and Lord Mayo, and a change from | Lawrence, and Lord Mayo. They all which was resisted by Lord Northbrook three carried out the same policy. The and disapproved by half of Lord Lytton's House at that hour-a quarter to 12 own Council-a disapproval they heard o'clock-would not wish to hear exnothing of until quite recently-that tracts; but would it allow him to refer policy had been changed, and changed to a letter that had appeared from Sir for months, and the result of that change Henry Norman? Sir Henry Norman, was to break off negotiations with the who distinguished himself at Delhi, had Ameer; and yet Lord Salisbury stated been Indian Military Secretary. He was there was no material change in our on Lord Mayo's Council, and was on relations with the Ameer. Lord Salis- Lord Northbrook's Council, and rebury also stated there was no reason for mained for some time on Lord Lytton's "any apprehension of any change of Council. On his return home, the prepolicy in our Indian Empire." This sent Government showed their conwas one of those statements which were fidence in him by placing him on the literally true, but which were, he might Indian Council. Sir Henry Norman, in say, naturally misinterpreted. There that letter, saidwas no apprehension of change of policy, because the change had been already made for months. They had, however, a complaint to make far more important than any charge against the late Government, or any charge of inconsistency in the statements of Members of the present Government, and that complaint was, that a change in policy was made which resulted in war, and which most men experienced in Indian affairs thought must, and all knew might, result in war, and yet Parliament was allowed to separate without any consultation being held with regard to this change. He quite admitted that there would be a danger in depriving the Executive of the power of declaring war; it was an ancient and a proper Prerogative; but, like many another Prerogative, it depended on its being exercised in the spirit of the Constitution. He did not for a moment say that under no emergency could a fresh line of policy be adopted without Parliament being consulted; but what he did say was that when there was not an emergency a fresh line of policy ought not to be adopted without some intimation to Parliament, as had been the case in the present instance. But now let him go to the main question, which was one of the most important that could come before the House or the country, and that was were we engaged in a war in which we ought to be engaged? He would not go over the story told by his hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread). He would not go back to the condition of affairs before Lord Lytton went out to India; though, at a fit time, he would be quite prepared to defend the acts of Lord Northbrook, Lord

He was

"My opinion was, and is, that up to the time of Lord Northbrook's departure the Ameer had no feeling of hostility to us, though he was somewhat out of temper, and was disquieted by distasteful to him. Any real resentment he writings which more or less pointed at measures may have subsequently shown is entirely due, according to my belief, to measures taken from April, 1876, to the present time." The writings to which he alluded were, he supposed, those of Sir Henry Rawlinson, whose book, published in 1875, recommending the annexation of a great part of Afghanistan, was doubtless in the Ameer's possession, and had much to do with his suspicion of the intentions and real desires of England. But the Ameer had not declared war against us. The question was, why we had declared war against him; what grievance we had against him; not what grievance he had against us. suspicious and angry about the course we adopted with reference to his son ; but there was no reason to suppose he would commit any acts of hostility. Lord Lytton went out he was not blaming Lord Lytton-under positive orders from Lord Salisbury to insist on the reception of permanent Agents, and then came the first overt act in our change of policy towards the Ameerthe letter dated July, 1876, insisting on the reception of such Agents. What was the next step? By arrangement with the Ameer our Native Agent at Cabul came to Simla in order to know what were the desire and objects of the Viceroy, so that he might convey informa tion with regard to them back to the Ameer. Then came that remarkable conversation which the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State had passed over lightly-in his opinion, somewhat [First Night 1

on,

too lightly. The Under Secretary of State for India (Mr. E. Stanhope) had stated that this conversation was confidential; but did hon. Gentlemen opposite suppose that the two statements first of all, that if the Ameer did not do what was required of him rivals might be encouraged; or, secondly, that the Russians might wipe him out of the map-were not intended to be communicated by the Vakeel to the Ameer; and, if so, was it not to be expected that from the moment he received them he would be frightened, angry, and suspicious? Well, as a matter of fact, he did become very much frightened, and at last sent word that he was helpless; that he greatly objected to have English Agents sent to reside on his territory, but that if it was insisted he would send one of his Ministers to meet our Envoy; and after considering all the difficulties of his position, the Ameer said they might arrange that British officers might be brought to live on the Border. Here, therefore, was a great concession made by the Ameer; but the Ameer's Minister died, and the Conference was broken up. The hon. Gentleman's explanation of the reason why Lord Lytton closed that Conference he must confess he could not understand; nor could he make the account of it given by Lord Lytton himself consistent with the statement of Viscount Cranbrook. Lord Lytton had certainly said in his despatch that the Ameer had been inciting the Border Tribes against him, and preaching a jehad; but, so far as he (Mr. W. E. Forster) had been able to see from the Papers, no proof whatever of that statement was furnished. But, be that as it might, the Conference was broken up, the Native Agent was withdrawn, and nothing more was heard of any proceedings for a period of 14 months. And what, he would ask, was the position of the Ameer during that time? We had withdrawn our promise to protect him, and there was a positive statement in the despatch of Lord Salisbury to the effect that we had done so, for he said

"Any illusions, therefore, which Shere Ali may have entertained upon this point have been effectually dissipated. He has further learned the formal responsibility of assisting him to de fend his country from the attacks of external

that the British Government will not undertake

tion, unless British officers are allowed to re-
side on the Frontier for the purpose of acquir
vernment.—[Afghanistan, No. 1, p. 224.]
ing information for communication to their Go-

There was a curious letter at page 247,
in which it is stated-

"I suspect that the coming of the English Mission is impossible so long as the Russians are here (or until the Russians have gone back).”

That brought out a remarkable coincidence of dates. That letter was written on the 19th of September-the very same day on which Lord Salisbury received a reply from St. Petersburg that the Russian Mission was a mere Mission of courtesy. He really saw no ground for proceeding to hostile measures with the Ameer. The threatening messages which had been sent to him were still rankling in his memory; and how could they, at a time when he was suspecting that he was the pipkin, as he was told, between the "two iron pots," expect him to refuse permission to the Russian Envoy to enter his territory? He hoped the House would consider-he was sure the country would, when they read the whole of these statements-that the Government were not justified in this war upon the Ameer. No doubt he was a barbarian, but he had his own feelings about independence; and the Government ought to have considered much more deliberately whether they should force their Envoys upon him. He might be told this was not a mere question of justice or injustice; that it lay much deeper; that this was a necessary warnecessary to the safety of India-and that they must not be led away by sentimental considerations of justice. Well, but what would be said if, instead of being a necessary and a wise war, it was an unnecessary and an unwise war? Suppose that, instead of securing the safety of India, it positively endangered it? Many people certainly entertained this opinion, and among them were some who knew much more about the matter than he did, or, for that part of it, than the majority of hon. Members knew. They were going to war with Afghanistan in order to guard India against Russia. But how? Was that object to be effected by conquering and annexing Afghanistan, and by extending our Frontier over that mountainous country

["No!"] Some people had advocated fairly be asked what would be the dithat; he did not know whether the Go-rection of their policy? He thought the vernment had done so. Well, then, enormous majority of those, both in and should we leave Afghanistan indepen- out of the House, who supported this dent? But in what a position would Amendment would, first of all, say they she be, and with what disposition towards would have "peace with honour." That, us? This was not our first Afghan however, was not very easy since the War; we had had another; and there Government had chosen to plunge us was not one now that he could find to into war. He believed the Opposition justify it. In this case, too, we should might go further and say - "We would leave memories behind in a hostile Af-take-and you ought to take the very ghanistan, though we said our great first opportunity of coming to honourobject was to guard against Russia by able terms with the Ameer." Having having a friendly Afghanistan. There shown the enormous superiority of our was a report that the Ameer had strength, we ought to try to convince fled out of the country. If that him that we returned to our old and were true, whom were we to put in his disregarded our new policy. What was place? Was it another Shah Soojah? this old policy-the policy of Lord LawThen it was said we wanted to rectify rence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northour Frontier. Well, he would not enter brook? It was to try to convince the into that question; but this he would Ameer first, that it was neither our wish say-that for every one competent mili- nor our interest to annex his territory, tary expert who said that the new Fron- or to conquer him, or to take from him tier was scientific there were two who his independence; and, secondly, that said it was unscientific. One word about it was our interest, and would be our the only statement which the Govern- intention, to secure him from any unment had vouchsafed as to their grounds provoked attack by Russia. That was for going to war before war was de- the assurance which Lord Northbrook clared. The Government said in the most gave to the Ameer; an assurance qualiauthoritative manner, through the lips fied by the necessary condition that the of the Prime Minister, that they were aggression was not to be provoked by bound to go to war, not because they the Ameer himself. That was our old had been provoked and were obliged in policy, and it formed a strong contrast honour to do so, but because they to the new one, which was to protect wanted a rectification of Frontier. That the Ameer against Russia, but only on confession of Lord Beaconsfield was, the condition that he submitted to terms perhaps, the most cynical statement which he believed would destroy his which ever fell from a Prime Minister. independence. We might return to that It was made on the 9th of November, old policy, though it would not be easy when the Government had not yet got to do so, because the Government had an answer to the Ultimatum sent to the made the Ameer suspicious and caused Ameer. It was possible that the Ameer his people to share his suspicion. Havwould have accepted the Ultimatum. ing endeavoured to answer a question There was not a single word in the Ulti- which might be asked of the Opposition, matum about a rectification of Frontier; he desired in turn to put a question to and yet the Prime Minister said we were Her Majesty's Government. He thought making an arrangement for rectifying the country ought to know more about our Frontier. He blushed to hear it; our relations with Russia in this matter. and the only excuse he could find for It ought to know something more about the statement was that we were taking the understanding referred to by Lord the Frontier, not from the Ameer, but Lytton, when he sent word to the from independent tribes. If so, why go Ameerto war with the Ameer? He was one of those who, whenever an important question arose, asked himself, when he opposed the Government-"What should I do if I were not in Opposition?" He, and those who acted with him, could not tell Gentlemen opposite the exact course they would take; but it might

"If the Ameer does not desire to come to a

speedy understanding with us; Russia does; and she desires it at his expense."-[Ibid. p. 183.] He thought they had a right to ask whether there was an attempt at such an understanding with Russia now; and he would therefore repeat the question [First Night.]

to the objection that many hon. Mem- | debate would be very inferior indeed. bers had already made arrangements which would keep them away during the greater portion of the evening.