candra (825 A.D.), Yogaśästra of Hemacandra (1088-1172A.D.), and Pramāṇanayatattvālokālamkāra of Deva Sūri (1086-1169 A.D.). I am indebted for these dates to Vidyābhūṣaṇa's Indian Logic.

It may here be mentioned that the Jains also possess a secular literature of their own in poetry and prose, both Sanskrit and Prakrit. There are also many moral tales (e.g. Samarāicca-kahā, Upamitabhavaprapañca-kathā in Prakrit, and the Yasastilaka of Somadeva and Dhanapala's Tilakamañjarī); Jaina Sanskrit poems both in the Purāṇa and Kāvya style and hymns in Prakrit and Sanskrit are also very numerous. There are also many Jaina dramas. The Jaina authors have also contributed many works, original treatises as well as commentaries, to the scientific literature of India in its various branches: grammar, biography, metrics, poetics, philosophy, etc. The contributions of the Jains to logic deserve special notice1.

Some General Characteristics of the Jains.

The Jains exist only in India and their number is a little less than a million and a half. The Digambaras are found chiefly in Southern India but also in the North, in the North-western provinces, Eastern Rājputāna and the Punjab. The head-quarters of the Svetambaras are in Gujarat and Western Rajputāna, but they are to be found also all over Northern and Central India.

The outfit of a monk, as Jacobi describes it, is restricted to bare necessaries, and these he must beg-clothes, a blanket, an almsbowl, a stick, a broom to sweep the ground, a piece of cloth to cover his mouth when speaking lest insects should enter it. The outfit of nuns is the same except that they have additional clothes. The Digambaras have a similar outfit, but keep no clothes, use brooms of peacock's feathers or hairs of the tail of a cow (cămara)3. The monks shave the head or remove the hair by plucking it out. The latter method of getting rid of the hair is to be preferred, and is regarded sometimes as an essential rite. The duties of monks are very hard. They should sleep only three hours and spend the rest of the time in repenting of and expiating sins, meditating, studying, begging alms (in the afternoon), and careful inspection of their clothes and other things for the removal of insects. The laymen should try to approach the ideal of conduct of the monks

1 See Jacobi's article on Jainism, E. R. E. 3 See Saddarśanasamuccaya, chapter IV.

2 See Jacobi, loc. cit.

by taking upon themselves particular vows, and the monks are required to deliver sermons and explain the sacred texts in the upāśrayas (separate buildings for monks like the Buddhist vihāras). The principle of extreme carefulness not to destroy any living being has been in monastic life carried out to its very last consequences, and has shaped the conduct of the laity in a great measure. No layman will intentionally kill any living being, not even an insect, however troublesome. He will remove it carefully without hurting it. The principle of not hurting any living being thus bars them from many professions such as agriculture, etc., and has thrust them into commerce1.

Life of Mahāvīra.

Mahāvīra, the last prophet of the Jains, was a Kṣattriya of the Jñāta clan and a native of Vaiśāli (modern Besarh, 27 miles north of Patna). He was the second son of Siddhartha and Triśalā. The Svetambaras maintain that the embryo of the Tirthankara which first entered the womb of the Brahmin lady Devanandā was then transferred to the womb of Triśalā. This story the Digambaras do not believe as we have already seen. His parents were the worshippers of Pārsva and gave him the name Varddhamāna (Vīra or Mahāvīra). He married Yaśodā and had a daughter by her. In his thirtieth year his parents died and with the permission of his brother Nandivardhana he became a monk. After twelve years of self-mortification and meditation he attained omniscience (kevala, cf. bodhi of the Buddhists). He lived to preach for forty-two years more, and attained mokṣa (emancipation) some years before Buddha in about 480 B.C.2.

The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology.

A thing (such as clay) is seen to assume various shapes and to undergo diverse changes (such as the form of a jug, or pan, etc.), and we have seen that the Chandogya Upaniṣad held that since in all changes the clay-matter remained permanent, that alone was true, whereas the changes of form and state were but appearances, the nature of which cannot be rationally

1 See Jacobi's article on Jainism, E. R. E.

2 See Hoernlé's translation of Uvāsagadasão, Jacobi, loc. cit., and Hoernlé's article on the Ājīvakas, E. R. E. The Śvetāmbaras, however, say that this date was 527 B.C., and the Digambaras place it eighteen years later.

demonstrated or explained. The unchangeable substance (e.g. the clay-matter) alone is true, and the changing forms are mere illusions of the senses, mere objects of name (nāma-rūpa)1. What we call tangibility, visibility, or other sense-qualities, have no real existence, for they are always changing, and are like mere phantoms of which no conception can be made by the light of reason. The Buddhists hold that changing qualities can alone be perceived and that there is no unchanging substance behind them. What we perceive as clay is but some specific quality, what we perceive as jug is also some quality. Apart from these qualities we do not perceive any qualitiless substance, which the Upaniṣads regard as permanent and unchangeable. The permanent and unchangeable substance is thus a mere fiction of ignorance, as there are only the passing collocations of qualities. Qualities do not imply that there are substances to which they adhere, for the so-called pure substance does not exist, as it can neither be perceived by the senses nor inferred. There are only the momentary passing qualities. We should regard each change of quality as a new existence.

The Jains we know were the contemporaries of Buddha and possibly of some of the Upaniṣads too, and they had also a solution to offer. They held that it was not true that substance alone was true and qualities were mere false and illusory appearances. Further it was not true as the Buddhists said that there was no permanent substance but merely the change of passing qualities, for both these represent two extreme views and are contrary to experience. Both of them, however, contain some elements of truth but not the whole truth as given in experience. Experience shows that in all changes there are three elements: (1) that some collocations of qualities appear to remain unchanged; (2) that some new qualities are generated; (3) that some old qualities are destroyed. It is true that qualities of things are changing every minute, but all qualities are not changing. Thus when a jug is made, it means that the clay-lump has been destroyed, a jug has been generated and the clay is permanent, i.e. all production means that some old qualities have been lost, some new ones brought in, and there is some part in it which is permanent The clay has become lost in some form, has generated itself in another, and remained permanent in still

1 See Chandogya, vi. I.

V

another form. It is by virtue of these unchanged qualities that a
thing is said to be permanent though undergoing change. Thus
when a lump of gold is turned into a rod or a ring, all the specific
qualities which come under the connotation of the word "gold"
are seen to continue, though the forms are successively changed,
and with each such change some of its qualities are lost and some
new ones are acquired. Such being the case, the truth comes to
this, that there is always a permanent entity as represented by the
permanence of such qualities as lead us to call it a substance in
spite of all its diverse changes. The nature of being (sat) then is
neither the absolutely unchangeable, nor the momentary changing
qualities or existences, but involves them both. Being then, as is def
testified by experience, is that which involves a permanent unit,
which is incessantly every moment losing some qualities and
gaining new ones. The notion of being involves a permanent
(dhruva) accession of some new qualities (utpāda) and loss of ead.
some old qualities (vyaya)1. The solution of Jainism is thus a re-
conciliation of the two extremes of Vedāntism and Buddhism on
grounds of common-sense experience.

The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (anekāntavāda). This conception of being as the union of the permanent and change brings us naturally to the doctrine of Anekāntavāda or what we may call relative pluralism as against the extreme absolutism of the Upaniṣads and the pluralism of the Buddhists. The Jains regarded all things as anekānta (na-ekānta), or in other words they held that nothing could be affirmed absolutely, as all affirmations were true only under certain conditions and limitations. Thus speaking of a gold jug, we see that its existence as a substance (dravya) is of the nature of a collocation of atoms and not as any other substance such as space (ākāśa), i.e. a gold jug is a dravya only in one sense of the term and not in every sense; so it is a dravya in the sense that it is a collocation of atoms and not a dravya in the sense of space or time (kāla). It is thus both a dravya and not a dravya at one and the same time. Again it is atomic in the sense that it is a composite of earth-atoms and not atomic in the sense that it is

1 See Tattvärthadhigamasūtra, and Gunaratna's treatment of Jainism in Şaddarśanasamuccaya.

not a composite of water-atoms. Again it is a composite of earthatoms only in the sense that gold is a metallic modification of earth, and not any other modification of earth as clay or stone. Its being constituted of metal-atoms is again true in the sense that it is made up of gold-atoms and not of iron-atoms. It is made up again of gold-atoms in the sense of melted and unsullied gold and not as gold in the natural condition. It is again made up of such unsullied and melted gold as has been hammered and shaped by the goldsmith Devadatta and not by Yajñadatta. Its being made up of atoms conditioned as above is again only true in the sense that the collocation has been shaped as a jug and not as a pot and so on. Thus proceeding in a similar manner the Jains say that all affirmations are true of a thing only in a certain limited sense. All things (vastu) thus possess an infinite number of qualities (anantadharmātmakam vastu), each of which can only be affirmed in a particular sense. Such an ordinary thing as a jug will be found to be the object of an infinite number of affirmations and the possessor of an infinite number of qualities from infinite points of view, which are all true in certain restricted senses and not absolutely'. Thus in the positive relation riches cannot be affirmed of poverty but in the negative relation such an affirmation is possible as when we say "the poor man has no riches." The poor man possesses riches not in a positive but in a negative way. Thus in some relation or other anything may be affirmed of any other thing, and again in other relations the very same thing cannot be affirmed of it. The different standpoints from which things (though possessed of infinite determinations) can be spoken of as possessing this or that quality or as appearing in relation to this or that, are technically called naya2.

The Doctrine of Nayas.

In framing judgments about things there are two ways open to us, firstly we may notice the manifold qualities and characteristics of anything but view them as unified in the thing; thus when we say "this is a book" we do not look at its characteristic qualities as being different from it, but rather the qualities or characteristics are perceived as having no separate existence from

1 See Gunaratna on Jainamata in Saḍdarśanasamuccaya, pp. 211, etc., and also Tattvärthädhigamasūtra.

2 See Tattvärthadhigamasūtra, and Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya, pp. 895–923.