CHAPTER VIII.

OF MORAL CERTAINTIES.

"SINCE the Creator (he may argue) has in various ways shewn His intentions with respect to the manner in which He designs His creatures to direct their conduct, is it not clear that He has intended us to assume highly probable evidence, as the index of truth, in matters of temporal interest wherein we are concerned to act? For having so placed and connected men together, as we see them placed and connected, He of course knew that the effect would be to compel them to this assumption. Since He has acted therefore in such a manner as to force us to admit highly probable evidence, we may infer that He intended the admission. But a notice conveyed by inference is sufficient for reasonable beings who have the power of drawing inferences. The intimation then of God's intention thus conveyed, is it not in effect a command to His creatures, a law? For what is our idea of a command or law, but that of the intention of the superior, duly notified to the subject?

"Accordingly, when I receive the testimony of credible witnesses, or allow the certainty of facts supported by a sufficiently strong chain of circumstantial evidence, and so act, I certainly fulfil God's law.

"Now is it not altogether agreeable to the attributes of the Deity, that a law which He has established for the guidance of men should be adequate for such guidance? Are not His laws in general sufficient for their purposes, if we duly avail ourselves of their efficacy? And is there not in truth great weight in the consideration, that those who have had better opportunities of observation than myself, unanimously declare that what naturally would be the case with respect to this law of highly probable evidence, in reality is so? And that experience constantly evinces the sure results obtained in the daily business of life?

"On the whole, then, am I not thus led more fully to appreciate the nature and character of what is called a Moral Certainty, so termed doubtless as connected with considerations of man's moral conduct. This certainty does indeed depend upon highly probable evidence: but then such evidence is supported by principles of religion, and strengthened by observation of results."

The mind of our inquirer therefore is now subdued and chastened. His considerations are, undoubtedly, susceptible of various illustrations. Let us endeavour to illustrate them.

Say then (if you please) that highly probable evidence is presented, of certain truths, which however do not in the least concern our moral conduct; with regard, for instance, to some object of antiquarian or historical research. Say that such evidence is adduced with respect to the place whence the builders of Stonehenge brought their huge stones, and the means by which they were able in remote and probably rude ages to move them; or with reference to the much canvassed question of the letters of Junius. Say again that equally probable evidence is adduced in regard to some fact, which, if it be true, seriously affects a man's moral conduct; i.e. if it be true, it is proper for him to pursue one course, if not true, another; and that too (it may be) in affairs of very great importance. Then in either of the first cases we have simply to consider the intrinsic weight of the evidence. The matter is one of curious speculation, but whether the things asserted be true or not, is of comparatively little moment. They cannot be said to have any important connexion with the attributes of God, or the questions of man's con

duct and responsibility. In these cases, then, it may be rash to say that we have obtained truth; though perfectly right to assert our possession of high probability. But in the last case, the intrinsic power of the evidence is strengthened by considerations of the Divine character, and the relation of God to man. Here then we are led to speak of a moral certainty. This is the position of jurymen, who may perhaps safely declare that they have arrived at a moral certainty: as did the jury who convicted the criminal at Norwich. Indeed, after his execution the evidence of guilt was confirmed. For the blunderbuss, with which he perpetrated the murders, was discovered secreted in his premises, while the ramrod fitting the instrument was found in the house of his victims.

Objections and answers to them may sometimes tend to illustration. Suppose it objected: "In adopting your principles with regard to moral certainty, you have assumed various things as true, viz. the existence and alleged character of God, and the facts by which you seek to establish certain relations between God and man: whereas these very allegations claim recognition upon the strength of an accumulation of evidence of great variety in cogency and power, and at all events very different in character from

the brief and undeniable demonstrations of mathematicians. In appealing therefore to the elementary doctrines of religion to establish what you term moral certainties, you are in fact appealing to things which you also characterize as moral certainties; and thus indeed assume your principles in order to prove your principles." In answer to this, it may be said: "It is admitted that the great primary truths of religion having reference to men's moral conduct, are therefore properly called moral cer- ? tainties also, though they can be proved so as to cause conviction in the human mind, such conviction may be produced, strengthened, ripened by an accumulation of evidences of various degrees in power; and therefore the manner of proof is doubtless different from that of mathematical deduction. Yet by what man sees every day of human life and behaviour, he is prepared to expect evidence, thus differing from mathematical proof, in matters involving conduct. Our arguments however are addressed to those whose minds are of such a character as to admit not only mathematical truth, but also certain first grand principles of human conduct; which appeal indeed for reception to some minds with much greater urgency than to others, to some with the accumulated power of many years'