Woodmen, 100 Mo. App. 138, 73 S. W. 326; Hunt v. Ancient Order of Pyramids, 78 S. W. 649, 105 Mo. App. 41; Modern Woodmen of America v. Kozak, 88 N. W. 248, 63 Neb. 146; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Liddell, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 252, 74 S. W. 87; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Egbert, 84 Fed. 410, 28 C. C. A. 281; Union Casualty & Surety Co. v. Goddard, 76 S. W. 832, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1035.

Insanity of the insured as an excuse for suicide must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence (Supreme Court of Honor v. Peacock, 91 Ill. App. 632). While the fact of suicide has a tendency to show insanity (Hathaway's Adm'r v. National Life Ins. Co., 48 Vt. 335), it is by no means conclusive as to the existence of mental derangement (Wolff v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 30 Fed. Cas. 413).

The evidence was regarded as sufficient to show the insanity of the
insured in Cotton States Life Ins. Co. v. Merritt, 59 Ga. 664;
Central Mut. Life Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, 62 N. E. 838, 195 Ill. 135;
Supreme Council K. E. W. v. Heineman, 78 S. W. 406, 25 Ky. Law
Rep. 1604; Meacham v. New York State Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 46
Hun (N. Y.) 363. The evidence was regarded as insufficient in
Fowler v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4 Lans. (N. Y.) 202; McClure v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 55 N. Y. 651; Texas Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Brown, 2 Posey, Unrep. Cas. (Tex.) 160.

In an action on an accident policy there was evidence that the insured
was of a genial disposition, of good education, pleasantly situated,
so far as his domestic relations were concerned, and in fair
circumstances financially. Up to within a few weeks of his death
he had been in full health and vigor, but about that time a change
was noticed in him by his family. He was moody and nervous,
desired to be alone, could not sleep nights, complained of a pain
in his head, and looked haggard and sick. On going away from
home on business, strangers remarked upon his appearance, and
he kept aloof from other men, and could not concentrate his atten-
tion upon the business in hand. It was held that there was evi-
dence to go to the jury on the question of his insanity. Black-
stone v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 74 Mich. 592, 42 N. W.
156, 3 L. R. A. 486.

(p) Same-Trial.

When suicide is interposed as a defense in an action on a life policy, it is proper to ask a juror, on his examination, his opinion as to the sanity of one who takes his own life.

Texas Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 2 Posey, Unrep. Cas. (Tex.) 160;
Grand Lodge Independent Order of Mutual Aid v. Wieting, 68 Ill.
App. 125.

But a juror is not incompetent because he believes suicide to be evidence of insanity, if he also states that he would require other and additional evidence to establish it (Hagadorn v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 22 Hun [N. Y.] 249).

Whether insured was insane when he committed suicide is a question for the jury.

Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Rodel, 95 U. S. 232, 24 L. Ed. 433; Mooney v. Ancient Order of United Workmen, Grand Lodge of Kentucky, 72 S. W. 288, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 1787, 114 Ky. 950; Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor v. Lapp's Adm'x, 74 S. W. 656, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 74; Arnold v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 49 Atl. 1103, 95 Me. 331; Meacham v. New York State Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 24 N. E. 283, 120 N. Y. 237.

So, too, whether he was insane to such a degree as to excuse the suicide is a question for the jury (Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Daviess' Ex'r, 87 Ky. 541, 9 S. W. 812).

On the issue as to suicide, it is proper to instruct the jury that they may take into consideration the instinctive love of life which ordinarily exists (Supreme Lodge K. P. v. Foster, 59 N. E. 877, 26 Ind. App. 333). It is not proper, however, for the court in its instructions to give undue prominence to the weight of a verdict of a coroner's jury assigning suicide as the cause of death, or to intimate that the absence of evidence showing any other cause of death would raise a presumption in favor of suicide (Rumbold v. Supreme Council Royal League, 69 N. E. 590, 206 Ill. 513, reversing 103 Ill. App. 596). Where it is claimed that the insurance was procured in contemplation of suicide, an instruction that, unless the jury find from the evidence that at the time the insured applied for the insurance he intended to perpetrate the fraud, they must disregard all the testimony concerning such fraud, is not ambiguous and unintelligible (Christian v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 45 S. W. 268, 143 Mo. 460).

An insurer who has waived all defenses except suicide cannot require the submission to the jury of an issue whether death was due to the gross or culpable negligence of insured (Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., v. Nicklas, 41 Atl. 906, 88 Md. 470). So, too, where the defense was suicide, a refusal to submit a special finding, "Do you find the deceased was killed by any other person?" was properly refused, as not presenting a controlling issue, as it did not follow that defendant would not be liable if the death was by accident (Inghram v. National Union, 72 N. W. 559, 103 Iowa, 395).

Where the sole material question was whether the death of the insured was caused by suicide, sane or insane, an interrogatory submitted to the jury should have been framed, if not in those words, at least in such words as to clearly put the exact issue before the jury; and a question as to whether insured came to his death "as the result of an act which he voluntarily committed, with intent to produce death by his own hands," was not well framed (Fey v. I. O. O. F. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 98 N. W. 206, 120 Wis. 358). A refusal to submit a special interrogatory, "Do you find that the deceased committed suicide?" was proper, where the defense was suicide, as such finding was directly involved in the general verdict (Inghram v. National Union, 72 N. W. 559, 103 Iowa, 395). A finding of the jury on the issue of suicide, based on conflicting evidence, is conclusive (Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Skipper, 115 Fed. 69, 52 C. C. A. 663).

Where the defense was suicide, and on an appeal from a judgment for plaintiff the Court of Civil Appeals reviewed the evidence as to suicide, and held that the verdict was contrary to the evidence, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, reversing the judgment for plaintiff, was a decision on the facts of the case, within Act April 13, 1892, providing that the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals shall be conclusive on the facts of a case. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hayward, 31 S. W. 507, 88 Tex. 315.

If, however, there is but little evidence to justify a jury in deciding which one of a half dozen or more possible theories as to the cause of death is the correct one, but what evidence there is supports the theory of suicide rather than accidental death, a verdict for plaintiff must be set aside (Merrett v. Preferred Masonic Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 98 Mich. 338, 57 N. W. 169).

XXIII. EXTENT OF LOSS AND LIABILITY OF INSURER -LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE.

1. Extent of liability in life insurance.

(a) Amount payable at death in general.

(b) Limitation of liability.

(c) Same-Amount dependent on cause of death.

(d) Amount of mortuary fund.

(e) Limitation of liability to amount of assessment.

(f) Deductions and offsets.

2. Extent of liability in accident and health insurance.

(a) Death resulting from accident.

(b) Total disability.

(c) Confinement to house.

(d) Continuing or permanent disability.

(e) Extent of liability in general.

(f) Liability for particular injuries.

(g) Extent of liability as dependent on cause of injury or death.

(h) Extent of liability as dependent on classification of risk.

(1) Questions of practice.

1. EXTENT OF LIABILITY IN LIFE INSURANCE.

(a) Amount payable at death in general.

(b) Limitation of liability.

(c) Same-Amount dependent on cause of death.

(d) Amount of mortuary fund.

(e) Limitation of liability to amount of assessment.

(f) Deductions and offsets.

(a) Amount payable at death in general.

An ordinary life insurance policy is generally regarded as a valued policy, in which the sum insured must be taken as the agreed amount of the loss.

Bevin v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 23 Conn. 244; Rockhold v.
Canton Masonic Mut. Ben. Soc., 129 Ill. 440, 21 N. E. 794, 2 L. R.
A. 420; St. John v. American Mut. Life Ins. Co., 9 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 419; Miller v. Eagle Life & Health Ins. Co., 2 E. D. Smith (N.
Y.) 268.

Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions the extent of the insurer's liability in the case of policies issued to creditors, or assigned to third persons, has been held to be measured by the extent of the

creditor's or assignee's interest. This question has, however, been discussed in connection with the general doctrine of insurable interest, and need not be again considered.1 In determining the amount payable under the policy, the rights of the parties are regarded as fixed by the contract, and may not be varied by mathematical calculations, conducted by the insurer alone, or by other companies, particularly when knowledge of the custom is not brought home to the insured (Bracher v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 86 N. Y. Supp. 557, 42 Misc. Rep. 290). So, a clause in a policy of fraternal insurance which states that the beneficiary "shall be entitled, within 90 days after the receipt of satisfactory evidence of death, to the return of all premiums paid in cash to the society, and, in addition thereto, a sum not exceeding $3,000 from the mortuary fund of the society," will be construed as meaning that the beneficiary is entitled to the pro rata share of the policy, according to the mortuary fund, in addition to the premiums paid in cash to the company, and not merely to a share in the mortuary fund proportionate to the face of the certificate plus the premiums, as contended by the insurer (Fahey v. Empire Life Ins. Co., 5 Lack. Leg. N. [Pa.] 377). In any event, the amount of death benefits payable by a mutual benefit association cannot exceed that authorized by the charter, though the constitution and by-laws provide for a larger one (Nelligan v. New York Typographical Union No. 6, 2 City Ct. R. [N. Y.] 261). The amount of the policy may, however, by agreement of the parties, be scaled (Leonard v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 33 Atl. 511, 65 Conn. 529). So, where, owing to a mistake, a certificate is issued for an amount greater than the rate of assessment would pay for, and it is agreed that the amount shall be reduced proportionately, the beneficiary cannot afterwards insist on payment of the whole amount stated in the certificate (Gray v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor, 118 Ind. 293, 20 N. E. 833). But, as has been already pointed out in treating of the construction of a contract, a mutual benefit association cannot, by the adoption of subsequent by-laws, arbitrarily reduce the amount of its benefit certificates, already issued. So, it was held in Supreme Council American Legion of Honor v. Storey (Tex. Civ. App.) 75 S. W. 901, that the words "face value," in a by-law of a beneficial association, providing that $2,000 shall be the highest amount paid on a benefit certificate, provided that the amount paid shall not 1 See ante, vol. 1, p. 298.

2 See ante, vol. 1, pp. 703-719, 827.