| United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce - 1971 - 2186 pages
...forced to bear them. The resulting configuration may not, be Pareto-ef ficlent . In this case, it may be possible to make at least one person better off and no one worse off through public action. This would be the case If the amounts that those adversely effected... | |
| United States. Congress. Senate. Commerce - 1971 - 890 pages
...forced to bear them. The resulting configuration may not. be Pareto-efficlent. In this case, it may be possible to make at least one person better off and no one worse off through public action. This would be the case if the amounts that those adversely effected... | |
| Michael A. DiConti - Business & Economics - 1992 - 192 pages
...(New York: Basic Books, 1975), 35. Pareto efficiency exists if no transaction is available which would make at least one person better off and no one else worse off. See James E. Alt and K. Alec Chrystal, Political Economics (Los Angeles: University of California Press,... | |
| John W. Sommer - Education - 344 pages
...This means that we could improve upon the allocations of resources that occur in the market, leaving at least one person better off and no one else worse off, with some theoretically achievable, alternative allocation. As we shall discover, welfare theory often... | |
| José A. Gómez-Ibáñez - Business & Economics - 2006 - 456 pages
...care. The market would be efficient, however, in the sense that (1) all the transactions tfiat could make at least one person better off and no one else worse off would be completed and (2) no transaction that failed this test would occur. In this framework, government... | |
| Peter James Burke - Social Science - 2006 - 404 pages
...incentive to unilaterally change strategy. The equilibrium is Pareto deficient when another outcome would make at least one person better off and no one else worse off. The simplest version of a social dilemma confronts two players with a binary choice: whether to cooperate... | |
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