the loss within 60 days after notice and proof, "in conformity to the conditions annexed to this policy." (Eastern R. Co. v. Relief Fire Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 420.) In Barre v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 76 Iowa, 609, 41 N. W. 373, it was decided that, the proofs not having been waived by the failure of the company to issue a policy in accordance with its contract, it was necessary, in an action on such contract, to show the furnishing of the notice and proofs required by the company's usual policy.2 (c) Policy covering mortgagee's interest. There is a conflict of authority as to how far the provisions of the policy as to notice and proofs of loss are applicable to a mortgage interest existing under the policy. In Illinois it has been decided that where the policy provided that, if there should exist in the policy any interest in favor of a mortgagee, the conditions thereinbefore contained should apply in the manner expressed in such provisions and conditions of insurance relating to such interest as it should be written upon, attached, or appended thereto, and where the mortgage clause itself contained no provision as to proofs, the provisions of the policy in relation thereto were not applicable. Queen Ins. Co. v. Dearborn Savings, Loan & Building Ass'n, 175 Ill. 115, 51 N. E. 717, affirming 75 Ill. App. 371; Northern Assur. Co. v. Chicago Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 98 Ill. App. 152, affirmed without reference to this point 64 N. E. 979, 198 Ill. 474. In each of the above cases the mortgage clause contained a provision to the effect that the insurance as to the interest of the mortgagee should not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor. The decision, however, in neither case was based upon this clause. It has, indeed, been directly decided that the presence of such a clause does not render the furnishing of at least such proofs as the mortgagee himself can furnish any less a condition. precedent to the liability of the company to him. If the mortgagor does not furnish the proofs, the mortgagee should do so. The clause in question refers only to acts or neglect in connection with the property while the risk is subsisting, and which, under the terms of the policy, would invalidate the insurance and not 2 As to waiver of proofs by failure to deliver policy, see post, p. 3516. to the omission to comply with provisions designed to secure evidence as to the nature and extent of the loss. Southern Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Home Ins. Co., 94 Ga. 167, 21 S. E. 375, 27 L. R. A. 844, 47 Am. St. Rep. 147; Id., 24 S. E. 396, 99 Ga. 65; Lombard Investment Co. v. Dwelling House Ins. Co.. 62 Mo. App. 315; Graham v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 8 Daly (N. Y.) 421. Such a clause has, however, been regarded as sufficient to relieve the mortgagee from the effect of an entire failure to furnish proofs. Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Porter, 44 Fla. 568, 33 South. 473, and Dwelling House Ins. Co. v. Kansas Loan & Trust Co., 5 Kan. App. 137, 48 Pac. 891. The argument is that under this provision the mortgagee, in the absence of an express clause to the contrary, is not required to furnish proofs of loss as a condition precedent to his right of action, and that the failure of the mortgagor or owner to furnish proofs, either wholly or within the time stipulated, constitutes one of the neglects from the invalidating consequences of which the mortgage was exempted. It is the doctrine of Fire Ins. Co. v. Felrath, 77 Ala. 194, 54 Am. Rep. 58, and State Ins. Co. v. Ketcham, 9 Kan. App. 552, 58 Pac. 229, that where the mortgage clause merely reads "Loss, if any, payable to," etc., the mortgagee cannot recover unless the required proofs have been made. And in Queen Ins. Co. v. Dearborn Savings, Loan & Building Ass'n, 75 Ill. App. 371, the court felt impelled to the opposite conclusion solely on account of the peculiar arrangement of the clauses of the policy; the phrase that "the conditions hereinbefore contained shall apply," in case of any mortgage interest, occurring before the provisions as to notice and proofs. (d) Demand for proofs. Where the proofs, or some particular portion of them, are only required by the policy to be furnished on demand, there is no obligation resting on the insured to furnish such proofs until the demand has been duly made. Harris This doctrine is either stated or implied in the following cases: nett v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 68 Mo. App. 343; Etna Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 49 Neb. 811, 69 N. W. 125; Jones v. Howard Ins. Co., 117 N. Y. 103, 22 N. E. 578; McManus v. Western Assur. Co., 48 N. Y. Supp. 820, 22 Misc. Rep. 269, affirmed without opinion 43 App. Div. 550, 60 N. Y. Supp. 1143; Moyer v. Sun Ins. Office, 176 Pa. 579, 35 Atl. 221, 53 Am. St. Rep. 690; Wells Whip Co. v. Tanners' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 209 Pa. 488, 58 Atl. 894; Seibel v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 24 Pa. Super. Ct. 154; Etna Ins. Co. v. Shacklett (Tex. Civ. App.) 57 S. W. 583. This rule has been held inapplicable where the by-laws required a certain certificate without reference to any demand, the policy itself providing that proof of loss should be made by declaration of the insured, and such other evidence "as the directors * * * may reasonably require" (McBryde v. South Carolina Mut. Ins. Co., 55 S. C. 589, 33 S. E. 729, 74 Am. St. Rep. 769). The demand must, of course, be made by an agent of the company (Aurora Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 46 Ind. 315). And in general a strict compliance with the provisions of the policy is required of the insurer. Thus, the demand must be for the specific form of proof mentioned in the policy. McGraw v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 54 Mich. 145, 19 N. W. 927; Dougherty v. German-American Ins. Co., 67 Mo. App. 526; Moyer v. Sun Ins. Office, 176 Pa. 579, 35 Atl. 221, 53 Am. St. Rep. 690. Where the demand is for an examination of the insured or of his books and papers, it must be specific, both as to time and place. The demand was held insufficient in these respects in the following cases: Aurora Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 46 Ind. 315; Etna Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 69 N. W. 125, 49 Neb. 811; Keeney v. Home Ins. Co., 71 N. Y. 396, 27 Am. Rep. 60; Seiber v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 24 Pa. Super. Ct. 154. In Fleisch v. Insurance Co. of North America, 58 Mo. App. 596, it was held that a demand was not untimely, though made after the time within which the company had by the policy promised to pay the loss, where it appeared that the delay was caused by a refusal of the insured to himself fix the time. That a rejection of proofs because they do not contain a certain certificate amounts to demand for such certificate is the doctrine of Sullivan v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 89 Mo. App. 106. And it has been held that, where an uncalled-for certificate is furnished, an objection to the sufficiency of such certificate will amount to a demand for the one specified in the policy. Etna Ins. Co. v. People's Bank, 62 Fed. 222, 10 C. C. A. 342, 8 U. S. The New York and Missouri courts have adopted the contrary doctrine, holding that the furnishing of the uncalled-for certificate was a superfluity, and that the objection thereto did not necessarily. amount to a demand for a different one. Jones v. Howard Ins. Co., 117 N. Y. 103, 22 N. E. 578; Swearinger v. Where the insured voluntarily absents himself, so that he cannot be found for the purpose of examination in accordance with the conditions of the policy, his absence will be equivalent to a demand and refusal. Harris v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 35 Conn. 310; Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sims, 115 Ga. 939, 42 S. E. 269; Sims v. Union Assur. Soc. (C. C.) 129 Fed. 804. The same doctrine is implied, though not stated, in Fire Ins. Co. v. Felrath, 77 Ala. 194, 54 Am. Rep. 58, and is involved in Robinson v. Ætna Fire Ins. Co., 135 Ala. 650, 34 South. 18, where the court held that no demand need be made for the production of books which had been destroyed owing to insured's breach of contract. The primary obligation being on the insurer under such a provision, it necessarily follows that the company must allege and prove the demand. Winnesheik Ins. Co. v. Schueller, 60 Ill. 465; Aurora Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 46 Ind. 315; Mueller v. Putnam Fire Ins. Co., 45 Mo. 84; McManus v. Western Assur. Co., 48 N. Y. Supp. 820, 22 Misc. Rep. 269, affirmed without opinion 43 App. Div. 550, 60 N. Y. Supp. 1143. 2. TIME AND MANNER OF SERVICE OF NOTICE AND PROOFS OF LOSS. (a) Time of giving notice of loss. (b) Time of furnishing proofs of loss. (c) Reasonableness of time of furnishing notice and proofs a question for the jury. (d) Special provisions as to time of furnishing notice and proofs. (e) Same--Statutory provisions. (f) Service by mail. (g) Same Time of actual delivery. (h) Effect of delay. (i) Burglary insurance. (a) Time of giving notice of loss. A requirement of the policy for "immediate" notice, or notice "forthwith" or "at once," will not receive a literal interpretation. Due diligence by the insured, resulting in notice within a reasonable time, under all the circumstances of the case, is all that can be required. Reference may be made to Brown v. Mechanics' & Merchants' Ins. Co., 4 Fed. Cas. 411; Central City Ins. Co. v. Oates, 86 Ala. 558, 6 South. 83, 11 Am. St. Rep. 67; Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Gould, 80 Ill. 388; Pennypacker v. Capital Ins. Co., 80 Iowa, 56, 45 N. W. 408. 20 Am. St. Rep. 395, 8 L. R. A. 236; Wightman v. Western Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 8 Rob. (La.) 442; Edwards v. Baltimore Fire Ins. Co., Gill (Md.) 176; Griffey v. New York Cent. Ins. Co., 100 N. Y. 417, 3 N. E. 309, 53 Am. Rep. 202; Continental Ins. Co. v. Lippold, 3 Neb. 391; Kirk v. Ohio Val. Ins. Co., 8 Ohio Dec. 182, 6 Wkly. Law Bul. 200; Lebanon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Erb, 112 Pa. 149, 4 Atl. 8; Wooddy v. Old Dominion Ins. Co., 31 Grat. (Va.) 362, 31 Am. Rep. 732. This principle is also approved, in the other cases cited in this paragraph, though the courts have differed as to what constitutes a reasonable time. In general, a notice served within 10 days after the loss has been regarded as served within a reasonable time. The notice was given within 10 days in the following cases: Taber v. |