is the cause of the colour in the cloth subsists in the yarns which form the material cause of the cloth) or in the material cause itself (e.g. in the case of a new form of smell being produced in a substance by fire-contact, this contact, which is the immaterial cause of the smell, subsists in that substance itself which is put in the fire and in which the smell is produced). The soul is eternal and has no other cause, and it has to be assumed that the immaterial cause required for the rise of a cognition must inhere in the soul, and hence must be a quality. Then again accepting the Nyāya conclusions we know that the rise of qualities in an eternal thing can only take place by contact with some other substances. Now cognition being a quality which the soul acquires would naturally require the contact of such substances. Since there is nothing to show that such substances inhere in other substances they are also to be taken as eternal. There are three eternal substances, time, space, and atoms. But time and space being all-pervasive the soul is always in contact with them. Contact with these therefore cannot explain the occasional rise of different cognitions. This contact must then be of some kind of atom which resides in the body ensouled by the cognizing soul. This atom may be called manas (mind). This manas alone by itself brings about cognitions, pleasure, pain, desite, aversion, effort, etc. The manas however by itself is found to be devoid of any such qualities as colour, smell, etc., and as such cannot lead the soul to experience or cognize these qualities; hence it stands in need of such other organs as may be characterized by these qualities; for the cognition of colour, the mind will need the aid of an organ of which colour is the characteristic quality; for the cognition of smell, an organ having the odorous characteristic and so on with touch, taste, vision. Now we know that the organ which has colour for its distinctive feature must be one composed of tejas or light, as colour is a feature of light, and this proves the existence of the organ, the eye-for the cognition of colour; in a similar manner the existence of the earthly organ (organ of smell), the aqueous organ (organ of taste), the ākāśic organ (organ of sound) and the airy organ (organ of touch) may be demonstrated. But without manas none of these organs is found to be effective. Four necessary contacts have to be admitted, (1) of the sense organs with the object, (2) of the sense organs with the qualities of the object, (3) of the manas

with the sense organs, and (4) of the manas with the soul. The objects of perception are of three kinds, (1) substances, (2) qualities, (3) jāti or class. The material substances are tangible objects of earth, fire, water, air in large dimensions (for in their fine atomic states they cannot be perceived). The qualities are colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort1.

It may not be out of place here to mention in conclusion that Kumārila Bhaṭṭa was rather undecided as to the nature of the senses or of their contact with the objects. Thus he says that the senses may be conceived either as certain functions or activities, or as entities having the capacity of revealing things without coming into actual contact with them, or that they might be entities which actually come in contact with their objects, and he prefers this last view as being more satisfactory.

Indeterminate and determinate perception.

There are two kinds of perception in two stages, the first stage is called nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and the second savikalpa (determinate). The nirvikalpa perception of a thing is its perception at the first moment of the association of the senses and their objects. Thus Kumārila says that the cognition that appears first is a mere alocana or simple perception, called non-determinate pertaining to the object itself pure and simple, and resembling the cognitions that the new-born infant has of things around himself. In this cognition neither the genus nor the differentia is presented to consciousness; all that is present there is the individual wherein these two subsist. This view of indeterminate perception may seem in some sense to resemble the Buddhist view which defines it as being merely the specific individuality (svalakṣaṇa) and regards it as being the only valid element in perception, whereas all the rest are conceived as being imaginary 1 See Prakaraṇapañcikā, pp. 52 etc., and Dr Gangānātha Jha's Prabhākaramimāmsā, pp. 35 etc.

2 Slokavārttika, see Pratyakṣasūtra, 40 etc., and Nyāyaratnākara on it. It may be noted in this connection that Samkhya-Yoga did not think like Nyaya that the senses actually went out to meet the objects (prāpyakāritva) but held that there was a special kind of functioning (vṛtti) by virtue of which the senses could grasp even such distant objects as the sun and the stars. It is the functioning of the sense that reached the objects. The nature of this vṛtti is not further clearly explained and Pārthasarathi objects to it as being almost a different category (tattväntara).

impositions. But both Kumārila and Prabhakara think that both the genus and the differentia are perceived in the indeterminate stage, but these do not manifest themselves to us only because we do not remember the other things in relation to which, or in contrast to which, the percept has to show its character as genus or differentia; a thing can be cognized as an "individual" only in comparison with other things from which it differs in certain welldefined characters; and it can be apprehended as belonging to a class only when it is found to possess certain characteristic features in common with some other things; so we see that as other things are not presented to consciousness through memory, the percept at the indeterminate stage cannot be fully apprehended as an individual belonging to a class, though the data constituting the characteristic of the thing as a genus and its differentia are perceived at the indeterminate stage1. So long as other things are not remembered these data cannot manifest themselves properly, and hence the perception of the thing remains indeterminate at the first stage of perception. At the second stage the self by its past impressions brings the present perception in relation to past ones and realizes its character as involving universal and particular. It is thus apparent that the difference between the indeterminate and the determinate perception is this, that in the latter case memory of other things creeps in, but this association of memory in the determinate perception refers to those other objects of memory and not to the percept. It is also held that though the determinate perception is based upon the indeterminate one, yet since the former also apprehends certain such factors as did not enter into the indeterminate perception, it is to be regarded as a valid cognition. Kumārila also agrees with Prabhakara in holding both the indeterminate and the determinate perception valid'.

Some Ontological Problems connected with the

Doctrine of Perception.

The perception of the class (jāti) of a percept in relation to other things may thus be regarded in the main as a difference between determinate and indeterminate perceptions. The problems of jāti and avayavāvayavi (part and whole notion) were 1 Compare this with the Vaiśeṣika view as interpreted by Śridhara. 2 See Prakaraṇapañcikā and Śāstradīpikā.

the subjects of hot dispute in Indian philosophy. Before entering into discussion about jāti, Prabhākara first introduced the problem of avayava (part) and avayavi (whole). He argues as an exponent of svataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda that the proof of the true existence of anything must ultimately rest on our own consciousness, and what is distinctly recognized in consciousness must be admitted to have its existence established. Following this canon Prabhākara says that gross objects as a whole exist, since they are so perceived. The subtle atoms are the material cause and their connection (samyoga) is the immaterial cause (asamavāyikāraṇa), and it is the latter which renders the whole altogether different from the parts of which it is composed; and it is not necessary that all the parts should be perceived before the whole is perceived. Kumārila holds that it is due to the point of view from which we look at a thing that we call it a separate whole or only a conglomeration of parts. In reality they are identical, but when we lay stress on the notion of parts, the thing appears to be a conglomeration of them, and when we look at it from the point of view of the unity appearing as a whole, the thing appears to be a whole of which there are parts (see Ślokavārttika, • Vanavāda)1.

Jāti, though incorporating the idea of having many units within one, is different from the conception of whole in this, that it resides in its entirety in each individual constituting that jāti (vyāsajya

1 According to Samkhya-Yoga a thing is regarded as the unity of the universal and the particular (sāmānyaviśeṣasamudāyo dravyam, Vyāsabhāṣya, III. 44); for there is no other separate entity which is different from them both in which they would inhere as Nyāya holds. Conglomerations can be of two kinds, namely those in which the parts exist at a distance from one another (e.g. a forest), and those in which they exist close together (nirantarā hi tadavayavāḥ), and it is this latter combination (ayutasiddhāvayava) which is called a dravya, but here also there is no separate whole distinct from the parts; it is the parts connected in a particular way and having no perceptible space between them that is called a thing or a whole. The Buddhists as Paṇditāśoka has shown did not believe in any whole (avayavī); it is the atoms which in connection with one another appeared as a whole occupying space (paramāṇava eva hi pararūpadeśaparihāreņotpannāḥ parasparasahitā avabhāsamānā deśavitānavanto bhavanti). The whole is thus a mere appearance and not a reality (see Avayavinirākaraṇa, Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts). Nyaya however held that the atoms were partless (niravayava) and hence it would be wrong to say that when we see an object we see the atoms. The existence of a whole as different from the parts which belong to it is directly experienced and there is no valid reason against it :

66

aduṣṭakaranodbhūtamanāvirbhūtabādhakam

asandigdañca vijñānam katham mithyeti kathyate."

Nyāyamañjarī, pp. 550 ff.

vrtti), but the establishment of the existence of wholes refutes the argument that jāti should be denied, because it involves the conception of a whole (class) consisting of many parts (individuals). The class character or jāti exists because it is distinctly perceived by us in the individuals included in any particular class. It is eternal in the sense that it continues to exist in other individuals, even when one of the individuals ceases to exist. When a new individual of that class (e.g. cow class) comes into being, a new relation of inherence is generated by which the individual is brought into relation with the class-character existing in other individuals; for inherence (samavāya) according to Prabhakara is not an eternal entity but an entity which is both produced and not produced according as the thing in which it exists is non-eternal or eternal, and it is not regarded as one as Nyāya holds, but as many, according as there is the infinite number of things in which it exists. When any individual is destroyed, the class-character does not go elsewhere, nor subsist in that individual, nor is itself destroyed, but it is only the inherence of class-character with that individual that ceases to exist. With the destruction of an individual or its production it is a new relation of inherence that is destroyed or produced. But the classcharacter or jāti has no separate existence apart from the individuals as Nyāya supposes. Apprehension of jāti is essentially the apprehension of the class-character of a thing in relation to other similar things of that class by the perception of the common characteristics. But Prabhākara would not admit the existence of a highest genus sattā (being) as acknowledged by Nyāya. He argues that the existence of class-character is apprehended because we find that the individuals of a class possess some common characteristic possessed by all the heterogeneous and disparate things of the world as can give rise to the conception of a separate jāti as sattā, as demanded by the naiyāyikas. That all things are said to be sat (existing) is more or less a word or a name without the corresponding apprehension of a common quality. Our experience always gives us concrete existing individuals, but we can never experience such a highest genus as pure existence or being, as it has no concrete form which may be perceived. When we speak of a thing as sat, we do not mean that it is possessed of any such class-characters as satta (being); what we mean is simply that the individual has its specific existence or svarū