of the sentence is indicated in La. Read τῆς μὲν δὴ πυθέσθαι τὴν ἡλικίαν καὶ ἐπιλέξασθαι τοὺς χρησμοὺς (οἷόν τ' ἐστίν).

2. Χ. 13, 10. τέχνη μὲν τὰ ἀναθήματα Ονάτα τοῦ Αἰγινήτου καὶ Καλύνθου τε ἐστικωσι ἔργου κ.τ.λ. The corruption was discussed at length, and the passage restored as τέχνη μὲν τὰ ἀναθήματα Ονάτα τοῦ Αἰγινήτου καὶ Καλύνθου τοῦ ̓Αττικοῦ συνεργοῦ κ.τ.λ. Evidence was brought forward to establish the

probability of the restoration.

3. Χ. 15, 1. Read Φρύνης δὲ εἰκόνα ἐπίχρυσον Πραξιτέλης μὲν εἰργάσατο ἐραστὴς (ὢν) καὶ οὗτος. The omission of the may, however, be due to Pausanias.

4. Χ. 15, 2. στρατηγοὶ δὲ οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ καὶ ̓Αρτέμιδος, τὸ δὲ ̓Αθηνᾶς, δύο τε ̓Απόλλωνος ἀγάλματά ἐστιν Αἰτωλῶν. The sentence is not properly balanced. Read καὶ τὸ μὲν ̓Αρτέμιδος, τὸ δὲ ̓Αθηνᾶς κ.τ.λ.

5. Χ. 17, 5. τετάρτη δὲ μοῖρα Ιολάου Θεσπιέων τε καὶ ἐκ τῆς ̓Αττικῆς στρατιὰ κατήρεν ἐς Σαρδώ. Read Θεσπιέων τε καὶ (τῶν ἐκ τῆς ̓Αττικής κ.τ.λ.

6. Χ. 25, 2. Pausanias sets out to describe the paintings of the Lesché of the Cnidians with the words Μενελάῳ δὲ τὰ ἐς τὴν ἀναγωγὴν εὐτρεπίζουσι. The indefinite use of the third plural at the beginning of a description is not Greek. Read therefore Μενελάῳ δέ τινες) τὰ ἐς τὴν ἀναγωγὴν εὐτρεπίζουσι.

7. Χ. 25, 2. καὶ τέως ὁμοῦ Νέστορι ὁ Μενέλαος πλέων, τότε κατὰ αἰτίαν ἀπελείφθη ταύτην ἵνα μνήματος καί, ὅσα ἐπὶ νεκροῖς ἄλλα, ἀξιώσειε τὸν Φρόντιν. Pausanias is paraphrasing Odyssey III. 285

ὄφρ ̓ ἕταρον θάπτοι καὶ ἐπὶ κτέρεα κτερίσειεν.

The difficulty lies with the μνήματος. The sense is not think him worthy of a tomb, which would be the meaning with the genitive, but honor him with a tomb. ἀξιόω in this latter sense requires the dative. Read therefore μνήματι in place of μνήματος.

8. Χ. 19, 11. καὶ ἵππον τὸ ὄνομα ἴστω τις μάρκαν ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν Κελτῶν. This passage has given much trouble but does not require emendation. Punctuate καὶ ἵππον, τὸ ὄνομα, ἴστω τις μάρκαν ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν Κελτών and there is no diffculty. Translate, “ and horse, that is the noun horse, let anybody know is marka among (or more literally, at the hands of) the Celts." For the use of vmb cf. X. 5, 9 δεύτερα δὲ λέγουσιν οἱ Δελφοὶ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ μελισσῶν τὸν ναόν. ; also X. 17, 1 ὄνομα δὲ αὐτῇ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὅ τι μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐγένετο οὐκ οἶδα.; and X. 26, 8 ἔργον δυσμενὲς ὑπὸ ̓Αγαμέμνονος καὶ Μενελάου γενέσθαι.

Adjourned at 5.30 P.M.

EVENING SESSION.

The Association assembled at eight o'clock in room 16, to listen to the address of the President, Professor Abby Leach, of Vassar College. The speaker was introduced by Professor Edward A. Birge, Dean of the College of Letters and Sciences, who extended a welcome to the Association on behalf of the University of Wisconsin.

5. The Athenian Democracy in the Light of Greek Literature, by Professor Abby Leach, of Vassar College, the President of the Association.

Athens was a typical democracy, a government of the people, by the people, and for the people, and because the population was so small that the people took part directly in affairs of state and not through representatives, and because life was less complex than now, in this miniature democracy the tendencies and workings of a democracy can clearly be seen.

The Funeral Speech of Pericles gives the ideal view of democracy, namely, equal rights and equal opportunities for all. Aristotle says: "It is equality determined not by merit but arithmetically, that is, by merely counting heads, and where this is the case, it necessarily follows that the masses are supreme." "A charming form of government are Plato's sarcastic words. "Full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike!" And he thinks the dominant characteristic of a democracy is an insatiate thirst for freedom that does away with all reverence and real respect for authority. Aristotle, often quoted as the champion of the majority, says, "As the multitude collectively may be compared to an individual with many feet, hands, and senses, so the same is true of their character and intelligence," but he goes on to state that this does not apply in all cases, whatever the character of the people or masses may be. The majority he approves is a select majority, for he rules out of citizenship all husbandmen and artisans and laborers in general, on the claim that they have not the requisite leisure for the cultivation of virtue.

The history of Athens shows a steady gain in the power of the people, and Aristotle asserts that statesmen more and more played into their hands to win power and place for themselves; that Pericles, able statesman and true patriot as he was, saw that the pathway to power lay through popular favor and, therefore, made presents to the people out of their own property by instituting pay for the members of the law-courts. This policy led to the rise of demagogues and "the popular leadership was occupied successively by the men who chose to talk the biggest and pander to the tastes of the majority with their eyes fixed only on the interest of the moment" and "in struggling to be first themselves, they were ready to sacrifice the whole conduct of affairs to the whims of the people."

There is plentiful testimony, too, against the orators for employing their skill merely to please the people and leading the people astray with artful speech. And not merely the tricks of pleasing speech throve apace at Athens, but there were more tangible ways of securing the allegiance of the people, and bribery became open and unblushing. The Athenians, though in general humane, became cruel and vindictive, according to Thucydides, when they had gained an empire, and imperialism made this liberty-loving people tyrannical.

The mass of people are shown to be susceptible to that which stirs their feelings, and hence are unstable and inconsistent in their actions and policy. When they see the evil consequences of their folly in a given case, they are ready to wreak vengeance upon those who led them astray, but have no blame for themselves, as if their votes had not determined the measure. The evils of the democ racy and its dangers were seen by statesmen and philosophers, and they each had remedies to propose, firmer adherence to the laws and greater severity against

any infraction of them in the one case, better training in virtue and appointment of disinterested rulers in the other case. They agree with Matthew Arnold: "The great danger to any democracy is the danger that comes from the multitude being in power with no adequate ideal to elevate or guide the multitude." Athens teaches that the Many are easily flattered and cajoled, that "they pursue the pleasures they like and the means thereto, and shun the contrary pains, but they have no thought of, as they have no taste for, what is right and truly sweet"; that there is always the gravest danger that unscrupulous men will rise to power by cunning manipulation of the people, by pandering to their baser natures instead of trying to influence them for their own good and the good of the state; that the Many with their emotionalism, their lack of ideals, their narrow vision, must have wise and noble leaders, and the problem is how to train these leaders upon whom Nature herself has set the stamp of greatness, into noble living and thinking, and how to make the people desire and accept such leadership.

This paper will be printed in full in the American Journal of Philology, XXI. No. 84.

MORNING SESSION.

The Association assembled at 9.30 A.M.

MADISON, July 4, 1900.

The Acting Secretary announced that the Local Committee, assisted by the University and by citizens of Madison, had arranged for a trip in a steamer on Lake Mendota, with supper at Red Gable Cottage, the steamer to leave the boat-house landing at 5.30 P.M.

The Acting Secretary read a communication from Professor J. H. Thayer on the American School in Palestine.

6. Traces of Epic Usage in Thucydides, by Professor Charles Forster Smith, of the University of Wisconsin.

This paper is printed in full in the TRANSACTIONS.

7. The Cognomina of the Goddess Fortuna, by Professor Jesse Benedict Carter, of Princeton University.

This paper appears in full in the TRANSACTIONS.

8. A Revision of Pronouns with Especial Attention to Relatives and Relative Clauses, by Professor Edward T. Owen, of the University of Wisconsin.

The writer merely outlined a theory of the relatives, which is to be defended in the ensuing volume of the Transactions of the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters.

The fact that some languages have no relative pronouns was used as provisional justification of the typical sentence: “I have a book will please you." This was

found to express two thought-members, or say two thoughts, otherwise expressible by (1) "I have a book" and (2) “book will please you." In the union of these two, as above, in a single sentence, thought-structure was shown by the diagram: ("I have a [book) will please you"], it being claimed that the idea named by "book" is simultaneous factor of both thoughts that such idea is once conceived and only once. So, too, in "red wine from France," it was held that "wine" is not thought of once as "red" and again as "from France." It was further emphasized that the singleness of conception in the case of "book," that is, the simultaneity of one idea in two thoughts, is that exactly which makes of two thoughts one that, in other words, which gives the well-known connecting power commonly ascribed to the relative.

66

It was further noted as a linguistic convenience, to mark the sentence subject and object, by a special sign. In the given example "book" is object of "have" and subject of will please." That a desire to use the subject and object signs persists, when the sentential function of a word is thus double, was shown by the following examples, given essentially as they occur in Bulwer's Rienzi.

I. (Defence against [whosoever) aspires],

II. (Defence against [whomsoever) aspires],

in which the author seems to feel the need of inflecting a simultaneous factor for each of its two sentential functions.

In preliminary illustration of relative procedure, this need was met by imagi nary methods, use being made of inflection at either word-end (as in some Greek tense-forms) and of isolated inflection (e.g. the "to" of the English infinitive= the re of amare). With such helps the sentence "The Bible teaches (whosoever wishes to learn, or say) the man wishes to learn" was rendered into imaginary Latin as follows: The idea named by "man" being conceived but once, its symbol hom," is used but once. The symbol "nem," the sign of object function in what might be called the front clause (The Bible teaches the man), is put where it seems to be the most effective, at the front end of the simultaneous factor "hom," developing "Biblia docent nem-hom." The symbol "o," the sign of subject function in the back clause, is put at the back end of the simultaneous factor, developing in full

46

But the inadmissibility of either double or front inflection requires the change to the form "Biblia docent hominem o vult "; and conventionality further requires the displacement of "o" by "qui." It was, however, claimed that the values of "hom," "nem," and "o" remain as before, and that the value of "o" is exactly maintained by “qui”; that the idea of “man” is thought but once; that, while it is thought under the influence of "hom," it is not thought under any influence of "qui"; that "qui" is not the sign of a thought-factor, but merely the sign of what is to be done with a thought-factor; that "qui" must rank, accordingly, not as structural, or say constructional, but as instructional, being, if strictly taken, a merely isolated inflection

It was stipulated that this view of relative value should not be taken as implying that such value was, historically, always the same. It was noted that the

exclusive consideration of the relative as a case-sign was without prejudice to the value which, like other case-signs, it has, as also a sign of number, gender, etc. Special attention was called to the indeclinable relative "that," in which the exhibition of second function shrinks to the announcement that second function is to occur (as in "I have a book that will please you"), what is usually a special guide becoming only a general warning.

Comparison was made with the German (“Er hat erreicht den [Himmel) der erwartete ihn]," in which it was argued that both the so-called article “ den" and the so-called relative "der" are merely isolated case-signs; and objective illustration was offered as follows: Conceive a wedding ceremony and a funeral service to occur simultaneously, in the same church, and so near together that a woman present may be regarded as forming part of the group attending each. Thus situated she may cherish the laudable wish to conform her dress to each of her two environments. She is somewhat in the predicament of a simultaneous sentence-factor, which also might advantageously suit itself to each of two verbal companies. A harlequin costume, partly festal and partly funereal, is forbidden by usage. Could the woman, however, duplicate herself in form, while remaining personally one; could she, in short, make use of a dummy, or could she, in theosophic parlance, project alongside of herself an astral or fictitious self, this illusory second self she might harmonize, in dress, with one environment, while her actual primary self conformed to the other. That is, without repeating her actual self, her individual significance, or, say, her meaning, she might be in formal accordance with her two surroundings. So, too, of the relative pronoun, it may, very figuratively, be said, that it is the verbal dummy, on which we hang the drapery of inflections suitable to a second verbal environment.

The relative was compared with true pronouns, as follows: In "I just met Brown. He is ill," by the word "Brown" a particular idea is established in your mind. But, at the end of the sentence in which it appears, this idea so far lapses from your mind that you will not think of it again, unless invited to do so that is, so far as you merely try to understand what is told you. But such an invitation is furnished by "He." This word, it is true, cannot, unaided, establish in your mind the idea named by "Brown." But when that idea once has been established by "Brown," even though it be disestablished, it can be reëstablished by "He" - that is, if the intervening time be not too great. The words of this order may be known as reëstablishers or reinstatives.

On the other hand, in "Brown has bought him a horse," it is plain that Brown continues fully in your mind till, even, you have utilized the symbol "horse." Figuratively speaking, the "him" is not designed to brighten a mind-picture which has faded. This "him" provides you rather with a copy of that picture, to hang in your mental gallery alongside of the still fresh original. In other words, the idea of Brown shall twice appear in a single thought. The linguistic promoter of the second appearance may be known as a coinstative.

On the background formed by these examples let there be projected now the following: "I know a servant who will suit you." The idea named by "servant" does not lapse from the attention which you give it with "I know," and come back to the attention which you give it with "will suit you." It cannot, therefore, be said that "who" reinstates "servant." Again, the idea first introduced by “servant" is not supplied with any copy to be used with it as its thought co