renders a compliance with such requirement a condition precedent to recovery on the policy. And though, under Burns' Rev. St. 1901, § 4923, prohibiting a foreign insurance company from requiring notice within less than five days, such stipulation only requires notice within a reasonable time, yet an allegation that the burglary occurred May 24, 1901, and that "afterwards" notice was given, does not show a compliance with the policy, action not having been commenced until February 27, 1902 (Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Sanders, 32 Ind. App. 448, 70 N. E. 167). 3. PERSONS BY WHOM AND TO WHOM NOTICE MAY BE GIVEN AND PROOFS FURNISHED. (a) Person by whom notice of loss may be given. (e) Person on whom proofs may be served. (a) Person by whom notice of loss may be given. Where the policy provides that in case of loss the "assured" shall give notice, a notice by a mortgagee, to whom the loss is made payable, will inure to the benefit of all interested parties (Watertown Fire Ins. Co. v. Grover & Baker Sewing Mach. Co., 41 Mich. 131, 1 N. W. 961, 32 Am. Rep. 146). Where the policy provides that notice shall be given by "all persons sustaining loss or damage," notice by an assignee of the policy is sufficient. Cornell v. Le Roy, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 163; McEvers v. Laurence, 1 Hoff. Ch. (N. Y.) 172. A provision that an assignee shall have all the rights of the original party was considered in Barnes v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 45 N. H. 21, to make a notice by an assignee as effectual as one by the assignor. Under a similar principle, a requirement that "any member" of a mutual company suffering loss shall give notice was deemed met by a notice given by a purchaser of the property at an orphans' court sale, the property having been destroyed between the time of the sale and its confirmation (Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Graybill, 74 Pa. 17). Though there is some question whether notice to a local agent of the insurer is sufficient, it is well established that such an agent may act for the insured in giving the company notice of the loss, and where the notice so passes from the insured, through the agent, to the company, it is sufficient. This principle is stated in Fisher v. Crescent Ins. Co. (C. C.) 33 Fed. 544; Burlington Ins. Co. v. Lowery, 61 Ark. 108, 32 S. W. 383, 54 Am. St. Rep. 196; Watertown Fire Ins. Co. v. Sewing Machine Co., 41 Mich. 131, 1 N. W. 961, 32 Am. Rep. 146; State Ins. Co. v. Schreck, 27 Neb. 527, 43 N. W. 340, 20 Am. St. Rep. 696, 6 Ľ. R. A. 524; Brink v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 70 N. Y. 593; Partridge v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 43 N. Y. Supp. 632, 13 App. Div. 519; Argall v. Old North State Ins. Co., 84 N. C. 355; West Branch Ins. Co. v. Helfenstein, 40 Pa. 289, 80 Am. Dec. 573; Beatty v. Lycoming County Mut. Ins. Co., 66 Pa. 9, 5 Am. Rep. 318; Oakland Home Ins. Co. v. Davis (Tex. Civ. App.) 33 S. W. 587. See, also. Bennett v. Maryland Fire Ins. Co., 3 Fed. Cas. 229, where the agency had terminated. It need not appear in the notice sent by the agent that he is acting for the insured. It is sufficient if, in fact, he is so acting. Stimpson v. Monmouth Ins. Co., 47 Me. 379, and Powers v. New England Even where the notice is sent by the agent without any communication with the insured, his act may afterwards be adopted by the insured, so as to render the notice sufficient. Loeb v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 99 Mo. 50. 12 S. W. 374; Anthony v. (b) Person to whom notice of loss must be given. Where the requirement is for notice to the secretary, it is met by notice sent to the company direct (Lewis v. Burlington Ins. Co., 80 Iowa, 259, 45 N. W. 749), or received at its place of business, though not by the secretary in person (Herron v. Peoria Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 28 Ill. 235, 81 Am. Dec. 272). But notice to a director is not sufficient, under a provision requiring notice to the secretary, "or other authorized officer" (Inland Ins. & Deposit Co. v. Stauffer, 33 Pa. 397). Notice to a local agent is not compliance with a provision requiring notice to be given to the secretary. Patrick v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 43 N. H. 621, 80 Am. Dec. 197; Sparrow v. Universal Fire Ins. Co., 17 Phila. (Pa.) 329; Cornell v. Milwaukee Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 18 Wis. 387. A Pennsylvania statute (Act June 27, 1883, P. L. 165) provides that notice to the agent countersigning the policy shall be sufficient. The effect of the statute has been considered in Welsh v. London Assur. Corp., 151 Pa. 607, 25 Atl. 142, 31 Am. St. Rep. 786, and Jacoby v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 10 Pa. Super. Ct. 366. Generally, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, a notice to the local agent is notice to the company, though there is no statute so providing. Bernero v. South British & N. Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 386, 4 Pac. 382; Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co. v. Winfield, 6 Kan. App. 527, 51 Pac. 567; Insurance Co. of North America v. McLimans, 28 Neb. 653, 44 N. W. 991; Killips v. Putnam Fire Ins. Co., 28 Wis. 472, 9 Am. Rep. 506. So, too, it has been said that notice given to one whom the insured rightfully believes to be the local agent is sufficient (Kendall v. Holland Purchase Ins. Co., 2 Thomp. & C. [N. Y.] 375). Under a policy issued by two companies making themselves severally liable, notice of loss addressed to but one company, but delivered to the agent of both, is sufficient to bind both (Bernero v. South British & N. Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 386, 4 Pac. 382). On the other hand, it was held in Ermentrout v. Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 63 Minn. 305, 65 N. W. 635, 30 L. R. A. 346, 56 Am. St. Rep. 481, that notice to a local agent is not sufficient. The case proceeds on the assumption that the authority of such agent is exhausted when the policy is issued, and pays no regard to the fact pointed out by Canty, J., who dissented, that it is the common practice of such agents to notify the company of any loss. The cases cited by the majority all deal with the authority of the agent to waive proofs of loss. It seems obvious that the authority of an agent as to proofs and settlement of a loss may be very different from his authority as to notice. (c) Person by whom proofs may be furnished. A policy usually requires the insured or the person sustaining loss or damage to furnish the proofs of loss. The insured is, of course, a proper person to make proofs, though the policy is made. payable to another person (Newman v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 17 Minn. 123 [Gil. 98]); as, for instance, a mortgagee (State Ins. Co. v. Ketcham, 9 Kan. App. 552, 58 Pac. 229). If, however, the mortgagor fails to comply with such provision, proofs executed and delivered by the mortgagee will be sufficient. Under such circumstances the mortgagee may be considered as the person described, and may furnish the proofs. The principle is stated in Southern Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Home Ins. Co., 94 Ga. 167, 21 S. E. 375, 27 L. R. A. 844, 47 Am. St. Rep. 147; Id., 24 S. E. 396, 99 Ga. 65; State Ins. Co. v. Ketcham, 9 Kan. App. 552, 58 Pac. 229; Lombard Investment Co. v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 62 Mo. App. 315; Graham v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 8 Daly (N. Y.) 421; Armstrong v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 56 Hun, 399, 9 N. Y. Supp. 873, judgment reversed on other grounds 130 N. Y. 560, 29 N. E. 991; Moore v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 71 Hun, 199, 24 N. Y. Supp. 507. Contra: Fire Ins. Co. v. Felrath, 77 Ala. 194, 54 Am. Rep. 58. In the same connection, see Carnes v. Farmers' Fire Ins. Co., 20 Pa. Super. Ct. 634, where a statement to the mortgagee that he need not furnish proofs was considered a waiver of proofs, apparently on the ground that he was in fact the proper person to furnish them; also, Graham v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 171, seems to support the same doctrine, holding that the mortgagee could not maintain an action to compel the mortgagor to furnish the proofs. In Nickerson v. Nickerson, 80 Me. 100, 12 Atl. 880, it was held that where it was evidently the legislative intent that any mortgagee, after notice to the company, should have the right to collect the money, it must have been also intended that such mortgagee should have the right to furnish the necessary proofs. Under the same principle, where it was held that a claim under a policy could be garnished before it has been rendered payable by service of proof, it was also held that the garnishing creditor could effect a substantial compliance with the policy by taking the testimony of insured and others and presenting it to the company (Northwestern Ins. Co. v. Atkins, 3 Bush [Ky.] 328, 96 Am. Dec. 239). But a judgment creditor for whose payment provision was made in the policy cannot furnish proofs of loss (Ayres v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 17 Iowa, 176, 85 Am. Dec. 553). In case a bankrupt absconds, a receiver, ordered by the court so to do, may furnish a sufficient statement of the loss, though he cannot substitute himself as the person to be examined (Sims v. Union Assur. Soc. [C. C.] 129 Fed. 804). And it would seem that the trustee in an ordinary bankruptcy case is also empowered to furnish the proofs (Fuller v. New York Fire Ins. Co., 184 Mass. 12, 67 N. E. 879). In accord with the foregoing principles it has been held that where a contractor building a house for another takes out insurance in the name of the owner, but for his own benefit, he is a proper person to make proof of loss (Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co. v. Brown, 3 Kan. App. 225, 44 Pac. 35). Under a policy requiring that "if the policy is made payable to a third party, or is held as collateral security, the proof of loss shall be made by the party originally insured," the proofs are required to be made by and in the name of the assured, though the whole insurance money is due the person to whom the loss is made payable (State Ins. Co. v. Maackens, 38 N. J. Law, 564). But under a similar provision, where the insured was the receiver for an insolvent corporation owning the property destroyed by fire, it was held that, as the officers of such corporation could speak with better knowledge, proofs by them were sufficient (Phoenix Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bowersox, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 1). In Stainer v. Royal Ins. Co., 13 Pa. Super. Ct. 25, effect is given to a Pennsylvania statute (Act June 27, 1883, P. L. 165), providing that, in case the policy is held as collateral, proofs may be made by either the original insured or the assignee. Where the policy was issued to a husband on a building constituting his homestead, and before any loss occurred he abandoned his wife, she, and a married woman to whom the loss was made payable, and her husband, might make proof of loss, though the policy provided that, if it should be made payable in case of loss to a third party, or held as collateral security, proofs of loss should be made by the party originally insured (Warren v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 13 Tex. Civ. App. 466, 35 S. W. 810). Where partners are insured, proofs of loss supported by the affidavit of one of them is sufficient under a condition that a particular statement of the loss shall be "signed and sworn to by the assured" (Myers v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 72 Iowa, 176, 33 N. W. 453). So, where insurance is issued to a copartnership in the firm name, proof of loss in such name is sufficient, though it does not give the name of any of the partners, except one who signed the proof with the firm name, and added thereto his individual signature, with the words "Treas." following it (Karelsen v. Sun Fire Office, 122 N. Y. 545, 25 N. E. 921, affirming 48 Hun, 621, 1 N. Y. Supp. 387). In Keeler v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 16 Wis. 523, 84 Am. Dec. 714, where there had been a forfeiture by the sale by one partner to another of an interest in the property, and a waiver thereof by the company, it was held that proofs furnished by the |