FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES-MR. MONROE'S "

VIEW."

OTWITHSTANDING Mr. Monroe's favorable feel

ings toward France and the cause in which she was engaged, he believed himself to be scrupulous in the observance of what he understood his instructions required; nor did he think that he was, for a moment, losing sight of the interests of his own country in his anxiety to preserve harmony and good fellowship with France. While, perhaps, his view of the relations of this country with England and France was by no means purely partisan, the friendship of the latter in the Revolutionary War could not be forgotten by him in an attempt to negotiate on equal and just terms.

At the outset he clearly and strongly set forth the . subjects of complaint and the objects from him demanding the attention of the so-called French Government, nor did he, from first to last, show the remotest disposition to yield the rights of his country as he understood them, to a nation for which he entertained, at the moment, strong friendly feelings.

But he thus continues his "View":—

"By these letters," from the Secretary of State, "it appeared that Mr. Jay had concluded a treaty upon other principles than those to which his powers were restricted, as inferred from my instructions, and, of course, that the nature and object of his mission to England had been misrepresented, through me, to

the French government. This circumstance subjected me to a degree of embarrassment which may be easily conceived; nor was it lessened by the intimation of the Secretary, that he saw no reasonable ground for dissatisfaction in the French Republic, especially as he admitted the uneasiness of its minister, and likewise withheld from me the contents of the treaty; a reserve I could not account for upon any consistent principle on the part of the Administration; nor otherwise, but upon its belief that the treaty would be deemed injurious to France by the French government. The more, therefore, I reflected upon this subject the more uneasiness it gave me. I was aware of the reproach to which I was personally exposed, let the commercial part of the treaty be what it might. But this was not the only consideration which gave me pain; I was also fearful that this transaction would bring on a crisis in our affairs which might be productive, in many respects, of much harm. Soon, however, I resolved upon the line of conduct, which, in the then juncture of affairs, it became me to pursue. That the Administration had injured me, was a point upon which I had no doubt; that it had likewise compromised its own credit, and with it that of the United States, was also a truth equally obvious to my mind. But the regard due to these considerations was the point to be determined. What did the honor and interest of my country require from me in the actual state of affairs? What was my object in accepting the mission to the French Republic, and how, under existing circumstances, could that object be best promoted? These were considerations of primary importance which presented themselves, and claimed a more early and dispassionate decision. Upon mature reflection, therefore, it appeared that I had but one alternative, which was to remain where I was, and proceed in the functions of my office notwithstanding the embarrassments to which I might be personally subjected, or to retire, and in retiring, to do it tranquilly, without explaining my motives for it; or by explaining them, denounce the Administration to the public. But by withdrawing tranquilly, I should not only have admitted the misconduct of the Administration, which I did not then wish to admit, but likewise my own, since it would have exposed me to the suspicion of having accepted the trust to serve a particular purpose, and withdrawing after that was accomplished. Besides, it seemed probable that my retreat at that moment, in either mode, might have some influence in inducing

the French government to adopt a system of policy towards us, which it was equally my duty and my wish to prevent. I resolved, therefore, to stand firm at my post, and let occurrences be what they might, to continue as I had done before, to use my utmost endeavors to preserve harmony between the two countries; since that being an object invariable in my mind, I did not see how I could abandon it at a moment when it was menaced by a new danger, from whatever cause or quarter proceeding. To this resolution, too, I was the more inclined, from the consideration that it was now probable, in case the treaty with England was, in other respects, of a different import from what I had been taught to expect it would be, and should likewise be ratified, that I should be recalled by the Administration; which compulsory mode of retreat I preferred to a voluntary one, upon the principle, if the Administration took that measure without showing a sufficient cause for it, consistent, too, with its previous declarations, that it would not only furnish to the world a new datum, whereby the 'better to estimate its general policy; but likewise leave me completely at liberty to explain, in every particular, the motives of my own conduct.

"Having, then, resolved to stand at my post, or rather not desert it by a voluntary retreat, the path before me, though likely to be difficult, was nevertheless a direct one. On the one hand it was my duty, let the treaty be what it might, to endeavor by all suitable means to reconcile the French government to it; and on the other to state faithfully to our own such facts and circumstances as occurred, tending to show the impression which the treaty made on the French government; so that the Administration, being correctly advised, might act accordingly. Upon this principle, therefore, I replied to the Secretary, in answer to his letters above mentioned, that I regretted the decision of the Administration to keep the treaty secret for the term specified; since, as I had explained to the French government the object of Mr. Jay's mission whilst its issue was uncertain, it was thought strange the result should be now withheld; a circumstance too, I added, which, by keeping alive the suspicions that were at first imbibed of its contents, would not fail to prove hurtful to our affairs in the interim. I assured him, however, that I should continue to endeavor to inspire the French government with a confidence, either that the treaty contained nothing improper, or would not be ratified in case it did.

"About the middle of August, 1795, American gazettes were received at Paris containing copies of the English treaty, whereby its contents were made known to the committee of public safety without my aid. From this period, therefore, all mystery upon that subject was at an end. The possession of the treaty enabled the French government to judge for itself upon all the points which it involved. Nor was the effect which it produced an equivocal one; for there did not appear to me to be a description of persons, not in the interest of the coalesced powers, who did not openly and severely censure it. True it is, it made its appearance at a time when it was likely to produce the worst effect, being when Paris and many other parts of France were, as above mentioned, in the utmost distress for provisions, and when the British were likewise seizing our provision vessels destined for their relief.

"It will readily occur, from a variety of considerations, that my situation was now truly an embarrassing one. I had, however, long before this settled in my mind the part it became me to act during this crisis of our affairs; which was to do every thing in my power, consistent with propriety, to reconcile the French government to that treaty. I had therefore now no new decision to make, but simply to pursue that which I had already made. But as yet it was not known that the treaty was ratified, nor certain that it would be, for the spontaneous and almost universal disapprobation that was bestowed upon it throughout the United States, as soon as it was seen, was sufficient at least to inspire a doubt on that point. Nor had I any letter from the Department of State of a late date, to intimate the course our Administration was likely to take. At this period, therefore, comprehending the months of August and September, 1795, I did not know how to act; for admitting that neither my previous well-known political principles, nor the communications I had made to the French government, which were in opposition to the result now before it, imposed upon me any restraint, though doubtless in strict propriety they ought so to have done, yet until our government took a part, it was impossible for me to take one. Had I, for example, turned out in that stage as a partisan of the treaty, and provoked a discussion of its merits with the French government, and a month afterwards received advice from the Administration that it was rejected, I should not only have exposed myself to contempt, but likewise have deprived the United

States of the merit which the rejection would have entitled them to with the French nation. Besides, what advantage was to be gained by such a course of proceeding in any stage? Was it not always in time to discuss the merits of that treaty, when the French government resolved to do it? and was it not my duty, seeking to preserve harmony between the two countries, to labor rather to prevent a discussion throughout, than to promote one? A certain portion of reserve, therefore, on my part, was now particularly necessary; and such was the conduct which I observed. At the same time I affirm, that it was my invariable practice to avail myself of every opportunity that occurred, to inculcate by all the means in my power, as well by obviating such objections as were made to the treaty, in the best way I could, as by urging considerations of a more general nature, the propriety and policy of preserving the subsisting harmony between the two countries, and with what effect will be seen by the documents which follow.

"At this period I witnessed a very extraordinary political phenomenon. The appearance of the treaty excited the general disgust of France against the American government, which was now diminished by the opposition which the American people made to the treaty; for as soon as France saw that the Americans took up the cause as their own, and were indignant at a measure which they thought arranged them on the side of Britain and of kings, against France and public liberty; from that moment did a friendly sentiment discover itself in her councils and throughout the community towards us, which by moderating the temper of the French government promoted of course the views of the Administration. The contrary effect was charged upon that display of the public sentiment in America; but the charge was dictated more in the spirit of party than of true philosophy; for it was not warranted at the time by the principles of the human heart, nor did it correspond with the fact."

During the unsatisfactory pendency of affairs between the United States and France, Mr. Monroe gave his attention, as far as possible and advisable, to other matters in the care of our foreign agents. Colonel David Humphreys, Minister to Portugal, sought his advice and services with the French authorities in