtue excites agreeable feelings in the mind of him to whom it is presented;* just as the deformity of Vice is disagreeable: he hates† it and shrinks from it.

Accordingly, as Stewart tells us, "it is impossible to behold a good action without being conscious of a benevolent affection, either of love or of respect towards the agent: and consequently, as all our benevolent affections include an agreeable feeling, every good action must be a source of pleasure to the spectator. Besides this, other agreeable feelings of order, of utility, peace of mind, &c. come in process of time to be associated with the general idea of virtuous conduct."

of

These moral emotions then are moving principles in our minds. The emotion just mentioned by Stewart, of love or respect, might, no doubt, prompt us to action.‡

* Magne pates Divûm, sævos punire tyrannos Haud aliâ ratione velis............

Virtutem videant, intabescantque relictâ. PERS. III. †To hate evil principles and actions seems indeed the proper application of the feeling of hatred.

Some years ago an enormous crime, that of murder in order to obtain bodies for dissection, was perpetrated in

So when we have stored up in our minds such maxims as have been heretofore considered, (see Book II. c. vi.) agreeable to truth, justice, and benevolence, we gradually proceed to love them. This love may frequently impel us to action. Though originally therefore they had no place in the mind, and some of them at least may be almost peculiar to ourselves, and accordingly they can hardly be called naturally instinctive; still the love of them has become settled in our hearts, and such love may therefore now be considered to operate as an instinctive principle of action.

But to whatever degree of nicety distinctions may be drawn, and classifications accomplished, an elaborate and minute analysis is not suitable to our general design; and it is at all events undeniable that there are such things as instinctive moving principles. God however added higher faculties. Supreme in the human mind is the power by which man determines the con

our metropolis: the populace were so indignant, that in their fury they hunted an unfortunate porter (who had ignorantly carried in a sack or box the body of one thus murdered) from street to street, until he was at length with difficulty rescued from their violence. Here probably was a moral emotion, a hatred of an evil principle, joined perhaps with defensive affection. There was at least a blind impulse.

duct proper to be pursued under any given circumstances,—that power indeed by which he duly appreciates moral evidence. Present such evidence to one of the inferior animals, and you do what, by the common voice of mankind, is pronounced no less absurd than if you ask the blind to judge of colours, or the deaf of sounds; for a brute has no faculty whereby to estimate what is proposed. The power by which man is indeed elevated in the scale of creation, is termed the Conscience, the Moral Faculty, in Scripture the Light within us.* As far as the design of this treatise is concerned, it seems unnecessary to determine "whether, in the words of Butler, the moral faculty is" rightly "called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason; whether considered as a perception of the understanding, or as a sentiment of the heart, or, which seems the truth, as including both." According to Reid, "Those who differ most in the theory of our moral powers, agree in the practical rules of morals wich they dictate. As a man may be a good judge of colours, and of the visible qualities of objects, without any knowledge of the anatomy of the eye and of the theory of vision; so a man may have a very

*Matth. vi. 23.

† See the Preface.

clear and comprehensive knowledge of what is right and what is wrong in human conduct, who never studied the structure of our moral powers." At all events conscience, be its essence what it may, is the judge of moral truth. Whatever assistance it may derive from the other powers of man, or in what manner soever they may be included in the notion of the moral faculty, it is assuredly the province of this faculty to judge both of internal principles and of outward actions, and ultimately to determine conduct.

*

The moral faculty, and the intellectual powers which so constitute it or assist it, or rather which are so included in it, that on the whole the operations result and are displayed of a power authorized to govern, we may call the Higher Faculties of man. The instinctive moving principles which have heretofore been considered, may in contradistinction be termed the Lower Principles of our nature.

Now before a man acts, his will must be moved to action.

It has already virtually been affirmed, that the office of the higher faculties is to govern the will, and so to guide the man.

* See Butler, as quoted in the last page.

But these lower principles, some of them possessing and others strongly claiming an abode in our hearts, do frequently with more or less power act upon the will, sometimes singly, at others aiding and abetting, or modifying and controlling each other: and therefore they have in fact a tendency, stronger or weaker, to govern the will, and thus to guide the man.

So that our inquirer's question, How to deal with them? naturally includes reflections upon government, since there is or may be even a contest in regard to government.

The consideration of this subject will furnish various illustrations tending to throw light upon the main design of our speculations, and to assist us in the appreciation of moral evidence. Again the conclusions to be obtained may, we trust, be themselves useful in regard to conduct and in supplying a fuller answer to the question, What am I to do as a man placed in the world? Moreover the consideration of the lower principles of our nature is peculiarly connected with the undertaking we have in hand; for, unless controlled by systematic discipline, they tend to disturb and blind the moral faculty itself.

Our inquirer, before he had duly surveyed and estimated the powers and the claims of the lower principles, had in reality acknowledged