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of the proofs and of the stipulation as to agency is more in the nature of an estoppel, either by denial or acknowledgment of liability or by the acceptance of the proofs offered as sufficient. And in no state, with the possible exception of Iowa, has the rule been followed that under such circumstances the waiver of the proofs and of the limitation must be by the company, as distinguished from its field force. No general rule has, indeed, been announced, but all, or nearly all, the cases are believed to be reconcilable under the general law of agency-that the company will be bound by the legal consequences of any act which the agent was authorized to do. If the agent is authorized to perform the act which may be justly taken to show the intention of the company, and which misleads the insured, it would seem that such act should be sufficient to waive not only the proofs, but the clause by which the company seeks to prevent a waiver from arising from the deception involved in the authorized act. Of course, the company itself can waive the provision by acts misleading the insured.

Carroll v. Girard Fire Ins. Co., 72 Cal. 297, 13 Pac. 863; Brock v. Des
Moines Ins. Co., 106 Iowa, 30, 75 N. W. 683; Smith v. Continental
Ins. Co., 108 Iowa, 382, 79 N. W. 126.

But so can a general manager, by letting the insured suppose that the proof furnished was sufficient (Ruthven v. American Fire Ins. Co., 102 Iowa, 550, 71 N. W. 574); or a general agent by an offer to pay (McCoubray v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 169 N. Y. 590, 62 N. E. 1097, affirming 64 N. Y. Supp. 112, 50 App. Div. 416), or by conduct inconsistent with an enforcement of the limitation as to the time of furnishing proof (Renier v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 74 Wis. 89, 42 N. W. 208).

So, also, any act of an adjuster within the general scope of his employment, which, aside from the limiting provision, would amount to a waiver or estoppel, will bind the company, though the policy contains the limiting provision.

This principle has been applied to a denial of liability in Smaldone v. President, etc., of Insurance Co. of North America, 162 N. Y. 580, 57 N. E. 168, affirming 48 N. Y. Supp. 1115, 22 App. Div. 633; Flaherty v. Continental Ins. Co., 46 N. Y. Supp. 934, 20 App. Div. 275; Young v. Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co., 92 Mich. 68, 52 N. W. 454. And as to an acceptance of proofs offered as sufficient in Sergent v. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co., 155 N. Y. 349, 49 N. E. 935, reversing 32 N. Y. Supp. 594, 85 Hun, 31, and Kahn v. Traders' Ins. Co., 4 Wyo. 419, 34 Pac. 1059, 62 Am. St. Rep. 47. See, also, Gristock

v. Royal Ins. Co., 84 Mich. 161, 147 N. W. 549, and Id., 87 Mich. 428, 49 N. W. 634, where the majority opinion makes no mention of the limiting provision, and McGuire v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 40 N. Y. Supp. 300, 7 App. Div. 575, judgment affirmed without opinion 158 N. Y. 680, 52 N. E. 1124, where the exact nature of the waiver does not appear.

In Iowa the Supreme Court, after first deciding that under the provision the acts of an adjuster could not amount to a waiver, changed its position to an admission of waiver by the implied knowledge in the company of the acts of the adjuster, and of the settlement by him. The distinction, however, between an estoppel by the acts of an adjuster and an estoppel by the implied knowledge in the company of such acts, is at once seen to be rather academic than practical.

Ruthven v. American Fire Ins. Co., 92 Iowa, 316, 60 N. W. 663; Id., 102 Iowa, 550, 71 N. W. 574; Brock v. Des Moines Ins. Co., 106 Iowa, 30, 75 N. W. 683; Heusinkveld v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.. 106 Iowa, 229, 76 N. W. 696; Smith v. Continental Ins. Co., 108 Iowa, 382, 79 N. W. 126.

On the other hand, acts of local agents in the adjustment and settlement of the loss have been held not to estop the company from insisting on the stipulated proofs, the policy providing either that no agent or representative should have power to waive at all, or that he should not have power to waive except in writing.

This is the rule in New York and Michigan. Gould v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 90 Mich. 302, 51 N. W. 455, affirmed on rehearing 90 Mich. 308, 52 N. W. 754; Wadhams v. Western Assur. Co., 117 Mich. 514, 76 N. W. 6; Van Allen v. Farmers' Joint Stock Ins. Co., 64 N. Y. 469, reversing 4 Hun, 413, 6 Thomp. & C. 591; Quinlan v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 133 N. Y. 356, 31 N. E. 31, 28 Am. St. Rep. 645; Hicks v. British America Assur. Co., 162 N. Y. 284, 56 N. E. 743, 48 L. R. A. 424, reversing 43 N. Y. Supp. 623, 13 App. Div. 444; Legnard v. Standard Life & Acc. Co., 81 N. Y. Supp. 516, 81 App. Div. 320 (a denial of liability by the agent who had countersigned a life policy). And it was the rule in Iowa and Wisconson prior to the adoption of the rule that the limiting provision does not apply to proofs of loss. Heusinkveld v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 106 Iowa, 229, 76 N. W. 696; Knudson v. Hekla Fire Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 198, 43 N. W. 954; Oshkosh Match Works v. Manchester Fire Assur. Co., 92 Wis. 510, 66 N. W. 525.

While the cases are not as clear as might be desired in explaining why a limiting provision, applicable in terms to all kinds of agents,

should be given full effect where the alleged estoppel has arisen by the acts of a local agent, and considered waived when the acts are those of a general agent or adjuster, yet it may be noted that in New York, Iowa, and Wisconsin it has been held, entirely aside from such provision, that a local agent does not have power in relation to the settlement or adjustment of the loss, and cannot, therefore, waive the proofs. The decision that the local agent is bound by the provision, and that his acts in the adjustment cannot estop the company to insist on it, is thus, in those states, rather cumulative in its nature. This explanation does not, however, apply to Michigan, where it has been held that, in the absence of restriction, the proofs may be waived by the local agent. Nor do the opinions in the Gould Case (90 Mich. 302, 51 N. W. 455), holding that the provision is applicable to a local agent, and the Young Case (92 Mich. 68, 52 N. W. 454), holding that the provision did not prevent an estoppel by the acts of an adjuster, offer any reason for the difference in the results beyond a showing that the adjuster represented the company.

Of course, if the local agent, in denying liability, is only executing the orders of the company, it will amount to a denial by the company, and estop it to insist either on the proofs or on the requirement for written waiver (Phenix Ins. Co. v. Kerr, 129 Fed. 723, 64 C. C. A. 251, 66 L. R. A. 569).

The doctrines considered-that of the nonapplicability of the limiting provision to the condition as to proofs, or to an estoppel to insist thereon, and the doctrine that the limiting condition may, under proper circumstances, be itself waived-seem to include all the cases save one. That case is Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Western Assur. Co. (C. C.) 129 Fed. 610, purporting to be governed by Northern Assur. Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Ass'n, 183 U. S. 308, 22 Sup. Ct. 133, 46 L. Ed. 213. The policy in the railway case contained the usual standard policy provision, that "no officer, agent, or other representative * shall have power," etc. The court, under this stipulation, sustained a demurrer to a complaint which alleged that full proof was waived "by said defendant by the acknowledgment of notice and the commencement and continuance of negotiations, * * whereby said plaintiff was led to believe," etc. In support of this the court quotes from the building association case, which had to do with the effect of the standard policy provision upon the issuance of a policy by an agent with knowledge of facts which would render it void. The

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Supreme Court, in deciding the case, said that where a limitation on the power of the agent to waive, except in writing "is expressed in the policy, executed and accepted, the insured is presumed as matter of law, to be aware of such limitation"; that the company may waive forfeitures, but that it must be shown that "the company," with knowledge of the forfeiture, dispensed with the observance of the condition; and that, "where the waiver relied on is the act of an agent, it must be shown, either that the agent had express authority from the company to make the waiver, or that the company subsequently, with knowledge of the facts, ratified the action of the agent."

It would thus seem that, even though the building association case be considered as applicable to a waiver of proofs of loss, it does not go the length of the decision in the railway case; for the building association case distinctly recognizes that "the company," even under the limiting provision, may waive, either primarily or by the ratification of its agent's acts, while the natural construction of the complaint held insufficient in the railway case would seem to be that the negotiations for settlement were carried on under the direct supervision of the "defendant." The doctrine of the building association case, indeed, as applied to a waiver of proofs, would seem to be merely that a local agent is bound by the provision, leaving open the question as to who would represent the company in effecting a waiver, or in ratifying the acts of a local agent.

13. ACTS AND CONDUCT CONSTITUTING WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL AS TO NOTICE AND PROOFS-IN GENERAL.

(a) Waiver by direct statement.

(b) Acts or conduct in general.

(c) Refusal to furnish blanks or deliver policy.

(d) Putting insured to trouble and expense.

(e) Acceptance of premiums and assessments.

(f) Recognition of liability in general.

(g) Investigation of circumstances of loss.
(h) Submission to arbitration.

(a) Waiver by direct statement.

The question as to the effect of statements by an agent is largely one of agency. If a statement that no proofs or notice will be required, or that they need not be furnished within the specified time,

is made by a duly authorized agent, the company will be bound, and a waiver of the policy requirements will arise.

Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Stoddard, 197 Ill. 330, 64 N. E. 355, affirming 99
Ill. App. 469; Phenix Ins. Co. v. Pickel, 3 Ind. App. 332, 29 N. E.
432; Prussian Nat. Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 30 Ind. App. 289, 64 N. E.
102; Scott v. Security Fire Ins. Co., 98 Iowa, 67, 66 N. W. 1054;
Ruthven v. American Fire Ins. Co., 102 Iowa, 550, 71 N. W. 574;
American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Heaverin, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 190, 35 S.
W. 922, affirming 16 Ky. Law Rep. 95; Insurance Co. of North
America v. Forwood Cotton Co., 12 Ky. Law Rep. 846; Eastern R.
Co. v. Relief Fire Ins. Co., 105 Mass. 570; Young v. Ohio Farmers'
Ins. Co., 92 Mich. 68, 52 N. W. 454; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
5 Minn. 492 (Gil. 393); Loeb v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 99 Mo. 50,
12 S. W. 374; McCollum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 67 Mo. App. 76;
Harness v. National Fire Ins. Co., 76 Mo. App. 410; Snyder v.
Dwelling House Ins. Co., 59 N. J. Law, 544, 37 Atl. 1022, 59 Am.
St. Rep. 625, reversing, on the question of agency, 59 N. J. Law,
18, 34 Atl. 931; Bishop v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 130 N. Y. 488, 29
N. E. 844, affirming (1890) 56 Hun, 642, 9 N. Y. Supp. 350; Sergent
v. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co., 155 N. Y. 349, 49 N. E. 935, revers-
ing judgment 32 N. Y. Supp. 594, 85 Hun, 31; McCoubray v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 64 N. Y. Supp. 112, 50 App. Div. 416.
affirmed without opinion 169 N. Y. 590, 62 N. E. 1097; Owen v.
Farmers' Joint Stock Ins. Co., 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 518; Strause v.
Palatine Ins. Co., 128 N. C. 64. 38 S. E. 256; Carnes v. Farmers' Fire
Ins. Co., 20 Pa. Super. Ct. 634.

The rule is also supported by the accident case of American Acc. Co. v.
Fidler's Adm'x, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 161, 35 S. W. 905.

Nor is the force of such a waiver affected by a stipulation, in a subsequent agreement for arbitration, that the agreement to arbitrate should be subject to the terms and conditions of the policy (Perry v. Mechanics' Mut. Ins. Co. [C. C.] 11 Fed. 478).

A request by the company for certain proofs and evidence as to the loss, accompanied by statements or intimations that such proof will be sufficient, will also excuse a compliance by the insured with any further requirements in the policy.

Perry v. Faneuil Hall Ins. Co. (C. C.) 11 Fed. 482; Heusinkveld v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 106 Iowa, 229, 76 N. W. 696; Lake v. Farmers' Ins. Co., 110 Iowa, 473, 81 N. W 710; Underwood v. Farmers' Joint Stock Ins. Co., 57 N. Y. 500; Burge Bros. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 106 Mo. App. 244, 80 S. W. 342; Carey v. Allemania Fire Ins. Co., 171 Pa. 204. 33 Atl. 185; German Ins. Co. v. Norris, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 250, 32 S. W. 727.

And where the insured was told that he need only present certain proof as to the amount of the loss, the waiver of other proof was

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