& Acc. Ins. Co., 63 Vt. 437, 22 Atl. 530, 25 Am. St. Rep. 773, 13 L. R. A. 637). To show a violation of the Texas statute' prohibiting seining in streams above tide water it must be shown that the stream was above tide water (Conboy v. Railway Officials' & Employés' Acc. Ass'n, 17 Ind. App. 62, 46 N. E. 363, 60 Am. St. Rep. 154; Id., 43 N. E. 1017). So, there is not a violation of the Iowa statute prohibiting placing across any body of water a trot-line, so as to prevent the free passage of fish, unless such line is so placed as to prevent the free passage of fish (Collins v. Bankers' Acc. Ins. Co., 64 N. W. 778, 96 Iowa, 216, 59 Am. St. Rep. 367). Attempting to board a moving street car by the front platform is not a violation of a city ordinance declaring that "no persons except motormen, conductors or police officials in uniform shall be allowed on the front platform of any such cars, when in operation, except that such front platform shall be used for the ingress and egress of passengers at stoppages. The rear platform of the cars shall also be used for the ingress and egress of passengers." (Johanns v. National Acc. Soc. of City of New York, 45 N. Y. Supp. 117, 16 App. Div. 104.) The court said that, if the insured had a right to board the car at all when it was in motion, he no more violated the city ordinance by using the front platform for that purpose than he would have done by using the rear platform. In Evans v. Phoenix Mut. Relief Ass'n, 1 Pa. Dist. R. 27, the policy declared that it should be void if the insured should take his own life by any unlawful act. It was held that the clause did not apply if insured, while trespassing on a train, was thrown under the wheels and killed. There must be some overt act to constitute a violation of law. Mere intent to violate is not sufficient. Thus, where the insured started out to hunt prairie chickens during the closed season, it was not a violation of law if no act contrary to the statute was actually performed (Cornwell v. Fraternal Acc. Ass'n of America, 6 N. D. 201, 69 N. W. 191, 40 L. R. A. 437, 66 Am. St. Rep. 601). So, making preparations to leave a train by getting out on the step while the train was still in motion is not a violation of a statute making it a misdemeanor to get off or on railroad cars in motion (Smith v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 88 N. W. 368, 115 Iowa, 217, 56 L. R. A. 271, 91 Am. St. Rep. 153). 8 Acts 23d Gen. Assem, c. 34, § 6. ? Willson's Cr. St. 1897, art. 510. Code Iowa, § 4811. In Hatch v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 120 Mass. 550, 21 Am. Rep. 541, death of a woman from the effects of an abortion was regarded as not within the risks assumed in the policy, the basis of the holding being that public policy precludes a recovery when death ensues from an abortion voluntarily submitted to without any justifiable medical necessity. This reasoning was approved in Wells v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 191 Pa. 207, 43 Atl. 126, 53 L. R. A. 327, 71 Am. St. Rep. 763, but it was also held that death from such cause fell within the terms of the exception of death resulting from violation of law. In a few cases it has been contended by the insurer that the suicide of the insured was a violation of law within the exception. It was, however, held in Patrick v. Excelsior Life Ins. Co., 67 Barb. (N. Y.) 202, that the exception cannot be construed to include suicide, though suicide has been called a felony. The leading case in New York is Darrow v. Family Fund Soc., 116 N. Y. 537, 22 N. E. 1093, 6 L. R. A. 495, 15 Am. St. Rep. 430, where it was said that, though the attempt to commit suicide is a criminal offense, the actual successful suicide is not so declared, and it cannot be regarded as equivalent to an attempt. This doctrine was followed in Freeman v. National Ben. Soc., 42 Hun, 252; Meacham v. New York State Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 46 Hun, 363. It was, however, held in Shipman v. Protected Home Circle, 174 N. Y. 398, 67 N. E. 83, 63 L. R. A. 347, that suicide, though not declared a crime, is at least an illegal act, within an exception of liability if the death of the insured should be caused by any illegal act of his own. The rule that suicide is not a violation of law within the usual exception has also been asserted in Minnesota (Kerr v. Minnesota Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 39 Minn. 174, 39 N. W. 312, 12 Am. St. Rep. 631) and Illinois (Royal Circle v. Achterrath, 68 N. E. 492, 204 Ill. 549, 63 L. R. A. 452, 98 Am. St. Rep. 224). And in Wisconsin it was said (Patterson v. Natural Premium Mut. Life Ins. Co., 75 N. W. 980, 100 Wis. 118, 42 L. R. A. 253, 69 Am. St. Rep. 899) that though suicide is technically a crime, as the common law prevails, except as altered by statute, it is not a crime in the ordinary meaning of the term, in the absence of any statute punishing suicide or attempt to commit suicide. In a majority of cases involving the consideration and application of this exception the insured has been engaged in an altercation with or an assault upon another. There seems to be no question as to the rule that where the insured commits a direct and aggravated assault, or in the progress of an altercation so conducts himself as to justify his adversary in taking his life in self-defense, or under such circumstances as render the killing justifiable homicide, there is a violation of law on the part of the insured within the exception. This rule is illustrated in Bloom v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478, 49 Am. Rep. 469; Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America v. Higbee's Adm'r, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 495, 57 S. W. 614; Payne v. Union Life Guards (Mich.) 99 N. W. 376; Wolff v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 5 Mo. App. 236; Brown v. Supreme Lodge K. P., 83 Mo. App. 633; Davis v. Modern Woodmen of America, 73 S. W. 923, 98 Mo. App. 713; Murray v. New York Life Ins. Co., 96 N. Y. 614, 48 Am. Rep. 658, affirming 30 Hun, 428. And evidence as to threats made by the insured previous to the altercation or assault is admissible to show the character of his acts. Yale v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 2 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 221. On the other hand, if the insured is guilty of no more than a simple assault, or is fighting in self-defense, or, having engaged in a fight, has withdrawn and retreated, not for the purpose of gaining vantage ground, but with the intent to retire from the struggle, so that it is not justifiable homicide for the adversary to kill him, the death of the insured is not within the exception. This rule is illustrated in Robinson v. United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n (C. C.) 68 Fed. 825; Cluff v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 99 Mass. 317; Harper's Adm'r v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 18 Mo. 109; Id., 19 Mo. 506; Overton v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 39 Mo. 122, 90 Am. Dec. 455. Associated with the exception as to violation of law is sometimes found a provision that the insurer shall not be liable if the insured is killed in a duel. The word "duel" signifies a prearranged combat. Consequently, the fact that the insured was killed in a combat does not relieve the insurer, unless it appears that such combat was prearranged. (Davis v. Modern Woodmen of America, 98 Mo. App. 713, 73 S. W. 923.) Whether the law violated be a criminal or a civil law, there must in all cases be some causative connection between the act which constituted the violation of law and the death of the insured (Bloom v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478, 49 Am. Rep. 469). Death must have been caused by the violation of law, to exempt the company from liability. It cannot be the true meaning of the exception that the policy is to be avoided by the mere fact that at the time of the death the insured was violating the law, if the death occurred from some cause other than such violation (Bradley v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 45 N. Y. 422, 6 Am. Rep. 115). Thus, the fact that insured was killed while living in a state of fornication with his mistress (Accident Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 90 Tenn. 256, 16 S. W. 723, 25 Am. St. Rep. 685), or while leaving a bawdy house and carrying concealed weapons (Jones v. United States Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 92 Iowa, 652, 61 N. W. 485), does not release the insurer unless the death of the insured was the necessary and natural consequence of the unlawful act as its probable and to be anticipated result. So, too, it is not sufficient that death or injury occurred while insured was taking steps preparatory to (Cornwell v. Fraternal Acc. Ass'n, 6 N. D. 201, 69 N. W. 191, 40 L. R. A. 437, 66 Am. St. Rep. 601), or intending (Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Beck, 181 U. S. 49, 21 Sup. Ct. 532, 45 L. Ed. 741, affirming 94 Fed. 751, 36 C. C. A. 467), a violation of law. These principles are also illustrated in Standard Life & Accident Ins. Similarly, if the cause of death was otherwise within the policy. the insurer is not relieved from liability because the insured was at the time violating the Sunday labor law, unless the fact that it was Sunday contributed to the death (Matthes v. Imperial Acc. Ass'n, 81 N. W. 484, 110 Iowa, 222). So, the exception does not apply where insured was injured on Sunday while at a friend's house after hunting, though hunting on Sunday is prohibited by law (Prader v. National Masonic Acc. Ass'n, 95 Iowa, 149, 63 N. W. 601). Not only must there be a causative connection between the violation of law and the death, but such connection must be direct, and not indirect; proximate or immediate, and not remote. Where different forces and conditions concur in producing a result, it is often difficult to determine which is properly to be considered the But the maxim, "Causa proxima non remota spectatur," cause. does not mean necessarily that the cause or condition which is nearest in time or space is to be deemed the proximate cause. On the contrary, as said in Freeman v. Mercantile Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 156 Mass. 351, 30 N. E. 1013, 17 L. R. A. 753, it means that the law will not go further back in the line of causation than to find the active, efficient, procuring cause, of which the event under consideration is a natural and probable consequence, in view of the existing circumstances and conditions. The law does not consider the cause of causes beyond seeking the efficient predominant cause. So, the fact that the death of the insured is the consequence of some illegal act of his is not sufficient if it did not occur while engaged in such illegal act as the direct result thereof. Thus, though one has committed an assault on or engaged in a combat with another, the violation of law involved therein does not relieve the insurer if the insured has ceased from his assault or retreated from the combat, and is killed by the other person from motives of revenge, though the acts immediately follow each other. As illustrating these principles, reference may be made to Cluff v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 13 Allen, 308; Id., 99 Mass. 317; Supreme Lodge K. P. v. Bradley (Ark.) 83 S. W. 1055, 67 L. R. A. 770. A similar principle governed Goetzman v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3 Hun (N. Y.) 515, 5 Thomp. & C. 572, where the insured was killed by H. shortly after having had illicit intercourse with the wife of H., and it was held that, even if the act of the insured was a violation of the law, he did not die in consequence of it, within the meaning of the policy. The converse of the rule is well illustrated by the leading case of Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Seaver, 19 Wall. 531, 22 L. Ed. 155. Insured and another were driving in sulkies in a horse race, contrary to statute. The sulkies came into collision, and insured jumped to the ground uninjured. But in attempting to get hold of the reins. which had fallen, he became entangled in them, and was dragged against a stone, causing his death. It was held that the leap from the sulky and securing the reins, and the subsequent fall and injury, were so close and immediate in their relation to the racing, and all so manifestly part of one continuous transaction, that it could not be said that there was a new and controlling influence to which the disaster should be attributed. An interesting phase of this question is presented by those cases in which death occurred while the insured was escaping from, or |