defective: not that it must necessarily embody an attitude of rest; but such is the most desirable spiritual effect. How profoundly was this felt by the great Athenian sculptor, whom Aristotle designated skillful in beauty, when he conceived the immortal tranquillity. of those works which stamped the generic character upon the gods of Greece.

"Motion may be beautiful, as well as rest; but it must be such as to leave upon the observing mind no impress of laborious effort. There are valuable ends to be attained by the representation of action; but that pleasure can not be other than imperfect, which arises from the study of a Discobolus arrested in the act of throwing his quoit, or of a boxer stretching out his fist to all eternity. Whatever images of action or endurance a work may contain, in order to the effect of beauty, they must all harmonize in the expression of one idea, on which the spirit can dwell with satisfaction."

- Plato, Phædrus, Menon, Hippias major. Augustine. Addison, Pleasures of Imagination-papers, Spectator. Burke, on the Sublime and Beautiful. Reid, subject, Beauty. Dugald Stewart's Works, vol. IV. Dr. Thomas Brown, Lect. LIII-LVIII. Payne Knight, Essay on Beauty. Jeffrey, Miscellanies, on Taste. Crouzas. Winkleman, History of Art, Book IV.

On the Risible: Shaftsbury, Characteristics, Essay II. Campbell, Phil. Rhet., Book I, chapter ш. Kames, Ele. Crit. chaps. X, XII, XIII. Beattie, on Laughter and Ludicrous Composition. Brown, Lect. L. On the Sublime: Longinus, Burke, Blair, Lect. III, IV. On the Picturesque: Works of William Gilpin. Uvedale Price, ed. by Sir Thomas D. Lauder.

Essays of Sir

CHAPTER III.

OF THE BEAUTIFUL.

UPON noting carefully the operation of the senses, it will be found that there are some objects which pain the organs, and others that are productive of gratification. A sudden glare of light thrown upon the eye, is productive of acute suffering; also, rapid alternations of bright light and deep darkness; so piercing and jarring sounds, as intimated by the very names applied to them, are painful; while a mild, steady light is grateful to the eye, and soft, pure, and distinct sounds to the ear. A very pungent taste hurts the tongue and palate, and certain smells the nostrils, and I need not add, that there are substances which pain the surface of the body; while on the other hand, there are many tastes, smells, and objects of touch, conducive to the comfort of their respective organs, and consequently pleasant. Mankind, in the common use of language, have declared that such are not beauty and ugliness, but merely pleasure and pain. They are only sensations and we have seen already, that beauty can not be a sensation. But all our acquaintance with

the external world has been made through the senses. Consequently, our notions of it must be associated, in greater or less degree, with the gratification or pain of the organs whereby they have been admitted. In many cases, this pain or gratification is so slight, as to form a very feeble item of consciousness, of little or no practical effect. But in others, the pathological nature of the sensation is distinctly perceived the moment that attention is turned to it, and others even compel the interest of the whole thinking being. Many of our ideas of the external world are associated in the mind with distinct conceptions of pain or pleasure. These pains and pleasures, I have said, are not beauty and its opposite, neither does the common understanding of men so esteem them; but when the mind perceives a certain class of sensations to be pleasurable, it immediately enjoys a higher delight from the recognition of that conduciveness to its own well being. A person is often heard to remark of an article of food, that he likes it, because its taste is pleasant to him; or of a sound, that he dislikes it, because it is grating to his ears; expressions distinctly referring to a consciousness, that liking and disliking are secondary states of mind, and subsequent to a perception of the nature of the sensations. Another remark, no less common, that a green field is beautiful, for the eye can rest upon it with such pleasure and refreshment that it never tires of the sight, is quite as plain an assertion of the individual consciousness that the emotion of beauty is

subsequent to a perception of the nature of the sensation. Such, indeed, is our habit of speaking, concerning the emotion, as far as attendant upon any object of sense. It is both common and natural for all persons, those who have no idea of philosophy, and make no pretension to it, as truly as those who do, to assign reasons for thinking such objects beautiful. A young lady will exclaim at sight of a beautiful flower, and immediately, by way of expressing and explaining her emotion, dilate upon the softness or brilliancy of its colors, the smoothness of its petals, the delicacy of its outlines, and the sweetness of its fragrance: thus instinctively confessing that her feeling of its beauty results from her perception of those pleasant sensations. Such is not the case in regard to the sensations themselves; none but a philosophic mind ever thinks of accounting for them. We simply say that they pain or they please, they hurt or they gratify. Blue is grateful to the eye; a true fifth is pleasant to the ear; mignonette yields a delicious fragrance; honey is sweet; and the petals of the rose are pleasant to the touch: but why they are so we never add, unless when disposed to philosophise, and then find it no easy matter. We never instinctively give an account of why we have those feelings. But as soon as we maintain that any of these things are beautiful, then we naturally assign as a reason, some of the sensations they produce. The chord of the fifth is beautiful, because it is pleasant to the ear. A soft blue is beautiful, because it is pleasant to the eye.

The sensation is not confounded with the emotion; but the former, or rather a recognition of the former, is assigned as the cause of the latter. It is because I perceive a color to be pleasant, that I feel it to be beautiful. There are several steps in this mental process; the enjoyment of the sensation, the perception of the relation between the object and that enjoyment, a decision of the judgment that the object is calculated to produce such pleasure, and lastly, the emotion of beauty. So far then, I think we may conclude that the immediate antecedent of beauty is an intellectual state of mind; namely, a perception of the relation between primary pleasure and certain things suited to produce it. Again, there are pleasurable, intellectual, and moral states of mind, as the approbation of conscience, the perception of truth, the recognition of right, and attachments formed by habit, none of which are beauty, though all result in it. We do not say of the pleasure arising from following a clear train of evidence, that it is beauty, although we call its cause beautiful. So we speak of an eminently wise decision, of a pure and noble action, of an ingenious invention, as beautiful, although we do not confound the pleasure of justice, of generosity, or invention, with beauty. But when the mind has experienced these pleasures, and their causes, it immediately enjoys the ultimate emotion. On the other hand, if, in the contemplation of any of these things, there occurs an impediment to the primary pleasure, or any shortcoming of the object that should cause it, the