It was held sufficient in American Credit Indemnity Co. v. Carrollton Furniture Mfg. Co., 95 Fed. 111, 36 C. C. A. 671, that the claim furnished was prepared, as required by the policy, on the blanks of the company, and set out the particulars therein indicated. And this was true though the notice was to be of insolvency, which was defined in the policy so as to include a "nulla bona" return of a writ of execution, and though, subsequent to the notice, a writ was so returned. The blanks furnished contained no reference to such insolvency, and the court considered the interpretation of the policy furnished by such blanks to be binding on the company. The assignment of a credit insurance company for the benefit of creditors, 9 days after the expiration of the policy, was held in Smith v. National Credit Ins. Co., 65 Minn. 283, 68 N. W. 28, 33 L. R. A. 511, to amount to a breach of the policy, so as to enable the insured to recover on a quantum meruit against the assignee, though the final proofs required by the policy to have been made within 30 days after the expiration of the policy were never furnished. Perhaps the insured might have fully performed and brought an action against the insolvent company, but, as against the assignee, he was only entitled to recover on a quantum meruit. In Gray v. Blum, 55 N. J. Eq. 553, 38 Atl. 646, the acts of the receiver of an insolvent credit company in objecting to the sufficiency of notice sent after the stipulated time, and in continually requiring corrections to be made therein, were held to estop him, as the company might have estopped itself from objecting to payment on the ground of the original delay. Though, ordinarily, silence after receipt of proofs will be sufficient to constitute a waiver as to any defect therein, yet it cannot have that effect under express provisions of the policy that silence shall not constitute a waiver, and that changes in the conditions of the policy must be in writing, signed by the president or secretary of the company (American Credit Indemnity Co. v. Carrollton Furniture Mfg. Co., 95 Fed. 111, 36 C. C. A. 671). Error in refusing to instruct that proofs of loss were not evidence of the matter stated therein was held in Sloman v. Mercantile Credit Guarantee Co., 112 Mich. 258, 70 N. W. 886, not prejudicial, the testimony of the insured as to such matters not having been contradicted. XXVI. ADJUSTMENT OF LOSS. 1. Adjustment in general. (a) Effect of adjustment. (b) Fraud in adjustment. (c) Same-liability of adjuster. (d) Persons bound by adjustment. (e) Powers of agents. (f) Actions on adjustment. (g) Marine insurance. (h) Co-operative insurance. (i) Credit insurance. (j) Employers' liability insurance. 2. Necessity of arbitration or appraisal. (a). Validity of arbitration clause-General rules. (b) Same-Variations and exceptions to the rule. (c) Same Mutual societies. (d) Same Statutory provisions. (e) Compliance with agreement to submit to arbitration as essential or collateral-General rules. (f) Same-No action "until after full compliance." (g) Same "Loss not payable" until after appraisement. (h) Same-Effect of standard policies. (i) Same-Co-operative societies. (j) Compliance with submission as essential or collateral. (k) Necessity of disagreement. (1) Necessity of demand-"At written request of either party." (m) Same "When appraisal has been required." (n) Same-Miscellaneous provisions. (0) Same-Sufficiency of demand. (p) Same Time of making demand. (q) Property totally destroyed. (r) Acts of insured violating condition. (s) Rights of parties after failure of arbitration. (t) Pleading and practice. 3. Validity and effect of arbitration. (a) Nature in general. (b) Effect of award in general-Form of award. (c) Effect of valued policy law. (d) Binding effect of award as determined by matters submitted. (e) Manner of submission. (f) Same Submission differing from policy stipulations. (g) Submission to tribunals of mutual company. (h) Persons bound by appraisement. (i) Appointment of incompetent or partial appraisers. (j) Disagreement of appraisers—Award made without submission to all. 3. Validity and effect of arbitration-(Cont'd). (k) Validity of award as affected by matters considered. (1) Giving of notice and taking of testimony. (m) Inadequacy of award-Misconduct. (n) Necessity of substantial damage by misconduct or fraud (0) Fraud and mistake of insured. (p) Actions to defeat award. (q) Remuneration and liability of appraisers. 4. Waiver of arbitration or appraisal. (a) General rules-Parol waiver. (b) Refusal to arbitrate-What constitutes a refusal. (c) Circumstances justifying refusal-Sufficiency of demand by insured. (d) Denial of liability-What constitutes denial. (e) Same Time and circumstances of denial. (f) Demanding appraisement other than that specified. (g) Failure to demand arbitration or appraisal. (h) Acts inconsistent with intention to arbitrate. (i) Appointment of prejudiced appraiser. (j) Improper conduct during appraisement. (k) Putting insured to trouble or expense after his refusal to arbitrate. (1) Waiver of second arbitration after failure of first. (m) Pleading and practice. 5. Arbitration in life and accident insurance and submission to tribunals of fraternal orders. (a) Arbitration. (b) Recourse to tribunals of fraternal orders as condition precedent to action. (c) Conclusive effect of decisions by tribunals of the order. (d) Waiver. 1. ADJUSTMENT IN GENERAL. (a) Effect of adjustment. (b) Fraud in adjustment. (c) Same-liability of adjuster. (d) Persons bound by adjustment. (e) Powers of agents. (f) Actions on adjustment. (g) Marine insurance. (h) Co-operative insurance. (i) Credit insurance. (j) Employers' liability insurance. (k) Reinsurance. (a) Effect of adjustment. It is a common provision in fire policies that the ascertainment and estimate of a loss for which the company shall be liable shall be made by the insured and the company, other methods of determining the loss being provided only in case the parties to the contract fail to agree. A direct provision to this effect is contained in the standard policies * The most frequent question growing out of these provisions, and out of the adjustment of the loss between the insured and the company, is as to the binding effect of such adjustment, both as determining the amount of the loss and as fixing the liability of the company to pay the loss.1 Where the adjustment of the loss at a definite sum is the result of a compromise, the company agreeing to pay such sum to avoid litigation, though claiming that it is not liable at all, or that it is not liable for so large a proportion of the loss considered in the adjustment, it will be bound to pay such sum as under a separate agreement. Farmers' & Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Chesnut, 50 Ill. 111, 99 Am. Dec. 492; Millers' National Ins. Co. v. Kinneard, 136 Ill. 199, 26 N. E. 368, affirming 35 Ill. App. 105; Royal Ins. Co. v. Roodhouse, 25 Ill. App. 61; Stache v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 49 Wis. 89, 5 N. W. 36, 35 Am. Rep. 772. In Sears v. Grand Lodge, 163 N. Y. 374, 57 N. E. 618, 50 L. R. A. 204, this rule was applied to a compromise of a claim under a life policy. Both parties believed insured to be dead, but contracted with a view to the possibility that he might be alive. Subsequently, but before payment by the company of the compromise agreed upon, it was shown that the insured was alive. The court held that under such circumstances it could not be claimed that there was such a mistake as to render the contract unenforceable. In connection, see Riegel v. American Life Ins. Co., 153 Pa. 134, 25 Atl. 1070, 19 L. R. A. 166, where a cancellation made in ignorance of insured's death was held of no effect. 1 As to waiver of prior forfeitures by adjustment, compromise, and payment, see ante, vol. 3, p. 2733. As to the effect B.B.INS.-225 of adjustment on the right of garnishment, see Cent. Dig. vol. 24, "Garnishment," cols. 1907, 1908, § 60. And such an agreement is binding also on the insured. Farmers' & Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Chesnut, 50 Ill. 111, 99 Am. Dec. 492; Millers' Nat. Ins. Co. v. Kinneard, 136 Ill. 199, 26 N. E. 368. But see Vining v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 89 Mo. App. 311, where an adjustment which appeared to have been the result of compromise was held only an accord from which insured might withdraw. It further appeared in that case, however, that the company did not intend to pay the amount of the adjustment. Nevertheless, an agreement by the company to pay the loss, though not liable therefor, has been held void as without consideration (Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 4 Metc. [Ky.] 9, 81 Am. Dec. 521). And in Grier v. Northern Assur. Co., 183 Pa. 334, 39 Atl. 10, where it was claimed that an agreement to pay the loss, notwithstanding a forfeiture, was made as a part of a compromise by all the companies interested, it was said that the evidence to prove such agreement should be clear and convincing. Even though the liability of the company has not been one of the points at issue in the adjustment of the loss, yet if, after the amount has been adjusted, the company promises to pay such sum, it may, in the absence of fraud, be held upon its promise. Lapeyre v. Thompson, 7 La. Ann. 218; Godchaux v. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co., 34 La. Ann. 235; Granger v. Manchester Fire Assur. Co.. 119 Mich. 177, 77 N. W. 693; Smith v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 85, affirming 66 Barb. 556; Stolle v. Atna Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 10 W. Va. 546, 27 Am. Rep. 593; Commercial Bank v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 297, 58 N. W. 391. It has also been held that, nothing to the contrary appearing, the law will imply a promise to pay the amount of the fully completed adjustment of a loss. Illinois Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Archdeacon, 82 111. 236, 25 Am. Rep. 313; Fame Ins. Co. v. Norris, 18 Ill. App. 570; Whipple v. North British & Mercantile Fire Ins. Co., 11 R. 1. 139; Remington v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 14 R. I. 245. And see, also, Miller v. Consolidated Patrons' & Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 113 Iowa, 211, 84 N. W. 1049. The case of Amesbury v. Bowditch Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 6 Gray (Mass.) 596, was governed by a similar principle. In that case the policy provided that the directors should determine and pay the amount of the loss, and that, if the insured did not acquiesce in their determination, any action for the loss claimed should be brought within four months after such determination. Insured |