ence is also indicated by the fact that the infinite bliss of Brahman does not show itself in its complete and limitless aspect. If there was no ajñāna to obstruct, it would surely have manifested itself in its fullness. Again had it not been for this ajñāna there would have been no illusion. It is the ajñāna that constitutes the substance of the illusion; for there is nothing else that can be regarded as constituting its substance; certainly Brahman could not, as it is unchangeable. This ajñāna is manifested by the perceiving consciousness (sākṣi) and not by the pure consciousness. The perceiving consciousness is nothing but pure intelligence which reflects itself in the states of avidyā (ignorance).

Locus and Object of Ajñāna, Ahamkāra, and Antaḥkaraṇa.

This ajñāna rests on the pure cit or intelligence. This cit or Brahman is of the nature of pure illumination, but yet it is not opposed to the ajñāna or the indefinite. The cit becomes opposed to the ajñāna and destroys it only when it is reflected through the mental states (vrtti). The ajñāna thus rests on the pure cit and not on the cit as associated with such illusory impositions as go to produce the notion of ego "aham" or the individual soul. Vācaspati Miśra however holds that the ajñāna does not rest on the pure cit but on the jiva (individual soul). Madhava reconciles this view of Vācaspati with the above view, and says that the ajñāna may be regarded as resting on the jiva or individual soul from this point of view that the obstruction of the pure cit is with reference to the jīva (Cinmātrāśritam ajñānam jīvapakṣapātitvāt jīvāśritam ucyate Vivaraṇaprameya, p. 48). The feeling "I do not know" seems however to indicate that the ajñāna is with reference to the perceiving self in association with its feeling as ego or "I"; but this is not so; such an appearance however is caused on account of the close association of ajñāna with antaḥkaraṇa (mind) both of which are in essence the same (see Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha, p. 48).

The ajñāna however does not only rest on the cit, but it has the cit as its visaya or object too, i.e. its manifestations are with reference to the self-luminous cit. The self-luminous cit is thus the entity on which the veiling action of the ajñāna is noticed; the veiling action is manifested not by destroying the self-luminous character, nor by stopping a future course of luminous career on the part of the cit, nor by stopping its relations with the viṣaya,

but by causing such an appearance that the self-luminous cit seems so to behave that we seem to think that it is not or it does not shine (nāsti na prakāśate iti vyavahāraḥ) or rather there is no appearance of its shining or luminosity. To say that Brahman is hidden by the ajñāna means nothing more than this, that it is such (tadyogyatā) that the ajñāna can so relate itself with it that it appears to be hidden as in the state of deep sleep and other states of ajñāna-consciousness in experience. Ajñāna is thus considered to have both its locus and object in the pure cit. It is opposed to the states of consciousness, for these at once dispel it. The action of this ajñāna is thus on the light of the reality which it obstructs for us, so long as the obstruction is not dissolved by the states of consciousness. This obstruction of the cit is not only with regard to its character as pure limitless consciousness but also with regard to its character as pure and infinite bliss; so it is that though we do not experience the indefinite in our pleasurable feelings, yet its presence as obstructing the pure cit is indicated by the fact that the full infinite bliss constituting the essence of Brahman is obstructed; and as a result of that there is only an incomplete manifestation of the bliss in our phenomenal experiences of pleasure. The ajñāna is one, but it seems to obstruct the pure cit in various aspects or modes, with regard to which it may be said that the ajñāna has many states as constituting the individual experiences of the indefinite with reference to the diverse individual objects of experience. These states of ajñāna are technically called tulājñāna or avasthājñāna. Any state of consciousness (vṛttijñāna) removes a manifestation of the ajñāna as tulājñāna and reveals itself as the knowledge of an object.

The most important action of this ajñāna as obstructing the pure cit, and as creating an illusory phenomenon is demonstrated in the notion of the ego or ahamkāra. This notion of ahamkāra is a union of the true self, the pure consciousness and other associations, such as the body, the continued past experiences, etc.; it is the self-luminous characterless Brahman that is found obstructed in the notion of the ego as the repository of a thousand limitations, characters, and associations. This illusory creation of the notion of the ego runs on from beginningless time, each set of previous false impositions determining the succeeding set of impositions and so on. This blending of the unreal associations held up in the mind (antaḥkarana) with the real, the false with

the true, that is at the root of illusion. It is the antaḥkarana taken as the self-luminous self that reflects itself in the cit as the notion of the ego. Just as when we say that the iron ball (red hot) burns, there are two entities of the ball and the fire fused into one, so here also when I say "I perceive" there are two distinct elements of the self as consciousness and the mind or antaḥkaraṇa fused into one. The part or aspect associated with sorrow, materiality, and changefulness represents the antaḥkarana, whereas that which appears as the unchangeable perceiving consciousness is the self. Thus the notion of ego contains two parts, one real and the other unreal.

We remember that this is distinctly that which Prabhakara sought to repudiate. Prabhakara did not consider the self to be self-luminous, and held that such is the threefold nature of thought (tripuți), that it at once reveals the knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the self. He further said that the analogy of the red-hot iron ball did not hold, for the iron ball and the fire are separately experienced, but the self and the antaḥkaraṇa are never separately experienced, and we can never say that these two are really different and only have an illusory appearance of a seeming unity. Perception (anubhava) is like a light which illuminates both the object and the self, and like it does not require the assistance of anything else for the fulfilling of its purpose. But the Vedanta objects to this saying that according to Prabhākara's supposition it is impossible to discover any relation between the self and the knowledge. If knowledge can be regarded as revealing itself, the self may as well be held to be self-luminous; the self and the knowledge are indeed one and the same. Kumārila thinks this thought (anubhava) to be a movement, Nyāya and Prabhākara as a quality of the self1. But if it were a movement like other movements, it could not affect itself as illumination. If it were a substance and atomic in size, it would only manifest a small portion of a thing, if all-pervasive then it would illuminate everything, if of medium size it would depend on its parts for its own

1 According to Nyāya the atman is conscious only through association with consciousness, but it is not consciousness (cit). Consciousness is associated with it only as a result of suitable collocations. Thus Nyāyamañjarī in refuting the doctrine of self-luminosity (svaprakāśa) says (p. 432)

sacetanaścita yogättadyogena vinā jaḍaḥ

närthāvabhāsādanyaddhi caitanyam nāma manmaḥe.

constitution and not on the self. If it is regarded as a quality of the self as the light is of the lamp, then also it has necessarily to be supposed that it was produced by the self, for from what else could it be produced? Thus it is to be admitted that the .self, the atman, is the self-luminous entity. No one doubts any of his knowledge, whether it is he who sees or anybody else. The self is thus the same as vijñāna, the pure consciousness, which is always of itself self-luminous1.

Again, though consciousness is continuous in all stages, waking or sleeping, yet ahamkāra is absent during deep sleep. It is true that on waking from deep sleep one feels "I slept happily and did not know anything": yet what happens is this, that during deep sleep the antaḥkaraṇa and the ahamkara are altogether submerged in the ajñāna, and there are only the ajñāna and the self; on waking, this ahamkāra as a state of antaḥkarna is again generated, and then it associates the perception of the ajñāna in the sleep and originates the perception "I did not know anything." This ahamkāra which is a mode (vrtti) of the antaḥkarana is thus constituted by avidyā, and is manifested as jñānaśakti (power of knowledge) and kriyāśakti (power of work). This kriyāśakti of the ahamkāra is illusorily imposed upon the self, and as a result of that the self appears to be an active agent in knowing and willing. The ahamkara itself is regarded, as we have already seen, as a mode or vṛtti of the antaḥkarana, and as such the ahamkara of a past period can now be associated; but even then the vṛtti of antaḥkaraṇa, ahamkāra, may be regarded as only the active side or aspect of the antaḥkaraṇa. The same antaḥkaraṇa is called manas in its capacity as doubt, buddhi in its capacity as achieving certainty of knowledge, and citta in its capacity as remembering. When the pure cit shines forth in association with this antaḥkarana, it is called a jīva. It is clear from the above account that the ajñāna is not a mere nothing, but is the principle of the phenomena. But it cannot stand alone, without the principle of the real to support it (āśraya); its own nature as the ajñāna or indefinite is perceived directly by the pure consciousness; its movements as originating the phenomena remain indefinite in themselves, the real as under

1 See Nyāyamakaranda, pp. 130-140, Citsukha and Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha, PP. 53-58.

2 See Vedanta-paribhāṣā, p. 88, Bombay edition.

lying these phenomenal movements can only manifest itself through these which hide it, when corresponding states arise in the antaḥkarana, and the light of the real shines forth through these states. The antaḥkarana of which ahamkāra is a moment, is itself a beginningless system of ajñāna-phenomena containing within it the associations and impressions of past phenomena as merit, demerit, instincts, etc. from a beginningless time when the jīva or individual soul began his career.

Anirvācyavāda and the Vedānta Dialectic.

We have already seen that the indefinite ajñāna could be experienced in direct perception and according to Vedānta there are only two categories. The category of the real, the selfluminous Brahman, and the category of the indefinite. The latter has for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by which the one unchangeable Brahman is falsely manifested in all the diversity of the manifold world. But this indefinite which is different from the category of the positive and the negative, has only a relative existence and will ultimately vanish, when the true knowledge of the Brahman dawns. Nothing however can be known about the nature of this indefinite except its character as indefinite. That all the phenomena of the world, the fixed order of events, the infinite variety of world-forms and names, all these are originated by this avidyā, ajñāna or māyā is indeed hardly comprehensible. If it is indefinite nescience, how can all these well-defined forms of world-existence come out of it? It is said to exist only relatively, and to have only a temporary existence beside the permanent infinite reality. To take such a principle and to derive from it the mind, matter, and indeed everything else except the pure self-luminous Brahman, would hardly appeal to our reason. If this system of world-order were only seeming appearance, with no other element of truth in it except pure being, then it would be indefensible in the light of reason. It has been proved that whatever notions we have about the objective world are all self-contradictory, and thus groundless and false. If they have all proceeded from the indefinite they must show this character when exposed to discerning criticism. All categories have to be shown to be so hopelessly confused and to be without any conceivable notion that though apparent before us yet they crumble into indefiniteness as soon as they are