without prior notice served on the company. In the latter the evidence was admitted on the ground that the liability of the company was fixed by the loss, and not by the proofs, which only determined when the loss was payable. But aside from any special circumstances, or questions as to cause of loss, it has been directly held in Campbell v. Charter Oak Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 10 Allen (Mass.) 213, and Irving v. Excelsior Fire Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. Super. Ct. 507, that the insured cannot, on the trial, introduce evidence to contradict a statement in the proofs which, if true, would forfeit the policy. The statement of the Irving Case was, however, expressly disapproved as dictum in McMaster v. Insurance Co. of North America, 55 N. Y. 222, 14 Am. Rep. 239, and the Campbell Case proceeds on the theory that a false statement in the proofs renders them insufficient as such. The insured was thus, in the opinion of the court, placed between the horns of a dilemma. If the proofs were true, he could not recover on account of the other insurance. If they were not true, he could not recover on account of insufficient proofs. No other case, however, seems to have taken just this position. (d) Same-Fraud of company or agent. Of course, where the mistake in the proofs has been induced by the fraud or misconduct of the company, the insured will not be bound my such mistake. Cook v. Lion Fire Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 368, 7 Pac. 784; Commercial Ins. And this is doubly true as to an assignee representing creditors of the insured, the insured having, in connivance with the company. included a fraudulent compromise in the proofs (Platt v. Continental Fire Ins. Co., 62 Vt. 166, 19 Atl. 637). Under the same. principle it has been held that, where the proofs were in reality prepared by the company's agent, the statements contained therein were not conclusive on the insured (Crittenden v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 85 Iowa, 652, 52 N. W. 548, 39 Am. St. Rep. 321). (e) Proofs as evidence against the insurer. It may be stated, as a general rule, that the proofs of loss, as such, are not admissible, as against the company, to prove the statements therein contained. Thus, it has been held that they are not admissible to prove the amount of the loss. Williams v. Hartford Ins. Co., 54 Cal. 442, 35 Am. Rep. 77; Schilansky v. Merchants' & Manufacturers' Fire Ins. Co. (Del. Super.) 55 Atl. 1014, 4 Pennewill, 293; German Ins. Co. v. Bear, 63 Ill. App. 118: Edgerly v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 48 Iowa, 644; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 9, 81 Am. Dec. 521; Citizens' Fire Ins., Security & Land Co. v. Doll, 35 Md. 89, 6 Am. Rep. 360; Newmark v. Liverpool & L. Fire & Life Ins. Co., 30 Mo. 160, 77 Am. Dec. 608; Baile v. St. Joseph Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 73 Mo. 371; Bowne v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 46 Mo. App. 473; Summers v. Home Ins. Co., 53 Mo. App. 521; Sexton v. Montgomery County Mut. Ins. Co., 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 191; Klein v. Franklin Ins. Co., 13 Pa. 247; Lycoming Ins. Co. v. Schreffler, 42 Pa. 188, 82 Am. Dec. 501; Kittanning Ins. Co. v. O'Neill, 110 Pa. 548, 1 Atl. 592; Farrell v. Etna Fire Ins. Co., 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 542; Cascade Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Journal Pub. Co., 1 Wash. St. 452, 25 Pac. 331. It has even been asserted that the proofs are not admissible to prove the fact of loss. Schilansky v. Merchants' & Manufacturers' Fire Ins. Co. (Del. Super.) 55 Atl. 1014, 4 Pennewill, 293; Neese v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 55 Iowa, 604, 8 N. W. 450; Citizens' Fire Ins., Security & Land Co. v. Doll, 35 Md. 89, 6 Am. Rep. 360; Breckinridge v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 87 Mo. 62; Thurston v. Murray, 3 Bin. (Pa.) 326. Nor does the introduction of the proofs in evidence by the company, for the purpose of showing fraud therein, render them evidence against the company as to the truth of the statements therein contained. Browne v. Clay Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Mo. 133; Howard v. City Fire The fact that proofs were received is, however, sufficient to negative a denial of sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the alleged loss (Schaetzel v. Germantown Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 22 Wis. 412). A separate report of the loss, made out by the company's agent for the purpose of testing the fairness of the insured's claim, is not admissible against the company, though it is also accompanied by the affidavit of the insured (Lycoming County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schreffler, 44 Pa. 269). And in Everett v. London & L. Ins. Co., 142 Pa. 332, 21 Atl. 819, 24 Am. St. Rep. 499, it is held that, if it is sought to bind the company by the amount of loss stated in proofs prepared by its agent, it must at least be shown that the agent had authority from the company to prepare the proofs in place of the insured. The retention of proofs by the insurer without objection may, however, be considered as evidence of acquiescence in the amount of loss stated therein. Theodore v. New Orleans Ins. Ass'n, 28 La. Ann. 917; Everett v. London & L. Ins. Co., 142 Pa. 332, 21 Atl. 819, 24 Am. St. Rep. 499. But the failure of the company to object specifically save upon one ground, when proofs were made, merely prevented the company from objecting to the sufficiency of such proof upon other grounds, and the company did not, therefore, by such action, confess the full amount of loss as set forth in the proofs (Kuznik v. Orient Ins. Co., 73 Ill. App. 201). Though the proofs as such are not admissible in behalf of the insured, they may, after proper testimony has been given as to their accuracy, be admitted as a schedule of the property destroyed. Names v. Union Ins. Co., 74 N. W. 14, 104 Iowa, 612; Tubbs v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 84 Mich. 646, 48 N. W. 296; Allegheny Ins. Co. v. O'Hanlon, 1 Walk. (Pa.) 359. See, also, in this connection, Bini v. Smith, 55 N. Y. Supp. 842, 36 App. Div. 463, and Kahn v. Traders' Ins. Co., 4 Wyo. 419, 34 Pac. 1059, 62 Am. St. Rep. 47, where the proofs were held competent to refresh the memory of the witness as to the amount of the loss. It was held in Bini v. Smith, 55 N. Y. Supp. 842, 36 App. Div. 463, and Sutton v. American Fire Ins. Co., 188 Pa. 380, 41 Atl. 537, that in the absence of an objection to the admission of the proofs as evidence of the amount of loss, or a request that they be disregarded in that connection, a verdict might be founded thereon. On the other hand, it was stated in Hiles v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 65 Wis. 585, 27 N. W. 348, 56 Am. Rep. 637, that such a doctrine was most unjust, since very few lawyers would suspect that, because no objection was made to the admission of evidence competent for some purposes, it could be used to prove other matters as to which it was clearly incompetent. It has also been held that the omission to charge that the proofs were not evidence of value, although requested by the defendant, did not constitute an error, where they never were referred to on the trial as evidence, and the value was elaborately argued on both sides on wholly different grounds (Shaw v. Scottish Commercial Ins. Co. [C. C.] 1 Fed. 761). It was, however, intimated in Healy v. Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania, 63 N. Y. Supp. 1055, 50 App. Div. 327, that the distinction between the proofs as evidence of their having been furnished, and as evidence of the truth of the statements therein contained, should properly be drawn by instructions. It was not, therefore, error, in the opinion of that court, for the judge, when the proofs were admitted, to refuse to rule as to the purposes for which they might be used. 8. NECESSITY AND SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE AND PROOFS OF DEATH OR INJURY. (a) Necessity of notice and proofs. (b) Person by whom proofs may be furnished. (c) Service of notice and proofs. (d) Sufficiency of proofs-Facts to be proved. (e) Same-Amount and kind of proof. (f) Same-Certificate and affidavits. (g) Examination of body. (h) Matters peculiar to mutual benefit associations. (i) Questions of practice. (a) Necessity of notice and proofs. In the absence of some express provision, no preliminary proofs of the death or injury of an insured person need be furnished the company in order to render the insurance of effect. Railway Pass. Assur. Co. v. Burwell, 44 Ind. 460; Pennsylvania Mut. But, as a rule, life and accident policies require notice and proof of the death or injury and the cause thereof. This provision assumes various forms, and its effect, of course, varies with the wording of the stipulation. Where it is provided that no claim shall be paid under the policy until the required notice and proofs have been provided, the furnishing of such notice and proofs constitutes a condition precedent to any liability by the company. Independent Order of Mutual Aid v. Paine, 17 Ill. App. 572; Lyon v. A provision making the loss payable a certain time after the furnishing of proofs of death also renders their production a condition precedent to liability by the company. National Ben. Ass'n v. Grauman, 107 Ind. 288, 7 N. E. 233; Life Assur. Co. of America v. Haughton, 31 Ind. App. 626, 67 N. E. 950; Harrison v. Masonic Mut. Ben. Soc., 59 Kan. 29, 51 Pac. 893; Schwarzbach v. Ohio Valley Protective Union, 25 W. Va. 622, 52 Am. Rep. 227. And where a policy containing such a provision has been suspended but not abrogated by war, during which the insured died, the notice of death must be given upon the termination of the war (Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Duerson's Ex'r, 28 Grat. [Va.] 630). Where, however, it was stipulated that the insurance should be paid "immediately upon receipt and approval of proofs of the death and cause of death," and also that the "proofs of death" should be furnished at a particular time and place and in particular form, without further mention of proof of the cause of death, and where the policy covered death from any cause, it was held that the failure to mention proof of the cause of death with the specifications as to proof of death amounted to a modification of the first requirement, and that proof of the cause of death was not a condition precedent (Life Assur. Co. of America v. Haughton, 67 N. E. 950, 31 Ind. App. 626). In Hincken v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 6 Lans. (N. Y.) 21, the court stated that the agreement to pay within a certain time after due notice and proof of death did not impose a condition precedent upon the owner of the policy, and that evidence of the notice and proof was necessary only as establishing that the time of payment had elapsed. It did not, however, appear that the distinction was essential, the point at issue being whether the introduction by defendant of evidence showing the furnishing of the proofs was sufficient to cure the error of the court in refusing a prior motion for nonsuit, based on plaintiff's failure to introduce any such evidence. And the Court of Appeals, in affirming the case (50 N. Y. 657), made no mention of the distinction. The courts have even held the furnishing of the designated proofs. to be a condition precedent, though the policy only provided that, in case of failure in that regard on the part of insured or his beneficiary, the claim should be "invalidated" (Fidelity & Casualty Company v. Brown [Ind. T.] 69 S. W. 915), or “forfeited" (Thornton v. B.B.INS.-216 |