himself with all the precision of later writers who have possessed the double benefit of his experience and their own. To improve upon an hypothesis is far easier than to originate it. He might be considered as the enterprising geographer of an unknown country: subsequent travellers made use of his map and somewhat corrected it. And where has ever risen a more generous seeker after truth than he? Who ever confessed his errors, when they were proved against him, so candidly and even contritely? Who ever took such occasion to revolve and work over again all his opinions and conclusions? There is abundant proof,-not that he was invariably discreet and consistent in his language, but that in denying the doctrine of innate ideas he retained the strongest conviction of primary moral principles. And, first, let him show in his own words that ideas of sensation were not the whole nor the principal part of those which he ascribes to man. "The mind, receiving the ideas of sensation from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its own action about those ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation, as any of those it received from foreign things." -Book ii. chap. 6. Then having defined these ideas of reflection, he anticipates the view in question thus: "I think they equally forsake the truth, who running into the contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law, or deny that there is a law knowable by the light of nature, that is, without the help of positive revelation." "The visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so plainly in all the works of the creation, that a rational creature, who will but seriously reflect, cannot miss the discovery of a Deity." "Had they examined the ways whereby men came to the knowledge of many universal truths, they would have found them to result in the minds of men from the being of things themselves, when duly considered; and that they were discovered by the application of those faculties, that were fitted by nature to receive and judge of them, when duly employed about them."-Book i. chap. 4. "There is a law of nature as intelligible to a rational creature and studier of that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths." "Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father of light and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties: revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of by the testimony and proofs it gives that they come from God. So that he that takes away reason to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both, and does much-what the same, as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope."-Book iv. chap. 19. These quotations sufficiently express the real design and opinions of this great mental analysist, untoward and infelicitous as are some of his earlier statements and illustrations. We see throughout the just middle-place of those who smile at the conceit of innate ideas, and yet maintain the sound philosophy of certain original principles in ethics, and of as certain connatural perceptions in man. "History, if I may be allowed the expression, is now a vast museum, in which specimens of every variety of human nature may be studied. From these great accessions to knowledge, lawgivers and statesmen, but, above all, moralists and political philosophers, may reap the most important instruction. They may plainly discover in all the useful and beautiful variety of governments and institutions, and under all the fantastic multitude of usages and rites which have prevailed among men, the same fundamental, comprehensive, truths, the sacred master-principles which are the guardians of human society, recognised and revered (with few and slight exceptions,) by every nation upon earth, and uniformly taught (with still fewer exceptions,) by a succession of wise men from the first dawn of speculation to the present moment. The exceptions, few as they are, will, on more reflection, be found rather apparent than real. If we could raise ourselves to that height from which we ought to survey so vast a subject, these exceptions would altogether vanish; the brutality of a handful of savages would disappear in the immense prospect of human nature, and the murmurs of a few licentious sophists would not ascend to break the general harmony. The consent of mankind in first principles, and this endless variety in their application, which is one among many valuable truths which we may collect from our present extensive acquaintance with the history of man, is itself of vast importance. Much of the majesty and authority of virtue is derived from their consent, and almost the whole of practical wisdom is founded on their variety."-Mackintosh: Discourse on the Study of the Law of Nature and Nations. F. (page 67.) "I am not much concerned to know precisely, what the ancient Stoic philosophers held concerning fate, in order to determine what is truth; as though it were a sure way to be in the right, to take good heed to differ from them. It seems that they differed among themselves; and probably the doctrine of fate, as maintained by most of them, was, in some respects, erroneous. But whatever their doctrine was, if any of them held such a fate, as is repugnant to any liberty, consisting in our doing as we please; I utterly deny such a fate. If they held any such fate, as is not consistent with the common and universal notions that mankind have of liberty, activity, moral agency, virtue, and vice; I disclaim any such thing, and think that I have demonstrated, that the scheme I maintain is no such thing. If the Stoics, by fate, meant anything of such a nature, as can be supposed to stand in the way of advantage and benefit of in use of means and endeavours, or would make it less worth while for men to desire and seek after anything wherein their virtue and happiness consists; I hold no doctrine that is clogged with any such inconvenience, any more than any other scheme whatsoever; and by no means so much as the Arminian scheme of contingence; as has been shown. If they held any such doctrine of universal fatality, as is inconsistent with any kind of liberty, that is or can be any perfection, dignity, privilege, or benefit, or anything desirable, in any respect, for any intelligent creature, or indeed, with any liberty that is possible or conceivable; I embrace no such doctrine. If they held any such doctrine of fate, as is inconsistent with the world being in all things subject to the disposal of an intelligent, wise agent, that presides—not as the soul of the world, but as the Sovereign Lord of the universe, governing all things by proper will, choice, and design, in the exercise of the most perfect liberty conceivable, without subjection to any constraint, or being properly under the power or influence of anything before, above, or without himself; I wholly renounce any such doctrine.”—Edwards on the Freedom of the Will. Part iv. section 6. Such is the protest of this mighty man against certain consequences charged upon his system. If they be justly imputable to his system, it must bear them : he is acquitted from every intention, every consciousness, of entertaining them. "And binding nature fast in fate, Left free the human will." There is little meaning in these lines of Pope. Perhaps he intended what is the constituted state of material things by "nature,” expressing thus their uniformity, while he conceded to the will a "freedom"-without which it could not be will. It seems, however, to be borrowed from a more noble bard; Shakspeare says: "The fated sky Gives us free scope."-All's well, &c. G. (page 71.) That Aristotle, especially in the Nicomachean Ethics, should, from occasional expressions, be misconceived on the subject of this immortality of the soul, does not surprise; but his belief of it, if his whole writings be examined, must be admitted. The passage in the 11th chap. of the first book, which is quoted against this conclusion, when well considered, strongly fortifies it. "Μᾶλλον δ ̓ ἴσως τε διαπορεῖσθαι περι τους κεκμηκότας, εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν, ἤ των ἀντικειμένων, κ.τ.λ. For rather may be properly doubted concerning the state of the departed, whether they can partake of good or of calamity. For it seems certain, that if anything did reach them, whether favorable or adverse, it is impotent and trivial considered in itself, and especially to them. For such could not be of sufficient power, and of a proper kind, to make those happy who are not so, or to snatch the blessedness from those who are." The argument does not make light of earthly events; only, they are considered indifferent to the departed. But why? Because these are in a state of reward or punishment, so solemnly engrossing, that earthly good or evil would come alike to them, since they could not augment the one or relieve the other. A stronger testimony could not be borne to the immateriality, the immortality, and the accountableness, of the separate soul. In the same manner the Stagirite seems to have been misunderstood in his book, De Anima. Some of his arguments would at first point to the conclusion, that the soul depended, for its existence and exercise, upon the body. But he thus often seems to love a conclusion which opposes his main one. He is not without a vanity in adroitly meeting and overthrowing his own reasonings. The word which he employs concerning the soul, in the first chapter of the second book, just at its close, is, Xoporn, separable, that which can exist in itself. His argument is, that it is not the 'Evreλéxeia, the organ or the perfection of any body. He, like many others, divides the soul as into parts-theoretic and sensitive. But his whole aim is, to show that the higher soul has its own operations and affections. And thus in the fifth chapter of the third book, he speaks in this sort :— “ Οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀμιγὴς, καὶ ἀπαθὴς, τῇ ουσία ὤν ἔνεργεια : This soul, self-existible, and unmixed, and impassive, being in its nature active." He adds, "Touro póvov åðávatov κaì ảïdtov, This alone is deathless and eternal." The authority of Cicero may be considered inversely to his opinions. He is the declaimer against the public creed. All his objections tend to confirm its existence. He endeavoured in vain to overturn it. The doctrine of the soul's immortality he so attacks, that we must be convinced it was popularly held. Even his scornful, unwincing stoicism, is not always consistent with itself. "Sed ut illa secunda moderate tulimus, sic hanc non solum adversam, sed funditus eversam fortunam fortiter ferre debemus, ut hoc saltem in maximis malis boni consequamur, ut mortem, quam etiam beati contemnere debebamus, propterea quod nullum sensum esset habitura, nunc sic affecti, non modo contemnere debeamus, sed etiam optare." Epistolæ ad Familiares: Mescinio, lib. v. So again, in the sixth book of these epistles, he writes to Torquatus, after a similar idea :"Sed hæc consolatio levis est; illa gravior, qua te uti spero, ego certe utor: nec enim, dum ero, angar ulla re, cum omni vacem culpa: et, si non ero, sensu omnino carebo." These passages may simply refer to the insensateness of death, as we speak of it, who fully believe that the spirit is living still. They certainly betray some apprehension and suspense. The bravado ill conceals the cowardice which is at heart. "The dread of something after death, : But it is not difficult to set him at variance with himself. The phlegm of the philosopher ill accords with the ardor of the orator, and the amiableness of the man. "Quod si omnium consensus, naturæ vox est: omnesque, qui ubique sunt, consentiunt esse aliquid, quod ad eos pertineat, qui e vita cesserint; nobis quoque idem existimandum est. Et si, quorum aut ingenio aut virtute animus excellit, eos arbitramur, quia natura optima sunt, cernere naturæ vim maxime: verisimile est, cum optimus quisque maxime posteritati serviat, esse aliquid, cujus is post mortem sensum sit habiturus."-Tusc. Quæst. lib. i. cap. 15. |