say that knowledge is not to be valued for its own sake. The validity (prāmāṇya) of anything consists in this, that it directly helps us to get what is good for us and to avoid what is bad for us. Knowledge alone has this capacity, for by it we can adapt ourselves to our environments and try to acquire what is good for us and avoid what is bad'. The conditions that lead to the production of such knowledge (such as the presence of full light and proximity to the eye in the case of seeing an object by visual perception) have but little relevancy in this connection. For we are not concerned with how a cognition is produced, as it can be of no help to us in serving our purposes. It is enough for us to know that external objects under certain conditions assume such a special fitness (yogyatā) that we can have knowledge of them. We have no guarantee that they generate knowledge in us, for we are only aware that under certain conditions we know a thing, whereas under other conditions we do not know it. The enquiry as to the nature of the special fitness of things which makes knowledge of them possible does not concern us. Those conditions which confer such a special fitness on things as to render them perceivable have but little to do with us; for our purposes which consist only in the acquirement of good and avoidance of evil, can only be served by knowledge and not by those conditions of external objects.

Knowledge reveals our own self as a knowing subject as well as the objects that are known by us. We have no reason to suppose (like the Buddhists) that all knowledge by perception of external objects is in the first instance indefinite and indeterminate, and that all our determinate notions of form, colour, size and other characteristics of the thing are not directly given in our perceptual experience, but are derived only by imagination (utprekṣā), and that therefore true perceptual knowledge only certifies the validity of the indefinite and indeterminate crude sense data (nirvikalpa jñāna). Experience shows that true knowledge on the one hand reveals us as subjects or knowers, and on the other hand gives a correct sketch of the external objects in all the diversity of their characteristics. It is for this reason that knowledge is our immediate and most prominent means of serving our purposes.

1 Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṁkāra, p. 26.

2 See Parikṣā-mukha-sūtra, II. 9, and its vṛtti, and also the concluding vṛtti of ch. II.

Of course knowledge cannot directly and immediately bring to us the good we want, but since it faithfully communicates to us the nature of the objects around us, it renders our actions for the attainment of good and the avoidance of evil, possible; for if knowledge did not possess these functions, this would have been impossible. The validity of knowledge thus consists in this, that and it is the most direct, immediate, and indispensable means for serving our purposes. So long as any knowledge is uncontradicted it should be held as true. False knowledge is that which represents things in relations in which they do not exist. When a rope in a badly lighted place gives rise to the illusion of a snake, the illusion consists in taking the rope to be a snake, i.e. perceiving a snake where it does not exist. Snakes exist and ropes also exist, there is no untruth in that1. The error thus consists in this, that the snake is perceived where the rope exists. The perception of a snake under relations and environments in which it was not then existing is what is meant by error here. What was at first perceived as a snake was later on contradicted and thus found false. Falsehood therefore consists in the misrepresentation of objective facts in experience. True knowledge therefore is that which gives such a correct and faithful representation of its object as is never afterwards found to be contradicted. Thus knowledge when imparted directly in association with the organs in sense-perception is very clear, vivid, and distinct, and is called perceptional (pratyakṣa); when attained otherwise the knowledge is not so clear and vivid and is then called non-perceptional (parokşa2).

Theory of Perception.

The main difference of the Jains from the Buddhists in the theory of perception lies, as we have already seen, in this, that the Jains think that perception (pratyakşa) reveals to us the external objects just as they are with most of their diverse characteristics of colour, form, etc., and also in this, that knowledge arises in the soul

1 Illusion consists in attributing such spatial, temporal or other kinds of relations at to the objects of our judgment as do not actually exist, but the objects themselves actually exist in other relations. When I mistake the rope for the snake, the snake actually exists though its relationing with the "this" as "this is a snake" does not exist, for the snake is not the rope. This illusion is thus called satkhyāti or misrelationing of existents (sat).

2 See Jaina-tarka-värttika of Siddhasena, ch. I., and vṛtti by Santyācārya, Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṁkāra, ch. 1., Parīksā-mukha-sūtra-vṛtti, ch. I.

from within it as if by removing a veil which had been covering it before. Objects are also not mere forms of knowledge (as the Vijñānavādin Buddhist thinks) but are actually existing. Knowledge of external objects by perception is gained through the senses. The exterior physical sense such as the eye must be distinguished from the invisible faculty or power of vision of the soul, which alone deserves the name of sense. We have five such cognitive senses. But the Jains think that since by our experience we are only aware of five kinds of sense knowledge corresponding to the five senses, it is better to say that it is the "self" which gains of itself those different kinds of sense-knowledge in association with those exterior senses as if by removal of a covering, on account of the existence of which the knowledge could not reveal itself before. The process of external perception does not thus involve the exercise of any separate and distinct sense, though the rise of the sense-knowledge in the soul takes place in association with the particular sense-organ such as eye, etc. The soul is in touch with all parts of the body, and visual knowledge is that knowledge which is generated in the soul through that part of it which is associated with, or is in touch with the eye. To take an example, I look before me and see a rose. Before looking at it the knowledge of rose was in me, but only in a covered condition, and hence could not get itself manifested. The act of looking at the rose means that such a fitness has come into the rose and into myself that the rose is made visible, and the veil over my knowledge of rose is removed. When visual knowledge arises, this happens in association with the eye; I say that I see through the visual sense, whereas in reality experience shows that I have only a knowledge of the visual type (associated with eye). As experience does not reveal the separate senses, it is unwarrantable to assert that they have an existence apart from the self. Proceeding in a similar way the Jains discard the separate existence of manas (mind-organ) also, for manas also is not given in experience, and the hypothesis of its existence is unnecessary, as self alone can serve its purpose1. Perception of an object means

1 Tanna indriyam bhautikam kim tu ātmā ca indriyam...anupahatacakṣurādideśeşu eva ātmanaḥ karmakṣayopaśamastenästhagitagavākṣatulyāni cakṣurādīni upakaraṇāni. Jaina- Vättika-Vṛtti, II. p. 98. In many places, however, the five senses, such as eye, ear, etc., are mentioned as senses, and living beings are often classified according to the number of senses they possess. (See Pramāṇamīmāmsā. See also Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, ch. II. etc.) But this is with reference to the sense organs. The denial

that the veil of ignorance upon the "self" regarding the object has been removed. Inwardly this removal is determined by the karma of the individual, outwardly it is determined by the presence of the object of perception, light, the capacity of the sense organs, and such other conditions. Contrary to the Buddhists and many other Indian systems, the Jains denied the existence of any nirvikalpa (indeterminate) stage preceding the final savikalpa (determinate) stage of perception. There was a direct revelation of objects from within and no indeterminate sensematerials were necessary for the development of determinate perceptions. We must contrast this with the Buddhists who regarded that the first stage consisting of the presentation of indeterminate sense materials was the only valid part of perception. The determinate stage with them is the result of the application of mental categories, such as imagination, memory, etc., and hence does not truly represent the presentative part1.

Non-Perceptual Knowledge.

Non-perceptual knowledge (parokşa) differs from pratyakṣa in this, that it does not give us so vivid a picture of objects as the latter. Since the Jains do not admit that the senses had any function in determining the cognitions of the soul, the only distinction they could draw between perception and other forms of knowledge was that the knowledge of the former kind (perception) gave us clearer features and characteristics of objects than the latter. Paroksa thus includes inference, recognition, implication, memory, etc.; and this knowledge is decidedly less vivid than perception.

5

Regarding inference, the Jains hold that it is unnecessary to have five propositions, such as: (1) “the hill is fiery," (2) "because of smoke," (3) "wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the kitchen," (4) "this hill is smoky," (5) "therefore it is fiery," called respectively pratijñā, hetu, dṛṣṭānta, upanaya and nigamana, ex- uf cept for the purpose of explicitness. It is only the first two propositions which actually enter into the inferential process (Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, pp. 108, 109). When we make an of separate senses is with reference to admitting them as entities or capacities having r a distinct and separate category of existence from the soul. The sense organs are like windows for the soul to look out. They cannot thus modify the sense-knowledge which rises in the soul by inward determination; for it is already existent in it; the perceptual process only means that the veil which was observing it is removed. 1 Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, pp. 8-11.

inference we do not proceed through the five propositions as above. They who know that the reason is inseparably connected with the probandum either as coexistence (sahabhāva) or as invariable antecedence (kramabhava) will from the mere statement of the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the conclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting of five propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an inference1.

As regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit the authority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures give us right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who have lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and right knowledge have conquered all passions and removed all ignorance2.

Knowledge as Revelation.

The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of anything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us. That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that

1 As regards concomitance (vyāpti) some of the Jaina logicians like the Buddhists prefer antarvyāpti (between smoke and fire) to bahirvyāpti (the place containing smoke with the place containing fire). They also divide inference into two classes, svārthānumāna for one's own self and parārthānumāna for convincing others. It may not be out of place to note that the earliest Jaina view as maintained by Bhadrabahu in his Daśavaikālikaniryukti was in favour of ten propositions for making an inference; (1) Pratijñā (e.g. non-injury to life is the greatest virtue), (2) Pratijñāvibhakti (non-injury to life is the greatest virtue according to Jaina scriptures), (3) Hetu (because those who adhere to non-injury are loved by gods and it is meritorious to do them honour), (4) Hetu vibhakti (those who do so are the only persons who can live in the highest places of virtue), (5) Vipakṣa (but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by reviling Jaina scriptures one may attain merit as is the case with Brahmins), (6) Vipakṣa pratisedha (it is not so, it is impossible that those who despise Jaina scriptures should be loved by gods or should deserve honour), (7) Dṛṣṭānta (the Arhats take food from householders as they do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects), (8) Āśankā (but the sins of the householders should touch the arhats, for they cook for them), (9) Āśankāpratiṣedha (this cannot be, for the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly, so it could not be said that the cooking was undertaken for them), (10) Naigamana (non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) (Vidyābhūṣaṇa's Indian Logic). These are persuasive statements which are often actually adopted in a discussion, but from a formal point of view many of these are irrelevant. When Vätsyāyana in his Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya, I. 1. 32, says that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions as against the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, he probably had this Jaina view in his mind.

2 See Jainatarkavārttika, and Parīkṣāmukhasūtravṛtti, and Șaḍdarśanasamuccaya with Gunaratna on Jainism.