was sometimes the result. Jñāna was a movement and not the result of causal operation as Nyaya supposed. Nyaya would not also admit any movement on the part of the self, but it would hold that when the self is possessed of certain qualities, such as desire, etc., it becomes an instrument for the accomplishment of a physical movement. Kumārila accords the same self-validity to knowledge that Prabhākara gives. Later knowledge by experience is not endowed with any special quality which should decide as to the validity of the knowledge of the previous movement. For what is called samvadi or later testimony of experience is but later knowledge and nothing more1. The self is not revealed in the knowledge of external objects, but we can know it by a mental perception of self-consciousness. It is the movement of this self in presence of certain collocating circumstances leading to cognition of things that is called jñāna2. Here Kumārila distinguishes knowledge as movement from knowledge as objective consciousness. Knowledge as movement was beyond sense perception and could only be inferred. The idealistic tendency of Vijñānavāda Buddhism, Sāmkhya, and Mīmāmsā was manifest in its attempt at establishing the unique character of knowledge as being that with which alone we are in touch. But Vijñānavāda denied the external world, and thereby did violence to the testimony of knowledge. Samkhya admitted the external world but created a gulf between the content of knowledge and pure intelligence; Prabhakara ignored this difference, and was satisfied with the introspective assertion that knowledge was such a unique thing that it revealed with itself, the knower and the known; Kumārila however admitted a transcendent element of movement as being the cause of our objective consciousness, but regarded this as being separate from self. But the question remained unsolved as to why, in spite of the unique character of knowledge, knowledge could relate itself to the world of objects, how far the world of external objects or of knowledge could be regarded as absolutely true. Hitherto judgments were only relative, either referring to one's being prompted to the objective world, to the faithfulness of the representation of objects, the suitability of fulfilling our requirements, or to verification by later 1 See Nyayaratnamālā, svataḥ-prāmāṇya-nirṇaya. 2 See Nyāyamañjarī on Pramāņa, Ślokavārttika on Pratyakṣa, and Gāgā Bhaṭṭa's Bhaṭṭacintamani on Pratyakṣa. быт uncontradicted experience. But no enquiry was made whether any absolute judgments about the ultimate truth of knowledge and matter could be made at all. That which appeared was regarded as the real. But the question was not asked, whether there was anything which could be regarded as absolute truth, the basis of all appearance, and the unchangeable reality. This philosophical enquiry had the most wonderful charm for the Hindu mind. Vedānta Literature. It is difficult to ascertain the time when the Brahma-sūtras were written, but since they contain a refutation of almost all the other Indian systems, even of the Śūnyavāda Buddhism (of course according to Sankara's interpretation), they cannot have been written very early. I think it may not be far from the truth in supposing that they were written some time in the second century B.C. About the period 780 A.D. Gauḍapāda revived the monistic teaching of the Upaniṣads by his commentary on the Māṇḍūkya Upanisad in verse called Mandukyakārikā. His disciple Govinda was the teacher of Śaňkara (788-820 A.D.). Śankara's commentary on the Brahma-sūtras is the root from which sprang forth a host of commentaries and studies on Vedāntism of great originality, vigour, and philosophic insight. Thus Ānandagiri, a disciple of Śańkara, wrote a commentary called Nyāyanirṇaya, and Govindānanda wrote another commentary named Ratnaprabhā. Vācaspati Miśra, who flourished about 841 A.D., wrote another commentary on it called the Bhāmatī. Amalānanda (1247—1260 A.D.) wrote his Kalpataru on it, and Apyayadīkṣita (1550 A.D.) son of Rangarājādhvarindra of Kāñci wrote his Kalpataruparimala on the Kalpataru. Another disciple of Śankara, Padmapāda, also called Sanandana, wrote a commentary on it known as Pañcapädikā. From the manner in which the book is begun one would expect that it was to be a running commentary on the whole of Śankara's bhāṣya, but it ends abruptly at the end of the fourth sūtra. Mādhava (1350), in his Śankaravijaya, recites an interesting story about it. He says that Sureśvara received Sankara's permission to write a vārttika on the bhāṣya. But other pupils objected to Śankara that since Sureśvara was formerly a great Mīmāmsist (Maṇḍana Miśra was called Sureśvara after his conversion to Vedāntism) he was not competent to write a good vārttika on the bhāṣya. Sureśvara, disappointed, wrote a treatise called Naiskarmyasiddhi. Padmapada wrote a ṭīkā but this was burnt in his uncle's house. Sankara, who had once seen it, recited it from memory and Padmapāda wrote it down. Prakāśātman (1200) wrote a commentary on Padmapāda's Pañcapādikā known as Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa. Akhaṇḍānanda wrote his Tattvadipana, and the famous Nṛsimhāśrama Muni (1500) wrote his Vivaraṇabhāvaprakāśikā on it. Amalānanda and Vidyasagara also wrote commentaries on Pañcapādikā, named Pañcapādikādarpaṇa and Pañcapādikāṭīkā respectively, but the Pañcapadikāvivarana had by far the greatest reputation. Vidyaranya who is generally identified by some with Mādhava (1350) wrote his famous work Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha1, elaborating the ideas of Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa; Vidyaranya wrote also another excellent work named Jivanmuktiviveka on the Vedanta doctrine of emancipation. Sureśvara's (800 A.D.) excellent work Naiṣkarmyasiddhi is probably the earliest independent treatise on Sankara's philosophy as expressed in his bhāṣya. It has been commented upon by Jñānottama Miśra. Vidyaranya also wrote another work of great merit known as Pañcadaśī, which is a very popular and illuminating treatise in verse on Vedānta. Another important work written in verse on the main teachings of Śankara's bhāṣya is Samkṣepaśārīraka, written by Sarvajñātma Muni (900 A.D.). This has also been commented upon by Rāmatīrtha. Śrīharṣa (1190 A.D.) wrote his Khandanakhaṇḍakhādya, the most celebrated work on the Vedanta dialectic. Citsukha, who probably flourished shortly after Śrīharṣa, wrote a commentary on it, and also wrote an independent work on Vedānta dialectic known as Tattvadīpikā which has also a commentary called Nayanaprasādinī written by Pratyagrupa. Śankara Miśra and Raghunatha also wrote commentaries on Khandanakhaṇḍakhadya. A work on Vedānta epistemology and the principal topics of Vedānta of great originality and merit known as Vedantaparibhāṣā was written by Dharmarājādhvarindra (about 1550 A.D.). His son Rāmakṛṣnādhvarin wrote his Šikhāmani on it and Amaradāsa his Maniprabha. The Vedantaparibhāṣā with these two commentaries forms an excellent exposition of some of the fundamental principles of Vedanta. Another work of supreme importance 1 See Narasimhācārya's article in the Indian Antiquary, 1916. (though probably the last great work on Vedānta) is the Advaitasiddhi of Madhusudana Sarasvati who followed Dharmarājādhvarindra. This has three commentaries known as Gaudabrahmanandi, Viṭṭhaleśopadhyāyi and Siddhivyākhyā. Sadānanda Vyasa wrote also a summary of it known as Advaitasiddhisiddhantasära. Sadananda wrote also an excellent elementary work named Vedantasära which has also two commentaries Subodhini and Vidvanmanorañjini. The Advaitabrahmasiddhi of Sadānanda Yati though much inferior to Advaitasiddhi is important, as it touches on many points of Vedanta interest which are not dealt with in other Vedānta works. The Nyayamakaranda of Anandabodha Bhaṭṭārakācāryya treats of the doctrines of illusion very well, as also some other important points of Vedānta interest. Vedantasiddhantamuktāvali of Prakāśānanda discusses many of the subtle points regarding the nature of ajñāna and its relations to cit, the doctrine of dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda, etc., with great clearness. Siddhantalesa by Apyayadikṣita is very important as a summary of the divergent views of different writers on many points of interest. Vedāntatattvadīpikā and Siddhāntatattva are also good as well as deep in their general summary of the Vedānta system. Bhedadhikkara of Nrsimhasrama Muni also is to be regarded as an important work on the Vedanta dialectic. The above is only a list of some of the most important Vedānta works on which the present chapter has been based. Vedanta in Gauḍapāda. It is useless I think to attempt to bring out the meaning of the Vedanta thought as contained in the Brahma-sutras without making any reference to the commentary of Śankara or any other commentator. There is reason to believe that the Brahmasūtras were first commented upon by some Vaiṣṇava writers who held some form of modified dualism'. There have been more than a half dozen Vaisnava commentators of the Brahma-sūtras who not only differed from Sankara's interpretation, but also differed largely amongst themselves in accordance with the different degrees of stress they laid on the different aspects of their dualistic creeds. Every one of them claimed that his interpretation was the only one that was faithful to the sūtras and to 1 This point will be dealt with in the 2nd volume, when I shall deal with the systems expounded by the Vaiṣṇava commentators of the Brahma-sūtras. the Upanisads. Should I attempt to give an interpretation myself and claim that to be the right one, it would be only just one additional view. But however that may be, I am myself inclined to believe that the dualistic interpretations of the Brahma-sutras were probably more faithful to the sūtras than the interpretations of Sankara. The Śrīmadbhagavadgiītā, which itself was a work of the Ekanti (singularistic) Vaiṣṇavas, mentions the Brahma-sūtras as having the same purport as its own, giving cogent reasons1. Professor Jacobi in discussing the date of the philosophical sūtras of the Hindus has shown that the references to Buddhism found in the Brahma-sūtras are not with regard to the Vijñānavāda of Vasubandhu, but with regard to the Śūnyavāda, but he regards the composition of the Brahma-sūtras to be later than Nāgārjuna. I agree with the late Dr S. C. Vidyābhūṣhana in holding that both the Yogācāra system and the system of Nāgārjuna evolved from the Prajñāpāramitā3. Nāgārjuna's merit consisted in the dialectical form of his arguments in support of Śūnyavāda; but so far as the essentials of Śūnyavāda are concerned I believe that the Tathata philosophy of Asvaghosa and the philosophy of the Prajñāpāramitā contained no less. There is no reason to suppose that the works of Nāgārjuna were better known to the Hindu writers than the Mahāyāna sūtras. Even in such later times as that of Vācaspati Miśra, we find him quoting a passage of the Śālistambha sūtra to give an account of the Buddhist doctrine of pratityasamutpāda3. We could interpret any reference to Śūnyavāda as pointing to Nāgārjuna only if his special phraseology or dialectical methods were referred to in any way. On the other hand, the reference in the Bhagavadgita to the Brahma-sutras clearly points out a date prior to that of Nāgārjuna; though we may be slow to believe such an early date as has been assigned to the Bhagavadgita by Telang, yet I suppose that its date could safely be placed so far back as the first half of the first century B.C. or the last part of the second century B.C. The Brahma-sutras could thus be placed slightly earlier than the date of the Bhagavadgītā. Brahmasūtrapadaiścaiva hetumadbhirviniścitaḥ" Bhagavadgītā. The proofs in support of the view that the Bhagavadgītā is a Vaiṣṇava work will be discussed in the 2nd volume of the present work in the section on Bhagavadgītā and its philosophy. 1 66 2 Indian Antiquary, 1915. 3 See Vacaspati Miśra's Bhāmatī on Sankara's bhasya on Brahma-sutra, 11. ii. |