And in general it may be said that the validity of the assignment is governed by the same rules as those controlling the assignment of any other matured chose in action.

In the following cases the assignment was held sufficient: Spratley v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Fed. Cas. 973; Frels v. Little Black Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 120 Wis. 590, 98 N. W. 522; Continental Ins. Co. v. Pratt, 8 Kan. App. 424, 55 Pac. 671. See, also, Morley v. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co., 76 Minn. 285, 79 N. W. 103.

But in these it was held that no assignment had been effected: Kern v. Grier, 94 Ga. 498, 19 S. E. 819; Frankenthal v. Guardian Assur. Co., 76 Mo. App. 15; Hanchey v. Hurley, 129 Ala. 306, 30 South. 742.

(n) Same-Effect.

An assignment after loss with no reservations passes the whole claim to the assignee.

Perry v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 25 Ala. 355; Cohn v. Guardian Assurance
Co., 68 Mo. App. 376; Hand v. Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co., 57
N. Y. 41; Frels v. Little Black Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 120 Wis.
590, 98 N. W. 522.

Thus where one of two beneficiaries assigns it after loss to the other,
with authority to collect the same, paying any surplus to the as-
signor after the payment of a debt due by him, in the event of re-
covery in the suit by the assignee, the only claim the assignor
would have would be against the assignee, and not against the
insurance company (Indian River State Bank v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. [Fla.] 35 South. 228). And though the company pays the
claim to the insured in reliance on his statement that a prior order
had been revoked, it will nevertheless be liable to the person to
whom the order, which was in fact unrevoked, had been given
(Hall v. Dorchester Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 111 Mass. 53, 15 Am. Rep. 1).
Nor will payment into court as garnishee defendant protect the
company where at the time of such payment it knew of the prior
assignment and kept silent in relation thereto (Frels v. Little
Black Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 120 Wis. 590, 98 N. W. 522).
Policies assigned after loss for the securing of the payment "of any
and all pecuniary obligations" due the creditor may be retained as
security for all accounts, though the assignment was made as the
result of an agreement touching certain of the credits only (Board-
man v. Holmes, 124 Mass. 438).

The rights of such an equitable assignee are superior to those of insured's subsequent attaching creditor (Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Columbia Mfg. Co., 73 Ill. App. 560), or the holder of a mechanic's lien who has filed his bill after the assignment (Galyon v. Ketchen, 85 Tenn. 55, 1 S. W. 508).

The assignee, however, takes all such claims subject to prior equities between the insured and insurer.

Archer v. Merchants' & Mfrs. Ins. Co., 43 Mo. 434; Matthews v. General Mut. Ins. Co., 9 La. Ann. 590. In Johnston v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 39 Md. 233, an indorsement made on the policy by insurer's agent was held not to have constituted such a recognition of the assignee's rights as would estop the company from asserting an offset arising from an indebtedness of the insured.

But where property covered by a policy containing the union mortgage clause was sold by the mortgagor, the purchaser, with the consent of all parties, assuming the mortgage debt, the right of such mortgagor after a loss, in his character of surety as to the mortgage debt, to pay the trustee the amount of such debt, and become the beneficiaries' assignee, was held not subject to be defeated by the prior purchase of the mortgage by the insurer. The premium paid by the mortgagor the court held was a full equivalent for the risk insured. (Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Story, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 124, 35

S. W. 68.)

Equities in favor of third persons outstanding against the proceeds at the time of the assignment have also been held superior to those of the assignee after loss.

In re Wittenberg Veneer & Panel Co. (D. C.) 108 Fed. 593; Mc-
Donald v. Daskam, 116 Fed. 276, 53 C. C. A. 554; Dickey v. Pocomoke
City Nat.. Bank, 89 Md. 280, 43 Atl. 33; Ames v. Richardson, 29
Minn. 330, 13 N. W. 137. See, also, Smith v. Carmack (Tenn. Ch.
App.) 64 S. W. 372, where the facts were held to have been sufficient
to put the assignee on inquiry.

But an assignment after loss is not conclusively shown to have been void as to the assignee by the fact that on account of such assignment the insured was declared a bankrupt (Traders' Ins. Co. v. Mann, 118 Ga. 381, 45 S. E. 426). And a company against which garnishee judgment has been rendered must show in addition that judgment has been rendered against the assignor as principal debtor before it can successfully interpose the defense that the assignment was void as in fraud of the assignor's creditors (Horst v. City of London Fire Ins. Co., 73 Tex. 67, 11 S. W. 148).

The question as to whether the assignee should sue in his own name or in that of his assignor is dependent on the rule in force governing the bringing of action on a chose in action assigned after maturity.

In Massachusetts and Illinois it has been held that the action should be brought in the name of the assignor. Merchants' Ins. Co. v.

Union Ins. Co., 162 Ill. 173, 44 N. E. 409, affirming 58 Ill. App. 611; Hall v. Dorchester Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 111 Mass. 53, 15 Am. Rep. 1. In Georgia the action must be brought in the name of the assignor unless the assignment was in writing so as to pass the legal title. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Amos, 98 Ga. 533, 25 S. E. 575; Traders' Ins. Co. v. Mann, 118 Ga. 381, 45 S. E. 426.

In code states the action may be brought in the name of the assignee as the real party in interest. Spare v. Home Mut. Ins. Co. (C. C.) 17 Fed. 568; Perry v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 25 Ala. 355; Western Assurance Co. v. McCarty, 18 Ind. App. 449, 48 N. E. 265; Continental Ins. Co. v. Pratt, 8 Kan. App. 424, 55 Pac. 671; Cohn v. Guardian Assurance Co., 68 Mo. App. 376; Star Union Lumber Co. v. Finney, 35 Neb. 214, 52 N. W. 1113; Mellen v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 12 N. Y. Super. Ct. 101, affirmed 17 N. Y. 609; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carnahan, 63 Ohio St. 258, 58 N. E. 805; Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 40 Wis. 446.

(0) Employers' liability insurance.

Where judgment has been obtained against an employer for death of an employé, and the employer holds a policy insuring it against liability for damages for injury to employés, the judgment creditor may issue attachment execution, and serve it on the insurer as garnishee, notwithstanding its defense that it has not consented to an assignment of any interests of the insured to such creditor, and that the insured has not suffered any loss, and therefore cannot give any better right against the insurer than it would have (Fritchie v. Miller's Pennsylvania Extract Co., 197 Pa. 401, 47 Atl. 351). And where the policy provided that the company would take upon itself the settlement of any loss and the control of legal proceedings taken against the insured, and that the insured would not settle with the employé without the consent of the insurer, the claim of the insured did not pass to one to whom he made a general assignment after the accident, and therefore the employé was not deprived by such assignment of his right of garnishing the insurance company (Anoka Lumber Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., Nelson, Intervener, 63 Minn. 286, 65 N. W. 353, 30 L. R. A. 689). Nevertheless the amount paid by such a company to the employer does not constitute an asset of the estate of the employé (Hawkins v. McCalla, 95 Ga. 192, 22 S. E. 141).

2. RIGHT TO PROCEEDS IN LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE.

(a) Scope of discussion.

(b) Right to proceeds in general.

(c) What law governs.

(d) Policy payable to insured, his heirs or estate.

(e) Policy payable to legal representatives.

(f) Rights of persons designated as beneficiaries in general.

(g) Policy payable to wife or widow.

(h) Rights of divorced wife.

(i) Policy payable to wife or children.

(j) Policy payable to trustee.

(k) Policy payable to any relative or person equitably entitled to fund. (1) Distribution among beneficiaries.

(m) Rights of legatees.

(n) Persons entitled to proceeds when designation is invalid or there is

no designation.

(0) Funeral benefits.

(p) Endowment policies.

(q) Vested interest of beneficiary.

(r) Right to change beneficiary.

(s) Mode of changing beneficiary.

(t) Validity and effect of change.

(u) Death of original beneficiary.

(v) Policy procured with money wrongfully obtained.

(a) Scope of discussion.

The questions connected with the right to the proceeds of insurance policies are numerous and varied. In a large majority of the cases the questions depend not so much on the general principles of construction as on the particular facts; and in a very large percentage of cases the decisions turn on the local laws of descent and distribution of estates. To even attempt to present a complete discussion of all the cases would simply overburden and confuse the reader, and cause him to lose sight of the principles on which the decisions rest. In the treatment of this branch of the subject, therefore, the purpose is to present the salient points-the governing principles underlying the determination of the right to the proceeds of the policy—and refer the reader for specific illustrations to the digests, where the cases are grouped according to their facts.

(b) Right to proceeds in general.

It is fundamental that, in order to be entitled to the proceeds of a life insurance policy or benefit certificate, a beneficiary must be

properly designated and fall under the class of persons who may be beneficiaries.1

Berkeley v. Harper, 3 App. D. C. 308; Brooklyn Life Ins. Co. v. Bledsoe, 52 Ala. 538; Kinney v. Dodd, 41 Ill. App. 49; Hogan v. Wallace, 63 Ill. App. 385; Id., 46 N. E. 1136, 166 Ill. 328; Voigt v. Kersten, 164 Ill. 314, 45 N. E. 543; Grimme v. Grimme, 101 Ill. App. 389, judgment affirmed 64 N. E. 1088, 198 Ill. 265; Supreme Lodge of Knights of Honor v. Metcalf, 15 Ind. App. 135, 43 N. E. 893; Mitchell v. Grand Lodge Iowa Knights of Honor, 70 Iowa, 360, 30 N. W. 865; Derrington v. Conrad, 3 Kan. App. 725, 45 Pac. 458; Williams v. Williams, 10 Ky. Law Rep. 37; Nuckols v. Kentucky Mut. Ben. Soc., 16 Ky. Law Rep. 270; Succession of Richardson, 14 La. Ann. 1; Brierly v. Equitable Aid Union, 170 Mass. 218, 48 N. E. 1090, 64 Am. St. Rep. 297; Hosmer v. Welch, 107 Mich. 470, 67 N. W. 504, 65 N. W. 280; Hanson v. Minnesota Scandinavian Relief Ass'n, 59 Minn. 123, 60 N. W. 1091; Independent Order of Sons & Daughters of Jacob of America v. Henderson, 76 Miss. 326, 24 South. 702, 71 Am. St. Rep. 532; Grand Lodge v. Elsner, 26 Mo. App. 108; Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. v. McKinstry, 67 Mo. App. 82; St. Louis Police Relief Ass'n v. Strode, 103 Mo. App. 694, 77 S. W. 1091; Shryock v. Shryock, 50 Neb. 886, 70 N. W. 515; Scott v. Provident Mut. Relief Ass'n, 63 N. H. 556, 4 Atl. 792; Eastman v. Provident Mut. Relief Ass'n, 65 N. H. 176, 18 Atl. 745, 23 Am. St. Rep. 29, 5 L. R. A. 712; Eckert v. Mutual Relief Soc. (Sup.) 2 N. Y. Supp. 612; Arnott v. Prudential Ins. Co., 63 Hun, 628, 17 N. Y. Supp. 710; Brown v. Brown, 6 Misc. Rep. 433, 27 N. Y. Supp. 129; Bogart v. Thompson, 53 N. Y. Supp. 622, 24 Misc. Rep. 581; Olmstead v. Olmstead, 76 App. Div. 582, 79 N. Y. Supp. 98; Massey v. Mutual Relief Soc., 102 N. Y. 523, 7 N. E. 619; Olmstead v. Olmstead, 177 N. Y. 579, 69 N. E. 1128; Elliott v. Whedbee, 94 N. C. 115; State v. Central Ohio Mut. Relief Ass'n, 29 Ohio St. 399; Appeal of Folmer, 87 Pa. 133; Donithen v. Independent Order of Foresters, 58 Atl. 142, 209 Pa. 170; Id., 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 442; Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor v. Martin, 16 Phila. (Pa.) 97, 13 Wkly. Notes Cas. 160; Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 386, 34 S. W. 781: Renner v. Supreme Lodge of Bohemian Slavonian Ben. Soc. of United States, 89 Wis. 401, 62 N. W. 80.

But the presumption is that the designation made in the certificate is a legal one, and the society has the burden of proving the contrary.

Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor v. Davis, 26 Colo. 252, 58 Pac. 595;
Nye v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W., 9 Ind. App. 131, 36 N. E. 429.

1 For a discussion of the validity,

sufficiency, and construction of the des

ignation of the beneficiary, see ante, vol. 1, p. 796 et seq.