out into a plate over 40 inches long and about | Pomerania, and, after the death of Frederick 3 inches wide. Prof. Henry St. Claire Deville of Paris has considerably modified Dr. Roberts's method of melting platinum, and performs the operation in lime crucibles. Messrs. Johnson and Matheys of London have fused some pounds of platinum and iridium in Deville's furnace.A compound blowpipe is conveniently made by placing one tube one eighth of an inch in diameter inside another of one half inch diameter. Illuminating gas is admitted at the side of the outer tube and lighted at one end, while the other end is made gas-tight. A current of air is blown by bellows through the inner tube, which at once changes the yellow gas flame to the intense blue blowpipe flame; the combustion is more complete and the flame hotter as the mixture of gas and air is more perfect. This piece of apparatus is called Bunsen's blast lamp; it is used in all chemical laboratories which have gas, and is also used by glass blowers in the manufacture of nice chemical and philosophical apparatus. By this method the effect of a furnace is obtained by chemists for melting the contents of small crucibles in analytical operations. If either or both gases be passed through heated pipes, a still higher degree of heat may be obtained. By substituting oxygen for the atmospheric air, globules of platinum may be instantly melted upon charcoal. This mixture may be conveniently and economically used instead of hydrogen and oxygen for the production of the Drummond light. The so-called Bohemian glass blowers seem still to prefer the old-fashioned blowpipe, consisting of two gas burners about 10 inches apart, with air jets blowing directly toward each other, by which means the two opposite sides of the glass are heated at the same time. BLUCHER, Gebhard Leberecht von, prince of Wahlstadt, Prussian field marshal, born at Rostock, in Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Dec. 16, 1742, died at Krieblowitz, in Silesia, Sept. 12, 1819. He was sent, while a boy, to the island of Rügen, and there, in 1756, secretly enlisted in a regiment of Swedish hussars as ensign, to serve against Frederick II. of Prussia. Made prisoner in the campaign of 1760, he was, after a year's captivity, and after he had obtained his dismissal from the Swedish service, prevailed upon to enter the Prussian army. In 1771 he was appointed senior captain of cavalry. In 1778 Capt. Von Jägersfeld, a natural son of the margrave of Schwedt, being appointed in his stead to the vacant post of major, Blücher wrote to Frederick: "Sire, Jägersfeld, who possesses no merit but that of being the son of the margrave of Schwedt, has been preferred to me. I beg your majesty to grant my discharge." reply Frederick ordered him to be shut up in prison until he would retract his request; but as he remained obstinate for nearly a year, the king complied with his petition in a note to this effect: 66 Capt. Von Blücher may go to the devil." He now retired to Silesia, married, became a farmer, acquired a small estate in II., reëntered his former regiment as major, on the express condition of his appointment being dated back to 1779. Some months later his wife died. Having participated in the bloodless invasion of Holland, he was appointed lieutenant colonel in 1788, and in 1790 colonel. In 1793 he distinguished himself during the campaign in the Palatinate against republican France as a leader of light cavalry, and in May, 1794, after the victorious affair of Kirrweiler, was promoted to the rank of major general. While incessantly alarming the French by bold coups de main and successful enterprises, he never neglected keeping the headquarters supplied with the best information as to the hostile movements. His diary, written during this campaign, and published in 1796 by Count Goltz, his adjutant, is considered, despite its illiterate style, a classical work on vanguard service. After the peace of Basel he married again. Frederick William III. appointed him in 1801 lieutenant general, in which quality he occupied, and administered as governor, Erfurt, Mühlhausen, and Münster. In 1805 a small corps of observation was collected under him at Bayreuth. In 1806 he led the Prussian vanguard at the battle of Auerstädt (Oct. 14). His charge was, however, broken by the terrible fire of Davoust's artillery, and his proposal to renew it with fresh forces and the whole of the cavalry was rejected by the king of Prussia. After the double defeat at Auerstädt and Jena, he retired down the Elbe, picking up the remnants of different corps, which swelled his army to about 25,000 men. His retreat to Lübeck, before the united forces of Soult, Bernadotte, and Murat, forms one of the few honorable episodes in that epoch of German warfare. Since Lübeck was a neutral territory, his making the streets of that open town the theatre of a desperate fight, which exposed it to a three days' sack on the part of the French soldiery, afforded the subject of passionate censure; but under existing circumstances the important thing was to give the German people one example, at least, of stanch resistance. Thrown out of Lübeck, he had to capitulate in the plain of Ratkow, Nov. 7, on the express condition that the cause of his surrender should be stated in writing to be "want of ammunition and provisions." Liberated on his word of honor, he repaired to Hamburg, there, in company with his sons, to kill time by card-playing, smoking, and drinking. Being exchanged for Gen. Victor, he was appointed governor general of Pomerania; but one of the secret articles of the alliance conIncluded, Feb. 24, 1812, by Prussia with Napoleon, stipulated for Blücher's discharge from service, like that of Scharnhorst and other distinguished Prussian patriots. To soothe this official disgrace, the king secretly bestowed upon him the handsome estate of Kunzendorf in Silesia. During the period of transition between the peace of Tilsit and the German war of independence, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, | by attacking, Aug. 26, Blücher's outposts, the chiefs of the Tugendbund, desiring to ex- stationed from Prausnitz to Kraitsch, where temporize a popular hero, had chosen Blücher. the Neisse flows into the Katzbach. The soIn propagating his fame among the masses, they called battle on the Katzbach consisted in fact had succeeded so well, that when Frederick of four different actions, the first of which, William III. called the Prussians to arms by the dislodging by a bayonet attack from a the proclamation of March 17, 1813, they were plateau behind a ridge on the right bank of the strong enough to impose him upon the king as Neisse of about eight French battalions, which the general-in-chief of the Prussian army. In constituted hardly one tenth of the hostile the well contested, but for the allies unfortu- force, led to results quite out of proportion to nate, battles of Lützen and Bautzen he act- its original importance, in consequence of ed under Wittgenstein, the commander of the the fugitives from the plateau not being colRussian army. During the retreat of the allied lected at Niederkrain, and left behind the armies from Bautzen to Schweidnitz, he lay in Katzbach at Kraitsch, in which case their ambush at Haynau, from which he fell with his flight would have had no influence whatever cavalry on the French advanced guard under on the rest of the French army; in consequence Maison, who in this affair lost 1,500 men and 11 of different defeats inflicted at nightfall upon guns. Through this surprise Blücher raised the the enemy by Sacken's and Langeron's corps spirit of the Prussian army, and made Napoleon stationed on the left bank of the Neisse; in very cautious in pursuit.—Blücher's command consequence of Marshal Macdonald, who comof an independent army dates from the ex- manded in person on the left bank, and had piration of the truce of Trachenberg, Aug. 10, defended himself weakly till 7 o'clock in the 1813. The allied sovereigns had then divided evening against Langeron's attack, marching their forces into three armies: the army of the his troops at once after sunset to Goldberg, in north under Bernadotte, stationed along the such a state of exhaustion that they could no lower Elbe; the main army, advancing through longer fight, and must fall into the enemy's Bohemia; and the Silesian army, with Blu- hand; and, lastly, in consequence of the state cher as its commander-in-chief, supported by of the season, violent rains swelling the otherGneisenau as the chief of his staff, and Müffling wise insignificant streams the fugitive French as his quartermaster general. These two men, had to traverse-the Neisse, the Katzbach, the attached to him in the same quality until the Deichsel, and the Bober-to rapid torrents, peace of 1815, supplied all his strategical plans. and making the roads almost impracticable. Blücher himself, as Müffling says, "understood Thus it occurred, that with the aid of the nothing of the strategical conduct of a war; so country militia in the mountains on the left little indeed, that when a plan was laid before flank of the Silesian army, the battle on the him for approval, even relating to some unim- Katzbach, insignificant in itself, resulted in the portant operation, he could not form any clear capture of 18,000 prisoners, above 100 pieces idea of it, or judge whether it was good or of artillery, and more than 300 ammunition, bad." Like many of Napoleon's marshals, he hospital, and baggage wagons. After the batwas unable to read the maps. The Silesian tle Blücher did everything to instigate his army was composed of three corps d'armée: forces to exert their utmost strength in the 40,000 Russians, under Count Langeron; 16,- pursuit of the enemy, justly representing to 000 men under Baron von Sacken; and a them that "with some bodily exertion they Prussian corps of 40,000 men under Gen. York. might spare a new battle." On Sept. 3 he Blücher's position was extremely difficult at crossed the Neisse with his army, proceeding the head of this heterogeneous army. Lan- by Görlitz to concentrate at Bautzen. By this geron, who had already held independent com- move he saved the main army, which, routed mands, and demurred to serving under a for- at Dresden, Aug. 27, and forced to retreat beeign general, was moreover aware that Blücher hind the Erzgebirge, was now disengaged; Nahad received secret orders to limit himself to poleon being compelled to advance with rethe defensive, but was altogether ignorant that enforcements toward Bautzen, there to take up the latter, in an interview on Aug. 11 with the army defeated on the Katzbach, and to offer Barclay de Tolly at Reichenbach, had extorted battle to the Silesian army. During his stay the permission to act according to circum- in the E. corner of Saxony, Blücher, by a series stances. Hence Langeron thought himself of retreats and advances, always shunned battle justified in disobeying orders whenever the when offered by Napoleon, but always engaged general-in-chief seemed to him to swerve from when encountering single detachments of the the preconcerted plan, and in this mutinous French army. On Sept. 22, 23, and 24 he execonduct he was strongly supported by Gen. cuted a flank march on the right of the enemy, York. The danger arising from this state of advancing by forced marches to the lower things became more and more threatening, Elbe, in the vicinity of the army of the north. when the battle on the Katzbach secured Blü- On Oct. 2 he bridged the Elbe at Elster with cher that hold on his army which guided it to pontoons, and on the morning of the 3d his the gates of Paris. Marshal Macdonald, charged army defiled. This movement, not only bold, by Napoleon to drive the Silesian army back but even hazardous, inasmuch as he completeinto the interior of Silesia, began the battle ly abandoned his lines of communication, was VOL. IL-48 necessitated by supreme political reasons, and led finally to the battle of Leipsic, which but for Blücher the slow and over-cautious grand army would never have risked. The army of the north, of which Bernadotte was the commander-in-chief, was about 90,000 strong, and it was of the utmost importance that it should advance on Saxony. By means of the close connection which he maintained with Bülow and Wintzingerode, the commanders of the Prussian and Russian corps forming part of the army of the north, Blücher believed that he had obtained convincing proofs of Bernadotte's coquetting with the French, and of the impossibility of inciting him to any activity so long as he remained alone on a separate theatre of war. Bülow and Wintzingerode declared themselves ready to act in spite of Bernadotte, but to do so they wanted the support of 100,000 men. Hence Blücher's resolution to venture upon his flank march, in which he persisted despite the orders he had received from the sovereigns to draw near to them on the left, toward Bohemia. He was not to be diverted from his purpose through the obstacles which Bernadotte systematically threw in his way, even after the crossing of the Elbe by the Silesian army. Before leaving Bautzen he had despatched a confidential officer to Bernadotte, to inform him that, since the army of the north was too weak to operate alone on the left bank of the Elbe, he would come with the Silesian army, and cross at Elster on Oct. 3; he therefore invited him to cross the Elbe at the same time, and to advance with him toward Leipsic. Bernadotte not heeding this message, and the enemy occupying Wartenburg opposite Elster, Blücher first dislodged the latter, and then, to protect himself in case Napoleon should fall upon him with his whole strength, began establishing an intrenched encampment from Wartenburg to Bleddin. Thence he pushed forward toward the Mulde. On Oct. 7, in an interview with Bernadotte, it was arranged that both armies should march upon Leipsic. On the 9th, while the Silesian army was preparing for this march, Bernadotte, on the news of Napoleon's advance on the road from Meissen, insisted upon retreating behind the Elbe, and only consented to remain on its left bank on condition that Blücher would resolve to cross the Saale in concert with him, in order to take up a position behind that river. Although by this movement the Silesian army lost anew its line of communication, Blücher consented, since otherwise the army of the north would have been effectually lost for the allies. On Oct. 10 the whole Silesian army stood united with the army of the north on the left bank of the Mulde, the bridges over which were destroyed. Bernadotte now declared a retreat upon Bernburg to have become necessary, and Blücher, with the single view of preventing him from crossing the right bank of the Elbe, yielded again on the condition that Bernadotte should cross the Saale at Wettin and take up a position there. On the 11th, when his columns were just crossing the high road from Magdeburg to Halle, Blücher being informed that, in spite of his positive promise, Bernadotte had constructed no bridge at Wettin, resolved upon following that high road in forced marches. Napoleon, seeing that the northern and Silesian armies avoided accepting battle, which he had offered them by concentrating at Düben, and knowing that they could not avoid it without retreating across the Elbe being at the same time aware that he had but four days left before he must meet the main army, and thus be placed between two firesundertook a march on the right bank of the Elbe toward Wittenberg, in order by this simulated movement to draw the northern and Silesian armies across the Elbe, and then strike a rapid blow on the main army. Bernadotte indeed, anxious for his lines of communication with Sweden, gave his army orders to cross without delay to the right bank of the Elbe, by a bridge constructed at Aken, while on the same day, Oct. 13, he informed Blücher that the emperor Alexander had, for certain important reasons, put him (Blücher) under his orders. He consequently requested him to follow his movements on the right bank of the Elbe with the Silesian army, with the least possible delay. Had Blücher shown less resolution on this occasion and followed the army of the north, the campaign would have been lost, since the Silesian and northern armies, amounting together to nearly 200,000 men, would not have been present at the battle of Leipsic. He wrote in reply to Bernadotte that, according to all his information, Napoleon had no intention whatever of removing the theatre of war to the right bank of the Elbe, but only intended to lead them astray. At the same time he conjured Bernadotte to give up his intended movement across the Elbe. Having, meanwhile, again and again solicited the main army to push forward upon Leipsic, and offered to meet it there, he received at last, Oct. 15, the long expected invitation. He immediately advanced toward Leipsic, while Bernadotte retreated toward the Petersberg. On his march from Halle to Leipsic, Oct. 16, Blücher routed at Möckern the 6th corps of the French army under Marmont, in a hotly contested battle, in which he captured 54 pieces of artillery. Without delay he sent accounts of the issue of this battle to Bernadotte, who was not present on the first day of the battle of Leipsic. On its second day, Oct. 17, Blücher dislodged the enemy from the right bank of the Parthe, with the exception of some houses and intrenchments near the Halle gate. On the 18th, at daybreak, he had a conference at Brachenfeld with Bernadotte, who declared he could not attack on the left bank of the Parthe unless Blücher gave him for that day 30,000 men of the Silesian army. Keeping the interest of the whole exclusively in view, Blücher consented without hesitation, but on the condition of remaining himself with these We 30,000 men, and thus securing their vigorous ville, La Rothière, and Chaumenil, with three cooperation in the attack. After the final vic- different corps, Napoleon would on Jan. 30 have tory of Oct. 19, and during the whole of Napo- been able to fall upon Blücher with superior leon's retreat from Leipsic to the Rhine, Blücher numbers, as the latter was still awaiting his realone gave him an earnest pursuit. While, on enforcements. Napoleon, however, kept up a Oct. 19, the generals in command met the sov- passive attitude, while the main army was conereigns in the market place of Leipsic, and centrating by Bar-sur-Aube, and detachments precious time was spent in mutual compliments, of it were strengthening Blücher's right flank. his Silesian army was already marching in pur- The emperor's inactivity is explained by the suit of the enemy to Lützen. On his march negotiations of the peace congress of Châtilfrom Lützen to Weissenfels, Prince William of lon, which he had contrived to start, and by Prussia overtook him, to deliver to him the which he expected to gain time. In fact, after commission of a Prussian field marshal. The the junction of the Silesian with the main army allied sovereigns had allowed Napoleon to had been effected, the diplomatic party insistgain a start which could never be recovered; ed that during the deliberations of this conbut from Eisenach onward Blücher found him- gress the war should be carried on as a feint self every afternoon in the room which Napo- only. Prince Schwarzenberg sent an officer leon had left in the morning. When about to Blücher to procure his acquiescence, but to march upon Cologne, there to cross the Blücher dismissed him with this answer: Rhine, he was recalled and ordered to block- must go to Paris. Napoleon has paid his visits ade Mentz on its left bank; his rapid pursuit as to all the capitals of Europe; should we be less far as the Rhine having broken up the confed-polite? In short, he must descend from the eration of the Rhine, and disengaged its troops throne, and until he is hurled from it we shall from the French divisions in which they were have no rest." He urged the great advantages still enrolled. While the headquarters of the of the allies attacking Napoleon near Brienne, Silesian army was established at Höchst, the before he could bring up the remainder of his main army marched up the upper Rhine. Thus troops, and offered to make the attack himself, ended the campaign of 1813, the success of if he were only strengthened in York's absence. which was entirely due to Blücher's bold enter- The consideration that the army could not subprise and iron energy.-The allies were divided sist in the barren valley of the Aube, and must as to the plan of operations now to be followed; retreat if it did not attack, caused his advice the one party proposing to stay on the Rhine, to prevail. The battle was decided upon, but and there to take up a defensive position; the Prince Schwarzenberg, commander-in-chief of other to cross the Rhine and march upon Paris. the main army, instead of bearing upon the After much wavering on the part of the sover- enemy with the united force at hand, only eigns, Blücher and his friends prevailed, and lent Blücher the corps of the crown prince of the resolution was adopted to advance upon Würtemberg (40,000 men), that of Gyulay (12,Paris in a concentric movement, the main army 000), and that of Wrede (12,000). Napoleon being to start from Switzerland, Bülow from on his part neither knew nor suspected anyHolland, and Blücher, with the Silesian army, thing of the arrival of the main army. When from the middle Rhine. For the new campaign, about 1 o'clock, Feb. 1, it was announced to three additional corps were made over to Blu- him that Blücher was advancing, he would not cher, viz., Kleist's, the elector of Hesse's, and believe it. Having made sure of the fact, he the duke of Saxe-Coburg's. Leaving part of mounted his horse with the idea of avoiding the Langeron's corps to invest Mentz, and the new battle, and gave Berthier orders to this effect. reenforcements to follow as a second division, When, however, between Old Brienne and RoBlücher crossed the Rhine Jan. 1, 1814, at thière, he reached the young guard, who had three points, at Mannheim, Caub, and Cob- got under arms on hearing the approaching lentz, drove Marmont beyond the Vosges and cannonade, he was received with such enthusithe Saar, posted York's corps between the fort- asm that he thought fit to improve the opporturesses of the Moselle, and with a force of 28,000 nity, and exclaimed, "L'artillerie en avant! men, consisting of Sacken's corps and a division Thus, about 4 o'clock, the affair of La Rothière of Langeron's, proceeded by Vaucouleurs and commenced in earnest. At the first reverse, Joinville to Brienne, in order to effect his however, Napoleon no longer took any personal junction with the main army by his left. At part in the battle. His infantry having thrown Brienne, Jan. 29, he was attacked by Napoleon, itself into the village of La Rothière, the comwhose forces mustered about 40,000, while bat was long and obstinate, and Blücher was York's corps was still detached from the Sile- even obliged to bring up his reserve. sian army, and the main army, 110,000 strong, French were not dislodged from the village till had only reached Chaumont. Blücher had con- 11 o'clock at night, when Napoleon ordered sequently to face the greatly superior forces of the retreat of his army, which had lost 4,000 or Napoleon, but the latter neither attacked him 5,000 men in killed and wounded, 2,500 prisonwith his usual vigor, nor hindered his retreat ers, and about 50 cannon. If the allies, then to Trannes, save by some cavalry skirmishes. only six days' march from Paris, had vigorously Having taken possession of Brienne, placed part pushed on, Napoleon must have succumbed beof his troops in its vicinity, and occupied Dien- fore their immensely superior numbers; but the The sovereigns, still apprehensive of cutting Napoleon off from making his peace at the congress of Châtillon, allowed Prince Schwarzenberg to seize upon every pretext for shunning a decisive action. While Napoleon ordered Marmont to return on the right bank of the Aube toward Ramerupt, and himself retired by a flank march upon Troyes, the allied army split into two armies, the main army advancing slowly upon Troyes, and the Silesian army marching to the Marne, where Blücher knew he would find York, besides part of Langeron's and Kleist's corps, so that his aggregate forces would be swelled to about 50,000 men. The plan was for him to pursue Marshal Macdonald, who had meanwhile appeared on the lower Marne, to Paris, while Schwarzenberg was to keep in check the French main army on the Seine. Napoleon, however, seeing that the allies did not know how to use their victory, and sure of returning to the Seine before the main army could have advanced far in the direction of Paris, resolved to fall upon the weaker Silesian army. Consequently, he left 20,000 men under Victor and Oudinot in face of the 100,000 men of the main army, advanced with 40,000 men, the corps of Mortier and Ney, in the direction of the Marne, took up Marmont's corps at Nogent, and on Feb. 9 arrived with these united forces at Sézanne. Meanwhile Blücher had proceeded by St. Ouen and Sompuis on the road leading to Paris, and on Feb. 9 established his headquarters at the little town of Vertus. The disposition of his forces was this: about 10,000 men at his headquarters; 18,000, under York, posted between Dormans and Château-Thierry, in pursuit of Macdonald, who was already on the great post road leading to Paris from Epernay; 30,000 under Sacken, between Montmirail and La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, destined to prevent the intended junction of Sebastiani's cavalry with Macdonald, and to cut off the passage of the latter at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre; the Russian general Olzuvieff cantoned with 5,000 men at Champaubert. This faulty distribution, by which the Silesian army was drawn up in a very extended position en échelon, resulted from the contradictory motives which actuated Blücher, or rather his military advisers, Gneisenau and Müffling. On the one hand, he desired to cut off Macdonald, and prevent his junction with Sebastiani's cavalry; on the other hand, to take up the corps of Kleist and Kaptzevitch, who were advancing from Châlons, and expected to unite with him on the 9th and 10th. The one motive kept him back, the other pushed him | cover the road to Châlons. After a successful combat on the 10th, Sacken had driven Macdonald across the Marne at Trilport, but, hearing on the night of the same day of Napoleon's march to Champaubert, hastened back on the 11th toward Montmirail. Before reaching it, he was at Vieils Maisons obliged to form against the emperor, coming from Montmirail to meet him. Beaten with great loss before York could unite with him, the two generals effected their junction at Viffort, and retreated Feb. 12 to Château-Thierry, where York had to stand a very damaging rear-guard engagement, and withdrew thence to Oulchy-la-Ville. Having ordered Mortier to pursue York and Sacken on the road of Fismes, Napoleon remained on the 13th at Château-Thierry. Uncertain as to the whereabout of York and Sacken and the success of their engagements, Blücher had from Bergères, during the 11th and 12th, quietly watched Marmont posted opposite him at Etoges. When informed on the 13th of the defeat of his generals, and supposing Napoleon to have moved off in search of the main army, he gave way to the temptation of striking a parting blow upon Marmont, whom he considered Napoleon's rear guard. Advancing on Champaubert, he pushed Marmont to Montmirail, where the latter was joined on the 14th by Napoleon, who now turned against Blücher, met him at noon at Vauchamps, 20,000 strong, but almost without cavalry, attacked him, turned his columns with cavalry, and threw him back with great loss on Champaubert. During its retreat from the latter place, the Silesian army might have reached Etoges before it grew dark, without any considerable loss, if Blücher had not taken pleasure in the deliberate slowness of the retrograde movement. Thus he was attacked during the whole of his march, and one detachment of his forces, the division of Prince Augustus of Prussia, was again beset from the side streets of Etoges, on its passage through that town. About midnight Blücher reached his camp at Bergères, broke up after some hours' rest for Chalons, and arrived there about noon, Feb. 15. At this place he was joined by York's and Sacken's forces on the 16th and 17th. The different affairs at Champaubert, Montmirail, ChâteauThierry, Vauchamps, and Etoges had cost him 15,000 men and 27 guns. Leaving Marmont and Mortier to front Blücher, Napoleon with Ney returned in forced marches to the Seine, where Schwarzenberg had driven back Victor and Oudinot, who had retreated across the Yères, and there taken up 12,000 men under Macdonald, and some reënforcements from Spain. On the 16th they were surprised by the sudden arrival of Napoleon, followed on the 17th by his troops. After his junction with the marshals he hastened against Schwarzenberg, whom he found posted in an extended triangle, having for its summits Nogent, Montereau, and Sens. The generals under his command, Wittgenstein, Wrede, and the crown |