guāna-pariņām a

addition. All our uncontradicted knowledge of the objects of the external world should be regarded as right knowledge until the absolute is realized.

When the antaḥkaraṇa (mind) comes in contact with the external objects through the senses and becomes transformed as it were into their forms, it is said that the antaḥkarana has been transformed into a state (vrtti)1. As soon as the antaḥkarana has assumed the shape or form of the object of its knowledge, the ignorance (ajñāna) with reference to that object is removed, and thereupon the steady light of the pure consciousness (cit) shows the object which was so long hidden by ignorance. The appearance or the perception of an object is thus the self-shining of the cit through a vṛtti of a form resembling an object of knowledge. This therefore pre-supposes that by the action of ajñāna, pure consciousness or being is in a state of diverse kinds of modifications. In spite of the cit underlying all this diversified objective world which is but the transformation of ignorance (ajñāna), the former cannot manifest itself by itself, for the creations being of ignorance they are but sustained by modifications of ignorance. The diversified objects of the world are but transformations of the principle of ajñāna which is neither real nor unreal. It is the nature of ajñāna that it veils its own creations. Thus on each of the objects created by the ajñāna by its creating (vikṣepa) capacity there is a veil by its veiling (āvaraṇa) capacity. But when any object comes in direct touch with antaḥkaraṇa through the senses the antaḥkaraṇa becomes transformed into the form of the object, and this leads to the removal of the veil on that particular ajñāna form-the object, and as the selfshining cit is shining through the particular ajñāna state, we have what is called the perception of the thing. Though there is in reality no such distinction as the inner and the outer yet the ajñāna has created such illusory distinctions as individual souls and the external world of objects the distinctions of time, space,

1 Vedanta does not regard manas (mind) as a sense (indriya). The same antaḥkarana, according to its diverse functions, is called manas, buddhi, ahamkāra, and citta. In its functions as doubt it is called manas, as originating definite cognitions it is called buddhi. As presenting the notion of an ego in consciousness ahaṁkāra, and as producing memory citta. These four represent the different modifications or states (vṛtti) of the same entity (which in itself is but a special kind of modification of ajñāna as antaḥkaraṇa).

etc. and veiled these forms. Perception leads to the temporary and the partial breaking of the veil over specific ajñāna forms so that there is a temporary union of the cit as underlying the subject and the object through the broken veil. Perception on the subjective side is thus defined as the union or undifferentiation (abheda) of the subjective consciousness with the objective consciousness comprehending the sensible objects through the specific mental states (tattadindriyayogyaviṣayāvacchinnacaitanyābhinnatvam tattadākāraviṣayāvacchinnajñānasya tattadamśe pratyakṣatvam). This union in perception means that the objective has at that moment no separate existence from the subjective consciousness of the perceiver. The consciousness manifesting through the antaḥkaraṇa is called jīvasākṣi.

Inference (anumāna), according to Vedānta, is made by our notion of concomitance (vyāptijñāna) between two things, acting through specific past impressions (samskāra). Thus when I see smoke on a hill, my previous notion of the concomitance of smoke with fire becomes roused as a subconscious impression, and I infer that there is fire on the hill. My knowledge of the hill and the smoke is by direct perception. The notion of concomitance revived in the subconscious only establishes the connection between the smoke and the fire. The notion of concomitance is generated by the perception of two things together, when no case of the failure of concomitance is known (vyabhicārājñāna) regarding the subject. The notion of concomitance being altogether subjective, the Vedantist does not emphasize the necessity of perceiving the concomitance in a large number of cases (bhuyodarśanam sakṛddarśanam veti višeṣo nādaraṇīyah). Vedānta is not anxious to establish any material validity for the inference, but only subjective and formal validity. A single perception of concomitance may in certain cases generate the notion of the concomitance of one thing with another when no contradictory instance is known. It is immaterial with the Vedānta whether this concomitance is experienced in one case or in hundreds of cases. The method of agreement in presence is the only form of concomitance (anvayavyapti) that the Vedanta allows. So the Vedanta discards all the other kinds of inference that Nyāya supported, viz. anvayavyatireki (by joining agreement in presence with agreement in absence), kevalānvayi (by universal agreement where no test could be applied of agreement in absence) and

kevalavyatireki (by universal agreement in absence). Vedānta advocates three premisses, viz. (1) pratijña (the hill is fiery); (2) hetu (because it has smoke) and (3) dṛṣṭānta (as in the kitchen) instead of the five propositions that Nyāya maintained1. Since one case of concomitance is regarded by Vedānta as being sufficient for making an inference it holds that seeing the one case of appearance (silver in the conch-shell) to be false, we can infer that all things (except Brahman) are false (Brahmabhinnam sarvam mithya Brahmabhinnatvāt yedevam tadevam yathā śuktirūpyam). First premiss (pratijñā) all else excepting Brahman is false; second premiss (hetu) since all is different from Brahman; third premiss (drṣṭānta) whatever is so is so as the silver in the conch2.

Atman, Jīva, Iśvara, Ekajīvavāda and Dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda.

We have many times spoken of truth or reality as selfluminous (svayamprakāśa). But what does this mean? Vedānta defines it as that which is never the object of a knowing act but is yet immediate and direct with us (avedyatve sati aparokṣavyavahārayogyatvam). Self-luminosity thus means the capacity of being ever present in all our acts of consciousness without in any way being an object of consciousness. Whenever anything is described as an object of consciousness, its character as constituting its knowability is a quality, which may or may not be present in it, or may be present at one time and absent at another. This makes it dependent on some other such entity which can produce it or manifest it. Pure consciousness differs from all its objects in this that it is never dependent on anything else for its manifestation, but manifests all other objects such as the jug, the cloth, etc. If consciousness should require another consciousness to manifest it, then that might again require another, and that another, and so on ad infinitum (anavastha). If consciousness did not manifest itself at the time of the object-manifestation, then even on seeing or knowing a thing one might doubt if he had seen or known it. It is thus to be admitted that consciousness (anubhūti) manifests itself and thereby maintains the ap

1 Vedanta would have either pratijñā, hetu and udāharaṇa, or udāharaṇa, upanaya and nigamana, and not all the five of Nyāya, viz. pratijñā, hetu, udaharaṇa, upanaya and nigamana.

2 Vedantic notions of the pramaņa of upamāna, arthāpatti, śabda and anupalabdhi, being similar to the mimāmsa view, do not require to be treated here separately.

pearance of all our world experience. This goes directly against the jñātata theory of Kumārila that consciousness was not immediate but was only inferable from the manifesting quality (jñātata) of objects when they are known in consciousness.

Now Vedanta says that this self-luminous pure consciousness is the same as the self. For it is only self which is not the object of any knowledge and is yet immediate and ever present in consciousness. No one doubts about his own self, because it is of itself manifested along with all states of knowledge. The self itself is the revealer of all objects of knowledge, but is never itself the object of knowledge, for what appears as the perceiving of self as object of knowledge is but association comprehended under the term ahamkāra (ego). The real self is identical with the pure manifesting unity of all consciousness. This real self called the atman is not the same as the jīva or individual soul, which passes through the diverse experiences of worldly life. Iśvara also must be distinguished from this highest ātman or Brahman. We have already seen that many Vedāntists draw a distinction between māyā and avidyā. Māyā is that aspect of ajñāna by which only the best attributes are projected, whereas avidyā is that aspect by which impure qualities are projected. In the former aspect the functions are more of a creative, generative (vikṣepa) type, whereas in the latter veiling (āvaraṇa) characteristics are most prominent. The relation of the cit or pure intelligence, the highest self, with māyā and avidyā (also called ajñāna) was believed respectively to explain the phenomenal Isvara and the phenomenal jīva or individual. This relation is conceived in two ways, namely as upadhi or pratibimba, and avaccheda. The conception of pratibimba or reflection is like the reflection of the sun in the water where the image, though it has the same brilliance as the sun, yet undergoes the effect of the impurity and movements of the water. The sun remains ever the same in its purity untouched by the impurities from which the image sun suffers. The sun may be the same but it may be reflected in different kinds of water and yield different kinds of images possessing different characteristics and changes which though unreal yet phenomenally have all the appearance of reality. The other conception of the relation is that when we speak of ākāśa (space) in the jug or of ākāśa in the room. The ākāśa in reality does not suffer

elf

Pure

any modification in being within the jug or within the room. In reality it is all-pervasive and is neither limited (avachinna) within the jug or the room, but is yet conceived as being limited by the jug or by the room. So long as the jug remains, the ākāśa limited within it will remain as separate from the ākāśa limited within the room.

Of the Vedantists who accept the reflection analogy the followers of Nrsimhāśrama think that when the pure cit is reflected in the māyā, Īśvara is phenomenally produced, and when in the avidya the individual or jīva. Sarvajñātmā however does not distinguish between the māyā and the avidyā, and thinks that when the cit is reflected in the avidya in its total aspect as cause, we get Iśvara, and when reflected in the antaḥkaraṇa—a product of the avidya-we have jīva or individual soul.

Jiva or individual means the self in association with the ego and other personal experiences, i.e. phenomenal self, which feels, suffers and is affected by world-experiences. In jīva also three stages are distinguished; thus when during deep sleep the antaḥkarana is submerged, the self perceives merely the ajñāna and the jiva in this state is called prājña or ānandamaya. In the dreamstate the self is in association with a subtle body and is called taijasa. In the awakened state the self as associated with a subtle and gross body is called viśva. So also the self in its pure state is called Brahman, when associated with māyā it is called Īśvara, when associated with the fine subtle element of matter as controlling them, it is called hiranyagarbha; when with the gross elements as the ruler or controller of them it is called virāt purusa.

The jiva in itself as limited by its avidyā is often spoken of as pāramarthika (real), when manifested through the sense and the ego in the waking states as vyavahārika (phenomenal), and when in the dream states as dream-self, prātibhāṣika (illusory).

Prakāśātmā and his followers think that since ajñāna is one there cannot be two separate reflections such as jīva and Iśvara; but it is better to admit that jiva is the image of Isvara in the ajñāna. The totality of Brahma-cit in association with māyā is Isvara, and this when again reflected through the ajñāna gives us the jiva. The manifestation of the jīva is in the antaḥkaraṇa as states of knowledge. The jiva thus in reality is Isvara and apart from jiva and Iśvara there is no other separate existence of