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"British policy does not permit of the alteration of definite Treaty engagements. The Ameer has hitherto had only verbal understandings with us. The letter given him by Lord Mayo was not in the nature of a Treaty engagement, and was, no doubt, vague and gene

ral in its terms."

going to trouble the House with the | I do not know what construction my poetical allusion to the "earthen pipkin | right hon. Friend is going to put upon and the iron pots;" but I should like to it; but to my mind it appears that we have some information with regard to a have here a plain distinction drawn by statement which it seems to me is more the Viceroy between the obligations deserving of condemnation than any which are imposed by written Treaties, other I have read. In the last few lines and the obligations entailed upon us by of page 183 it will be seen that the the verbal promises of our Viceroy. Can Viceroy went on to observe that there be any other rational construction, I would ask, placed upon the words which I have quoted to the House? And what more dangerous question, I should like to know, could be raised throughout India than that which those words suggest? What have the Native Princes of India to depend upon in most cases? Now, I may, I think, say, with the con- verbal assurances given to them by the Not on written engagements, but upon currence of the House, that this is lanViceroy ; and if you cast the slightest guage which is calculated to shake the doubt upon the fact that the promise of confidence not only of the Ameer, but of every Prince in India. Here we have one Viceroy is binding upon his sucthis diplomatist drawing a sharp line cessors, you are aiming one of the between written Treaty engagements deal at the confidence which is reposed heaviest blows which you could possibly and the word of Her Majesty's Re-in our Government in India. My right presentative. ["Oh, oh!"] Is that an unfair interpretation ? [Cries of “Yes!”]. I will read the paragraph over again-The Viceroy went on to observe that "British policy does not permit of the alteration of definite Treaty engagements"-that is to say, of the Treaty of 1855, which has always been looked upon as a one-sided Treaty, and the only clause in which, in reality, is that which binds us to respect the territory of the Ameer. The Viceroy goes on to say that the Ameer has hitherto had only verbal understandings with us; and what conclusions, I would ask, could the Ameer draw from all this, except that British policy did permit the alteration of verbal understandings?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER: Read to the end.] I will; because there are, in my opinion, three things mentioned in this paragraph to which it is desirable that the attention of the House should be distinctly drawn. We have, first of all, the reference to Treaties; then to letters written by our Representatives; and then to verbal negotiations. The end of the paragraph is

"The letter given him by Lord Mayo was not in the nature of a Treaty engagement, and was, no doubt, vague and general in its terms."

[The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER : Hear, hear!] Well, the letter was no doubt, "vague and general in its terms."

hon. Friend, at all events, is awake to
the gravity of the point; and I shall be
glad if, in the course of this debate, he
would give us some explanation on the
The Viceroy seems to have
been very much enamoured of this
subject.
singular sentence with regard to the
obligations of Treaties; because you will
find, if you turn to page 216, that there
is a reference to the point, and that there

was a distinct idea in his mind that the

obligation imposed upon us by a Treaty was one thing, and that by verbal assurfrom a letter of Sir Lewis Pelly adances another. I am now about to quote dressed, during the Peshawur Conferences, to the Minister of the Ameer, Syud Noor Mahomed Shah. Sir Lewis

Pelly says

"Your Excellency's contention is that the British Government is already bound, by its existing engagements with the Ameer, to support and defend His Highness against any foreign or Ameer has nothing to gain by a Treaty of domestic enemy; and that consequently the Alliance which, so far as the British Government is concerned, would be a mere re-statement of the obligations it has already contracted on his behalf, whilst, so far as His Highness is concerned, it would impose upon him obligations altogether new. This is, I think, a fair summary of your Excellency's argument: and the argument would be perfectly sound if its premises were true.

But, unfortunately for the Ameer, they are fundamentally erroneous. The only obligations ever contracted on behalf of each other by the British Government and the [First Night.]

Barakzai Rulers of Afghanistan are embodied in two Treaties, of which the first was signed in 1855 and the second in 1857."

upon

time.

They are to be found at pages 192, 193, and 194. In the first of these letters, which is written by Atta Mahomed Khan, and which is dated Cabul, November 23, it is stated that—

which conveyed to His Highness an invitation to attend the Proclamation of Her Majesty as "Empress of India" Now, are there, I would ask, no other at Delhi. Now, I am not sure that obligations except those contracted by the Viceroy did a wise thing in inthese Treaties? Have hon. Members viting the Ameer to grace his triumph at not seen how Shere Ali clung to what he this grand Delhi Proclamation; because called the writings which were given to he would be sure to meet on that occahim by Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo?sion a great many Native Princes whose They were his charters. internal affairs had been very considerHe repeated, over and over again, that there was no ably interfered with by different British need of any Treaty. He was, he said, Residents in India. I do not like, I satisfied with the assurances which he may add, to dwell in detail on this point had received, and wanted nothing more. of the reception of British Agents on He had the writings of Lord Lawrence the Frontier. Hon. Members will find and Lord Mayo, and they were, as he in the Papers letters dated November himself expressed it, "efficient and suffi- 23, December 5, 7, 11, 18, and 21, which cient." I can hardly conceive that the depict the attitude of the Ameer at the Ameer could have put any other construction the language which was used by the Viceroy than that which I have put upon it. It seems to me to be the reasonable construction. Well, the Envoy was told to convey an account of what had taken place faithfully to the Ameer, certain conditions being attached to the opening of negotiations-namely, the location of British officers on the Afghan Frontier, and the maintenance of an attitude of friendship and confidence on the part of the Ameer. The second condition there was no difficulty in acceding to; but the residence of British Officers in his territory evidently was a great stumbling block throughout these communications. On this point of the introduction of British Agents on the Frontier there is a very remarkable statement, and it is the first time we hear anything definite with regard to the re-arrangement of Frontier. The Viceroy in the account of his second interview, on the 13th of October, 1876, with the Native Agent, Atta Mahomed Khan, says

"Should the Ameer not consider the advantages worth the concession required by him, viz., British Agency on the Frontier, and a really friendly attitude on the part of the Ameer himself, it would then be needless for him to depute his Minister to meet the Viceroy's Envoy, and the Viceroy would be free to adopt his own course in his re-arrangement of Frontier relations, without regard to Afghan interests." [Ibid. p. 185.].

This is the first occasion on which we have the question of the re-arrangement of Frontier introduced. We have next a letter from the Viceroy to the Ameer, dated Simla, October 11th, 1876,

"The general result of their observations was that the Government of Afghanistan was not in a position to receive British officers within its Frontier."-[Ibid. p. 192.]

The letters then went on to show that there were signs of yielding in the Ameer; and in the last of the series, which was dated December 21, the writer says, after a lengthened interview with the Ameer, His Highness observed

"God willing, for ever, the friendship_existing between our Government and the British Government will remain more firm than before, and this true friendship will never be disturbed. Whatever objections or pleas have been hitherto made as to the residence of British officers on the border are owing to the savage conduct of the people of Afghanistan, and even now we agree to their residence on the border owing to helplessness."-[Ibid. p. 194.]

The meaning of that is, that he had been driven to this concession; that pressure had been put upon him; in other words, that he had been bullied; and that he could not resist any longer giving his consent to the residence of British officers within his territory. Then he sends an Envoy to meet Sir Lewis Pelly at Peshawur, and the first interview of this Envoy is with Dr. Bellew. You will find an account of it at page 195. Dr. Bellew, in a Memo-. randum, dated January 28, 1877, of his visit to the Envoy, records the following observations made by the latter :

"The Ameer now has a deep-rooted mistrust of the good faith and sincerity of the British

Government, and he has many reasons for this | him in India. He says here, at page

mistrust."

Dr. Bellew's reply to that observation was to the effect that he had always thought

"The disposition of the British Government towards that of the Ameer was of a most friendly character, and that he felt sure, from all that he could see as a private individual, that its most earnest desire was to see the Ameer's Government strong and prosperous, and consolidated on a firm basis."

The answer of the Envoy was

because he knew the lawless character of his

202

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He told Dr. Bellew at the first inter-
view that the allusion to his assent to
the admission of British Agents to re-
side in Afghanistan
66 was as much as
an order for his death." There is a
ring of truth about this story that the
people of Afghanistan were violently-
fanatically, if you will-opposed to this
step.

That the opposition was a true one I think we can, after reading these Papers, hardly entertain a doubt; and, moreover, it was an opposition which, it seems to me, the Ameer hardly dare face. In the Report of the Conference at Peshawur between Sir Lewis Pelly and the Ameer's Agent on February 15, 1877, Sir Lewis Pelly says

"That is what you say. But the promises of your Government are of one sort and their acts of another. Now listen to me. I tell you what I know. It is twenty-two years since the Government of the Ameer made a Treaty with John Lawrence Sahib, and it has not from that time to this diverged from it. At that time the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan refused to consent to the residence of British officers in his country, people, and how they had killed Englishmen in the streets of Cabul at the time of Shah Shuja's overthrow. Well, his explanation was accepted and friendship continued, and then after a time the Ameer (Shere Ali Khan) came down and met Lord Mayo. Again the question of British officers was advanced, and on the same grounds objected to. After this you came with Pollock Sahib to Seistan. You will recollect that on one occasion he spoke in praise of Yakoob Khan, and I immediately warned him that if he desired to secure the "But, in the most friendly manner, I beg the Ameer's confidence he would never mention Envoy to understand that, if the Ameer reject the name of Yakoob Khan again. Well, when all we offer and all we ask, and no basis of neI returned from Teheran I met Lord North-gotiation is left, the Viceroy, while observing brook, and discussed various matters at Simla, where the question of British officers coming to Afghanistan was again mooted. Now, why all this pressing to send British officers to Afghanistan when you declare that you have no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan? It has roused the suspicion of the Ameer." -[Ibid. p. 195.]

Now, the more I read these Papers, the more it seems to me that there had not been so much intrigue with other Powers as a deeply-rooted feeling in the hearts of the people of Afghanistan against the introduction of British Residents into their country. They evidently felt that their independence would be gone the moment they gave way on that point. Dr. Bellew paid the Cabul Envoy a second visit, which is referred to at page 202, and there, again, the Envoy uses words which I cannot help thinking are spoken from the man's own heart. In his interviews with Dr. Bellew he appears to have spoken perfectly freely; and that, I believe, is the impression which has been conveyed to the minds of many of those who knew

the terms of the Treaty of 1855, will decline to
support the Ameer and his dynasty in any
troubles, internal or external, and their unknown
consequences, and will continue to strengthen
the Frontier of British India without further
reference to the Ameer."-[Ibid. p. 210.]
Now here I would ask, how was the Vice-
roy going at once to strengthen the Fron-
tier and maintain intact the Treaty of
1855? That is a matter which appears
to me to require explanation. Then the
Cabul Envoy says that he does not
understand what "strengthening the
Frontier " meant; and Sir Lewis Pelly
replied-

"The Viceroy will take such measures as he may_deem wise and lawful for strengthening the Frontier of British India and providing for the safety and repose of that Empire; and this without communication with the Ameer." Then the Cabul Envoy asks

Ameer of Afghanistan, or otherwise ? "
Sir Lewis Pelly replied-

"Does this mean, within the territories of the

"That the object of the present Conference is not to interfere with Afghanistan.”—[1bid.] [First Night.]

Now was that, I would ask, a satisfactory | ference. He found by that time that answer? Now this Pelly Conference, as the mere location of British officers in it is called at Peshawur, was brought to a close at the time of the death of Noor Mahomed Shah, the Ameer's Envoy. The death of the Envoy occurred on the 26th of March, and on the 30th of March the Conference was, by order of the Viceroy, brought to a close, although another Envoy was present at Peshawur at the time. If you want to see the reason for the closing of the Conference you must turn to pages 170 and 171to the despatch of the Viceroy, dated the 10th of May, 1877. The Viceroy there tells us that

"The Afghan Envoy, who had long been suffering from a mortal disease, expired shortly after his receipt of this communication. His surviving colleague, the Mir Akhor, declared that he had no authority to answer any question from the British Government; and Sir Lewis Pelly was consequently instructed to close the Conference on the ground that there was no basis for negotiation. Apparently the Ameer, whose object was still to gain time, was much surprised and embarrassed by this step. At the moment when Sir Lewis Pelly was closing the Conference, His Highness was sending to the Mir Akhor instructions to prolong it by every means in his power; a fresh Envoy was already on the way from Cabul to Peshawur; and it was reported that this Envoy had authority to accept eventually all the conditions of the British Government. The Viceroy was aware of these facts when he instructed our Envoy to close the Conference."

Now, it is a little difficult to understand why the Conference was closed when that which the Viceroy had taken so much trouble to gain appeared to be at last within his grasp. Was not it the obvious solution of the difficulty, that by that time it was deemed expedient that there should be an extension of our North-Western Frontier? The Viceroy tells us that it was evident it was not desirable to go further with the Conference when he found that Shere Ali was not friendly in his disposition towards us, and was obviously not cordial about the receipt of these British Residents. But had he at any time, I would ask, found the Ameer cordial with respect to the reception of those Residents? Had he not been warned, over and over again, by every officer whom he came across in India, that the Ameer was strongly opposed to such a step? He, nevertheless, presses on the subject; and when at last he knew that the Envoy of the Ameer was about to accept all his terms, he closes the Con

the Ameer's territory would not be sufficient, and that he wanted an extension of Frontier. It is impossible to account otherwise for his closing the Conference after so long a delay when he was on the point of having the very terms acceded to for which he had been asking throughout. Well, a great break occurs at this stage of the proceedings. The matter was reported to the Government at home in a despatch dated 10th of May, 1877, from Simla, and you will find towards the close of that despatch, at page 172, the following remarkable passage:

"The further course of Cabul politics we cannot foresee, and do not attempt to predict. But we await its natural development with increased confidence in the complete freedom and paramount strength of our own position. In the meanwhile we see no reason to anticipate any act of aggression on tho part of the present Ameer, or on our own part any cause for interference with His Highness. Our relations with him are still such as we commonly maintain with the Chiefs of neighbouring and friendly countries. But whilst, on the one hand, they are now relieved from all liabilities, real or imputed, on behalf of his personal fortunes or those of his dynasty, on the other hand, they have been placed by our recent arrangements with Khelat (and others which will be separately reported to your Lordship) in a position much less dependent than heretofore upon the peruncertain a neighbour." sonal disposition, or uncontrolled conduct, of so

Now, this step was taken of closing the Conference, and it was reported home in the despatch from which I have been quoting, and which is dated the 10th of May, 1877; but it appears, I confess, to my mind, somewhat curious that this despatch is the first official record of these transactions we have following the despatch of the 28th of January, 1876; or, in other words, for a period of a year and a-quarter. That was a very long time for the Viceroy to be left without counsel and support from the Government at home. It seems to me that a Viceroy inaugurating a thoroughly new policy, which had been opposed by his Predecessors, should have sought advice from home during that period. But Lord Lytton does not appear to have done that. Is it possible that a despatch on the subject was delayed? because had such a despatch been written there were members of the Viceroy's own Government who would

have been found to protest against it. I hold in my hand a letter which has been addressed to the Editor of The Daily News by Sir Henry Norman. It is too long to read; but I may inform the House that Sir Henry Norman states that if he and his Colleagues had been consulted they would certainly have protested against this policy. I will read only one sentence from the letter. Speaking of how odd it would appear if he cordially concurred in adopting a policy which he had a few weeks previously deprecated, Sir Henry Norman

says

"I did no such thing, nor did Sir William Muir or Sir Arthur Hobhouse, who, with myself, were members of the Viceroy's Council during all the discussions preceding Sir Lewis Pelly's Mission; ou the contrary, we objected to the policy, and to measures in connection with it."

Well, Lord Lawrence spoke after the noble Marquess in the debate, and he was followed by Lord Northbrook, who said

"I heard what fell from the noble Marquess to-night. with the greatest possible satisfaction, because I feel it would be no light matter to change a policy which has been pursued deliberately by successive Governments in this country, and which has received the cordial support and approval of men like Lord Canning, my noble Friend who has just addressed your Lordships, and Lord Mayo."-[Ibid. 1842.]

I have seen that some explanation has since been given of the answer of Lord Salisbury on that occasion, and it is to the effect that we had not meant to send a British Resident to Cabul. Now, for my own part, I am disposed to doubt whether even the literal correctness of that explanation can be maintained; for it will, I think, be found from one of the We can understand that it would have Viceroy's letters to the Ameer, that he been inconvenient to write home under proposed to send Sir Lewis Pelly to him the circumstances. I wish also to point at Cabul or elsewhere. But be that as out that as it was possible to carry out it may, I contend that the speech of this policy only by deliberately concealing Lord Salisbury was one which was calit from Parliament, it was so concealed.culated to throw us off the scent, partiDuring the spring of 1877 a good many persons began to hear from India reports of these Conferences which alarmed them; but the matter was allowed to rest for a time. There were, however, later on, debates on the subject, both in the House of Lords and the House of Commons. One of the most important was that which took place in the House of Lords on the 15th of June, 1877, and it was a debate, I may observe, which threw the whole of us off our guard in reference to this question. That debate was opened by the Duke of Argyll, who, in the course of his speech, remarked

that

"Rumour said that the Government of India had determined upon a complete change of policy, and had resolved to insist on the Ameer receiving a Resident British Envoy at his Court. It had been said, too, that a particular officer had been appointed."-[3 Hansard, ccxxxiv. 1832.]

Well, what was the reply of the Marquess of Salisbury?

"We have not tried to force an Envoy upon the Ameer at Cabul-we have not suggested Sir Lewis Pelly as an Envoy at Cabul. Our relations with the Ameer of Cabul have undergone no material change since last year. I do not believe that he is worse disposed to

wards us than hitherto, or that his feelings are in any way more em bittered towards the British Government."-[Ibíd. 1835.]

cularly in that sentence which says that
our relations with the Ameer have under-
gone no material change since last year.
Ånd now I wish, in dealing with that
point, to make this remark. There is,
to my mind, nothing more important than
that our Questions and Answers to each
other should be not only literally true-
as I assume the Answer to which I have
just referred to be-but that they should
be frank. Right hon. and hon. Gentlemen
who sit on the front Benches opposite
have far more interest in this than in-
dependent Members. If we cannot rely
absolutely on the information which we
receive in Question and Answer in Par-
liament, it would be impossible to con-
duct the business of the country without
resorting to practices which would be
distasteful to every Englishman. If,
where it may be done, an Answer were
to be given which, while it may be
literally true, might serve to throw us
off the scent, then it would become
in the form of the clauses of a criminal
for us to frame our Questions
necessary
indictment, and that would be to degrade
the business of Parliament. I, for one,
trust that we shall always be able to
maintain the practice which has hitherto
prevailed; and that when we receive an
Answer to any Question which we may

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