from the root ni is sometimes explained as that by which sentences and words could be interpreted as having one particular meaning and not another, and on the strength of this even Vedic accents of words (which indicate the meaning of compound words by pointing out the particular kind of compound in which the words entered into combination) were called Nyāya1. Prof. Jacobi on the strength of Kautilya's enumeration of the vidya (sciences) as Ānvīkṣikī (the science of testing the perceptual and scriptural knowledge by further scrutiny), trayī (the three Vedas), värttä (the sciences of agriculture, cattle keeping etc.), and danḍanīti (polity), and the enumeration of the philosophies as Samkhya, Yoga, Lokāyata and Ānvīkṣikī, supposes that the Nyaya sutra was not in existence in Kautilya's time 300 B.C.). Kautilya's reference to Nyāya as Anvikṣiki only suggests that the word Nyāya was not a familiar name for Ānviksiki in Kautilya's time. He seems to misunderstand Vātsyāyana in thinking that Vātsyāyana distinguishes Nyāya from the Anvīkṣiki in holding that while the latter only means the science of logic the former means logic as well as metaphysics. What appears from Vātsyāyana's statement in Nyāya sūtra I. i. I is this that he points out that the science which was known in his time as Nyāya was the same as was referred to as Ānvīkṣikī by Kautilya. He distinctly identifies Nyāyavidyā with Ānvīkṣikī, but justifies the separate enumeration of certain logical categories such as samsaya (doubt) etc., though these were already contained within the first two terms pramāņa (means of cognition) and prameya (objects of cognition), by holding that unless these its special and separate branches (prthakprasthāna) were treated, Nyāyavidyā would simply become metaphysics (adhyātmavidyā) like the Upanisads. The old meaning of Nyāya as the means of determining the right meaning or the right thing is also agreed upon by Vatsyāyana and is sanctioned by Vācaspati in his Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā 1. i. 1). He compares the meaning of the word Nyāya (pramāṇairarthaparīkṣaṇam—to scrutinize an object by means of logical proof) with the etymological meaning of the word ānvikṣiki (to scrutinize anything after it has been known by perception and scriptures). Vātsyāyana of course points out that so far as this ingical side of Nyāya is concerned it has the widest scope for

1

dāsa's Kumārasambhava “Udghāto praṇavo yāsām nyāyaistribhirudīraṇam,” inātha's gloss on it.

Jacobi's "The early history of Indian Philosophy,” Indian Antiquary, 1918.

itself as it includes all beings, all their actions, and all the sciences1. He quotes Kautilya to show that in this capacity Nyāya is like light illumining all sciences and is the means of all works. In its capacity as dealing with the truths of metaphysics it may show the way to salvation. I do not dispute Prof. Jacobi's main point that the metaphysical portion of the work was a later addition, for this seems to me to be a very probable view. In fact Vātsyāyana himself designates the logical portion as a pṛthakprasthāna (separate branch). But I do not find that any statement of Vātsyāyana or Kautilya can justify us in concluding that this addition was made after Kautilya. Vātsyāyana has no doubt put more stress on the importance of the logical side of the work, but the reason of that seems to be quite obvious, for the importance of metaphysics or adhyātmavidyā was acknowledged by all. But the importance of the mere logical side would not appeal to most people. None of the dharmaśāstras (religious scriptures) or the Vedas would lend any support to it, and Vātsyāyana had to seek the support of Kautilya in the matter as the last resource. The fact that Kautilya was not satisfied by counting Ānvīkṣikī as one of the four vidyās but also named it as one of the philosophies side by side with Samkhya seems to lead to the presumption that probably even in Kautilya's time Nyāya was composed of two branches, one as adhyātmavidyā and another as a science of logic or rather of debate. This combination is on the face of it loose and external, and it is not improbable that the metaphysical portion was added to increase the popularity of the logical part, which by itself might not attract sufficient attention. Mahāmahopadhyāya Haraprasāda Śāstrī in an article in the Journal of the Bengal Asiatic Society 1905 says that as Vācaspati made two attempts to collect the Nyāya sūtras, one as Nyāyasūci and the other as Nyāyasūtroddhāra, it seems that even in Vācaspati's time he was not certain as to the authenticity of many of the Nyaya sutras. He further points out that there are unmistakable signs that many of the sūtras were interpolated, and relates the Buddhist tradition from China and Japan that Mirok mingled Nyāya and Yoga. He also 1 Yena prayuktaḥ pravarttate tat prayojanam (that by which one is led to act is called prayojanam); yamartham abhīpsan jihāsan vā karma ārabhate tenānena sarve prāṇinaḥ sarvāņi karmāņi sarvāśca vidyāḥ vyāptāḥ tadāśrayāśca nyāyaḥ pravarttate (all those which one tries to have or to fly from are called prayojana, therefore all beings, all their actions, and all sciences, are included within prayojana, and all thes depend on Nyāya). Vātsyāyana bhāṣya, 1. i. 1.

thinks that the sūtras underwent two additions, one at the hands of some Buddhists and another at the hands of some Hindu who put in Hindu arguments against the Buddhist ones. These suggestions of this learned scholar seem to be very probable, but we have no clue by which we can ascertain the time when such additions were made. The fact that there are unmistakable proofs of the interpolation of many of the sūtras makes the fixing of the date of the original part of the Nyāya sūtras still more difficult, for the Buddhist references can hardly be of any help, and Prof. Jacobi's attempt to fix the date of the Nyāya sūtras on the basis of references to Śūnyavāda naturally loses its value, except on the supposition that all references to Śūnyavāda must be later than Nagarjuna, which is not correct, since the Mahāyāna sūtras written before Nāgārjuna also held the Śūnyavāda doctrine.

The late Dr S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa in J.R.A.S. 1918 thinks that the earlier part of Nyāya was written by Gautama about 550 B.C. whereas the Nyaya sutras of Akṣapāda were written about 150 A.D. and says that the use of the word Nyāya in the sense of logic in Mahābhārata I. I. 67, I. 70. 42-51, must be regarded as interpolations. He, however, does not give any reasons in support of his assumption. It appears from his treatment of the subject that the fixing of the date of Akṣapāda was made to fit in somehow with his idea that Akṣapāda wrote his Nyāya sūtras under the influence of Aristotle-a supposition which does not require serious refutation, at least so far as Dr Vidyābhūṣaṇa has proved it. Thus after all this discussion we have not advanced a step towards the ascertainment of the date of the original part of the Nyāya. Goldstücker says that both Patañjali (140 B.C.) and Katyāyana (fourth century B.C.) knew the Nyāya sūtras1. We know that Kautilya knew the Nyaya in some form as Ānvīkṣikī in 300 B.C., and on the strength of this we may venture to say that the Nyaya existed in some form as early as the fourth century B.C. But there are other reasons which lead me to think that at least some of the present sūtras were written some time in the second century A.D. Bodas points out that Bādarāyaṇa's sūtras make allusions to the Vaiseṣika doctrines and not to Nyāya. On this ground he thinks that Vaiseṣika sūtras were written before Bādarāyaṇa's Brahma-sutras, whereas the Nyaya sutras were written later. Candrakanta Tarkālamkāra also contends in his 1 Goldstücker's Pāņini, p. 157.

edition of Vaiśesika that the Vaiseṣika sutras were earlier than the Nyāya. It seems to me to be perfectly certain that the Vaiseṣika sūtras were written before Caraka (80 A.D.); for he not only quotes one of the Vaiseṣika sūtras, but the whole foundation of his medical physics is based on the Vaiseṣika physics'. The Lankavatāra sūtra (which as it was quoted by Aśvaghosa is earlier than 80 A.D.) also makes allusions to the atomic doctrine. There are other weightier grounds, as we shall see later on, for supposing that the Vaiseṣika sūtras are probably pre-Buddhistic2.

It is certain that even the logical part of the present Nyāya sūtras was preceded by previous speculations on the subject by thinkers of other schools. Thus in commenting on I. i. 32 in which the sūtra states that a syllogism consists of five premisses (avayava) Vātsyāyana says that this sūtra was written to refute the views of those who held that there should be ten premisses3. The Vaiseṣika sutras also give us some of the earliest types of inference, which do not show any acquaintance with the technic of the Nyāya doctrine of inference1.

Does Vaiśeşika represent an Old School of Mimāmsā ?

The Vaiseṣika is so much associated with Nyaya by tradition that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be supposed to represent an old school of Mimāmsā, older than that represented in the Mimāmsā sūtras. But a closer inspection of the Vaiseṣika sūtras seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable way. We have seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes a Vaiseṣika sutra. An examination of Caraka's Sutrasthāna (I. 35-38) leaves us convinced that the writer of the verses had some compendium of Vaiseṣika such as that of the Bhāṣapariccheda before him. Caraka sūtra or kārikā (1. i. 36) says that the guņas are those which have been enumerated such as heaviness, etc., cognition, and those which begin with the guņa "para" (universality) and end with "prayatna" (effort) together with the sensequalities (sārtha). It seems that this is a reference to some wellknown enumeration. But this enumeration is not to be found in the Vaiseṣika sūtra (I. i. 6) which leaves out the six guņas, 1 Caraka, Śārīra, 39.

* See the next section.

3 Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya on the Nyāya sūtras, 1. i. 32. This is undoubtedly a reference to the Jaina view as found in Daśavaikālikaniryukti as noted before.

4 Nyaya sutra 1. i. 5, and Vaiśeşika sūtras IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5, and III. i. 8-17.

heaviness (gurutva), liquidity(dravatva), oiliness (sneha), elasticity (samskāra), merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma); in one part of the sutra the enumeration begins with "para" (universality) and ends in "prayatna," but buddhi (cognition) comes within the enumeration beginning from para and ending in prayatna, whereas in Caraka buddhi does not form part of the list and is separately enumerated. This leads me to suppose that Caraka's sūtra was written at a time when the six guņas left out in the Vaiseṣika enumeration had come to be counted as guņas, and compendiums had been made in which these were enumerated. Bhāṣapariccheda (a later Vaiśeṣika compendium), is a compilation from some very old kārikās which are referred to by Viśvanatha as being collected from "atisamkṣiptacirantanoktibhiḥ”—(from very ancient aphorisms1); Caraka's definition of sāmānya and viseṣa shows that they had not then been counted as separate categories as in later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines; but though slightly different it is quite in keeping with the sort of definition one finds in the Vaiseṣika sutra that sāmānya (generality) and viseṣa are relative to each other. Caraka's sūtras were therefore probably written at a time when the Vaiseṣika doctrines were undergoing changes, and well-known compendiums were beginning to be written on them.

The Vaiseṣika sūtras seem to be ignorant of the Buddhist doctrines. In their discussions on the existence of soul, there is no reference to any view as to non-existence of soul, but the argument turned on the point as to whether the self is to be an object of inference or revealed to us by our notion of "I." There is also no other reference to any other systems except to some Mīmāmsā doctrines and occasionally to Samkhya. There is no reason to suppose that the Mīmāmsā doctrines referred to allude to the Mimāmsā sūtras of Jaimini. The manner in which the nature of inference has been treated shows that the Nyāya phraseology of "pūrvavat” and “seṣavat" was not known. Vaiseṣika sūtras in more than one place refer to time as the ultimate cause. We know that the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad refers to those who regard time as the cause of all things, but in none of the

1 Professor Vanamāli Vedāntatirtha's article in J. A. S. B., 1908.

2 Caraka (1. 1. 33) says that sāmānya is that which produces unity and viśeṣa is that which separates. V. S. 11. ii. 7. Sāmānya and viśeșa depend upon our mode of thinking (as united or as separate).

3 Vaiseṣika sūtra (11. ii. 9 and v. ii. 26).