refolution, which was feconded by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, General Smith rofe and remarked, that, in confequence of having molt attentively examined the papers upon the table, he was now convinced of the juftice of the war, and of the policy of the meafures which had been adopted; nor could he reflect upon the laft, without adding that the fyftem of Government purfued by Earl Cornwallis flood, if poffible, even higher than it was before in his opinion. In order to form a juft idea of the intentions of Tippoo Sultan, and the principles upon which he acted, it was neceflary to take a retrofpect of his former conduct. From the papers it would appear, that it was his determined refolution to attack the lines of Travancore. He had fummoned the fort of Cranganore to furrender. There could be no doubt that the Dutch had a right to fell thefe forts and that the Rajah was fully at liberty to conclude the purchase. Perhaps, however, it might be thought that the British Government ought to have been confulted in the conduct of this tranfaction: And if, in this refpect, there appeared any omiffion, or any want of proper deference, he was more willing to impute it to the influence of fome miitake, than to any intentional neglect or difpofition to offend. The conduct of Tippoo was infidious, and plainly indicated a defire to feize upon every pretext of quarrel, and a deter mined refolution to commence hoftilities. Whilft he was collecting his forces, and preparing for action, he wrote a letter to the Rajah of Travancore, complaining of the purchase of the forts, and ftating his right to their exclufive poffeffion. When he had received an answer on these points, which left him no longer any room for complaint, and deprived him of every pretext for afferting his right, he had recourfe to a fecond expedient. He trumped up a ftory of an encroachment on his boundaries, on which to found a further pretext of quarrel, and juftify his refolution to commence He was firmly perfuaded, that if 2 F For der der to preferve that refpect, it was neceffary that we should act with vigour. There was no doubt that justice formed the first principle of action; but, it could not be denied that refiftance to infult was alfo neceffary. On these principles, he was of opinion, that no other part could have been acted by Lord Cornwallis, than that which he really pui fued. The honourable St. A. St. John remarked that however great his regard might be for the perfonal character and private virtue of Lord Cornwailis, he could by no means concur with refolutions for approving of the prefent tranfactions in India, on which an expence of millions, and the lives of many thoufands, might yet be dependant. Much of the evidence which had been produced to justify the refolutions, appeared to him foreign to the queftion: And from the ftricteft attention to the papers on the table, and a clofe examination of their contents, he had been led to form a full and deliberate opinion, that the war at prefent carried on in India was impofitic, needlefs, and unjuft. It had been afferted, that Tippoo had, for feveral years, entertained intentions of attack. This affertion depended on the faith of a Sabardar of the Rajah of Cochin, who had been in the camp of Tippoo, and whofe evidence, as he must have entered into his fervice for the purpose of betraying him, was not entitled to much credit. Had T ppoo entertained a previous intention of attack, might it not be fuppofed that he would have put his arma. ment on a much better footing? Colonel Macleod remarked, that lord Cornwallis had, for four years, been engaged in ferving his country in a climate not the moft favourable to health. During that time, he had brought the affairs of his government into the most flourishing fituation, and had established the ftate of credit upon a footing highly refpectable. He was just upon the eve of returning, when a cruel and treacherous tyrant, a determined enemy of the British name, began, by his hoftile attempts, to embroil the affairs of India. How does lord Cornwallis act upon this occafion? He foregoes his own prof pects of ease and retreat; he undertakes the management of public affairs; he faces the ftorm, and affumes upon himself the whole refponfibility. Colonel Macleod, proceeded to ftate, that the power of the Mahrattas was not, as had been fuggefted, likely to be rendered too formidable, fo as to deftroy the balance of India, by any diminution of the power of Tippoo. The Mahrattas, in their prefent ftate, were not at all dangerous. They were divided into two parts perfectly diftinct. There fubfifted between themfelves a number of little difcuffions and divifions of interest. Before they could become formidable, it was neceflary that they fhould unite. But this was lefs probable, as the principle part of the Mahrattas was governed by five chiefs of equal power, each of whom it was neceffary fhould confent to any declaration of hoftility. Among this number we always had it in our power to secure fuch a degree of influence, as would prevent the probability of fuch an event. It had been fated that the character of Tippoo ought to be laid afide in confidering the prefent queftion. So far from agreeing with this opinion, he regarded it as the main hinge on which the difcuffion depended. He was an implacable and inveterate enemy of the British name ; inveterate from religion, inveterate from ambition, and a restless defire of conqueft. His enmity to the British was not lefs ftrong and rooted, than that of Hannibal to the Romans, and could not be gratified till it had effected their utter deftruction. Great as the expence was which had been inincurred this year, he could not answer but that a great armament would prove neceffary to be maintained at the fame expence every year, till Tippoo fhould either have received fome effec effectual blow, or be altogether crushed. As to the argument that had been urged, of attacking Tippoo at a time when he could not be fupported by the *French, if fuch was one of the motives of the war, he did not fee how it was not perfectly fair to take the advantage. It had been faid that another motive of the war was, to divide his territo. rics. Such a partition among the princes who now languished under his tyranny, would be an event highly defirable. If it was confidered that Hyder Ally had difpoffeffed the Hindoos of a territory extending no lefs › than five hundred miles, it would certainly appear an act of juftice to reftore the native princes, who had, in confequence of the ufurpation, been reduced to the greateft diftrefs and extremity, to their original dominions. The Zamoren, whofe court had once boafted fo much splendour and magnificence, had come to his camp, and in what fituation?-to beg a little rice for his own fupport, and that of his family. He, it may be fuppofed, was not infenfible to the distress of the royal fupplicant, and did not fail to give him a fpecimen of British generofity. The movement of general Meadows had been cenfured, as tending to protract the war. He, from his local knowledge, could affium, that the general had moved in the exact line which he ought. By thofe who cenfured his movement, it was not confidered that the object of the war was, first, to protect the Rajah of Travancore, and fecondly, that the fouthern part of our fettlements was the most defencelefs and expofed; the general had planted himself in such a fituation as to afford a fecurity to both. By this time he hoped that he was in the middle of the Myfore. Indeed, from the fituation of our army, and the wifdom of the meafures that had been employed, he had no doubt of our speedy fuccefs. Mr. Taylor now proceeded to read a statement, of the courfe of the war, written by Mr. Hippesley; the premifes of which may be refolved into thefe corollaries, viz. ft, That the original aggreffion was made by the Rajah's taking poffeffion of Cranganore and Iacottah. 2d, That if fo, the firft attack of the lines (had it not been difavowed by Tippoo Sultan) was not an aggreffion (which vi termini, is the first provocation), but the confequence or refentment of an aggreffion. "3d, That even if Tippoo's act was an aggreffion, it would not justify our entering into a war without leav ing a door open to accommodation 4th, That if the object of the war be to extirpate Tippoo, and to divide his countries between us, the Nizam, and the Mahrattas, the fuccefs of the war in obtaining fuch object might eventually be injurious to the effential interefts, and hazardous to the ultimate fecurity of the British empire in the Eaft. "From these conclufions, Mr. Hippefley meant, if able, to move the refolutions which he was obliged to de volve on his honourable friend, who urged them with fo much ftrength of argument, and under all the coviction of local experience, though unfortunately fo little to the conviction of the majority of the Houfe ! Mr. Taylor declared, that it gave him great concern to trefpafs upon the indulgence of the houfe, and expreffed his conviction that gentlemen would believe that what he had done proceeded from the duty he owed to a friend; and that being now dif charged, he thanked the house for the attention he had met with, and as he was up, would offer what he had to fay on the prefent motion. The prefent war in India he confidered in a high degree imprudent, impolitic, and above all, unjust; this opinion he thought himself perfectly at liberty to ftate. Much had been faid about giving opinions freely concerning men of high rank and character; but on fubjects of great national importance, when great names must neceffarily be men tioned, tioned, he thought fentiments might be very freely expreffed on the queftion, without any fort of difgrace to the names mentioned: nor did he conceive that opinions given by any humble individual like himself, could poffibly affect Lord Cornwallis in any improper way. Mr. Taylor infifted that the war had been provoked entirely by the mifconduct and rafhnefs of the Rajah of Travancore, which he thought was completely proved by the different papers on the table, particularly by the letter of Mr Hollond to the Rajah of Travancore, advifing him to relinquish the purchafe he had made, as it muft be offenfive to Tippoo Sultan, and would inevitably bring on a war; which advice, however, it appeared that the Rajah had totally defpifed. Certainly, the Rajah was the caufe of this war breaking out, and though an ally of ours, the treaty of alliance was by no means, as fome gentlemen had argued it to be, of a nature that obliged us to fupport him in an unjuft and unwarrantable war. The treaty of Mangalore went exprefsly to protect the Rajah of Travancore against any encroachments that Tippoo might make upon the Travancore territories, and to replace him in cafe any of his dominions were wrefted from him; but it by no means went to countenance or encourage any attack by him upon Tippoo, or any collufive bargain that he might make with the Dutch, which militated against Tippoo Sultan, far lefs to extirpate him from his domin'ons. As to the act of Parliameat which was intended to prevent our governors in India from making war upon frivolous, or even ftrong pretences, it appeared to have been reprehenfibly difregarded; for, furely, encouraging a continuance of the exifting war, was acting diametrically oppofite to the prohibitions of that act of parliament. Mr. Taylor adverted to an expreffion of the honourable general, that the confequence and power of this country in India, was to be kept up by character, rather than by arms; in this he perfect} agreed; but certainly, the prefen meafure did not arise out of that fyftem; on the contrary, as far he could fee, they only would if followed out, degrade the British character, and be productive of the most calamitous and difgraceful confequences, both in In dia and at home. A minifter of this country held out to that houfe, and to the nation, that our poffeffions is India were in a profperous and florrifhing condition, merely on accour of the tranquillity that prevailed; and that by a continuance of a peaceful fyftem, they muft flourish f more. How, then, with any kind of confiftency, could that right honoura-> ble and learned gentleman give a vote of approbation and thanks for bring ing on, and continuing a war, when he could be no ftranger to the diftreffed ftate of the finances of our different governments there? Mr. Foddrell entered into a detail of all circumftances relative to th purchase of the forts fince the com mencement of hoftilities, and juftified || that tranfaction, because he feemed to think that the Rajah of Travancore was perfecty competent to have nego tiated that purchafe from the Dutch, without confulting or obtaining the confent of the British government a Madrafs, The first refolution being put and carried, the fecond was moved and feconded. The Speaker put the quefton. Mr. Fox conceiving the refolution whether true or falfe in itself, to be unneceffary, moved the previous que tion. Mr. Chancellor Pitt faid, that the queftion having been once stirred it was neceffary that it fhould be fet tled. The previous question was nega tived, and the refolution put and carried. Mr. Dundas then moved the refo lution, approving of the treaties, whic was feconded by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The hon. St A. St. John entreated the house to paufe, before they came to a vote of approbation on treaties, of which they were not fully acquainted with the contents. By an article in each of thefe treaties it was ftipulated that none of the contracting parties fhould accept of any terms of peace without the confent of the other two. Gentlemen must fee that this was an article which put the conclufion of peace in a great measure out of our own power, and left it at the option of the Nizam and the Mahrattas to what extent the war fhould be profecuted. It would, therefore, become the difcretion and forefight of the houfe to confider well the probable confequences, before they gave a folemn fanction to treaties for carrying on a war, over which neither the executive nor the legiflative power of the country would have fuch means of controul as to put an nd to it, when it should seem adviseable fo to do, without an express violation of thofe very treaties. General Smith said, he had not fufficiently confidered the treaties to have made up his mind as to the policy and prudence by which they were dictated, and therefore he could not vote for them, nor would he give them his ne gative. Mr. Francis intreated the house to pause and confider what they were going to do, in declaring that the faith of the British nation was pledged for the due performance of the engagements contained in the treaties with the Nizam and the Mahrattas. Do you mean to establish that, whenever the India Company's authorifed fervants in India make a treaty with any of the powers, the British nation is bound by it? Is the nation bound, ipfo facto, by acts done by the Company's fervants, without a commiffion, without even the knowledge of the government at home? It is a new principle, I believe, in our Indian fyf tem, and may lead you very far. But in theinftance before you, do you know what you are pledged to? You fay, to the due performance of the engagements. Do you know how much you are to pay for the ten thousand horfe? or'will you bind yourselves to conditions, which are to be fettled hereafter? I hope the honourable genteleman will tell us, at least, what we are to understand by the due performance of this particular article. Mr. Dundas declared, that it had always been his opinion that points relative to a fubfifting negotiation, or papers concerning a war actually exifting, were matters foreign to the confideration of parliament, and that it had been the invariable rule to rely, in all fuch cafes, upon the executive government, who were refponfible for their conduct, for a due performance of every thing neceffary for the better carrying on of the war already commenced, till a fit opportunity offered, when their whole conduct might fafely be brought under investigation. When, therefore, papers and treaties, immediately connected with the war, in which we were at that time involved in In dia, were called for by that house, he had no other expectation whatever refpecting thofe papers but that the production of them must end in one of thefe two circumftances—either a ' vote of cenfure of Lord Cornwallis, or a vote of approbation. To let the fubject come under difcuffion, and to leave it a neutral queftion, without its being brought to one of those two conclufions would have been highly dangerous, and the worst use might have been made of fuch a procedure in India. In this cafe, a doubt has been ftarted during an exifting war in India, by perfons of great weight and authority in that houfe upon the juf tice of the war, and the policies of the treaties made with the Mahrattas and the Nizam, and upon the ground of that doubt, certain refolutions condemning the war, and cenfuring Lord Cornwallis for having entered |