systems that we have can we trace any upholding of this ancient view1. These considerations as well as the general style of the work and the methods of discussion lead me to think that these sūtras are probably the oldest that we have and in all probability are pre-Buddhistic. The Vaiseṣika sūtra begins with the statement that its object is to explain virtue, "dharma." This is we know the manifest duty of Mimāmsā and we know that unlike any other system Jaimini begins his Mīmāmsă sūtras by defining “dharma." This at first seems irrelevant to the main purpose of Vaiseṣika, viz., the description of the nature of padartha2. He then defines dharma as that which gives prosperity and ultimate good (niḥśreyasa) and says that the Veda must be regarded as valid, since it can dictate this. He ends his book with the remarks that those injunctions (of Vedic deeds) which are performed for ordinary human motives bestow prosperity even though their efficacy is not known to us through our ordinary experience, and in this matter the Veda must be regarded as the authority which dictates those acts3. The fact that the Vaiseṣika begins with a promise to describe dharma and after describing the nature of substances, qualities and actions and also the adṛṣṭa (unknown virtue) due to dharma (merit accruing from the performance of Vedic deeds) by which many of our unexplained experiences may be explained, ends his book by saying that those Vedic works which are not seen to produce any direct effect, will produce prosperity through adṛṣṭa, shows that Kanāda's method of explaining dharma has been by showing that physical phenomena involving substances, qualities, and actions can only be explained up to a certain extent while a good number cannot be explained at all except on the assumption of adṛṣṭa (unseen virtue) produced by dharma. The 1 Śvetāśvatara 1. i. 2. 2 I remember a verse quoted in an old commentary of the Kalāpa Vyākaraṇa, in which it is said that the description of the six categories by Kaṇāda in his Vaišeṣika sütras, after having proposed to describe the nature of dharma, is as irrelevant as to proceed towards the sea while intending to go to the mountain Himavat (Himālaya). “Dharmam vyākhyātukāmasya ṣat padărthopavarṇanam Himavadgantukāmasya sāgaragamanopamam.” 3 The sūtra “ Tadvacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam (1. i. 3 and x. ii. 9) has been explained by Upaskāra as meaning "The Veda being the word of Iśvara (God) must be regarded as valid," but since there is no mention of "Iśvara" anywhere in the text this is simply reading the later Nyaya ideas into the Vaiseṣika. Sūtra x. ii. 8 is only a repetition of VI. ii. 1. description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but is the means of proving that our ordinary experience of these cannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on the supposition of adṛṣṭa proceeding out of the performance of Vedic deeds. In v. i. 15 the movement of needles towards magnets, in V. ii. 7 the circulation of water in plant bodies, V. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion of air, the combining movement of atoms (by which all combinations have taken place), and the original movement of the mind are said to be due to adṛṣṭa. In v. ii. 17 the movement of the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the assimilation of food and drink and other kinds of contact (the movement and development of the foetus as enumerated in Upaskāra) are said to be due to adṛṣṭa. Salvation (mokṣa) is said to be produced by the annihilation of adṛṣṭa leading to the annihilation of all contacts and non-production of rebirths. Vaiseṣika marks the distinction between the dṛṣṭa (experienced) and the adṛṣṭa. All the categories that he describes are founded on drsta (experience) and those unexplained by known experience are due to adṛṣṭa. These are the acts on which depend all life-process of animals and plants, the continuation of atoms or the construction of the worlds, natural motion of fire and air, death and rebirth (VI. ii. 15) and even the physical phenomena by which our fortunes are affected in some way or other (V. ii. 2), in fact all with which we are vitally interested in philosophy. Kanāda's philosophy gives only some facts of experience regarding substances, qualities and actions, leaving all the graver issues of metaphysics to adṛṣṭa. But what leads to adrsta? In answer to this, Kaṇāda does not speak of good or bad or virtuous or sinful deeds, but of Vedic works, such as holy ablutions (snāna), fasting, holy student life (brahmacarya), remaining at the house of the teacher (gurukulavāsa), retired forest life (vānaprastha), sacrifice (yajña), gifts (dāna), certain kinds of sacrificial sprinkling and rules of performing sacrificial works according to the prescribed time of the stars, the prescribed hymns (mantras) (VI. ii. 2). He described what is pure and what is impure food, pure food being that which is sacrificially purified (VI. ii. 5) the contrary being impure; and he says that the taking of pure food leads to prosperity through adṛṣṭa. He also described how feelings of attachment to things are also generated by adṛṣṭa. Throughout almost the whole of VI. i Kaṇāda is busy in showing the special conditions of making gifts and receiving them. A reference to our chapter on Mīmāmsā will show that the later Mīmāmsā writers agreed with the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika doctrines in most of their views regarding substance, qualities, etc. Some of the main points in which Mīmāmsā differs from Nyaya-Vaiseṣika are (1) selfvalidity of the Vedas, (2) the eternality of the Vedas, (3) disbelief in any creator or god, (4) eternality of sound (śabda), (5) (according to Kumārila) direct perception of self in the notion of the ego. Of these the first and the second points do not form any subject of discussion in the Vaiśesika. But as no Isvara is mentioned, and as all adṛṣṭa depends upon the authority of the Vedas, we may assume that Vaiseṣika had no dispute with Mīmāmsā. The fact that there is no reference to any dissension is probably due to the fact that really none had taken place at the time of the Vaiseṣika sūtras. It is probable that Kaṇāda believed that the Vedas were written by some persons superior to us (II. i. 18, VI. i. 1-2). But the fact that there is no reference to any conflict with Mīmāmsā suggests that the doctrine that the Vedas were never written by anyone was formulated at a later period, whereas in the days of the Vaiseṣika sūtras, the view was probably what is represented in the Vaiseṣika sutras. As there is no reference to Isvara and as adṛṣṭa proceeding out of the performance of actions in accordance with Vedic injunctions is made the cause of all atomic movements, we can very well assume that Vaiśeṣika was as atheistic or non-theistic as the later Mimāmsā philosophers. As regards the eternality of sound, which in later days was one of the main points of quarrel between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāmsā, we find that in II. ii. 25-32, Kaṇāda gives reasons in favour of the non-eternality of sound, but after that from II. ii. 33 till the end of the chapter he closes the argument in favour of the eternality of sound, which is the distinctive Mīmāmsā view as we know from the later Mīmāmsā writers'. Next comes the question of the proof of the existence of self. The traditional Nyāya view is 1 The last two concluding sutras II. ii. 36 and 37 are in my opinion wrongly interpreted by Sankara Miśra in his Upaskāra (11. ii. 36 by adding an “api” to the sutra and thereby changing the issue, and II. ii. 37 by misreading the phonetic combination "samkhyābhāva" as samkhyā and bhāva instead of samkhyā and abhāva, which in my opinion is the right combination here) in favour of the non-eternality of sound as we find in the later Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika view. that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, etc. Traditionally this is regarded as the Vaiśesika view as well. But in Vaisesika III. ii. 4 the existence of soul is first inferred by reason of its activity and the existence of pleasure, pain, etc., in III. ii. 6–7 this inference is challenged by saying that we do not perceive that the activity, etc. belongs to the soul and not to the body and so no certainty can be arrived at by inference, and in III. ii. 8 it is suggested that therefore the existence of soul is to be accepted on the authority of the scriptures (agama). To this the final Vaiśesika conclusion is given that we can directly perceive the self in our feeling as "I" (aham), and we have therefore not to depend on the scriptures for the proof of the existence of the self, and thus the inference of the existence of the self is only an additional proof of what we already find in perception as "I” (aham) (III. ii. 10-18, also IX. i. 11). These considerations lead me to think that the Vaiśesika represented a school of Mīmāmsa thought which supplemented a metaphysics to strengthen the grounds of the Vedas. Philosophy in the Vaiśeșika sūtras. The Vaiseṣika sūtras begin with the ostensible purpose of explaining virtue (dharma) (I. i. 1) and dharma according to it is that by which prosperity (abhyudaya) and salvation (niḥśreyasa) are attained. Then it goes on to say that the validity of the Vedas depends on the fact that it leads us to prosperity and salvation. Then it turns back to the second sūtra and says that salvation comes as the result of real knowledge, produced by special excellence of dharma, of the characteristic features of the categories of substance (dravya), quality (guņa), class concept (sāmānya), particularity (višeșa), and inherence (samavāya)1. The dravyas are earth, water, fire, air, ether, time, space, soul, and mind. The gunas are colour, taste, odour, touch, number, measure, separations, contact, disjoining, quality of belonging to high genus or to species. Action (karma) means upward move 1 Upaskāra notes that viseṣa here refers to the ultimate differences of things and not to species. A special doctrine of this system is this, that each of the indivisible atoms of even the same element has specific features of difference. * Here the well known qualities of heaviness (gurutva), liquidity (dravatva), oiliness (sneha), elasticity (samskāra), merit (dharma), and demerit (adharma) have been altogether omitted. These are all counted in later Vaiśeşika commentaries and com " ment, downward movement, contraction, expansion and horizontal movement. The three common qualities of dravya,guṇa and karma are that they are existent, non-eternal, substantive, effect, cause, and possess generality and particularity. Dravya produces other dravyas and the gunas other gunas. But karma is not necessarily produced by karma. Dravya does not destroy either its cause or its effect, but the gunas are destroyed both by the cause and by the effect. Karma is destroyed by karma. Dravya possesses karma and guna and is regarded as the material (samavāyi) cause. Gunas inhere in dravya, cannot possess further guņas, and are not by themselves the cause of contact or disjoining. Karma is devoid of guna, cannot remain at one time in more than one object, inheres in dravya alone, and is an independent cause of contact or disjoining. Dravya is the material cause (samavāyi) of (derivative) dravyas, guna, and karma; guņa is also the nonmaterial cause (asamāvāyi) of dravya, guna and karma. Karma is the general cause of contact, disjoining, and inertia in motion (vega). Karma is not the cause of dravya. For dravya may be produced even without karma1. Dravya is the general effect of dravya. Karma is dissimilar to guna in this that it does not produce karma. The numbers two, three, etc., separateness, contact and disjoining are effected by more than one dravya. Each karma not being connected with more than one thing is not produced by more than one thing. A dravya is the result of many contacts (of the atoms). One colour may be the result of many colours. Upward movement is the result of heaviness, effort and contact. Contact and disjoining are also the result of karma. In denying the causality of karma it is meant that karma is not the cause of dravya and karma3. In the second chapter of the first book Kaṇāda first says that if there is no cause, there is no effect, but there may be the cause even though there may not be the effect. He next says that genus (samanya) and species (višeșa) are relative to the under pendiums. It must be noted that "guṇa” in Vaiśeṣika means qualities and not subtle reals or substances as in Samkhya-Yoga. Guņa in Vaiśeṣika would be akin to what Yoga would call dharma. 1 It is only when the karya ceases that dravya is produced. See Upaskāra 1. i. 22. 2 If karma is related to more than one thing, then with the movement of one we should have felt that two or more things were moving. 3 It must be noted that "karma" in this sense is quite different from the more extensive use of karma as meritorious or vicious action which is the cause of rebirth.. |