information is laid before the House of the grounds which "influenced" and brought about that change. We know not how or by what arguments that sudden volte-face, before the Russian Ambassador, was produced. It is now for the House to look at the results, not unpredicted and unwarned, and to judge of that change of policy. A policy approved and maintained by Parliament, by successive Administrations and Viceroys, has been suddenly and secretly altered, and Parliament knows not the reasons which induced the alteration. Unless the House of Commons is to be no more than a debating society, it must judge the acts of the Ministry, and hold them responsible for a change in a declared policy that Parliament had approved. The country expects the House to do this. Yet the information which alone can enable the House to arrive at this judgment, has not been laid before the House; and we are called together because the wilful change of policy has immediately resulted in a war, just as we were forewarned that it would. The fact I believe to be this-Lord Salisbury never apprehended the old policy, because of a most pernicious fallacy in his mind; and he initiated the new policy as a direct outcome of that fallacy. He could not understand the former policy, which has been termed "masterly inactivity," because he has no conception of any influence except brute force. He, for the same reason, disbelieved in the possibility of any Russian influence being exerted in Afghanistan or India, and told us to study "maps on a large scale,' maps on a large scale," and see how far off India is from Russia; and he jeered at Russian power being felt in India, saying that you might just as well expect a Russian Army to march on the Cape of Good Hope. As he misjudged the former policy, so too when he found that Russian influence had become paramount at Cabul, he had no other idea of establishing English influence, except by brute force. Yet, "opinion is stronger than armies." That disbelief in anything except brute force is the grave error in Lord Salisbury's mind, which has proved fatal to our influence in the East, and has thrown Afghanistan into the arms of Russia, and given Russian policy full scope in Europe. He has, as I will presently show, been playing Russia's game, in fighting the Ameer, and causing us to assume the character of aggressors, while Russia is enabled to appear as a protector. Lord Napier, in his able Memorandum on this question (at page 225 of the Papers)-a Memorandum penned on the very day of the signature of the Schouvaloff-Salisbury capitulation-May 30-says-"We have managed the Ameer badly. . . . the Afghans look upon us as a weak and treacherous people." That is very true; and all our recent acts and words have, I will show, tended to increase that distrust in the Ameer's mind. It will be found, by the Papers, that the Ameer reiterated frequently his profound distrust of the Russians. That feeling pervades, indeed, the whole of Central Asia. Thus we read in Sir Donald McLeod's Memorandum (page 47)— "All the information I have been enabled to obtain on the subject leads me to believe that there exists, throughout Central Asia, in the minds of all the most influential and best inof distrust and dislike of the Russians, as an formed of its populations, a wide spread feeling aggressive and unscrupulous Power, who have brought their co-religionists (Mahommedans) to ruin and humiliation, in almost all quarters where their dominion has been established." That was written in 1868, before the events of the late war, the Berlin Treaty, and the Secret Agreement; or the same would have been also said of us. Another example of this feeling is given in the Ameer's letter of May 5, 1873 (page 110), in which he says "It cannot be concealed that it is impossible for the Russians to remain always firm in their remain firm in their engagements about the "negotiations. For instance, they could not Crimea even for a short period. My anxiety which I feel on account of the Russians will never be removed unless the British Government adorns the Afghan Government with great assistance in money and ammunitions of war for the troops, and unless great aid is given for the construction of strong forts throughout the Northern Afghan Border. And further, if an emergency arises from the Afghan Governcannot take place without the co-operation of ment to oppose the Russians, such opposition the disciplined troops of the British Government... Time has approached very near, when the Russians, after taking possession of Urganj and Merve Shajehan, will make communications for exercising some influence in my kingdom." That was the state of feeling throughout Russia. They knew the Russians to be false, faithless, and robbers of territory by fraud and force. They recognized the fact that the Russian political prin ciple is-Destruction in order to annex. | That was a very natural conclusion in What should have been our line of con- regard to the real object in the urgency duct? We should have been careful to of British demands to send British dissociate ourselves entirely from the Envoys. The occupation of Quetta Russians, and separated ourselves en- strengthened that suspicion. "It would tirely from their proceedings. What be a very good step," said the Indian was our line of conduct? On Gortcha- Government, "provided you could get koff's suggestion we did the very re- the Ameer to concur in it; but not otherWe set to work thoroughly to wise, as it would raise his suspicions." re-assure the Ameer (as we learn from Look at the position of Quetta on the page 211 and many other places). We map; at the mouth of the Bolan Pass; told the Ameer that there is no danger excellent to bar an advance of the Rusfrom Russia; no precautions need be sians; but no one fears an advance of taken against Russia; Russia will never the Russians; we are all thoroughly invade him, nor interfere in his terri- re-assured on that point. The only tory; there is not the slightest reason other use of it is, as a basis from which to fear Russia. Lord Salisbury expa- to effect a coup de main on Candahar, tiated upon this theme in his speech and then on Guzni, and then on Cabul. about "large scale maps," and " Cape That was the next step to sow distrust, of Good Hope" re-assurance. Doubtless, and to make the Ameer suspect our inthat speech was read in Cabul, and the tentions. So that, as we re-assured the incredulous Afghans learned that we Ameer against all fears concerning English considered that the inspection Russia, as Prince Gortchakoff persuaded of a large map was enough to convince us to do, we were, in fact, causing him to any sane man that the Russians could distrust our own good intentions. Not never reach Afghanistan, and that no content with this, the suggestion is apprehensions need be entertained of a quietly rumoured (as we find from the Russian advance in Central Asia. But, despatch of the Indian Government of at the same time, we were urging the May 10th, 1877) that the Ameer was Ameer to receive a British Envoy at "assumed to be dependent" on Great Cabul, and English officers on his Britain. We are further told (page Northern Frontier. " I really cannot be 166)answerable for their lives (reiterated the Ameer), my people have an ineradicable hatred to Europeans." Yet we continued to urge it vehemently. " Why then should you want to send Envoys and officers ?" asked he. "Merely out of kindness; in order to protect your territory." "From whom?" "From Russian aggression." "That is but a pretext 'thought he). You tell me not to fear Russian aggression, and yet you want to send Envoys and officers to protect me against Russian aggression. I sus- mere dependent of Great Britain. pect that you would send them to under- What was the effect on the Ameer? At mine my independence, so that you may the Peshawur Conferences, on May 19th, make me a mere Indian Prince, or 1877, we find the Envoy saying signifiopenly annex my territory." That was a cantly-You talk of danger? But very natural conclusion for him to arrive danger is of two kinds, external and at, and that was the conclusion which internal. Against all external danger he arrived at. Colonel Taylor, the you have re-assured me; you say there British Commissioner at Umbeyla, is none. Umbeyla, is none. There is then only a danger wrote these words with regard to British from within; and that is the very thing officers in Afghanistanwhich I fear that your Envoys would cause. The mischief seemed, then, to have been already done; and it was worked by our own hands. Yet we were not content. We allowed ourselves to be inveigled into going further "As a body, the Afghans do distrust us, and the re-appearance of fair faces in the streets of Cabul would not be popular, as they would be regarded as the forerunners of occupation."[Ibid. p. 58.] "Prince Gortchakoff had not been slow to fix upon us all the responsibilities of such a position. It is the British Government which the Government of Russia would endeavour to hold responsible for the conduct of the Ameer." He had not only, then, been led, by our own words and acts, to mistrust us, and to suspect us; but he was induced to associate us in the same enterprize with the Russians, and we had so far succeeded that he was already regarded as a in our mischievous re-assurance. The Envoy at the Peshawur Conferences was a cunning man. He bethought him of a delicate test. "You wish me to accept your British Envoys, to guard me against Russia, because the advance of Russia is so rapid in Central Asia? (thought he.) I will see whether you are sincere." He therefore said to Sir Lewis Pelly (page 114) "The Turkomans, across the Oxus, are much afraid of the Russian Army which is approaching; and they have sent to the Ameer for help against the advancing Russians; but what do you, Sir Lewis Pelly, advise?" "Oh!" said Sir Lewis, "the Turkomans are a set of robbers; do not help them; leave them to the Russians." "Oh no! (thought the Envoy), you seem very much to concur in the Russian plans of aggression; perhaps you belong to the same gang, and are a mere pal of theirs." That was a suspicion. Was it a just suspicion ? Of course, it was more than a suspicion. For the Peshawur Conference was closed in February, 1877; while on January 28, 1876, the Indian Government wrote, in their despatch, concerning "The assurances given to the Ameer, that a good understanding exists between England and Russia on Central Asian affairs."-[Ibid. p. 154.] Then England and Russia had already come to an understanding, not only as to what should be done with Afghanistan, but also respecting all the Khanates of Central Asia! The booty was already divided beforehand! That was one way of "re-assuring" the Ameer, who had already begun to think that Afghanistan had been placed between the upper and nether millstone! Again, the Viceroy and Sir Lewis Pelly used a threat to the Envoy at Peshawur-a threat which flew like an arrow, to wound beyond its mark. On October 10, 1876 (page 183) they said "Our only interest in maintaining the independence of Afghanistan is to provide for the security of our own Frontier. But the moment we cease to regard Afghanistan as a friendly and firmly allied State, what is there to prevent us from providing for the security of our Frontier by an understanding with Russia, which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether? If the Ameer does not desire to come to a speedy understanding with us, Russia does; and she desires it at his expense." Just as I thought! said the Ameer to himself; they have been plotting together for my destruction; and if I cannot be persuaded to admit the "internal danger," they will tear me in pieces by force; better to trust to the God of Battles and of Justice, and die sword in hand. Lord Napier, in his Memorandum written on the Schouvaloff-Salisbury capitulation day, says "Does not the example of Turkey, with her tributary States stirred into rebellion by emissaries from Russian societies, show the mischief which Russia might work in India?"-[Ibid. p. 225.] That the Ameer had been thinking much on this subject is proved by the and asked Dr. Bellew (on February 7, fact that his Envoy spread out a map, vina and Servia and Bulgaria, and 1877) to point to Bosnia and HerzegoCircassia; and asked "How it was that the nations of Europe (and notably Great Britain) permitted Russia to send her soldiers to fight in the Servian ranks whilst the Russian Ambassador remained at Constantinople."-[Ibid. p. 202.] Doubtless he asked, also, why we interfered to save Servia, who had been guilty of the "most outrageous and wicked war (as the Prime Minister said on September 21, 1876), and to prevent Turkey from crushing Servia, and even from taking securities against a repetition of the offence. He perhaps asked why we had been content with telling Russia that it was a breach of invade Turkey; while we did not fulfil our obligations under those Treaties, pendence of the Ottoman Empire. Dr. and defend the integrity and inde Treaties and of International Law to Bellew states that he asked about Circassia-Circassia, whose independence bulwark that prevented the advance of we had recognised-Circassia, the great Russia into Central Asia, the first fortress of India (as was well remarked by Sir Henry Rawlinson, and by others. in these Afghan Papers). And we allowed Russia to take Circassia and menace India! Yet that was of little use to Russia; for the Caucasus, even although Russian, was yet impassable; and Poti, to the south, was marshy, and malarious, and with three miles of shoal water between it and the sea; and so we gave Russia the only good harbour on the coast Batoum and enabled her to turn the Caucasus and ] land her troops to menace Persia and India. So the Envoy saw how that by our perfidious advice to Turkey we had weakened her hands-the Head of all Islam-and by our treacherous acts at Berlin we had given away her fortresses and harbours, and by our secret agreements, we had partitioned her Empire. Nay more; his suspicions were confirmed when he read the Premier's speech on the 28th July "One of the results of my attending the Congress of Berlin has been to prove, what I always suspected to be an absolute fact, that this horrible, devastating war, which has just terminated, would not have taken place if England had spoken with the necessary firmness" Was not all this enough to make the Ameer say: "Russia and England seem to be pulling together; they are in the same boat; while there is this difference between them-Russia is the stronger, and England is afraid; besides England deserts her allies in the hour of need; it is better for me at once to propitiate the Russians." These were the Envoy's words, as reported by Sir Lewis Pelly (page 181) "The Russians broke Treaties at pleasure, were very pushing in their policy, and feared no one. The recent political history of Europe showed that the English were unable to compel the Russians to adhere to Treaties, and were equally impotent to arrest Russian aggressions." That, then, was the Ameer's suspicion of our real intent in forcing British Envoys upon him; and that was the estimation in which he held us. In his He LORD ROBERT MONTAGU: may have heard of the despatch of February 28, 1876, before the Peshawur Conference at the end of the year. Such things are easily done in India. I am, however, no longer speaking of the effect on the Ameer's mind; I have passed from that to the acts of the Government- MR. E. STANHOPE said, that the document referred to was a confidential and private despatch, containing instructions intended for the Viceroy. The Government thought it ought to be now published for the information of the House. LORD ROBERT MONTAGU: Then, I think, Sir, that the next poetical effusion, which Lord Lytton writes, should be entitled-" "The Sorrows of a Viceroy;" for it appears that he must submit to receiving despatches couched in language which no gentleman would address to his butler. Yet Sir Lewis Pelly, taking his cue from his superior, seems almost to have capped it. For, on February 15, 1877 (page 210), he told the Ameer's Envoy that the British Government would "Strengthen the Frontier of British India without further reference to the Ameer. . . . The Viceroy will take such measures as he may deem wise and lawful for strengthening the Frontier of British India, and providing for the safety and repose of that Empire; and this without communication with the Ameer." Nothing, then, can be more manifest than this chain of causes and effect; nothing more clear than that the words and acts of the Government have led straight up to war, and that those acts and words were such as to make the This eyes, we seemed to be plotting with his enemy, while pretending to be his friend; Ameer conclude that England was perwe appeared to be insidiously forcing fidious and secretly hostile to him, and Envoys upon him, in order to break up that his safest course was to cement a his independence; we were afraid to fight in fulfilment of our Treaty obliga-effect had been foreseen, but not by the timely friendship with Russia. tions; we connived at violations of law; British Government. It was foreseen we approached him with character gone that British policy would throw Afghanand honours tarnished. And that was istan into the arms of Russia, and that the consequent war was playing the game of Russia and securing her aims. The Indian Government, in their despatch of June 7, 1875 (page 133), the time which Lord Salisbury chose for making his haughty demands (page 159) "Her Majesty's Government... must have, for their own Agents, undisputed access to its Frontier positions (of Afghanistan). . . . They must be entitled to expect becoming attention to their friendly counsels; and the Ameer must be made to understand that, subject to allMR. E. STANHOPE observed that the Ameer had never seen the despatch from which the noble Lord was quoting. said "If we are correct in believing that the refusal (to receive British Envoys) would not show the intentions of the Ameer to be disloyal, it would afford no sufficient justification for a change of the arms of Russia upon the first favourable policy which might throw Afghanistan into opportunity. We may also observe that the re fusal would weaken the hands of Her Majesty's Government in any future negotiations with Russia when questions might be raised as to the real value of British influence in Afghanistan." although the Ameer desired to prolong Government (page 247) state it to be the Sir Richard Temple went further, and, in his Memorandum (page 69), he states the conclusions to which we had arrived-Mission, which was armed, and 1,000 "If we engage ourselves in Afghanistan, Russia will find us in the hour of trial impoverished and embarrassed. If we keep out of Afghanistan, Russia will find us in the hour of trial strong, rich, and prosperous in India. she really wishes us ill she must naturally desire that we may be so infatuated as to pur If sue the former course. But it is for us to avoid the course which our enemies, if we have any, would desire us to follow." strong. Yet he did not refuse; he merely wished to delay it, as he was mourning for his favourite son; and also he did not wish to accede to the peremptory demand to admit it on a specified day; because he said it would disgrace him in the eyes of his people." But he intimated that he would receive it later. Yet our pretended cause of war is his refusal to receive our Mission. Be it so. Would that be a just cause of war? Sir Neville Chamberlain evidently thought that the refusal would not be a sufficient cause of war; for he telegraphed to the Viceroy on September 21 (page 236)—“ Shall I make. ... Faiz Mahomed. . . . fire upon us?" and on being forbidden to do so, he telegraphed (page 244) that he would consider a refusal to let the Mission pass "the same as if we had been fired on.' It is clear that such a refusal, even if absolute, would So much for the expediency of this war; and now as to its justice. Either Lord Salisbury intended war, or he did not. If he intended to force on a war (which he has done, whether intentionally or not), then the war is unjust, and a grievous crime. If he did not, then by over-riding the Indian Government, in his pride and petulance, and despising its earnest warnings, he has committed a very grave error. They closed their despatch of January 28th, 1876, with a most solemn warning on a matter of such grave importance," and "de-not give a cause of war. If an acquaintprecated" the demand to send British Envoys "as involving serious danger to the peace of Afghanistan." Was it just to make such a demand? It was a violation of pledges and assurances repeatedly given by the British Government to the Government of Afghanistan, as will be seen on pages 89, 94, and 95. The Indian Government themselves assert in the above-mentioned despatch that "The proposal to establish British Agents in Afghanistan is, as we pointed out in our Despatch of the 7th of June, a departure from the understanding arrived at between Lord Mayo and the Ameer at the Umballa Conferences of 1869."-[Ibid, p. 151.] At the end of the Conference at Peshawur last year, after the demand had been rejected, the Ameer was assured that there was no cause of quarrel or ground of hostility between England and Afghanistan, as you will see on page 172, where we have the statement to this effect deliberately written by the Indian Government; and on page 220, where there is Sir Lewis Pelly's own assurance. Yet the Conference was prematurely closed on the death of the Ameer's Envoy, ance whom I did not care to see were to call on me, and I told my servant to say— "Not at home," would he have a right to burst into my house, and enter my room and fire a revolver at me? On October 6, the Ameer wrote a letter of expostulation to the Viceroy, saying (page 252)—“I am astonished and dismayed by this letter, written threateningly to a well-intentioned friend;" then he pleads his "great trouble," the loss of his favourite son, and complains of the harsh and breathless haste" in sending the Mission. This letter, Lord Lytton came to regard as "a direct On October 30, challenge" (page 253). Lord Salisbury telegraphed the Ultimatum which was to be sent to the Ameer, where the cause of war was thus stated (page 254)-"You did not hesitate to instruct your authorities on the Frontier to repel the Mission by force." Yet it was expressly stated by Major Cavagnari, Sir Neville Chamberlain, and others, that the Commander of Ali Musjid explained that, having received no orders from the Ameer, it would be his duty to oppose by force the forcible entrance of the Mission. It seems to me that there has |