we compare the futilities (jāti) quibbles (chala), etc., relating to disputations as found in the Nyaya sutra with those that are found in the medical work of Caraka (78 A.D.), III. viii. There are no other works in early Sanskrit literature, excepting the Nyāya sūtra and Caraka-samhita which have treated of these matters. Caraka's description of some of the categories (e.g. dṛṣṭānta, prayojana, pratijñā and vitaṇḍā) follows very closely the definitions given of those in the Nyaya sūtras. There are others such as the definitions of jalpa, chala, nigrahasthāna, etc., where the definitions of two authorities differ more. There are some other logical categories mentioned in Caraka (e.g. pratiṣṭhāpanā, jijñāsā, vyavasāya, vākyadoṣa, vākyapraśamsā, upalambha, parihāra, abhyanujñā, etc.) which are not found in the Nyāya sūtra1. Again, the various types of futilities (jāti) and points of opponent's refutation (nigrahasthāna) mentioned in the Nyāya sūtra are not found in Caraka. There are some terms which are found in slightly variant forms in the two works, e.g. aupamya in Caraka, upamāna in Nyāya sūtra, arthāpatti in Nyāya sūtra and arthaprapti in Caraka. Caraka does not seem to know anything about the Nyaya work on this subject, and it is plain that the treatment of these terms of disputations in the Caraka is much simpler and less technical than what we find in the Nyaya sutras. If we leave out the varieties of jāti and nigrahasthāna of the fifth book, there is on the whole a great agreement between the treatment of Caraka and that of the Nyāya sūtras. It seems therefore in a high degree probable that both Caraka and the Nyāya sūtras were indebted for their treatment of these terms of disputation to some other earlier work. Of these, Caraka's compilation was earlier, whereas the compilation of the Nyaya sutras represents a later work when a hotter atmosphere of disputations had necessitated the use of more technical terms which are embodied in this work, but which were not contained in the earlier work. It does not seem therefore that this part of the work could have been earlier than the second century A.D. Another stream flowing through the Nyaya sutras is that of a polemic against the doctrines which could be attributed to the Sautrāntika Buddhists, the Vijñānavāda Buddhists, the nihilists, the Samkhya, the Cārvāka, and some other unknown schools of thought to which we find no

1 Like Vaiseṣika, Caraka does not know the threefold division of inference (anumāna) as pūrvavat, feṣavat and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa.

further allusion elsewhere. The Vaiseṣika sutras as we have already seen had argued only against the Mīmāmsā, and ultimately agreed with them on most points. The dispute with Mīmāmsā in the Nyaya sutras is the same as in the Vaiseṣika over the question of the doctrine of the eternality of sound. The question of the self-validity of knowledge (svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda) and the akhyāti doctrine of illusion of the Mimāmsists, which form the two chief points of discussion between later Mīmāmsā and later Nyāya, are never alluded to in the Nyaya sūtras. The advocacy of Yoga methods (Nyāya sūtras, IV. ii. 38-42 and 46) seems also to be an alien element; these are not found in Vaiśeṣika and are not in keeping with the general tendency of the Nyaya sūtras, and the Japanese tradition that Mirok added them later on as Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasāda Śāstrī has pointed out1 is not improbable.

The Vaiseṣika sūtras, III. i. 18 and III. ii. 1, describe perceptional knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the self (atman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived under special conditions of samskära (conglomeration etc.). The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the nonsimultaneity (ayaugapadya) of knowledge and efforts is almost the same with Vaiseṣika as with Nyaya. The Nyaya sūtras give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring in the questions of samskāra or udbhūtarūpavattva which Vaiseṣika does. On the question of inference Nyaya gives three classifications as pūrvavat, śeṣavat and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, but no definition. The Vaiseṣika sūtras do not know of these classifications, and give only particular types or instances of inference (V. S. III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5). Inference is said to be made when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and so on. These are but mere collections of specific instances of inference without reaching a general theory. The doctrine of vyāpti (concomitance of hetu (reason) and sādhya (probandum)) which became so important in later Nyāya has never been properly formulated either in the Nyaya sutras or in the Vaiseṣika. Vaiseṣika sutra, III. i. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitance between hetu and sadhya (prasiddhipūrvakatvāt apadeśasya), 1 J. A. S. B. 1905.

but the technical vyāpti is not known, and the connotation of the term prasiddhipūrvakatva of Vaiseṣika seems to be more loose than the term vyāpti as we know it in the later Nyāya. The Vaiseṣika sutras do not count scriptures (sabda) as a separate pramāṇa, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas. With Nyaya sūtras śabda as a pramāņa applies not only to the Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and Vātsyāyana says that trustworthy persons may be of three. kinds ṛṣi, ārya and mleccha (foreigners). Upamāna which is regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyāya is not even referred to in the Vaiseṣika sutras. The Nyāya sūtras know of other pramāņas, such as arthāpatti, sambhava and aitihya, but include them within the pramāṇas admitted by them, but the Vaiseṣika sūtras do not seem to know them at all'. The Vaiseşika sutras believe in the perception of negation (abhäva) through the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i. 1-10). The Nyāya sūtras (II. ii. 1, 2, 7–12) consider that abhāva as non-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another to "bring the clothes which are not marked," he finds that marks are absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued that absence or non-existence can be directly perceived. Though there is thus an agreement between the Nyaya and the Vaiseṣika sutras about the acceptance of abhāva as being due to perception, yet their method of handling the matter is different. The Nyaya sutras say nothing about the categories of dravya, guņa, karma, viseṣa and samavāya which form the main subjects of Vaiseṣka discussions. The Nyaya sutras take much pains to prove the materiality of the senses. But this question does not seem to have been important with Vaiseṣika. The slight reference to this question in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient. The Vaiseṣika sutras do not mention the name of" Isvara," whereas the Nyaya sutras try to prove his existence on eschatological grounds. The reasons given in support of the existence of self in the Nyaya sutras are mainly on the ground of the unity of sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the

1 The only old authority which knows these pramāņas is Caraka. But he also gives an interpretation of sambhava which is different from Nyaya and calls arthāpatti arthaprapti (Caraka 111. viii.).

2 The details of this example are taken from Vātsyāyana's commentary.

3 The Nyāya sūtra no doubt incidentally gives a definition of jäti as “samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ ” (11. ii. 71).

Vaiseṣika lays its main emphasis on self-consciousness as a fact of knowledge. Both the Nyaya and the Vaiseṣika sūtras admit the existence of atoms, but all the details of the doctrine of atomic structure in later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are absent there. The Vaisesika calls salvation niḥśreyasa or mokṣa and the Nyāya apavarga. Mokṣa with Vaiśesika is the permanent cessation of connection with body; the apavarga with Nyaya is cessation of pain. In later times the main points of difference between the Vaiseṣika and Nyāya are said to lie with regard to theory of the notion of number, changes of colour in the molecules by heat, etc. Thus the former admitted a special procedure of the mind by which cognitions of number arose in the mind (e.g. at the first moment there is the sense contact with an object, then the notion of oneness, then from a sense of relativeness-apekṣābuddhi-notion of two, then a notion of two-ness, and then the notion of two things); again, the doctrine of pilupaka (changes of qualities by heat are produced in atoms and not in molecules as Nyāya held) was held by Vaiseṣika, which the Naiyāyikas did not admit. But as the Nyaya sutras are silent on these points, it is not possible to say that such were really the differences between early Nyāya and early Vaiseṣika. These differences may be said to hold between the later interpreters of Vaiseṣika and the later interpreters of Nyaya. The Vaiseṣika as we find it in the commentary of Prasastapāda (probably sixth century A.D.), and the Nyāya from the time of Udyotakara have come to be treated as almost the same system with slight variations only. I have therefore preferred to treat them together. The main presentation of the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika philosophy in this chapter is that which is found from the sixth century onwards.

The Vaiseṣika and Nyāya Literature.

It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the Vaiseṣika sūtras by Kaṇāda, also called Aulūkya the son of Ulūka, though there is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It

1 Professor Vanamāli Vedāntatirtha quotes a passage from Samkşepaśańkarajaya, xvI. 68-69 in J. A.S. B., 1905, and another passage from a Nyāya writer Bhāsarvajña, pp. 39-41, in J.A.S. B., 1914, to show that the old Naiyāyikas considered that there was an element of happiness (sukha) in the state of mukti (salvation) which the Vaiseşikas denied. No evidence in support of this opinion is found in the Nyaya or the Vaiseṣika sūtras, unless the cessation of pain with Nyaya is interpreted as meaning the presence of some sort of bliss or happiness.

2 See Madhava's Sarvadarśanasamgraha-Aulūkyadarśana.

appears from the Vayu purāna that he was born in Prabhāsa near Dvārakā, and was the disciple of Somaśarma. The time of Prasastapāda who wrote a bhāṣya (commentary) of the Vaiseşika sutras cannot also unfortunately be ascertained. The peculiarity of Prasastapāda's bhāṣya is this that unlike other bhāṣyas (which first give brief explanations of the text of the sūtras and then continue to elaborate independent explanations by explaining the first brief comments), it does not follow the sutras but is an independent dissertation based on their main contents'. There were two other bhāṣyas on the Vaiseṣika sūtras, namely Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya and Bharādvāja-vṛtti, but these are now probably lost. References to the former are found in Kiraṇāvalībhāskara of Padmanābha Miśra and also in Ratnaprabha 2. 2. 11. Four commentaries were written on this bhāṣya, namely Vyomavati by Vyomasekharācārya, Nyāyakandali by Śrīdhara, Kiraṇāvalī by Udayana (984 A.D.) and Līlāvatī by Śrīvatsācārya. In addition to these Jagadisa Bhaṭṭācārya of Navadvīpa and Śankara Miśra wrote two other commentaries on the Prasastapada-bhāṣya, namely Bhāṣyasūkti and Kaṇāda-rahasya. Śankara Miśra (1425 A.D.) also wrote a commentary on the Vaiseṣika sutras called the Upaskāra. Of these Nyāya-kandali of Śrīdhara on account of its simplicity of style and elaborate nature of exposition is probably the best for a modern student of Vaiśesika. Its author was a native of the village of Bhūrisṛsti in Bengal (Rāḍha). His father's name was Baladeva and mother's name was Acchoka and he wrote his work in 913 Śaka era (990 A.D.) as he himself writes

at the end of his work.

The Nyaya sutra was written by Akṣapāda or Gautama, and the earliest commentary on it written by Vātsyāyana is known as the Vatsyāyana-bhāṣya. The date of Vatsyāyana has not

1 The bhāṣya of Prasastapāda can hardly be called a bhāṣya (elaborate commentary). He himself makes no such claim and calls his work a compendium of the properties of the categories (Padarthadharmasamgraha). He takes the categories of dravya, guna, karma, sāmānya, višeșa and samavä ya in order and without raising any discussions plainly narrates what he has got to say on them. Some of the doctrines which are important in later Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika discussions, such as the doctrine of creation and dissolution, doctrine of number, the theory that the number of atoms contributes to the atomic measure of the molecules, the doctrine of pilupāka in connection with the transformation of colours by heat occur in his narration for the first time as the Vaiseṣika sūtras are silent on these points. It is difficult to ascertain his date definitely; he is the earliest writer on Vaiśeşika available to us after Kaṇāda and it is not improbable that he lived in the 5th or 6th century A.D.