CHAPTER I.

STATE OF MIND SUPPOSED TO LEAD A MAN TO

INQUIRY.

IMAGINE a man placed in the world; brought up under authority and example; pursuing the course in which he is directed without much consideration; doing as he sees others do; or urged perhaps to very questionable lines of conduct by incitements peculiar to his own disposition and temperament. It is clear therefore that his present behaviour is such, that it can scarcely be said to be founded upon any high principle: for principles are the result of thought, and he has not hitherto been led to think.

The case imagined is no extraordinary one. The condition is that of multitudes.

Suppose, however, that as the mind is expanded, and his reasoning powers are strengthened, he is arrested in the heedless course which he pursues by some check, no matter what, some painful revulsion perhaps of feeling, which creates a pause, and throws him back on the resources of his own reason and conscience.

Conceive him then, not immediately perhaps, nor easily, but after some time, and with labour, it may be, and difficulty, to adopt such a train of thought as the following:

"I am a man; an inhabitant of the earth; living in a society of beings similar to myself; connected with them by numerous relations and ties; susceptible of various feelings and affections; urged by appetites; surrounded by objects to which these feelings, affections, and appetites answer and correspond; possessing also higher faculties which distinguish me from the mere animals, and elevate me as superior.

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Hence, further, it is plain that I may not be quiescent: though afflicted by disappointment, I may not for the future prevent the possibility of such disappointment, by determining to drag on an unharassed life in lethargic indifference. On the contrary, I am constantly required to act. Even if I had both the power and the will (and yet how strange and harsh would be the exercise of such power!) to stifle a multitude of natural affections and desires, still the very animal wants of my body would force me to mark out objects for attainment. Moreover I have been taught, and am convinced, that to direct his powers to the accomplishment of objects is a primary and fundamental prin

ciple of man's nature. A necessity, unconnected with the satisfaction of the appetites and the preservation of life, compels me to carry out this principle. My mind, with an earnestness which it is impossible to despise, craves that to which it may devote itself.

"But results follow actions. A design with which I act is to obtain results. It may however be my object to avoid results. To take a very simple instance. As on the one hand I know that fire, when not too nearly approached, will comfort and cherish me, and accordingly I avail myself of the good; so, on the other hand, it being clear that fire will scorch,. I am moved by a natural and instinctive feeling of self-preservation to avoid its too close proximity, and thus I escape the evil. In such a case as this, then, I have motives which at once direct my conduct, when I am convinced that certain things are true.

"But in general it is plain that results may be either desirable or not desirable, good or evil and numerous truths are not so manifest at a first glance, as is the proposition that fire will scorch, and yet after some consideration are clearly discernible: and it is certain that men continually make mistakes in what they acknowledge to be matters of great importance: it

behoves me therefore, as a fallible man, to take great pains, in order that I may make the best use of the powers I possess, and may be able to judge what is good, what evil, and what

moreover are the means by which to obtain the former and to avoid the latter: for the means are not always so simple as when I approach the fire in order that I may be warmed, or remove my body lest I should be scorched; yet it is manifest that if I am to accomplish objects, I must use means suitable to such accomplishment, and to the end that I may use them, I must know them.

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Accordingly, if to mark out objects for attainment be an irresistible principle of my nature, what is the value of the saying which has been told me, "as to choose an end distinguishes a man from a beast, so to choose a good end is the distinction of a good man. "* At least I may assume that some things are to be considered objects of choice, open perhaps to my hand, and, like ripe fruit, ready to be plucked, or, it may be, hard to be attained; other things again are presented, which it behoves me to reject either easily and at once, or with difficulty and trouble. In short, to choose the good, and

* Jeremy Taylor.