dependence of things on knowledge? It shows, in the first place, that the content of things is in no case made up of relations beyond themselves. So the content of a thing cannot be made up of its relation to consciousness. Of course, the consciousness of a thing is made up of the thing and its relation to consciousness. But the thing then contributes its own nature to the conscious complex, and does not derive it therefrom. If a is in relation to consciousness, then consciousness-of-a is constituted in part of a, but a itself is not constituted of consciousness. It follows, in the second place, that whether the relation of a thing to consciousness is a relation of dependence or not, is an empirical question. It is necessary to examine the relation, and see. In other words, it is impossible to infer dependence simply from the fact of relation. It is impossible to argue that 'independent reals' must stand absolutely out of relation to consciousness, if they are to be independent. The theory of the externality of relations is not sufficient in itself to establish the case for realism. Indeed it is so general in scope as to argue pluralism rather than realism." It shows that the nature of things is prior to the relations into which they enter, and that the nature of these relations, whether of dependence or not, is an extrinsic fact. So that we are left to conclude that many things are interdependent or not, as the facts may prove. But it remains for realism to investigate the precise nature of the relation of things to consciousness, to discover whether or no this is a relation of dependence. And this is now a question of fact, like the question of the relation of the tides to the moon, or the relation of Mother Goose to the atomic weight of hydrogen. " 1 Cf. Russell: op. cit., and On the Nature of Truth," Proc. Aristotelian Soc., N.S., Vol. VII, 1906–1907, pp. 37–44; E. G. Spaulding: “The Logical Structure of Self-Refuting Systems," Phil. Review, Vol. XIX, 1910, pp. 276-301; and above, pp. 244–246. ? Precisely as the contrary theory argues monism rather than idealism, cf. Royce: "The World and the Individual, Vol. I, Lect. III. For pluralism, cf. above, pp. 242-249. The Argument from the Distinction between Object 89. The empirical argument for realism turns upon the nature of mind, and the specific kind of relationship which the mind's objects sustain to it. It must, of course, be assumed that consciousness is a relationship, as has been shown in the foreand Awareness going chapter. But first I propose to consider an intermediate argument to the effect that consciousness is different from its object This is the main contention of Mr. G. E. Moore in the several papers which he has contributed to this subject. The idealist "maintains that object and subject are necessarily connected, mainly because he fails to see that they are distinct, that they are two, at all. When he thinks of 'yellow' and when he thinks of the 'sensation of yellow,' he fails to see that there is anything whatever in the latter which is not in the former." But it is evident that "sensation of yellow," contains over and above "yellow," the element, "sensation," which is contained also in "sensation of blue," "sensation of green," etc. "Yellow exists" is one thing; and "sensing" it is another thing. In other words, the object of a sensation is not the sensation itself. In order that a sensation shall be an object, it is necessary to introduce yet another awareness, such as introspection, which is not at all essential to the meaning of the sensation itself. And "the existence of a table in space is related to my experience of it in precisely the same way as the existence of my own experience is related to my experience of that." In both cases awareness is evidently a "distinct and unique relation," "of such a nature that its object, when we are aware of it, is precisely what it would be, if one were not aware."1 But what awareness is, further than this, Mr. Moore does not inform us. Mr. Russell adds that it is "utterly unlike other relations, except that of whole and part, in that one 1 G. E. Moore: "The Refutation of Idealism," Mind, N.S., Vol. XII, 1903, PP. 442, 449, 453. Cf. also, "The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception," Proc. of the Aristotelian Soc., N.S., Vol. VI, 1905–06. of its terms presupposes the other. A presentation must have an object." But there is so little to stand for it besides the object, that one could scarcely be blamed if he allowed Mr. Moore's distinction to lapse. Furthermore, while Mr. Moore's argument does prove that the object does not contain or by itself imply being experienced, it does not prove that it may not actually stand in some sort of dependent relation to that circumstance. The 'table is in my room,' does not contain awareness. But neither does it contain 'transportation,' although it may, as a matter of fact, have been put there by an expressman. And similarly it may, despite Mr. Moore's argument, have been put there by awareness. Such indeed would be the case, were I merely imagining the table to be in my room, or judging falsely that the table was in my room. As Mr. Russell himself admits in a later discussion, it is possible that 'table,' 'my room,' and the relation 'in,' should all be related to mind, and compose an aggregate on that account, although the table is not actually in the room.2 In other words, awareness creates an indirect relation among its objects, by virtue of bringing them severally into the direct relation of awareness. And it is open to anyone to maintain that this indirect relation is the only relation which things have inter se; or that any specific relation, such as the physical relation, is a case of this indirect relation; or that things are actually brought into new cross-relations by means of this indirect relation. § 10. We need, in other words, to forsake dialectics, and observe what actually transpires. We then find that The Argument consciousness is a species of function, exercised from the Nature by an organism. The organism is correlated with an environment, from which it evolved, and on which it acts. Consciousness is a selective response 1 B. Russell: op. cit., p. 515. of Mind 2 "Every judgment is a relation of a mind to several objects, one of which is a relation; the judgment is true when the relation which is one of the objects relates the other objects, otherwise it is false." B. Russell: Philosophical Essays, p. 181. to a preëxisting and independently existing environment. There must be something to be responded to, if there is to be any response. The spacial and temporal distribution of bodies in its field of action, and the more abstract logical and mathematical relationships which this field contains, determine the possible objects of consciousness. The actual objects of consciousness are selected from this manifold of possibilities in obedience to the various exigencies of life. It follows that the objects selected by any individual responding organism compose an aggregate defined by that relationship. What such an aggregate derives from consciousness will then be its aggregation, and nothing more. A subjective manifold will be any manifold whose inclusion and arrangement of contents can be attributed to the order and the range of some particular organism's response. The number of the planets, for example, and their relative distances from the sun, cannot be so accounted for; but the number of the planets which I have seen, the temporal order in which I have seen them, and their apparent distances, can be so accounted for. In other words, the full astronomical nature of the planetary system, together with the particular circumstances of my sensibility, defines a limited manifold which is called the planetary system for me, or so far as belonging to my mental history. The physical planetary system is thus prior to and independent of each and every mental planetary system. And every question of subjectivity or objectivity is to be tested in the same fashion. III. TRUTH AND ERROR 11. The proof of the independence theory from an examination of the concrete nature of mind, defines at the The Realm of same time the principle which must be Subjectivity employed in solving the problems connected with subjectivity. We have found that the selective action of consciousness not only invests things with the character of 'object' or 'content;' but at the same time, according as it excludes or includes, also defines characteristic fragments, foreshortenings, and assemblages of things, that may not coincide with physical and logical lines of cleavage. And these may be said to be subjective. The clearest instance of subjectivity in this sense is perspective, or point of view; in which a projection defined by the position of the organism is abstracted from the plenum of nature. Such an experience does not create its content but distinguishes it, by virtue of bringing some of the environment into a specific relation that is not sustained by the rest. The so-called 'secondary qualities,' such as heat, color, sound, etc., must be dealt with by the same principle. The simple qualities themselves evidently cannot be subjective, any more than they can be physical. How far, if at all, the spacial and temporal relations of these qualities may be regarded as subjective, will depend entirely on how far these relations may be attributed to the sentient action of the organism.1 Subjective manifolds, or fictions, once instituted by the action of consciousness, may become stereotyped. They may be remembered or described; and through tradition and art, they may be incorporated more or less permanently into the environment. Such being the case, they may be mistaken for what they are not, and thus give rise to illusion and error. The Sphere of § 12. Subjectivity accounts for the possibility of error; but it does not in itself constitute error. It is possible for the mind to "entertain" daring and original speculations, go wool-gathering," build "castles in Spain," or "imagine a vain thing," without committing error. A highly speculative or imaginative mind incurs a peculiar liability to error, 1 For the application of this method, cf. W. P. Montague: "Contemporary Realism and the Problems of Perception," Jour. of Phil., Psych., and Scientific Methods, Vol. IV, 1907, No. 14; T. P. Nunn: Are Secondary Qualities Independent of Perception?" Proc. Aristotelian Soc., N.S., Vol. I, 1900-01; E. B. Holt: "The Place of Illusory Experience in a Realistic World," in The New Realism. |